CHURCH, EUCHARIST, AND LITURGICAL REFORM AT MERCERSBURG: 1843-1857

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INTRODUCTION

In the early decades of the nineteenth century a significant theological awakening swept over Europe. Foreshadowed by works like Friedrich Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion, first published in 1799, this awakening resulted from a confrontation between the claims of an emerging historical/critical consciousness and the claims of traditional Christian orthodoxy. Both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians participated in the awakening, especially in German universities. The University of Tübingen, which could boast the presence of both Protestant and Roman Catholic faculties of theology after 1820, was an important center for the dissemination of a "higher criticism" that called for the radical re-interpretation of biblical texts and dogmatic assumptions. Protestant scholars like Ferdinand Christian Baur and Roman Catholics like Johann Adam Moehler and Johann Baptist Hirscher helped make the "Tubingen School" extraordinarily prominent in the theological environment of Europe during the 1820's and the 1830's.

Eventually the impact of this theological awakening reached the shores of America. This dissertation proposes to examine that impact on the thinking of two men: John Williamson Nevin and Philip Schaff, leading figures in a movement within the German Reformed Church in America known as the

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"Mercersburg Theology". An American by birth and a Presbyterian by religious upbringing, John W. Nevin accepted a call to the newly created German Reformed seminary at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, in 1840. Four years later he was joined by Philip Schaff, a young Swiss-born scholar who had been educated at the universities of Halle, Tubingen, and Berlin. Reared in the German Reformed tradition, Schaff had been exposed, through his university education, to a variety of theological influences: pietism at Halle; rationalism and "left-wing Hegelianism" at Tubingen; and evangelical historiography under August Neander at Berlin. Schaff's arrival in America (1844) was thus a momentous occasion in the life of the German Reformed community, for it marked the beginning of a new theological movement, one influenced by ideas that had been circulating in German university circles for several decades.

Almost from the beginning of Schaff's presence at Mercersburg, it was clear that the "new German theology" would be regarded with suspicion by German Reformed pastors in the United States. Indeed, within a year of Schaff's arrival in America, accusations of heresy were directed against him at meetings of the German Reformed Synod. Nevin's violent attacks against puritanism and revivalism in the American Protestant community, and Schaff's vision of an "evangelical Catholicism" that would grow organically out of the principles of the Reformation, were unacceptable to many persons in the German Reformed communion. The seminary at Mercersburg, originally planned to provide a well-educated clergy for a largely immigrant church, quickly became a center of theological controversy.

Before long this controversy found a focus in liturgical worship. As Nevin's and Schaff's convictions about the importance of an "objective church system" grew, so did their concern for a form of worship that was both faithful to the Reformed tradition, as represented by John Calvin and the Heidelberg Catechism, and faithful to the catholic tradition, as represented by the "classical liturgies" of the Greek and Latin churches. Nevin's opposition to the emotional extravagances of "anxious bench" revivalism led him to insist on a set form of worship that was centered on altar, eucharist, and an objective understanding of sacramental grace. Schaff's conviction that the Reformation resulted from an organic development out of medieval Catholicism led him to call for a fixed pattern of worship that was not limited to the liturgical models of the sixteenth century. By the early 1850's, the "liturgical question" had assumed central importance in the life of the German Reformed Church in America. The Synod appointed a Liturgical Committee to study the question and to propose a new order for public worship.

A temporary resolution of the liturgical question was reached in 1857, when the Committee presented its service-book to the Synod. But this "Liturgy, or Order of Christian Worship," commonly referred to as the "Provisional Liturgy," aroused passionate debate. Influential German Reformed pastors like John Henry Augustus Bomberger attacked the new liturgy as utterly incompatible with the Reformed tradition. Nevin and Schaff defended it as a faithful expression of the sacramental doctrine found in Calvin's Institutes and in the Heidelberg Catechism. Instead of settling the liturgical issue once and for all, the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 marked the beginning of a bitter controversy that continued to plauge the German Reformed community for nearly thirty years. Indeed, the debate became so acrimonious that the General Synod found it necessary to establish a Peace Commission to bring the warring factions in the church back together.

The details of this nineteenth century liturgical quarrel within the German Reformed Church in America have been discussed by James Hastings Nichols in his Romanticism in American Theology: Nevin and Schaff at Mercersburg (1961) and by Jack Martin Maxwell in his Worship and Reformed Theology: The Liturgical Lessons of Mercersburg (1976). Nichols' book is a rather systematic exposition of the principal theological features of the Mercersburg movement, while Maxwell's volume is devoted to the history of the liturgical debate in the German Reformed Church and to the liturgical sources that influenced the structure and contents of the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 (and its subsequent revisions in 1866 and 1884).

For this dissertation, however, I have adopted a different approach to the Mercersburg movement. The reasons for this difference in approach may be outlined as follows:

First, it is impossible to situate the Mercersburg theologians accurately in their historical context without taking into account the theological awakening mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction. This awakening revealed itself particularly in the confrontation between the claims of a method based on rigorous historical criticism of theological sources, and the claims of an orthodoxy that stressed the immutability of dogma and the immunity of Christian sources from such critical procedures. The result of this confrontation was a profound conflict of hermeneutics--a conflict that has lasted well into the twentieth century. A second result was an increasing theological pluralism in the early decades of the nineteenth century. This pluralism was evident, for example, in the conflicting approaches to Christian historiography championed by two of Schaff's teachers, Ferdinand Christian Baur and August Neander. It was evident, too, among Roman Catholic theologians, where men like Johann Adam Moehler attacked the dogmatic intransigence of Roman "papal theology". In the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore, theology, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, was not all one piece of cloth. Schaff's reaction to this fact of theological pluralism was more complicated than one might suppose in a man who never lost his affection for the "edifying" church history of pietist scholars like Neander. The complexity of Schaff's reaction to this growing theological pluralism will be discussed in Chapter Two, which deals with the European roots of the Mercersburg ecclesiology. In that same chapter

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it will also be possible to assess the influence of thinkers like Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Johann Adam Moehler on Schaff's reaction to the nineteenth century debate between higher criticism and orthodoxy.

Secondly, it seems to me that the two most distinctive contributions Schaff and Nevin made to the theological enterprise lay in the areas of ecclesiology and sacramental theory. At the same time these two areas are crucial for understanding the Mercersburg proposals for liturgical reform. Thus, Chapter Three of this dissertation will explore the development of an ecclesiology at Mercersburg during the fruitful early years of the movement (1843-1851). There it will be possible to analyze both Schaff's theory of the "Principle of Protestantism" and Nevin's notion of "catholic wholeness" (or "radical catholicity"). In Chapter Five, moreover, Nevin's contribution to sacramental theory in The Mystical Presence (1846) will be discussed. It will be seen that Nevin's understanding of sacraments is deeply rooted in his anthropology, and that his anthropology is indebted to an insight derived from post-Kantian idealism: viz., that "spirit" must ever seek to "incarnate" itself in forms that are visible, historical and fleshly.

Thirdly, just as the Mercersburg theological program cannot be accurately understood apart from the larger context of the debate between proponents of higher criticism and adherents of traditional orthodoxy, so the Mercersburg proposals for liturgical reform must be read in the light of several similar proposals made in the nineteenth century. Five such patterns of reform, drawn from both Protestant and Roman Catholic traditions, will be discussed in Chapter Four. It will be my purpose to show that each of these nineteenth century patterns was based upon a distinctive theology of worship and upon an implied hermeneutic of reform. The liturgical patterns discussed in Chapter Four will provide a context for interpreting both Nevin's contributions to sacramental theory (Chapter Five) and the proposals made in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 (Chapter Six).

Fourthly, it will be noted that pluralism affected not only the nineteenth century theological debate but also the proposals for liturgical reform made during the same period. It is a mistake, I believe, to interpret all the patterns of liturgical reform proposed in the last century as manifestations of "romanticism" or "high church tendencies". For one thing, "romanticism" is a notoriously vague designation that frequently blurs the real differences between men and movements in the nineteenth century. If liturgical reformers as distinctively different as Prosper Guéranger, Johann Baptist Hirscher and Wilhelm Loehe are all "romanticists", then either the term is too general to be useful or it is too narrow to be accurate. Similarly, it is important not to confuse the liturgical reform movements of the earlier part of the nineteenth century with those that emerged later in the period, especially under the influence of "ritualists" in the Anglican communion. These points will be discussed in greater detail toward the end of Chapter Four.

Finally, it has been my decision to limit discussion of church, eucharist and liturgical reform at Mercersburg to the period between 1843, when Nevin's The Anxious Bench appeared, and 1857, the year in which the Provisional Liturgy was submitted to the Synod for tentative approval. This fourteen year period covers, in my opinion, the most creative years of the Mercersburg movement. The period begins shortly before Schaff's arrival from Europe and ends shortly after Nevin's temporary retirement into private life (roughly 1853-1855). During this time the two greatest works of the Mercersburg movement appeared: Schaff's The Principle of Protestantism and Nevin's The Mystical Presence. After 1857, the movement seemed to lose steam. Although Nevin and Schaff continued vigorously to support the liturgical principles embedded in the Provisional Liturgy, the heady theological atmosphere of earlier days at the Mercersburg seminary was gone.

By 1861, Nevin had returned to public life and was lecturing at Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. By 1863, Schaff's interests had turned toward the Union Theological Seminary in New York.

Although the Mercersburg movement eventually disintegrated, its contributions to the development of theology and worship in nineteenth century America remain significant. In the chapters that follow it will be my purpose to explore the contributions made by Nevin and Schaff and to show how the Mercersburg program of ecclesiology, sacramental theory and liturgical theology exemplify the larger patterns of theological awakening in the last century.

CHAPTER I

THE GERMAN REFORMED CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES

The first formal congregation of the German Reformed Church in America was organized in Germantown, Pennsylvania in 1719.[1] The roots of this congregation stretched back into the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries. For toward the end of the seventeenth century, in 1683, William Penn had invited the German Lutheran pastor Francis Daniel Pastorius and his small band of mystics to establish what became the Germantown settlement.[2] Penn's encouragement inaugurated a wave of German immigration to the American colonies that continued until nearly the period of the Revolution. It also marked the commencement of German Reformed Christianity in this country.

The German Reformed communion, which traced its geneaological roots back to the region of the Palatinate, adhered to the confession of faith and the ecclesiastical discipline of the Heidelberg Catechism.[3] This catechism, largely the work of Zacharias Ursinus (1534-1583) and Caspar Olevianus (1536-1587), appeared in the same year that saw the publication of the old Palatinate Liturgy (1563).[4] Both catechism and liturgy were destined to have a significant impact on a theological movement that developed in nineteenth century America and which is commonly known as the "Mercersburg Theology".

Indeed, it was the explicit program of the Mercersburg theologians to recover the ecclesiological and sacramental doctrine of the Heidelberg Catechism as more truly representative of Reformed tradition than the sort of "unsacramental" and "unchurchly" views that prevailed among nineteenth century German Reformed churchmen in America. Efforts to recover the high sacramentalism and churchmanship of the Catechism and (so the Mercersburg men argued) of John Calvin himself occupied seminary professors like John Nevin and Philip Schaff for nearly three decades. It will be the purpose of this dissertation to show how such efforts at sacramental and ecclesiological recovery resulted in the production of a new German Reformed liturgy, the "Provisional Liturgy" (1857).

Distinctive theological movements like that associated with Mercersburg are not spontaneously generated. Given the conditions of German Reformed church life in America, the challenges posed by pietism, Puritanism and revivalism, and the influence of continental German scholarship in the early nineteenth century, the emergence of the Mercersburg movement was entirely predictable. It will be the intention of this first chapter to explore those conditions of German Reformed life in eighteenth and nineteenth century America that set the stage for the appearance of what Sydney Ahlstrom has called "the most creative manifestation of the Catholic tendency in American Protestantism".[5]

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THE PERIOD OF GERMAN REFORMED IMMIGRATION TO AMERICA

Despite the fact that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) formally concluded the "Thirty Years' War" and recognized the legitimacy of the "three confessions" (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed), conditions in Germany for adherents of the Reformed communion were often unsavory in the late seventeenth century.[6] The "Sun King" Louis XIV conducted a number of raids into the Palatinate region during the years 1688-1689 and he succeeded in demolishing or severely crippling important cities like Speyer, Mainz, Mannheim and Heidelberg. A sizeable number of French Reformed (Huguenots) and Palatines sought asylum in Switzerland, where conditions favoring religious toleration were better.[7] But these French and German immigrants faced extreme poverty there. While the so-called "Peace of Ryswick" (1697)[8] brought temporary relief, such respite lasted only until the outbreak of a new conflict: the War of the Spanish Succession (1701).[9]

By the early eighteenth century, therefore, the situation of the Palatine refugees, even for those living in Switzerland, had become quite intolerable. During the years 1708-1709, many of them began looking toward America where offers like that made by William Penn to Daniel Pastorius looked extremely appealing. Moreover some European monarchs, like Queen Anne of England, began to extend promises of help in relocating the Palatine refugees in the American colonies. Such offers met with vigorous acceptance, and soon there was a significant migration of Reformed communicants to the colonies, especially to the region around Philadelphia.

An exact chronology of the early Reformed settlements in this country is difficult to establish. Among the early Reformed pioneers were men like John Frederick Hagar, who arrived in New York in 1709 and was responsible for the establishment of the principal congregations in the Hudson and Mohawk valleys. At his arrival Hagar was still only a *candidatus theologiae*, but he was ordained to the ministry within the year and worked steadily until his death in 1723.[10]

Hagar's life and work were typical of many of the early German Reformed pioneers. Often they arrived in America without prior benefit of ordination and their precise ministerial position in the community was sometimes uncertain. The disputed status of non-ordained ministers occasioned a number of controversies in the early period of German Reformed history in America.

An early example of this sort surrounded the missionary ministry of John Philip Boehm. Boehm had arrived in America no later than 1720. Formerly he had been a parochial schoolmaster and precentor of a Reformed congregation in Worms. Although his piety and scholarship were unquestionable, Boehm had not been regularly ordained prior to his arrival in America. He proceeded, nevertheless, to accept the pastoral charge of several Reformed congregations in Pennsylvania, chiefly those at Falckner's Swamp, Skippack and White Marsh.[11]

Almost immediately Boehm's pastoral ministry ran into opposition, despite the fact that his situation was neither unique nor even uncommon. Very frequently the early Reformed communities in America were without a duly ordained minister and the local schoolmaster was forced, in the absence of other leadership, to assume the most important role in the congregation. The schoolmaster could, at least, teach the children the fundamentals of the Bible and the Heidelberg Catechism, and could prepare them for confirmation and holy communion. Often, too, he was the man charged with the responsibility for the church's farm, the revenues from which went to the support of the local church and its parochial school.[12]

At root the controversy that surrounded Boehm's work touched the troublesome areas of church order and ministry. Those who insisted that Boehm withdraw from his pastoral activity did so in view of the fact that a regularly ordained minister had arrived in the territory in September, 1727, in the person of George Michael Weiss. But those who defended Boehm appealed to pastors of the Dutch Reformed church in New York for advice and upon their recommendation the entire case was forwarded to the Reformed Classis of Amsterdam for resolution. The Amsterdam Classis replied in June, 1729, that, while Boehm's teaching and his sacramental ministrations of baptism and eucharist were "lawful", he should be supplied with what was lacking, viz., regular ordination to the ministry according to the customary ecclesiastical usage. Accordingly, Boehm was ordained to the ministry on 23 November, 1729.[13]

The appeal to the Classis of Amsterdam in the case of Boehm's ordination marked the beginning of a long and close relationship between the German Reformed church in Pennsylvania and the Reformed Church of Holland. And it is significant that the relationship arose out of a controversy about church order and ministry. The dispute between followers of Boehm and those of Weiss revealed the seriousness which the pioneers of the German Reformed Church in America regarded the ecclesiastical discipline governing ordination and the administration of the sacraments. These very issues of church order and sacramental discipline were to re-emerge in the nineteenth century under the impulse of the Mercersburg movement.

The question of church order affected not only the discipline relative to ordination, but also arrangements for local church government. The Dutch Reformed churches of Holland patterned each congregation on a consistorial or presbyteral model. The consistorium (or presbyterium) of each local congregation consisted of the pastor, the elders and the deacons. Popularly this body of officials was known as the "Kirchenrath". In theory half the consistorium was retired annually. Still, the office of elder was regarded as permanent, even though one could temporarily be relieved of its responsibilities. On the whole this pattern seems to have been followed in American churches, though the vocabulary used to designate various officeholders fluctuated. For example, the "elders" of the congregation were called, variously, "ancients", "censors", or "wardens".[14]

Some early German Reformed congregations in Pennsylvania drew up constitutions--also called "covenants" or "ordinances" --but these were relatively rare, at least in the eighteenth century. An example of one such constitution, dating from 1725, comes from the churches served by Boehm at Falckner's Swamp, Skippack and White Marsh. It exhibits a consistorial form of local church government and outlines the duties of the minister, the elders and the deacons:

> . . .all the members of the congregation shall, with the Minister and the rest of the consistory, choose new members of consistory.
>
> . . .When any Elder or Deacon goes out of office he shall be exempt for two years and then may again be chosen; or even earlier, if it is deemed necessary by the consistory for the time being.
>
> The Holy Supper shall be administered twice a year in each place where public worship is maintained.
>
> The bread and wine for the Lord's Supper shall always be provided by the Deacons, who shall collect and distribute the alms. . .
>
> The office and duty of the Minister shall be to preach the pure doctrine of the Reformed Church according to God's Word, and to administer the seals of the Covenant at the proper time and place, to adhere strictly to the Confessions of Faith of the Reformed Church, to explain in order the Heidelberg Catechism, and to catechise, and with the Elders to exercise and discipline.[15]

In the eighteenth century, local government in the German Reformed church was supplemented by annual meetings of the Coetus. Historically the term "coetus" seems to have been used in the sixteenth century by John à Lasco. In this country the Coetus strongly resembled the Synod of European Reformed Churches, with the notable exception that the American

Coetus was not allowed to administer ordination to ministerial candidates. Composed of ministers and elders, the Coetus met once a year, usually in Philadelphia or Lancaster, for a session that ordinarily lasted for three days. Its work included a rather detailed examination of the conditions prevailing in local churches, as well as a censura morum of the ministers of those congregations. The minutes of the sessions of the Coetus were scrupulously recorded and sent to the Synods of the Dutch Reformed Church in Holland for their scrutiny and approval. Annual meetings of the Coetus continued until the period of the American Revolution.[16]

Throughout the eighteenth century, however, the close supervision of the Synods in Holland over the American Coetus had become increasingly problematic. Finally, in 1772, the Coetus asserted its own independent right to ordain ministers, a move the Dutch Synods regarded as dangerously innovative.[17] But the trend toward independence and self-assertion continued despite opposition from Holland. Nineteen years later (1791), the Coetus solemnly resolved to reserve to itself the right to examine and ordain ministers without any recourse to the Dutch Synods.[18] The following year (1792), a synodical constitution was drawn up and by April, 1793, the new American Synod of the German Reformed Church in the United States met at Lancaster and adopted its own Synodalordnung.[19] Geographically this earliest Synod of the German Reformed Church in the United States included all the territory from the city of New York through Pennsylvania and the Maryland valley to the

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valley of Virginia. There were also scattered congregations in the territory west of the Alleghenies, but the most important congregations were those of Lancaster and Philadelphia.

In the same year the synodical form of church government was adopted (1793), a decision was made to allow for the organization of _classes_.[20] In cases where at least three ministers lived at a distance too great for convenient attendance at meetings of the Synod, they were permitted to organize themselves into a _classis_ to be represented at synodal meetings by one or more delegates. The idea does not seem to have taken hold immediately, but by 1819 the German Reformed Synod had divided into eight _classes_.[21] Though these _classes_ had powers of local jurisdiction, they were not granted the right of ordination to the ministry for a considerable period of time.

Thus by the end of the eighteenth century the German Reformed community in America had asserted its independence from Dutch control in the matter of ministerial ordination and ecclesiastical organization, had instituted a synodical form of church government, and had established a firm network of congregations in the eastern United States. But this early consolidation of German Reformed life was confronted by a number of difficult challenges in the eighteenth century. Two of these challenges can be readily identified and should be discussed: Pietism and Revivalism.

THE CHALLENGE OF PIETISM

Like many another religious movement pietism is not a uniform system of doctrine and behavior. Its historical manifestations had varied widely. While pietism is usually regarded as a distinctive movement originating within the Lutheran communion, its influence broadened and came to affect other Christian communities like the Dutch and German Reformed as well.

It has often been assumed that pietism in the Reformed churches stems directly from the tradition of English Puritanism, but this assumption is difficult to substantiate.[22] The influence of English Puritan pietism must certainly be conceded, but a more immediate source for pietistic thought in the German Reformed communion can be found in the early Dutch pietists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, chiefly Jean de Taffin (1529 (?)-1602), William Teellinck (1579-1629), William Amesius (Ames) (1576-1633) and Jadocus van Lodensteyn (1620-1677).[23] Indeed, the names of these men must be directly associated with the rise of pietism as a discernible movement in the Reformed churches.

None of these early Dutch pietists were ecclesiastical separatists, however.[24] Taffin, for example, was fond of quoting the patristic aphorism: "Whoever confesses God as his father should also acknowledge the church as his mother".[25] Despite his staunch allegiance to the institutional forms of church life, Taffin was convinced that certainty about salvation could be derived neither from institutional membership nor from reasoned theological orthodoxy.[26] Assurance resulted only from those "holy affections and desires" that pointed, unmistakably, to the power of the Spirit residing in the believer.

Perhaps the most influential of the early Dutch pietists was William Amesius, an Englishman who was forced to seek refuge in Holland because of his strict Puritan views.[27] He was largely responsible for giving the pietist position a systematic theological base. Amesius' principal work, the Medulla Sacrae Theologiae, became widely known not only in Holland and England, but also in the New England colonies where it was used as a standard theological textbook. It was Amesius' contention that theology is, above all, the knowledge and art of living for God: "Theologia est doctrina Deo vivendi".[28] For Amesius the power of human understanding to grasp the doctrines of faith and the moral principles of action was severly limited. Hence theology and ethics must be grounded upon revelation, not upon rational speculation: the discipline of theology "non est ex natura, et indagine humana, (ut relique) sed ex revelatione et institutione divina".[29]

Jadocus von Lodensteyn, perhaps the greatest preacher among the early Dutch pietists, carried Amesius' view of theology into the practical language of the pulpit. His plea was for personal religion, an experiential Christianity that shunned the vain distinctions of theological disputation for the sake of practical, lively devotion to prayer and works of piety. Von Lodensteyn objected, as well, to what he

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regarded as the mechanical formality of worship. He was particularly earnest about denouncing practices like the admission of children of unbelieving parents to baptism and of permitting men and women who were living palpably unchristian lives to communicate in the Lord's Supper.[30] The need for re-establishing sacramental discipline in the Reformed churches remained a chief theme throughout von Lodensteyn's long career as a pietist preacher.

These Dutch theologians and preachers were, then, among the earliest representatives of the movement that came to be called pietism. Ordinarily, however, the Lutheran Philip Jacob Spener is considered the immediate "father" of pietism. Spener's classic Pia Desideria (1675) surveyed what the author felt were widespread corruptions in the church of his day and proposed several means to eradicate such abuses. Particular attention was paid to the covenant-effects of baptism and to the universal priesthood of believers that results from them.[31] Spener wrote:

> Your God has indeed given you baptism, and you may be baptized only once. But he has made a covenant with you--from his side a covenant of grace and from your side a covenant of faith and a good conscience. This covenant must last through your whole life. It will be in vain that you comfort yourself in your baptism and in its promise of grace and salvation if for your part you do not also remain in the covenant of faith and good conscience or, having departed therefrom, return to it with sincere repentance. Accordingly if your Baptism is to benefit you, it must remain in constant use throughout your life.[32]

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Concerning the exercise of the spiritual priesthood of all believers Spener had this to say:

> Nobody can read Luther's writings with some care without observing how earnestly the sainted man advocated this spiritual priesthood, according to which not only ministers but all Christians are made priests by their Savior, are anointed by the Holy Spirit, and are dedicated to perform spiritual-priestly acts. . .all spiritual functions are open to all Christians without exception. Although the regular and public performance of them is entrusted to ministers appointed for this purpose, the functions may be performed by others in case of emergency. Especially should those things which are unrelated to public acts be done by all at home and in everyday life.[33]

In addition to these emphases Spener argued that in the training of clergy doctrinal controversy and argumentation should be reduced in favor of a theology characterized by "apostolic simplicity".[34] He recommended the reading of works like the Theologia Germanica, the sermons of John Tauler (1300-1361) and the Imitation of Christ.[35] Spener also advocated the formation of collegia pietatis, small groups organized for the cultivation of personal holiness and Christian devotion. The New Testament, Spener cautioned, should be read in a way that is "useful for their [the theological students'] edification":

> This should be done in such fashion that each student may be permitted to say what he thinks about each verse and how he finds that it applies to his own and others' benefit. The professor, as the leader, should reinforce good observations. . .[36]

Spener further encouraged the practice of disclosing the condition of one's conscience to members of the collegium pietatis, especially as a means of preparation for the Lord's Supper.[37]

The sort of pietism advocated by Spener became prominent at the newly constituted University of Halle, which had been founded by Emperor Frederick III in 1694.[38] Indeed Halle was the undisputed center for Spenerian pietism throughout most of the eighteenth century.[39] There the characteristic theological features of the movement were formulated and a number of important pietist leaders exercised their ministry. August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), for example, developed a fluid but comprehensive system of education designed to imbue students of all economic classes with a deep sense of religious earnestness and moral seriousness.[40] Francke's system of education included four types of schools: a) the *paedagogium* for sons of noblemen who were preparing for careers in government or military service; b) the *Latin School* for sons of wealthier classes who were likely to pursue careers in medicine, law or commerce; c) the *German Schools*, co-educational institutions designed to prepare ordinary citizens for crafts and domestic trades; d) *Schools for the poor* which provided free education for children of economically deprived citizens.[41]

Among the early students in the Halle *paedagogium* was Nicholas Ludwig Count von Zinzendorf (1700-1760), whose Moravian Brethren were later to exert some influence on German Reformed congregations in America.[42]

Among the theological positions maintained by the Spener-Halle pietists was the view that an "unconverted" minister could not exercise an effective ministry.[43] Francke championed this position, which was eminently compatible with his vision of theological education. A recent writer, F.E. Stoeffler, has commented:

> In the very center of his understanding of theological education was the idea that the study of theology cannot be divorced from a life of piety. 'For', he says, 'it is not enough that you become learned; the basis of it must be rightly formed being in Christ'.[44]

Francke's position reminds one, of course, of the Cyprianic contention that one who does not have the Spirit cannot communicate it through his ministerial actions. It became characteristic of Spener-Halle pietism that the quality of a minister's life in Christ determined his effectiveness as a preacher and as a celebrant of the sacraments.

The pietist vision of effective ministry was rooted in a fundamental theology of "new creaturehood" or "new birth". This new birth was not an automatic consequence of baptism; it did not result in any ontological modification of the human person as a Roman Catholic theology of sacramental character might have held. Thus, salvation, in the pietist understanding of things, was not an immediate effect of baptism. Francke, for instance,

> treated baptism as being both a gift and a responsibility, a sign of God's promise, as well as an occasion for self-examination. It appears to have been his belief that the baptized infant finds himself in a relation of special divine solicitude, which, however, never precludes the absolute necessity of a personal decision for God either on the part of a child or an adult. At some point in the maturation of the individual personal faith must be added to baptism.[45]

The union effected between the believer and Christ through "new birth" was primarily psychological in nature. It resulted in a "new mind", a radically new attitude that generated a discernibly new pattern of life. At the center of this new life, the cross stood as a primary symbol, for the truly converted Christian was one who practiced rigorous self-denial and self-discipline for the sake of serving others in active love. Intense and practical ethical concern became, indeed, a conspicuous characteristic of pietist preaching and action. The means for achieving this sort of ethical sensitivity were the classical staples of reformed piety: frequent critical self-examination, daily repentance for sin, personal prayer, reading and listening to the Word, participation in the Lord's Supper.[46] These means were given particular emphasis in the communal pietism that developed among Zinzendorf's Moravian Brethren.[47]

Reformed churches on the continent provided a kind of natural habitat for pietism in the Spener-Halle mode. Thus, prior to the immigration of German Reformed Christians to America, the impact of pietism on the continental churches was already evident. J.H. Nichols has pointed out, for example, how pietist theology directly affected German Reformed worship in Europe.[48] Pietist prayer meetings and conventicles gradually eroded the fixed liturgical patterns of the old Palatinate order and resulted in the widespread popularity of "free prayer".[49]

Meetings of the General Synod attempted to limit the amount of such free experimentation but apparently their instructions had little effect. The General Synod of Cleve (1674), for example, instructed ministers to permit conventicles, but also admonished them not to encourage practices that might jeopardize the central importance of public worship:

> In fact, all private conventicles must be conducted in a way which will not hinder public worship or bring it into disrepute. Furthermore, ministers and consistories shall have freedom to forbid anything which in their particular circumstances is not helpful or is dangerous, though it is otherwise permitted.[50]

Despite such admonitions, however, the traditional Reformed liturgical formulas--including the old and revered Palatinate order of 1563--steadily disappeared on the local congregational level. Under the growing influence of pietism, both ministers and people chose structureless "free prayer" in preference to "prayerbook liturgies". Similarly they chose newly composed hymnody expressive of pietist concerns in preference to the metrical psalms traditional in Reformed usage.

It can hardly be denied, then, that pietism had made visible inroads into the German Reformed church on the continent, especially in Germany and Switzerland, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the period of the great immigration to the American colonies.

In eighteenth century America the most obvious pietist challenges to German Reformed life derived from two sources: 1) the quasi-monastic Ephrata Community, associated with the colorful and controversial figure of Conrad Beissel (1691-1768), and 2) the ecumenical projects of Nicholas Ludwig Count von Zinzendorf and his Unitas Fratrum.[51] Since both these groups posed discernible threats to German Reformed life in America during the critical eighteenth century period, some comments about each of them are in order.

The Ephrata Cloister: Conrad Beissel had come to America from his home in the Rhenish Palatinate in 1720.[52] A gifted mathematician and musician, Beissel had been baptized, brought up and confirmed in the Reformed Church. Early in his life, however, he exhibited a strong interest in mystical experience and began to oppose what he considered the empty formalism of Reformed life and worship. Two dissident pietist groups, the Dunkers and the "Inspired", attracted Beissel's attention while he was still in Germany.[53]

The Dunkers, who rejected paedobaptism, practiced total immersion and limited the sacrament to confessed believers, sought to re-establish a primitive Christianity without reference to the traditional creeds and ceremonial of the established churches.[54] Organized in 1708 under Alexander Mack (1679-1735), they advocated a return to "apostolic simplicity" and encouraged practices like love-feasts, foot-washing, pacifism and wearing plain dress.[55] During the years 1719-1729, large numbers of Dunkers immigrated to the United States in order to escape harassment from the established Christian churches in Germany, Holland and Switzerland.[56]

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The "Inspired" were a more radical pietist sect than were the Dunkers. Originating in Germany about 1700, they laid stress on immediate revelation and direct inspiration of the Christian by divine illumination.[57] More directly charismatic in nature, the "Inspired" sought guidance through the mystical utterances of their prophetic leaders, to whom they pledged uncompromising obedience. These German *inspirati* seem to have aligned themselves with the Camisards, a violent band of French Protestants in the region of Languedoc who led a bloody uprising against Louis XIV during the years 1702-1705.[58] The Camisards came to be known in the English-speaking world as the "French Prophets". Several of these "prophets", men like Elie Marion, Durande Fage and Jean Allut, were forced to seek sanctuary in more tolerant lands like England and Scotland.[59] Eventually Marion and Allut made a foundation in Halle (1713), already the bastion of Spenerian pietism.[60]

As time went on the "Inspired" (after 1716, the "True Inspired") developed characteristically anti-sacramental positions.[61] They depended even more vigorously upon the inspired mysticism of their prophets, whom they liked to call "holy vessels". Further, they repudiated the baptismal and eucharistic celebrations of the established Reformed Church, became increasingly intolerant of marriage, and extolled the virtues of celibate life.[62] Some of the "Inspired" emigrated to America, but not many did so prior to the early nineteenth century.

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Both the Dunkers and the "Inspired" made marks on the impressionable Conrad Beissel while he was still a student in Germany.[63] It is possible, too, that Beissel picked up some influences from the Rosicrucians shortly after his arrival in America. This secret society, stemming from the late medieval period, enjoyed a sort of revival in the seventeenth century when a Lutheran pastor, J.V. Andreae (1586-1654) published two works, the Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosenkreutz and the Confessio Fraternitatis.[64] These works purported to be the account of one Christian Rosenkreutz, who had learned esoteric wisdom from the Arabs. Although Andreae had written the accounts as satire, many readers took them seriously and wide public interest was aroused in the history and ideas of the Rosicrucians. A group of German hermits, under the leadership of one Johannes Kelpius, brought interest in Rosicrucian occult practices to the region of Wissahickon Creek, near Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1694.[65] This group devoted themselves to meditation and prayer, cultivated medicinal herbs and offered religious instruction to people living in the area.

Upon his arrival in Germantown in 1720, Beissel associated himself with the Dunkers. After about a year there he moved to Lancaster County (then called Conestoga) where he followed through on his original intention to live an eremitical life. But this did not last long. He accepted baptism from the congregation of Dunkers in Germantown and became leader of a new Dunker community in Conestoga.[66]

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Beissel's advocacy of things like the superiority of celibacy over marriage and the observance of the Old Testament sabbath led him into open schism against the Germantown Dunkers in 1728.[67]

During the imbroglio that followed Beissel suddenly left Conestoga and took up a solitary residence at Cocalico Creek, where he quickly attracted disciples of both sexes. It was here that the so-called "Ephrata Cloister" had its beginning. By around 1732 or 1733 Beissel and his followers had organized themselves along the lines of a semi-monastic conventual life.[68] The community came to embrace three distinct and semi-independent "orders": that of the celibate brothers (the Order of the Solitary, or the Brotherhood of Zion); that of the celibate sisters (called the Sisterhood of Sharon or the Order of the Roses of Sharon); and that of the married couples or householders.[69]

The Ephrata community maintained many practices typical of Roman Catholic monastic organizations, like voluntary celibacy, community of goods and the taking of religious names.[70] But their mystical doctrine strikes one as having strong affinities with some forms of Valentinian gnostic speculation. The brothers and sisters of Ephrata held, for example, that the true wisdom of Christianity could be achieved only by breaking the chains of flesh and by reunion with the heavenly Sophia.[71] Their anthropology presupposed a primaeval state wherein man was constituted a single perfect being combining both male and female elements. This primordial androgynous condition, lost through the fall of man, was to be regained through a life of intense self-denial, daily mortification of the flesh, repudiation of marriage and dedication to mystical prayer.[72]

Conrad Beissel's own chaotic personality was probably the most distinctive feature of the life at Ephrata Cloister.[73] Although the Chronicon Ephratense uncritically glorifies him as a prophet and saint, the true quality of Beissel's life remains obscure.[74] That he was magnetic, strong-willed and often arbitrary in his use of power seems incontestable. At the height of his influence he found it possible to pry into the most intimate details of the "solitaries'" lives. He required, for example, a scrutiny of soul from each brother and sister every Friday night. These testimonials or "lectiones", as Beissel called them, were read out and commented upon at the Sabbath service.[75]

A number of events in the life of the Ephrata community indicate that Beissel brooked no opposition to his considerable power. But perhaps the clearest indication of his predilection towards tyranny arises from his treatment of the community's "prior", Israel Eckerlin. Eckerlin, who had come under the influence of the Dunkers in Germantown as early as 1725,[76] showed very early in his career at Ephrata that he possessed a high degree of administrative ability. He saw that the success of the Order of the Solitary would depend in great measure upon the creation of a stable economic environment that would permit the community to become self-sustaining.

Largely through Eckerlin's efforts a system of mills was established which included a sawmill, flaxseed oil mill, fulling mill and bark mill.[77] At the same time Eckerlin brought all the male hermits, who had been living in separate cabins in the woods, together into Zion monastery. This allowed him to give each of them definite work assignments for which they could be held responsible. These two actions--establishment of the mill system and organization of the brothers into a productive work-force--made it possible for Eckerlin to build up a trade with merchants in cities like Philadelphia, Wilmington and Lancaster and to begin putting money into the cloister's treasury.[78]

But economic success bred resentment in Beissel. He began to berate the mill system as sinful, though it took him at least two years to decide whether or not God was telling him that the mills should be shut down. The Chronicon Ephratense, largely a panegyric of Beissel, refers obliquely to the situation as follows:

> The rock of offense and the stone of stumbling were erected in the settlement and this was the cause why hypocracy [sic] did not thrive for everyone's secret was brought to light.[79]

Elsewhere, and more explicitly, the Chronicon comments:

> Thus the Prior brought the Brotherhood into such thralldom that the only difference between a Brother of Zion and a Negro, the negro was black and an involuntary slave and the former was white and a voluntary one.[80]

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The upshot of the affair was that Beissel deposed and demoted Prior Israel in 1745. Not content with deposition and demotion Beissel also had all Eckerlin's writings burned, uprooted an orchard of bearing fruit trees the Prior had planted, and destroyed the mill operation. Eckerlin voluntarily left Ephrata on 4 September, 1745.[81]

Another example of Beissel's high-handedness comes from his treatment of Conrad Weiser. A Lutheran, Weiser was an important political figure in Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland, and was largely responsible for the formulation of the Indian policy in the colony of Pennsylvania.[82] It is not altogether clear how Beissel managed to attract a man like Weiser into cloistered life at Ephrata, but manage he did--at least for a time. Eventually Weiser became disillusioned with Beissel's arrogance and he left Ephrata on 3 September, 1743.[83] A letter Weiser wrote to the brothers indicates his feeling at the time of his departure:

> It cannot be denied at Ephrata that I and several other members of the community partly gone to their rest, partly still living, were compelled to protest for a considerable time against the domination of conscience, the suppression of innocent minds, against the prevailing pomp and luxury, both in dress and magnificent buildings; but we achieved about as much as nothing; on the contrary, in spite of all protests this practice was still more eagerly continued and following the manner of the world, the attempt was made to cover such pride and luxury with the man of God. It was most zealously defended, so that for years nothing has been heard in public assemblies but the boast. "There the work stands, it is the work of God"! as if it were the first Babylonian masterpiece. Whole assemblies were held in honor of the loathesome idolatry, while the leaders have indulged in the most fulsome self-praise by all kinds of fictitious stories.[84]

Weiser's bitter disillusionment stands in stark contrast to the vigorous enthusiasm of a man like John Peter Miller.[85] Miller had been a promising young pastor among the German Reformed communities in America. A scholar of considerable refinement, Miller was a master linguist as well as a gifted writer and theologian. His influence on the German Reformed Church promised to be enormous. In 1735, however, Miller withdrew from his pastorate at Tulpehocken and joined Beissel at Ephrata, taking with him a good number of the elders and members of the congregation. As "Brother Jaebez", Miller helped organize the extensive printing and publishing operations at the Zion monastery and he eventually became prior of the community. Miller's own literary output, which included translations, philosophical and theological works, and hymns, was widely respected throughout the colonies.[86]

Miller's defection from the pastoral life of the German Reformed Church in America was a severe loss. His learning would have been extremely beneficial to his church in those critical formative years of the eighteenth century. For throughout that century the German Reformed communion found itself troubled by sectarian fragmentation.[87] Indeed the lack of significant church leadership, coupled with poor education for the clergy, continued to plague the German Reformed community until well into the nineteenth century.

Count Zinzendorf and the "Congregation of God in the Spirit": In the middle of the eighteenth century a second serious pietist challenge to German Reformed life in the

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American colonies arose. Mention has already been made of Nicholas Ludwig Count von Zinzendorf in connection with the Spenerian school of pietism at Halle. The young Zinzendorf's training at the Halle paedagogium equipped him with deep pietist convictions about "Herzensreligion" and about devotion to the person of Jesus Christ as the core of Christian life.[88] It became Zinzendorf's lifelong position that a heart-to-heart, intimate devotion to Jesus, especially in his sufferings, wounds and death, could lead men to rise above barriers of credal confession and achieve a higher Christian unity in the Spirit.[89] Although he never studied theology,[90] Zinzendorf became a leading eighteenth century ecumenist. Concerning his ecumenical work Karl Barth once commented:

> If appearances are not deceptive, it was the prophetic intention of Count Zinzendorf in the founding of his remarkable 'brotherhoods', not to split the Confessional Churches, not to replace them by a super-Church, but, as they came together freely as loyal members of the particular Churches, to confront them typically with the unity which they had not lost and actually could not lose in Jesus Christ Himself, who remarkably enough was elected their common Elder Brother. It is no accident that the very man who in his preaching and poetry and dogmatics (so far as he had any) was perhaps the only genuine Christocentric of the modern age (fools would say: Christomonist), must also perhaps be called the first genuine ecumenist, i.e., the first really to speak and think wholly in terms of the matter itself.[91]

Zinzendorf's interest in ecumenical matters was primarily active, not speculative. In May of 1722 he offered his estate at Herrnhut to a group of Bohemian and Moravian exiles called the "Moravian Brethren" or the Unitas Fratrum.[92] Historically, these brethren originated as a religious body among the Utraquists (sometimes called "Hussites") in Bohemia during the fifteenth century (1457). From their beginning the brethren had stressed the importance of a believer's direct access to the benefits of Christ and his passion, the bond of fellowship symbolized by common use of the eucharistic cup for ordained and non-ordained alike, and the indispensability of Christian missionary endeavor. Periodically throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the brethren were subjected to persecution. By the end of the seventeenth century they had suffered almost total eclipse, but, largely through the efforts of their Bishop John Amos Comenius, the Moravian "Hidden Seed" survived.[93]

The establishment of Herrnhut gave Zinzendorf a chance to test some of his deepest personal convictions about Christian life. From the beginning of the foundation Zinzendorf regarded the brethren as an "ecclesiola" within the Lutheran communion.[94] This conception continued to govern the Count's understanding of the Herrnhut group, which by 1727 had been organized as a civil community (with rights and restrictions in public law) and as a spiritual fellowship.[95] More significantly, Zinzendorf established the community on a firmly ecumenical basis. His 42 statutes, called The Brotherly Agreement of the Brethren from Bohemia and Moravia and Others, Binding Them to Walk According to the Apostolic Rule, included this provision:

> Herrnhut shall stand in unceasing love with all children of God in all Churches, criticize none, take part in no quarrel against those differing in opinion, except to preserve for itself the evangelical purity, simplicity and grace.[96]

The missionary spirit of the Moravian Brethren at Herrnhut led them to make a foundation in the colony of Georgia in 1735.[97] It was this group that John Wesley encountered in his own early activity in America. Wesley wrote in his Journal for 7 February, 1735:

> Mr. Oglethorpe returned from Savannah with Mr. Spangenberg, one of the pastors of the Germans. I soon found what spirit he was of and asked his advice with regard to my own conduct. He said, "My brother, I must first ask you one or two questions. Have you the witness within yourself? Does the Spirit of God bear witness with your spirit that you are a child of God?" I was surprised, and knew not what to answer. He observed it and asked, "Do you know Jesus Christ?" I paused and said, "I know He is the Saviour of the world". "True", replied he; "but do you know He has saved you?" I answered, "I hope He has died to save me." He only added, "Do you know yourself?" I said, "I do." But I fear they were vain words.[98]

Indeed, even before his arrival in Georgia, while he was still aboard ship, Wesley had been impressed by the "great seriousness" of these people:

> At noon our third storm began. At four it was more violent than before. At seven I went to the Germans. I had long before observed the great seriousness of their behaviour. Of their humility they had given a continual proof by performing those servile offices for the other passengers, which none of the English would undertake; for which they desired and would receive no pay, saying, "it was good for their proud hearts," and "their loving Saviour had done more for them." And

> every day had given them an occasion of showing a meekness which no injury could move. If they were pushed, struck, or thrown down, they rose again and went away; but no complaint was found in their mouth. There was now an opportunity of trying whether they were delivered from the spirit of fear, as well as from that of pride, anger and revenge.
>
> In the midst of the psalm wherewith their service began, the sea broke over, split the mainsail in pieces, covered the ship, and poured in between the decks, as if the great deep had already swallowed us up. A terrible screaming began among the English. The Germans calmly sang on. I asked one of them afterward, "Were you not afraid?" He answered, "I thank God, no." I asked, "But were not your women and children afraid?" He replied, mildly, "No; our women and children are not afraid to die."[99]

Wesley left Georgia in December of 1737, but the Moravian missionaries stayed and tried to expand their work into South Carolina and Pennsylvania. Their success was not overwhelming. Thus, in 1740, when the evangelist George Whitefield offered the remnants of the Moravian colony in Georgia the opportunity to go to Philadelphia, they eagerly accepted.[100] They purchased land and began a settlement. The following year (1741), Count Zinzendorf himself arrived in New York and then travelled to visit the settlement in Pennsylvania. Since Zinzendorf was present for the celebration of Christmas with the brethren, he named the settlement "Bethlehem".[101]

The Moravian settlement at Bethlehem made Zinzendorf extremely optimistic about the potential realization of his ecumenical vision. His plan was to create not a unified ecclesiastical institution but rather a "united Christian people who would serve the Lord in harmony in Pennsylvania".[102] Although Zinzendorf had been consecrated a Moravian bishop in

Europe,[103] he laid aside all claims to rank, civil or ecclesiastical, while engaged in his American venture. Travelling under the assumed name "Herr von Thürnstein", he preached to a good number of Reformed and Lutheran congregations in the colonies.[104] Zinzendorf also solicited and received support from men like John Bechtel, pastor of the Reformed Church in Germantown, and Henry Antes, a lay-preacher of the Reformed Church.[105]

Both Bechtel and Antes shared the Count's ecumenical enthusiasm. At one time Antes had been the trusted friend and co-worker of John Philip Boehm, but the two eventually parted company over questions of church polity.[106] Antes took up a sort of free-lance ministry of evangelization, apparently with the intention of creating a loose confederation of German churches in the colonies. Thus when Zinzendorf arrived in America, Antes seized the opportunity to call meetings in Germantown for the purpose of elaborating a plan of union to be called the "Congregation of God in the Spirit".[107] This plan was formulated "in strict accordance with Zinzendorf's theory of tropes, according to which every one might retain his denominational peculiarities. . .in a higher religious unity."[108]

The movement picked up steam and Zinzendorf proceeded to ordain ministers for both Lutheran and Reformed congregations. John Bechtel, the pastor mentioned above, was ordained (actually, re-ordained) under these circumstances.[109] Earlier he had opposed Boehm's recourse to the church of Holland for ordination and now the two men found themselves on a collision course over the matter of legitimate ministry. Meanwhile, the confusion about who was a legitimate minister in what congregation under whose auspices spread to a number of Lutheran and Reformed churches in Pennsylvania.

The chaotic situation spawned by the "Congregation of God in the Spirit" led Zinzendorf into conflict with both Reformed and Lutheran leaders. In late December of 1742, Zinzendorf had a confrontation with Henry Melchior Mühlenberg, who had come to America in October of that same year for the purpose of investigating conditions among the Lutheran congregations. Mühlenberg charged the Count with irregularities regarding his assumption of duties as a Lutheran pastor, while Zinzendorf challenged the orthodoxy of Mühlenberg's Lutheranism.[110]

Many Reformed congregations were confused by the split allegiance they sometimes found among their pastors. As the "Congregation of God in the Spirit" lost some of its ecumenical impetus and became more closely identified with the Moravian Brethren, local congregations were forced to choose between ministers who represented German Reformed interests and those who represented the Zinzendorf interests. Zinzendorf himself returned to Europe early in January of 1743, and the "Congregation of God in the Spirit" did not long survive his departure.[111] Antes became discouraged and retired to his farm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. In 1744, Bechtel was dismissed from the pastorate by his own congregation and took up residence with the Unitas Fratrum in Bethlehem.[112]

Still, the ecumenical activities of Antes, Bechtel and Zinzendorf left their mark on the German Reformed Church in eighteenth century America. Sydney Ahlstrom comments: "To a distracted and scattered church, it [the "Congregation of God in the Spirit"] was a tempting prospect."[113] Indeed, as an ecumenical project the "Congregation" did promise a way to overcome the sectarian and factional tendencies that threatened to overwhelm the German Reformed community in this country. But the price of such "unity" would have been the loss of the distinctive identity of the German Reformed Church in this country. Perhaps indirectly, and unintentionally, Zinzendorf's ecumenical scheme served to consolidate German denominational life in America. As G.W. Forell has remarked:

> Zinzendorf's major contribution to religion in America was that he served as a catalyst. Opposition to him helped precipitate the culture-language denominationalism which dominated the American development for the next two centuries.[114]

THE CHALLENGE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY "AWAKENINGS"

A third challenge to German Reformed life in eighteenth century America arose from the series of religious revivals that swept over the American colonies in the period between 1740 and 1745. Collectively these revivals of piety and practice are usually called "The Great Awakening", a term which indicates the scope and depth of their importance for religious life in colonial America.[115] In the view of some writers, the "Awakening" was of a piece with other pietist movements of the period, chiefly Wesley's Methodism and Zinzendorf's projects with the Moravian Brethren.[116]

Though there were earlier rumblings, the Great Awakening is ordinarily regarded as having begun about 1734 in Northhampton, Massachusetts.[117] It was then and there that Jonathan Edwards noticed a discernible acceleration of response to his sermons on justification by faith.[118] Still, Edwards himself was not responsible for the Awakening. Its appearance in New England had been prepared by the preaching of puritan divines like Edward Taylor (1642-1729), as well as by Edwards' own grandfather, Solomon Stoddard (1643-1729).[119]

Moreover the revival noticed by Edwards in 1734 was not long-lasting. Within three years its power had declined and its enthusiasm had evaporated. Still, this "frontier revival" of 1734-1737 was unquestionably a harbinger of greater things to come in the following decade.

Those greater things appeared in the person of George Whitefield, a young Anglican priest who first preached in New England on 15 September, 1740.[120] Whitefield was an itinerant preacher and his work in New England met almost immediately with enthusiastic response. The impact of his preaching was enormous and it soon attracted other missionary preachers like Gilbert Tennent (1703-1764) and James Davenport (1716-1757).[121] These two men picked up Whitefield's message and began to expound the necessity of replacing religious formalism with conversion of heart.

For the preachers of the Awakening appealed to an "experiential religion of the heart", to the living conviction that one's life has been directly touched and transformed by the merciful grace of God. These men thus opposed both the complacent orthodoxies of New England Puritanism as well as the more rationalistic views offered by advocates of Arminianism.[122] A taste of what "awakening" preaching was like can be had in this sample from a sermon preached by Whitefield in Philadelphia in 1742:

> . . .I here give you a Summons to meet me at the Judgment Seat of Christ, and to clear both my Master and me.--Would weeping, would Tears prevail on you, I could wish my Head Waters, and my Eyes Fountains of Tears, that I might weep our every Argument, and melt you into Love.--Hearts, I think I could bear to pluck out my Eyes, or even to lay down my Life for your Sakes. Or was I sure to prevail on you by Importunity, I could continue my Discourse till Midnight, I would wrestle with you even till the Morning Watch, as Jacob did with the Angel, and would not go away till I had overcome.--But such Power belongeth unto the Lord, --I can only invite; it is He only can work in you both to Will and to Do after his good Pleasure; It is his Property to take away the Heart of Stone, and give you a Heart of Flesh; It is his Spirit that must convince you of unbelief, and of the everlasting Righteousness of his dear Son.--'Tis he alone must give Faith to apply his Righteousness to your Hearts, It is He alone can give you a wedding Garment, and cause you to sit down and drink New Wine in his Kingdom.[123]

The years 1741-1742 were, indeed, the high-water mark of the First Great Awakening. The religious turmoil of these two years touched all sectors of New England society urban and rural, wealthy and poor.[124] Some of its effects began to filter out into areas of colonial America beyond New England. But it would be erroneous to believe that the Awakening met with universal acclaim and approval. It struck some Christians as strangely innovative and perhaps even subversive. In the Presbyterian communion, for example, reactions for and against the Awakening led to the formation of "Old Side" and "New Side" factions. The "Old Side" Presbyterians adhered earnestly to the traditional confessions of faith, to a properly educated clergy and to the actions of church synods as the guarantors of orthodoxy. Supporters of the "New Side" maintained that educated and certified--but unconverted--clergymen provided no true ministry at all.[125] For a time the dispute led to a schism, with the New Brunswick Presbytery being forced out of the Synod during the years 1741-1758.[126]

A similar division developed within the German Reformed Church. Like their Presbyterian counterparts, the "Old Side" Reformed churchmen placed the greatest stress on purity of doctrine, maintenance of traditional church structures and continuance of the Reformed educational system.[127] Adherents of the "New Side" among the German Reformed congregations sometimes called themselves "Pietists" or "New Lights". They were vigorously attracted to the visible effects of religious enthusiasm and to the revival of "experiential Christianity" as it had been encouraged in the hey-day of the Great Awakening among the English-speaking churches.[128]

These two groups were divided particularly over the issue of ministry. The "Old Siders" demanded highly educated clergy, men with a high degree of theological sophistication. In contrast the "New Siders" wanted ministers who were converted, whose lives displayed the fruit of "Herzensreligion", even if they had not enjoyed a systematic theological education for ministry.

Perhaps the most prominent clerical representative of the Pietist ("New Side") school in the German Reformed church was Philip William Otterbein (1726-1813).[129] Otterbein's career is a good illustration of the impact pietism and religious revivalism had on German Reformed life in eighteenth century America. A teenager during the high-water period of the Great Awakening, Otterbein was still living in his native Germany while men like Whitefield, Tennet and Davenport were spreading the message of repentance and conversion in colonial America. Nevertheless, before his arrival in America in 1752, Otterbein had been subject to sturdy pietist influences.[130] His education at Herborn near Dillenburg (in Nassau) cultivated in him a profound respect for personal religious experience and for the value of conversion.[131]

Upon coming to the colonies Otterbein served for twenty-two years in Pennsylvania churches at Lancaster, Tulpehocken and York, as well as in Maryland at the village of Frederick.[132] Although he was neither a brilliant theologian nor a gifted orator, the people seem to have been impressed by his evident piety and sincerity. In 1774, after he had returned from a visit to relatives in Germany, Ottenbein was called to the pastorate of the Second Reformed Church in Baltimore.[133] The congregation there had been schismatically divided for nearly four years over the question of finding a worthy minister. In some desperation the elders of the Baltimore congregation referred the matter to the Coetus which hoped to reunite the opposing parties through the appointment of a man acceptable to both sides. Otterbein was the choice of the Coetus, but the "Old Side" party objected. The Coetus then turned the case over to the Synod in Holland, which proceeded to confirm Otterbein's appointment.[134]

The circumstances of Otterbein's call to the Second Reformed Church in Baltimore were, then, clouded by schismatic controversy. Another factor at work in Otterbein's Baltimore pastorate was the influence of Methodism in the person of its well-known American pioneer Francis Asbury (1745-1816).[135] It seems that Asbury had been working on a plan to establish conventicles of piety ("ecclesiolae in ecclesia") among the German Reformed churches. Like the collegia pietatis discussed above in connection with Spener's pietism, such societies were intended to promote mutual edification among church members, especially those who had attained a superior degree of enlightenment and spiritual progress.[136]

Apparently Otterbein found Asbury's plan attractive.[137] Not only was it agreeable to Otterbein's own pietist leanings, but it offered a plausible pastoral solution to the urgent need for religious instruction among Reformed believers in both Maryland and Pennsylvania. Asbury's plan of conventicles would broaden the scope of Christian education by enlisting the help of lay leaders and thus relieving the clergy of part of the burden of pastoral catechesis. It seems that this plan, which involved small meetings once or twice a week and a public class on Sundays, was actually put into effect in a number of churches in Maryland and southern Pennsylvania.[138]

But the Asbury plan eventually led Otterbein into partial independence from his own German Reformed communion. Like Zinzendorf, Otterbein seems to have supported the view that Christians could participate in a "higher unity" without renouncing their specific denominational allegiance.[139] Thus, while the Second Reformed Church in Baltimore retained its affiliation with the German Reformed *Coetus* (and, after 1793, with the Synod), it pursued the "new measures" associated with the Awakening and with Methodist evangelism in a manner that would have made "Old Side" Reformed churchmen suspicious.[140]

It is known, moreover, that the *Coetus* itself often showed sympathy toward the pietist wing of the German Reformed Church.[141] For a time, in fact, the "New Lights" were in the ascendancy. This was so such the case that it was frequently possible for a pastor of pietist persuasion to disregard "Old Side" decisions of the *Coetus* and Synod with impunity. Such, for instance, was the situation with George A. Gueting, an enthusiastic supporter of pietist causes who had been ordained by the German Reformed *Coetus* in 1783.[142] Gueting organized evangelistic meetings on a grand scale, promoted "new measures" revivalism, and safely disregarded the admonitions of *Coetus* and Synod for better than twenty years. He was not formally excluded from the Synod until 1804--and then only by a vote of twenty to seventeen.[143] Otterbein, whose commitment to evangelism was perhaps less vocal but certainly no less profound than Gueting's, managed to retain satisfactory connections with the Synod throughout the period of his active ministry.[144]

As in the case of the Ephrata community and the Zinzendorf projects for ecumenism, the pietist awakenings in eighteenth century America left an indelible print on the life of the German Reformed Church. As Sydney Ahlstrom remarks: "The tensions revealed by Otterbein's career were to be continuous problems for the German Reformed church throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries".[145] However well-meant they may have been, the efforts of the more extreme pietist churchmen served to fragment a largely immigrant church that was already having trouble establishing its distinctive character in doctrine and worship. As a consequence, pietism and evangelism came to be almost synonymous with "separatism" and "schism".[146] Such problems--especially the tendencies toward sectarianism and disregard for Reformed tradition as laid out in the Heidelberg Catechism and in the church confessions--were to become major preoccupations of the Mercersburg theologians John Nevin and Philip Schaff.

ATTEMPTS TO RESPOND TO THESE CHALLENGES

The efforts made by the German Reformed Church to cope with the challenges presented by the eighteenth century pietist movements described above seem to have taken two major forms:

1) reorganization of church structure, and 2) plans for improving the quality of education among the clergy.

The changeover, in 1793, from Coetus to synodical form of church government, has already been mentioned. The period following this reorganization was not, however, a particularly bright one for the German Reformed community in America. Throughout the first quarter of the nineteenth century the church was weakened by poorly educated clergy and by the lack of any significant literary or theological productivity. The church remained a German church that made little effort to accommodate itself to the broader English-speaking public.[147] As late as 1804, a proposal to use English in public worship met with staunch opposition among members of the important Race Street Church in Philadelphia.[148] The conflict grew so embittered that the congregation eventually split along lines of linguistic preference.

Further ecumenical ventures were proposed and rejected during the early years of the nineteenth century. Although the Lutheran and Reformed churches of Prussia had agreed on a plan of union in 1817, such endeavors among these same two communions in America were abortive--this, despite the fact that in the eighteenth century the Reformed Michael Schlatter and the Lutheran Henry Melchoir Mühlenberg had been close collaborators and had shared much the same ecclesiastical vision.[149] In 1818 there was an attempt to bring Lutherans and Reformed together on a project for a joint theological seminary to be located at Franklin College in Lancaster. A similar proposal had come from the Dutch Reformed Church in America for a common seminary in New Brunswick, New Jersey. The German Reformed Church desperately needed such an institution to improve the quality of education for its ministers, but neither plan was brought to fruition.[150]

At about this same time, *circa* 1820, a new problem arose for the German Reformed community in America. The "new measures" revivalism associated with the name of Charles Finney began to make its influence felt in a number of Protestant communions, the German Reformed church among them.[151] While still a Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, Nevin himself had had some experience of this brand of revivalistic technique at Union College in New York.[152] The challenge of "new measures revivalism" to the Mercersburg ecclesiology will be discussed more fully in a later chapter. For the moment, suffice it to say that the impact of Finney's new measures, combined with the progressively deteriorating quality of ministerial education, led the German Reformed Synod to consider once more the idea of a seminary. Accordingly the Synod meeting at Hagerstown, Maryland, in 1820, adopted a plan for a theological seminary and resolved to pursue the idea to actual fulfillment:

> Resolved, that the above Plan of a Theological Seminary be put into effect as soon as possible.
>
> Resolved, that in the future no minister be allowed to receive a young man, in order to educate him in theology; only in preparatory courses for entrance into the Seminary.[153]

Not everyone agreed on the need for a seminary. Feeling against the project ran so high in some quarters that it led to the formation of a temporary schismatic Synod called the "Synod of the Free German Reformed Congregations of Pennsylvania".[154] Nevertheless the project continued to occupy the attention of synodical meetings at Harrisburg (1822), Baltimore (1823), and Bedford (1824). Finally, on 11 March, 1825, the theological seminary was opened at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, where it was hoped that cooperation with Dickinson College would brighten the chances for the school's success.[155] Unfortunately the cooperative association with Dickinson never materialized and in September, 1829, the Synod meeting at Lebanon decided in favor of removing the seminary from Carlisle to York, where it remained until 1837, when the transfer to Mercersburg took place.[156]

SUMMARY

This historical sketch of the early fortunes of the German Reformed church in the United States provides necessary background for understanding what sort of ecclesiastical tradition and practice Nevin and Schaff found themselves connected with when they began teaching at the seminary in Mercersburg in the 1840's (Nevin began in 1840; Schaff arrived in 1844).

In summary, several points about that historical background deserve to be underscored because of their future impact on the Mercersburg theology and on the liturgical practices it inspired.

1. Communicants of the German Reformed Church in America brought with them an earnest allegiance to the doctrine and discipline of the Heidelberg Catechism. Their concern for parochial education, even early in the eighteenth century, testifies to their devotion to this document as a normative expression of Reformed faith. Nevin will seek to reassert the system of the Catechism, especially its sacramental views, over against the "Puritanism" he felt had infected Reformed Church life in this country.

2. The early association between the German Reformed Church in the United States and the Synods of the Dutch Reformed Church in Holland demonstrates a high regard for details of church order and ministry. The ecclesiastical discipline governing ordination to the ministry was carefully observed, even after the American Synod of the German Reformed Church severed its bonds with Holland. Again, Nevin will attempt to defend a "churchly" and "sacramental" view of both church and ministry as essential to the Reformed tradition.

3. The challenges of eighteenth century pietism in at least three forms had a direct influence on the German Reformed Church in America. These three forms--the "monastic" experiment at Ephrata, Zinzendorf's ecumenical community at Bethlehem, and the "Great Awakening" with its aftermath--threatened to dissolve the German Reformed community into sectarian splinters throughout the eighteenth century. It also needs to be remembered that pietism influenced whole schools of theological thought, some of which eventually came

to affect the Mercersburg theologians. For example, August Neander, Schaff's professor of church history while he was a student at Halle, was a staunch representative of the pietist tradition as over against another professor of Schaff's, Ferdinand Christian Baur, who represented the "higher criticism" of the Tübingen school.

4. The problems raised for the German Reformed Church after about 1820 by "new measures revivalism" continued to affect church members until well into the Mercersburg period. The exaggerated revivalist emphasis on the unique validity of subjective enlightenment and personal religious experience was opposed by both Nevin and Schaff. They insisted, as we shall see, on the historical character of Christian doctrine; the necessary visibility of the church; and the objective force of the sacraments. Indeed, one of Nevin's earliest publications at Mercersburg was to be his tract The Anxious Bench (1843), wherein he attacked spurious revivals and urged German Reformed churchmen to remain faithful to their catechetical system and to their historical sacramental life.

Thus the earliest historical background of the German Reformed Church in America already allows one to glimpse some of the emerging issues that will occupy stage-center for the Mercersburg theologians. The historical and developmental nature of Christian doctrine will concern Schaff from the very beginning of his long tenure at Mercersburg (the Principle of Protestantism was published in 1845). The necessity of a visible, organic structure for the church are already on

Nevin's mind in his sermon on "Catholic Unity", appended to the English edition of Schaff's Principle. Finally, the objective force and effect of the sacraments over against the "Puritan rationalism" abroad in American churches will be articulated in the strongest terms in Nevin's The Mystical Presence (1846).

These issues--ecclesiology and sacramental theory--will occupy our attention in the third and fifth chapters that follow.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1] Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 247.

[2] John Henry Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," in Edward T. Corbin, ed., A History of the Reformed Church, Dutch; the Reformed Church, German and the Moravian Church in the United States (The American Church History Series, Vol. 8; Philip Schaff, ed.; New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1895), p. 234.

[3] The text of the Heidelberg Catechism in English translation may be found in Arthur Cochrane, Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 305-331.

[4] See Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 230, 266.

[5] See Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 615.

[6] On the Treaty of Westphalia and its aftermath, see Constance V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years' War (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 445-506.

[7] See David Ogg, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (8th ed.; London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960), pp. 36-37.

[8] See Max Beloff, The Age of Absolutism: 1660-1815 (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1960), p. 32.

[9] Ibid. See also Louis Krieger, Kings and Philosophers: 1689-1789 (The Norton History of Modern Europe; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), pp. 58-59.

[10] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 243-244.

[11] See Herbert M.J. Klein, History of the Eastern Synod of the Reformed Church in the United States (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Franklin and Marshall College, 1943), pp. 16-18.

[12] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 242-243.

[13] Klein, History of the Eastern Synod, pp. 17-18.

[14] Ibid., pp. 1-4.

[15] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[16] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[17] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 323.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., pp. 324-325.

[20] Klein, History of the Eastern Synod, p. 3.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See F. Ernest Stoeffler, The Rise of Evangelical Pietism (Studies in the History of Religions, Supplements to Numen, Vol. 9; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), p. 117.

[23] On these men and their influence on the development of pietism, see Stoeffler, Rise of Evangelical Pietism, pp. 121-148.

[24] Ibid., p. 148.

[25] Ibid., p. 122.

[26] Ibid., p. 124.

[27] Ibid., p. 134.

[28] The text is cited as found in Stoeffler, Rise of Evangelical Pietism, p. 134.

[29] The text is cited as found in Stoeffler, Rise of Evangelical Pietism, p. 137.

[30] Ibid., p. 144.

[31] See John Dillenberger and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 124.

[32] Philip Jacob Spener, Pia Desideria, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), p. 66.

[33] Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[34] Ibid., p. 110.

[35] Ibid., pp. 110-111.

[36] Ibid., p. 113.

[37] Ibid., p. 114.

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[38] On the importance of the university at Halle for the development of continental pietism, see F. Ernest Stoeffler, German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century (Studies in the History of Religions, Supplements to Numen, Vol. 24; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), pp. 39-87. For the date of the opening of the university see ibid., p. 42.

[39] Ibid., p. 39.

[40] Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[41] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[42] Zinzendorf will be considered in greater detail later in this chapter. On his work in colonial America, see James R. Weinlick, "Moravianism in the American Colonies," in F. Ernest Stoeffler, ed., Continental Pietism and Early American Christianity (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 123-163.

[43] See John T. McNeill, Modern Christian Movements (New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1968), p. 64.

[44] Stoeffler, German Pietism, p. 29.

[45] Ibid., p. 17.

[46] Ibid., p. 21.

[47] McNeill, Modern Christian Movements, pp. 67-68.

[48] See James Hastings Nichols, Corporate Worship in the Reformed Tradition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 118-119.

[49] Ibid., p. 118.

[50] Cited in Stoeffler, German Pietism, p. 219.

[51] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, pp. 241, 247-248.

[52] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 259-260.

[53] Ibid., p. 260.

[54] See Stoeffler, German Pietism, p. 214.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 260.

[57] Karl Holl, "The Inspired," in Samuel M. Jackson, ed., The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 13 Vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1950), Vol. VI, pp. 19-21.

[58] Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 356-365.

[59] Ibid., pp. 365-371.

[60] Ibid., p. 365.

[61] Holl, "The Inspired," p. 20.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ernest E. Doll, The Ephrata Cloister: An Introduction (Ephrata, Pennsylvania: Ephrata Cloister Associates, Inc., 1958), p. 5.

[64] See Arthur Edward Waite, The Brotherhood of the Rosy Cross (New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1961), pp. 48-49, 143-147, 158-214.

[65] Doll, The Ephrata Cloister, p. 4.

[66] Ibid., p. 5.

[67] Ibid. See also Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 261.

[68] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 260.

[69] Martin H. Heinicke, History of Ephrata, ed. Robert M. Hartranft (Ephrata, Pennsylvania: The Historical Society of the Cocalico Valley, n.d.), Booklet 3, pp. 5-27.

[70] David F. Durnbaugh, "The Brethren in Early American Colonial Life," in F.Ernest Stoeffler, ed., Colonial Pietism and Early American Christianity (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 242-244.

[71] Martin H. Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, pp. 9-10. The ascetics at Ephrata were also influenced, it seems, by the mystic Jacob Boehme. On Boehme, see Stoeffler, German Pietism, pp. 169-171.

[72] The Ephrata community's theory about the original androgynous condition of man was not unlike that of the Shakers. See Charles Nordhoff, The Communistic Societies of the United States (New York: Hilary House Publishers, Ltd., 1960), pp. 132-134.

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[73] Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, p. 11.

[74] See "Brother Lamech" and "Brother Agrippa", Chronicon Ephratense: A History of the Community of Seventh Day Baptists at Ephrata, trans. James M. Hark (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: S.H. Zahm and Company, 1899).

[75] Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, p. 12.

[76] Ibid., p. 22.

[77] Doll, The Ephrata Cloister, p. 9.

[78] Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, p. 23.

[79] Cited from Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, p. 25.

[80] Ibid., p. 24.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Doll, The Ephrata Cloister, pp. 25-26.

[83] Heinicke, History of Ephrata, Booklet 2, p. 15.

[84] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[85] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 262.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., p. 271.

[88] Arthur J. Lewis, Zinzendorf: The Ecumenical Pioneer (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 14-15, 25-32.

[89] Ibid., p. 27.

[90] Concerning Zinzendorf's lack of formal theological education, see George W. Forell, ed. and trans., Nicholaus Ludwig Count von Zinzendorf: Nine Public Lectures on Important Subjects in Religion (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1973),

[91] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. George W. Bromiley and Theodore F. Torrance, 4 Vols. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), Vol. 4/1, p. 683.

[92] James T. Hamilton, "A History of the Unitas Fratrum, or Moravian Church, in the United States of America," in Edwin T. Corwin, ed., A History of the Reformed Church, Dutch; the Reformed Church, German and the Moravian Church in the United States (The American Church History Series, Vol. 8; New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1895), p. 433.

[93] Lewis, Zinzendorf: The Ecumenical Pioneer, pp. 34-44.

[94] Weinlick, "Moravianism in the American Colonies," pp. 131-132.

[95] Ibid., p. 129.

[96] Cited from Lewis, Zinzendorf: The Ecumenical Pioneer, p. 53.

[97] Weinlick, "Moravianism in the American Colonies," pp. 131-132.

[98] John Wesley, The Journal of John Wesley, ed. Paul L. Parker (Chicago: Moody Press, n.d.), pp. 36-37.

[99] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[100] Weinlick, "Moravianism in the American Colonies," pp. 136-137.

[101] Ibid., pp. 138-141.

[102] Forell, Zinzendorf: Nine Public Lectures, p. xxi.

[103] Hamilton, "A History of the Unitas Fratrum," p. 438.

[104] Forell, Zinzendorf: Nine Public Lectures, p. xxi.

[105] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 271-274.

[106] Ibid., p. 272.

[107] Ibid., p. 273.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid., p. 274.

[110] For Muehlenberg's account of the debate, see Forell, Zinzendorf: Nine Public Lectures, pp. xxiii-xxvi.

[111] Weinlick, "Moravianism in the American Colonies," pp. 148-149.

[112] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 275.

[113] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 248.

[114] Forell, Zinzendorf: Nine Public Lectures, p. 114.

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[115] On the term "Great Awakening", see Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity, p. 136.

[116] See Edward S. Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1965), p. 3.

[117] Ibid., pp. 16-24. See also Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 282.

[118] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 282; on Jonathan Edwards' role in the first Great Awakening, see Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973), pp. 133-163.

[119] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, pp. 281-282.

[120] Gaustad, The Great Awakening, p. 25.

[121] Ibid., pp. 32-41.

[122] The Arminian position tended to reduce the decisions of faith to "a human, rational possibility": see Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity, p. 91.

[123] George Whitefield, "Marriage of Cana," in Robert L. Bushman, ed., The Great Awakening. Documents on the Revival of Religion, 1740-1745 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 34-35.

[124] Gaustad, The Great Awakening, p. 43. The awakening at Northhampton in 1734 was more limited, both geographically and in the classes of persons it directly affected.

[125] Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity, p. 139. See also Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 293.

[126] Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity, p. 139.

[127] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 293.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, pp. 249-250.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 304-305.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid., pp. 306-307.

[134] Ibid., p. 307.

[135] Ibid., pp. 308-309.

[136] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, pp. 250, 255.

[137] Ibid., pp. 439-441.

[138] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 309.

[139] Ibid., p. 310.

[140] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 250, remarks that Otterbein's growing interest in Methodist societies led him to become the founder of a "New Reformed Church", the United Brethren in Christ. But Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," pp. 311-312, notes that there is nothing in the minutes of the German Reformed Coetus or Synod that could be taken as a condemnation of the course Otterbein followed.

[141] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 312.

[142] Ibid., p. 310.

[143] Ibid., p. 312.

[144] He was present, for example, at its annual meeting in Baltimore in 1806. See Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 312.

[145] Ahlstrom, A Religious History, p. 250.

[146] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 313.

[147] Frederick S. Klein, The Spiritual and Educational Background of Franklin and Marshall College (Franklin and Marshall College Studies, Vol. 2; Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Commercial Printing House, 1939), pp. 84-85.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 283.

[150] Herbert M.J. Klein, A Century of Education at Mercersburg, 1836-1936 (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1936), pp. 4-9.

[151] On Finney's influence in American churches, see Ahlstrom, A Religious History, pp. 459-461.

[152] Theodore Appel, The Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin (Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication House, 1889), pp. 35-39.

[153] Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Synod at Hagerstown, Maryland, September 24-28, 1820. Text of the minutes may be found in George W. Richards, _History of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States, 1825-1934_ (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Rudisill and Company, Inc., 1952), p. 97.

[154] Richards, _History of the Theological Seminary_, pp. 116-124.

[155] Ibid., pp. 110-115.

[156] The decision to transfer location of the theological seminary from York to Lancaster was made in 1835 at a meeting of the Synod in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. See Dubbs, "History of the Reformed Church, German," p. 355.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN ROOTS OF THE MERCERSBURG ECCLESIOLOGY

It will be the purpose of this second chapter to situate the Mercersburg theological program, especially its ecclesiological outlook, within the context of the single most important debate that rumbled through Christianity in the first half of the nineteenth century. That debate concerned the conflict between an emerging historico-critical method (associated especially with the "Tübingen School") and the claims of traditional Christian orthodoxy. Philip Schaff and John Nevin were among the first theologians in America to recognize the implications of this debate and to develop a systematic response to its challenges. Since the debate originated in European university circles, the first phase in investigating the early development of the Mercersburg ecclesiology must consist in a discussion of the theological climate in nineteenth century Europe. It was from this environment that Philip Schaff emerged. The second phase of our investigation will necessitate an analysis of four leading theological figures--F.C. Baur, A. Neander, J.A. Moehler and S.T. Coleridge--each of whom adopted a somewhat different response to the conflict between criticism and faith and each of whom was to exert an influence on the Mercersburg men.

THE EUROPEAN ROOTS OF THE MERCERSBURG THEOLOGICAL PROGRAM

The early nineteenth century was an extremely fertile period for Christian theology in Europe. Under the dominating influences of pietism, rationalism and romanticism, what came to be known as the "liberal" program, especially in Protestant theology, began to unfold.[1] As a young man, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often identified as the "father" of liberal Protestant theology, had been nurtured by the pietism of Count Zinzendorf's Moravian brotherhood, with its strong individualism and its earnest Christocentric piety.[2] Although there appears to be a mighty chasm between the devotional pietism of Zinzendorf and the higher criticism of the early nineteenth century liberal theologians, one can find, upon examination, some unsuspected affinities. The centrality of the "conversion experience" for eighteenth century pietism, especially in its Moravian and Wesleyan forms, actually served to assert the primacy of the human subject in religious experience over against heteronomous control by stilted doctrinal debates and theological *obiter dicta*, however authoritative. In a word, eighteenth century pietism contributed to the emancipation of the believer as an autonomous inquirer (the preferred pietist vocabulary would have been "seeker"); it made the autonomous personal subject the pivotal center of valid religious experience.

It is not so surprising, then, that when a man like Schleiermacher began to orchestrate his theological program

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he emphasized the reactions of the religious subject and located religion in the field of "Gefühl", of "immediate self-consciousness".[3] It was Schleiermacher's contention that "any significant speech about God had to be discourse in which the self was concerned. . ." and that "consciousness of the truth was peculiarly one with self-consciousness."[4] Like his contemporaries Hegel (1770-1831) and Coleridge (1772-1834) Schleiermacher was faced not only with the demolition of eighteenth century optimism about "natural religion", but also with the philosophical challenge of Kant, who had denied any basis for knowledge of God through theoretical reason.[5]

Early nineteenth century theology thus faced an enormous task of reconstruction. It had to renogitiate the most primary questions about the nature and legitimacy of the theological enterprise and about its claims to meaning and truth. That the course of this renogiation was influenced by "romanticism" is widely admitted by scholars today, though agreement about what that term means is in no way universal.[6] With Sydney Ahlstrom it is perhaps more accurate to resist defining romanticism in favor of locating it descriptively as a pervasive "mood", first associated with individuals like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and fanned out across Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[7]

As in the case of the relation between pietism and liberalism, some unexpected affinities between this emergent romantic temper and the severe Kantian challenge to the claims of theoretical reason can be recognized. Before his personal "awakening" in 1772, Kant considered himself a rationalist, a man committed to the notion that out of its own resources human reason can ascertain the truth.[8] By the time the Critique of Pure Reason appeared in 1781 Kant was less sanguine about the possibilities of human knowledge and more sober in his assessment of its limitations. Moreover Kant had reversed the prevailing cognitive theory--that knowledge consists in the conformity of the "knower" to the "thing known"--by arguing that objects themselves must conform to "the constitution of our faculty of intuition."[9]

Though Kant was no pietist, his philosophy, like late eighteenth century pietism, led to renewed interest in the creative autonomy of the human subject. As Ahlstrom remarks: "Kant's philosophy. . .enfranchises the mind, conceives of it as creative and active, as having a truly constitutive role in man's cognition of the world".[10] By denying the right and even the possibility of human reason to establish a legitimate starting point for theology, Kant forced the European theologians of the early nineteenth century to move away from previous dogmatic securities and to embrace a far more critical approach to the theological task.

Thus, through a strange marriage, Rousseau's romantic temper and Kant's critique of reason led to the birth of several new theological programs in the nineteenth century.[11] Schleiermacher's own revisionist program of Glaubenslehre was one such offspring, for Schleiermacher was well acquainted with Kant's philosophy from his student days at Halle and with German romanticism during his later Berlin career as a pastor and teacher. But Schleiermacher did not stand alone as the representative of the new romantic mood in theology. Hegel and, in a somewhat different fashion, Coleridge (1772-1834), represented the same mood, if not always with the same results. In the view of Claude Welch, all three of these men were engaged in a task of demythologizing Christianity and of internalizing the mythic structures of Christian faith in order to produce "new and constructive views of the nature, the truth value, the limitations, and the possibilities" of theological discourse.[12]

An accurate understanding of the Mercersburg theology as developed by Philip Schaff and John Nevin requires that one keep in mind the shifting European theological mood represented especially by Schleiermacher, Hegel and Coleridge--and by their disciples. Schaff's student days at Tübingen (1837-1839), Halle (1839-1840) and Berlin (1840-1841) put him in touch with some of the earliest representatives of the "new German theology".[13] Though Schaff himself was not a student of either Schleiermacher or Hegel (each had died a few years before Schaff's arrival at the University of Berlin), he did attend the lectures of the influential church historian Dr. August Neander (1789-1850).[14] Similarly, during his earlier studies at Tübingen, Schaff had been a student of another major church historian, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860).[15] Both Neander and Baur directly influenced

Schaff's conception of church history and ecclesiology.[16] Some comments about the nature of that influence are in order here.

THE INFLUENCE OF AUGUST NEANDER AND FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR

Philip Schaff is often understood simply as Neander's pupil and subsequent spokesman, especially in the area of Christian historiography. Schaff himself may have contributed to this common impression. For example, in his laudatory article on "Neander as a Church Historian", Schaff celebrates his former teacher's achievements by remarking:

> From the beginning of his public activity. . . Neander appeared as one of the leading founders of the new evangelical theology in Germany, and its most conspicuous representative on the field of ecclesiastical and dogmatic history. His first and greatest merit now consists in this, that in opposition to the coldly intellectual and negatively critical method of Rationalism, he brought the religious and practical element of history again to its rights, without doing the least wrong at the same time to the claims of science. This comes into view very clearly in the preface already to the first volume of his great work, where he declares it to be the main object of his life to set forth the history of Christ, "as a speaking proof of the divine power of Christianity, as a school of christian experience, a voice of edification, instruction and warning, sounding through all centuries, for all who are willing to hear."[17]

This is an extremely suggestive passage, more important for what it alludes to than for what it says explicitly. Neander viewed church history as "a school of christian experience, a voice of edification." Such a view is not so remarkable until one locates it in the context of the bitter debates that rumbled in the first half of the nineteenth century about the meaning and purpose of church history. Neander represented what Klaus Penzel has called the "evangelical" or "romantic" camp of Christian historiographers.[18] He was opposed by F.C. Baur and by lesser luminaries of the Tübingen school who formed the "critical" or "idealistic" camp.[19] The Tübingen "higher critics" were concerned with an historical theology that gave primary emphasis to the search for historical truth free from restrictive dogmatic presuppositions.

The debate between the "evangelical" Neander and the "critical" Baur was, in fact, a conflict between the claims of traditional Christian dogma and the requirements of a thorough scientific criticism of sources. Although the clouds of conflict had already begun to gather in the eighteenth century, the storm broke out publicly with the rising historical consciousness of the early nineteenth century. Baur and his colleagues were committed to a critical systematic examination of the evidence for the origins and development of the Christian church.[20] It was Baur's earnest conviction that Christian theologians and historians could no longer afford either to ignore scientific criticism or to oppose it as godless paganism. He sought to mediate between theology and criticism because he was convinced that there was no irreconcilable opposition between the authentic faith of the Christian community and the critical-speculative sciences of the modern period.[21] The task of both Christian theologian and Christian historiographer was reconciliation. Indeed, for Baur, reconciliation was the organizing core of all religious experience, the mediating basis that united the subjective and the objective components of religion.[22]

Thus Baur opposed both "supernaturalism" and "rationalism". He felt that supernaturalism was a thinly disguised form of dualism, a failure properly to understand the relation between God and human history. In Baur's opinion dualist supernaturalism tended to view history as the everlasting conflict between light and darkness, God and Satan, truth and error. It resulted, further, in a dualist vision of the church as a "supernatural essense" with "historical manifestations".[23] The failure of such supernaturalism resulted, according to Baur's system of thought, from "the conceptual inability to grasp the history of the church as a unified, internally coherent total process, which contains within itself the principle of its own nature and development."[24]

But Baur contended that rationalism, the common alternative to supernaturalism, was likewise unable to grasp the connection between God and history. He complained that rationalism atomized history into discontinuous, unconnected moments and failed to discern history's fundamental cohesion, its continuity and development.[25] Baur's premier complaint against rationalism stands out sharply in his discussion of the work of Ludwig T. Spittler, whose historiography represented a kind of high-water mark in the type of historical

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thinking associated with the Enlightenment.[26] Spittler's rationalism led him into a skeptical subjectivism and a denial of any real providence in the course of human history. Baur objected to this view and commented:

> Thus not only do we not know what Christianity is, but also we do not need to know, because everyone surely takes Christianity only as it appears to him in his subjective way of thinking. As Spittler says, not even the historian may state his convictions as historical fact, since the book on whose information the whole affair must be judged ought to be in everyone's hands, and since it demands, from each individual. . . an investigation of his own. To this extent, then, everything connected with Christianity is left to the discretion of individual subjectivity.[27]

A bit later Baur complained:

> Where it is impossible to make out an objective principle of historical development there remains as a highest causality only chance, the contingency of outward circumstances, and the equally contingent situation of single individuals. From this point of view it makes no difference whether or not we call chance Providence.[28]

Baur's rejection of both supernaturalism and rationalism in favor of a "mediating" and "reconciliatory" view of history and theology shows unmistakably the influence of Hegel. Although Baur found difficulties in Hegel's Christology, he substantially assumed the Hegelian doctrine of reconciliation (divine nature mediating itself with itself) as the basis for his own view of history and theology.[29] As Baur himself put it:

> Christianity itself is nothing other than the revelation and external realization of the mystery of redemption existing eternally in God. However, that which is realized externally is, according to its principle, already existing

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> implicitly; and it can rightly be said that the whole of historical reality is nothing other than the consciousness in time of that which exists as an eternal idea in God.[30]

Baur's criticism of the supernaturalist and the rationalist positions also extended to the "neo-supernaturalism" of historians like August Neander. In reflecting upon Neander's view of Christian origins Baur wrote:

> In a single word, Neander adheres to a strictly supernaturalistic conception of the origin and nature of Christianity. If Christianity is an absolutely supernatural miracle, shattering the continuity of history, then history has nothing further to do with it, it can only stand before the miracle and see in it the end of its research and understanding. As miracle, the origin of Christianity is an absolutely incomprehensible beginning. . .the uncritical procedure of Neander in the area of New Testament criticism and in all church-historical questions connected with it, and the obvious endeavor to make belief in miracles acceptable and convincing with reasons that could serve only for apologetic interests, lie too closely before the eyes to admit of any doubt. . .[31]

Baur felt that Neander's admission of "miracle" as an explanatory factor for the origins and early development (especially the first three centuries) of Christianity was an admission that effectively checked any true progress in church historiography. Moreover Neander's appeal to miracle resulted in the destruction of any genuine view of historical development. Baur argued that Neander's effort to limit the supernatural operation of the historical principle to the first part of the process of development of the church was, finally, unsuccessful.[32] With some exasperation Baur remarked:

> How can the same principle [of development] work first supernaturally, then naturally? And how meaningless it is to talk, nevertheless, of

> a process of development! This view is as dualistic as it is supernaturalistic. If Christianity is so different in principle from human nature, then Christianity and human nature are two essentially different principles, opposites, which as such are related only externally. They work on each other externally, jostle each other, affect each other this way or that, but can never become internally one with each other. . .a unity of the whole and a principle of progressive development is here nowhere to be seen.[33]

Thus Baur's charge against Neander was twofold: first, he challenges Neander's admission of miracle as a causal motive for the rise and early progress of Christianity. Secondly, Baur denies that Neander has achieved any real doctrine of historical development precisely because he has failed to produce an internally consistent principle that would ground and sustain such a development. The result is a failure to reconcile theology and criticism. History in Neander's mode cannot commit itself fully to the rugged principles of historical criticism. It thus becomes an exercise in piety and edification, while it fails to overcome the impression of a dualistic incompatibility between Christianity and human nature. Baur argued:

> Christianity is cut off from reason, yet it can be comprehended by human nature and reason only naturally and rationally. The two can never attain unity, since Christianity can no more surrender its supernatural character than reason can acknowledge a determination of its own limits by Christianity. Thus the whole of history comes to resemble the movement of a ball being sent back and forth between the natural force of human reason and the supernatural force of Christianity. Reason forever seeks to enter into Christianity but is in continual rebound from its suprarational and supernatural aspects.[34]

Interestingly, the very charges Baur brings against Neander are the items Schaff applauds in his essay on the same man. Schaff was especially appreciative of Neander's piety, as the following text shows:

> As Spener and Franke formerly, so Neander likewise views theology, and consequently church history also, not as an exercise simply of the understanding, but as a practical business of the heart at the same time, and has for his chosen motto: Pectus est quod theologum facit. On this account, his works have a great advantage over the productions of the modern Tübingen school, as well as over the Text Book of Gieseler, which in point of learning and acute investigation at least deserves to be considered of equal distinction.[35]

A bit further in his essay Schaff draws even more sharply the contrast between "devotionalists" like Neander and rationalists like Gieseler or Baur:

> Neander moves through the history of the church with believing sense and devotional spirit; Gieseler with critical keenness of vision and cold intellect. The first lives in his heroes, thinks, feels, acts and suffers with them; the second surveys their movements from abroad, without love or hatred, without sympathy or antipathy. The one kisses reverently the footsteps of his Lord and Savior, wherever he may meet him; the other remains passionless and indifferent before even the most glorious revelations of the Christian life.[36]

These remarks are evidence of Schaff's high regard for Neander's view of history and theology. By implication Schaff disparages the more critical work of Baur: "his [Neander's] works have a great advantage over the productions of the modern Tübingen school."[37] It can certainly be affirmed that, at least in this essay of 1852, Schaff himself leaves the reader with the impression that his sympathies lie squarely within the "romantic", "evangelical", "pietist" camp of Neander. Still, there is evidence that Schaff's relation to Neander's thought was far more complex than one of adoring student to successful teacher. The complexity of that relationship will merit some attention later in this chapter.

Despite Schaff's affinity for Neander's brand of historiography, the influence of F.C. Baur cannot be discounted altogether. Indeed, it would be an error to suppose that Schaff's vigorous appreciation of Neander's piety reflected a distaste for critical history. For in Schaff's view the genius of Neander lay in his ability to combine both piety and a healthy respect for scientific criticism:

> . . .the innermost peculiarity, the fairest ornament and most abiding worth, of Neander's treatment of church history, may be said to consist in the *organic interpenetration and living marriage of the two elements of science and practical religion*. . .Neander is religious, *not although*, but *because* he is scientific, and he is scientific *because* he is religious. This is the only sort of edification we may expect from a learned work, but which also we *must* expect, where it has Christianity and its historical development for its contents. . .A church historian without faith and piety is only able at best to set before us, instead of the living body of Christ, a cold marble statue without seeing eye or feeling heart.[38]

Schaff had made a similar point in an earlier essay on Neander, where he remarked:

> He pursued theology, not as an exercise of the understanding merely, but always as a sacred business of the heart also, which he felt to be most intimately connected with the highest and most solemn interests of man, his eternal welfare and worth. The living center and heart's blood

> of the science was for him faith in Jesus Christ, as the highest revelation of a holy and merciful God, as the fountain of all salvation and sanctifying grace for the world.[39]

Despite such complimentary testimonies about Neander's life and work,[40] however, Schaff's approval of him was not unqualified. Three points particularly about Neander's theology and church history bothered Schaff.[41] A brief discussion of these three points will help clarify the extent to which Schaff relied not on Neander but on Baur for his approach to Christian historiography.

1. First, Schaff felt that Neander tended to be "unchurchly", that his view of the organic unity and the objective reality of the historical Christian church was deficient.[42] In his essay "Neander as a Church Historian" Schaff charged: ". . .he does not sufficiently recognize the objective and realistic character of Christianity and the Church, and betrays through all he has written on the subject, a disposition to resolve the whole mystery into something purely inward and ideal. In this respect he appears to us quite too little Catholic, in the real and historical sense of the word."[43] Even when Schaff commends Neander's ecclesiology, it is the latter's insistence on the "invisible" church that receives attention, as in the following passage from the "Recollections" essay:

> Thus was Neander in the noblest sense the friend of man, because Christ's friend, at home in all spheres of the invisible Church, the exact impression of evangelical catholicity, and an interpreter of the communion of saints, which transcends all limits of time and space, and

> comprehends all the children of God under the One Head Christ.[44]

Neander's emphasis on the spiritual invisibility of the church ran counter to Schaff's insistence on the historical visibility, unity and objectivity of the Christian community. In defense of his former teacher Schaff attributed this characteristic of Neander's thought to the influence of Schleiermacher, the "German Plato" who "possessed an extraordinarily keen eye for the personal and individual, and maintained everywhere its rights."[45]

2. Secondly, Schaff maintained that Neander occasionally conceded too much to the rationalists, to the higher criticism customarily associated with the Tübingen school.[46] This criticism was directly related to Schaff's charge that Neander was "unchurchly". For while Neander was successful at reconciling the "scientific" with the "religious" element in his theology, he was unable, Schaff argued, to mediate between the scientific and the "churchly" element. By the lack of a "churchly" element in Neander's thought Schaff meant "a want of decided orthodoxy".[47] It was particularly in the area of New Testament scholarship that Schaff noticed this flaw in Neander's work:

> In his treatment of the Life of Jesus and of the Apostolical Period, we meet. . .doubts on the strictly historical character of certain sections of the evangelical history, and on the genuineness of single books of the ecclesiastical canon, (namely, the First Epistle to Timothy, the Second Epistle of Peter, and the Apocalypse,) which though by no means rationalistic indeed, are nevertheless somewhat too loose and indefinite, and make too many and at times too serious concessions, in our judgment, to modern criticism.[48]

Once again Schaff attributed this unorthodox flaw to Neander's association with the school of Schleiermacher. He recommended that the only effective antidote to the onslaughts of modern criticism lay in "full and unconditional reverence for the holy word of God", a "humble bringing of reason into captivity to the obedience of faith", or at least a "present suspension of decisive judgment, in the hope that farther and deeper inquiry may lead to more satisfactory results."[49]

3. On the other hand, Schaff felt that Neander was too unsympathetic to some currents of historical and theological research, especially those emerging from the Hegelian "right".[50] In a word, Schaff believed that Neander was too soft on the higher critics of the New Testament and too hard on the speculative theologians of the Hegelian right.[51]

Unquestionably Schaff could agree with Neander's opposition to men like F.D. Strauss, whose Life of Jesus violently shook the German theological world in 1835.[52] Strauss' work was based on the flat denial that anything "miraculous" or "supernatural" could occur in human history. The relation between God and the world could only be *indirect*, through the ordinary operation of the laws of nature. Strauss asserted, in the second edition of the Life of Jesus:

> The miracles which God works for Moses, Jesus, and through them, are in no way secondary products of his working in the whole, but presuppose a direct influence in the individual object and, in so far, are in opposition to the

> usual kind of divine activity in the world. Now the supernatural view presupposed an exception to this kind of activity, valid only for the sphere of biblical history. That is a presupposition which we with our standpoint (this is the critical research which has no presuppositions--a claim we make for the present investigation. . .) cannot share. Our standpoint allows the same laws to hold sway in every sphere of being and activity; and therefore where a narrative runs contrary to the laws of nature, it must be regarded as unhistorical.[53]

Throughout his life Schaff was to consider Strauss a representative of shameless rationalism carried to a superlative degree, though Neander himself was willing to hedge a bit by conceding that some of Christ's miracles might be explained by the operation of as yet unknown and thus "natural" scientific forces.[54] Schaff did not seriously come to grips with the challenge presented by Strauss and the higher criticism of Tübingen until much later in his life (1882).[55] When he finally did respond to the seminal issues raised by the Hegelian "left", his reaction was negative. In this Schaff showed himself an orthodox champion of Neander's school with its reverence for the Apostolic Age as the supernatural "century of miracles".[56]

It might seem, then, that Baur's influence on Schaff was simply negative. That this was not the case, however, can be corroborated by Schaff's own remarks. In the Autobiographical Reminiscences one finds the following passage about F.C. Baur:

> [Baur]. . .filled me with intellectual admiration for his rare genius and scholarship. He had great magnetism as a teacher. . .He gave me the first idea of historical development, or of a constant and progressive flow of thought

> in the successive ages of the church. He made sad havoc with the literature of the apostolic age, and transferred all the writings of the canon, except the four great Epistles of Paul and the Apocalypse of John, down to the post-apostolic age. . .[57]

In these words Schaff acknowledges his indebtedness to Baur for a central theme in the Mercersburg ecclesiology: the idea of historical development, "of a constant and progressive flow of thought in the successive ages of the church."

Thus, despite his opposition to the "sad havoc" Baur wrought in New Testament criticism, Schaff was willing to entertain his old Tübingen professor's evolutionary view of church history. However much Schaff may have lamented Baur's unorthodox position about the origins of the Christian church, there can be little doubt that the latter influenced the former's conviction that "knowledge of developments comprising the history of Christianity was essential to the further progress of religion."[58]

It must be admitted, then, that both Baur and Neander affected Schaff's thinking about Christian historiography and ecclesiology. But it is inadequate to attribute the effects of such contrary influences merely to eclecticism on Schaff's part. Schaff clearly thought of Christian historiography as a theological enterprise, as an act of "retrospective prophecy", and not simply as the reportage of assorted facts about church life throughout the ages.[59] This point is evident early in Schaff's career, as when he wrote in his What is Church History?:

> History is still regarded and treated as a mere conglomeration of notices, more or less interesting, thrown together in a perfectly outward way. The body, the outward appearance simply, is considered to be enough. That which constitutes the main thing in history, the ideas which rule it and reveal themselves in the process, imparting to it its only true significance and importance, are too generally disregarded altogether. The conception of an organic development is wanting almost entirely; and yet without this it is not possible ever to come to any right understanding, especially of the history of the church.[60]

To write the history of the Christian church was impossible, according to Schaff, without a faithful theological appreciation of the church as the objective, historical continuation of Christ's life and work: "In the Church, Christ carries forward, so to speak, his divine human life. . ."[61]

The influence of both Baur and Neander are evident in Schaff's endeavor to combine a critical examination of historical sources with a preliminary theological judgment about the meaning and value of the Christian church. While Baur was committed to the search for historical truth through freedom from all dogmatic presuppositions, Neander admitted such presuppositions and felt that church history should edify.[62] Schaff's own program left him with a foot in both camps. He seems to have tried to graft as much of Baur's criticism onto Neander's pietism as possible. That Schaff could attempt this was possible, in the opinion of Klaus

Penzel, through the mediating influence of Schleiermacher.[63] It was Schleiermacher who first successfully combined romantic individualism with the concept of organic growth. This combination allowed him to produce an understanding of history as an "evolutionary, organic, individualizing process".[64] In What is Church History?, Schaff explicitly alluded to Schleiermacher as a promoter of both "evangelical" and "developmental" views in Christian historiography:

> The productive, strictly evangelical element, in his [Schleiermacher's] system, is found in this; that he placed the person of Christ as the Redeemer and author of a new life, in the centre of theology; put emphasis on the idea of communion in religion; and in this manner opened the way at least for a churchly tendency. He forms a supplementary counterpoise over against the Hegelian theory thus far, that he fastens his eye sharply in particular upon the original and specific in Christianity, and instead of starting from the idea, makes religious experience rather the fountain of dogmatic knowledge.[65]

It was through Schleiermacher that Schaff traced Neander's sense of organic development in the history of the Christian church:

> He [Neander] attaches himself, namely, still more closely than Schleiermacher, to the real and positive element of religion, and allows far more weight to the idea of organic development. In this respect he appears in a certain affinity with the Hegelian philosophy, although known as one of its bitter opponents.[66]

Schleiermacher thus provided the mediating principle that permitted Schaff to do church history in a way that would satisfy both the demands of historical criticism and the claims of Christian faith. Summarizing Schaff's work in Christian historiography, Klaus Penzel remarks that the former accomplished his task "in the shadow of Schleiermacher and Hegel, by grafting Baur onto Neander. . .and by ignoring Strauss."[67] Thus it was Schaff's purpose, especially in his early works, to combine German idealism and romanticism by accepting Hegel's principle of dialectical development and by adopting Schleiermacher's view of Christianity as an unfolding, organic process in which the Christ-life is "individualized" in the lives of believers.[68]

JOHANN ADAM MOEHLER

Schleiermacher's thought not only opened up a way for Schaff to reconcile historical criticism and Christian faith, it also influenced a young Roman Catholic theologian at the University of Tübingen, Johann Adam Moehler. In his History of the Apostolic Church Schaff spoke exuberantly of "the spirited and pious Moehler" and acknowledged him as "the greatest Roman Catholic theologian since Bellarmine and Bossuet."[69] Moreover Schaff noted that Moehler's vision of ecclesiology and church history had been shaped, in part at least, by both Schleiermacher and August Neander.[70]

Moehler's career in the Catholic theological faculty at Tübingen had begun in the summer of 1823 with his appointment as lecturer.[71] At this time the Catholic faculty there had already established a reputation for progressive thinking and for independence from strict papal orthodoxy. In fact two of Moehler's senior colleagues, Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853) and Johann Baptist Hirscher (1788-1865), had been accused, though not convicted, of heresy by suspicious conservatism in Rome.[72]

The liberal spirit of inquiry at Tübingen provided immediate encouragement for Moehler. He lost no time joining his colleagues in their spirited resistance against the rigid, juridical theology of established Roman allegiance. Moehler's first article as a faculty member at Tübingen was a scathing review of Ferdinand Walter's Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, a manual of canon law.[73] Moehler argued, first, that church authority played a far less vital role in the theological development of Christianity than canon lawyers were prepared to admit. For example, many of the ecumenical councils were convened not through the efforts of ecclesiastical authorities like the pope, but through historical accidents of force and circumstance. As Moehler put it:

> Whoever had the greatest external power convoked the council; whoever had the greatest interior power presided over it; and the whole Church confirmed it.[74]

Moehler went on to a sharp attack against what he called the "papal system", especially the claim of papal infallibility. Noting that such a claim was unknown in the earliest centuries of Christianity, Moehler argued that mere papal approval of a doctrine--or the lack of such approval--cannot of itself render that doctrine either orthodox or heterodox. Moehler's argument went like this: a doctrine is catholic and orthodox when it represents the faith of the entire church and is confirmed as such by a truly ecumenical council. Papal approbation adds nothing further; it cannot make such a doctrine "more catholic" or "more orthodox". On the other hand if a doctrine does not truly represent the faith of the whole church and is not confirmed as such by a genuinely ecumenical council, then no amount of papal approval can render that doctrine catholic and orthodox.[75] Citing a famous example, Moehler asks: "Was an Arian Synod like that of Sirmium orthodox simply because Liberius, the bishop of Rome, endorsed it?"[76] In the doctrine of papal infallibility Moehler perceived an inherent contradiction. For infallibility suggests that a doctrine can be declared catholic (i.e. universal) in as much as it has been confirmed by a single individual.

Further, Moehler argued vigorously for the "episcopal system" in preference to the papal system. In Moehler's view the pope could not lay claim to a universal episcopal jurisdiction superior to that of all the other bishops combined. Nor could the pope set himself up as the ultimate infallible oracle of sacred doctrine. Moehler quoted with approval the opinion of the conciliarist Jean Cerson (1363-1429):

> Quia angelus papa esse non potest, ergo papa ut papa est homo, et, ut homo sic est papa; et ut papa potest peccare, et ut homo errare.[77]

The pope is not only capable of doctrinal error, but in such a case he can be judged and even deposed by the universal church (e.g., through an ecumenical council). According to Moehler it is not the pope who gives an ecumenical council its authority. His presence at such a council is demanded not in virtue of his being putative "head of the church" but in virtue of his being, as bishop of Rome, a member of the episcopal college.

Although he was to moderate this conciliarist position in later publications, Moehler's strong anti-papal position did not go unnoticed. He quickly became the leading light of the younger generation of Catholic theologians at Tübingen. In 1825 Moehler published his *Die Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des Katholizismus dargestellt im Geiste der Kirchenväter der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*.[78] This work reveals both Moehler's romanticism and his debt to Schleiermacher. Three themes permeate *Die Einheit*: the notion of "organic wholeness"; the idea of life and love as the essential, constitutive "life-principle" (*Lebensprinzip*) of the church; and the unity of the church's history. As will be seen, these themes reappear in the ecclesiology of Philip Schaff.

At the root of Moehler's ecclesiology in *Die Einheit* is a Christian anthropology which asserts that to be truly human, to be "in God", is to be part of an organic whole. In paragraph 31 of *Die Einheit* Moehler wrote:

> Everyone recognizes that man is, by nature, inserted into an organic whole. He must consider himself a member of that whole and he must act accordingly. He is obliged to accept the bonds and relations that connect him with that whole. This is what the schoolmen called "being one with the universe", the harmony between an individual's life and the life of the universe. For the universe, as such, is rooted in God and is a kind of global revelation of God. Because man is part of this organic whole, he is rooted in God and he

> can know God in this whole. . .This is the secret of our knowledge of God: we can know him who created the whole only in the whole because God fully reveals himself only in the whole. How, then, can the individual know God? He can know him. . .by embracing the whole with his love. . . It is by love that we can stretch beyond ourselves and become one with the whole: it is love that knows God. The universe is represented for us men through humanity.[79]

A bit further in the same paragraph Moehler noted:

> Christ, the Son of God and the New Creator, can be known and grasped only in the totality of his faithful, only to the degree that the individual understands himself as a part of that whole which is the new creation--just as God the Father, the creator of the universe, can be grasped only by the individual who makes himself one with that universe.[80]

The organic wholeness of humanity and of the Christian church resulted, in Moehler's opinion, from the work of the Holy Spirit. It is this Spirit that establishes the mystical unity of believers in all ages: for the same Spirit that anointed Jesus and the apostles continues to anoint believers today.[81] The gift of the Spirit to believers grounds and sustains the "interior Tradition, a mysterious reality that defies all human analysis."[82] This interior tradition is not a system of doctrines or practices; it is a life, a "living, spiritual force which we inherit from our fathers and which is perpetuated in the church."[83] Moehler remarks:

> According to the teaching of the primitive church, true faith, true Christian experience, depends upon the presence of the Holy Spirit; and this presence has, for its part, an intimate connection with the church. If we ask more precisely how this life spreads itself, we can reply: "Each individual is to be stamped, by a personal religious experience, with the holy

> life that exists in the church. He is to transform and to make truly his own by contemplation the religious experience of the community. He must create and develop within himself a life entirely holy, a life that is consonant with those dispositions which his knowledge of Christianity have inspired."[84]

Moehler's conception of the church as a "mystical unity-in-life" established by the Spirit found clear echoes in the thought of the Mercersburg theologians, especially in John Nevin's work. In The Mystical Presence, for example, Nevin argues that Christianity is "not a doctrine, to be taught or learned like a system of philosophy or a rule of moral conduct."[85] Rather, Christianity is "a life. . .Not a rule or mode of life simply; not something that in its own nature requires to be reduced to practice; for that is the character of all morality. But life in its very nature and constitution, and as such the actual substance of truth itself. This is its grand distinction."[86]

In his "Introduction" to the English edition of Philip Schaff's The Principle of Protestantism, Nevin wrote in a manner that strongly recalls Moehler's formulations concerning the "organic wholeness" of humanity and of the church:

> The life of man, in any view, is not something single and separate. To a great extent, it holds in the order and constitution of his nature as a whole. Humanity is not an aggregation merely of men, but an organic unity rather in which all men are one. And so Christianity also as the perfect conception of humanity, must take possession of it not by separate individuals simply, separately taken, but generically. It must penetrate and transform into its own image the life, the whole life of the race, as such; and not until this shall have been done, can it be said to have fulfilled its mission, or actualized

> its idea, or accomplished its full development in the consciousness of the world. Thus we have in the church as a whole necessarily, the same progressive, leavenlike action of the Christian life, which we have just seen to hold in the history of the single believer. The kingdom of heaven here also is like leaven, but in a still more important sense as transfusing itself intensively into the life of humanity itself, as an organic whole.[87]

Like the Moehler of Die Einheit, Nevin viewed Christianity as a progressive, evolutionary life that gradually transforms the consciousness of humanity into itself. The Christian mission is not "extensive", but "intensive". What gives the Christian missionary impulse its force is not the desire to spread the external forms of church life, but the leavenlike power to transform human consciousness from within. This is one reason why Moehler and his Catholic colleagues at Tübingen objected tirelessly to the imposition of western Latin customs on new Christians in mission lands. In his 1823 review of Walter's manual of canon law, Moehler urged the use of vernacular in the liturgy. With considerable sarcasm he opposed Walter's suggestion that Latin be maintained as a symbol of church unity:

> What a stirring example of uniformity it is, for example, when all nuns pray the Latin breviary! What a marvelous unity, when no community in the whole Catholic world understands its priest!. . . Can there not also be a uniformity in foolishness?[88]

For Moehler, as later for Nevin and Schaff, no amount of external conformity could produce church unity. The transmission of Christian faith is concerned not with the communication of concepts, but with the propagation of a life. Forms and structures, customs and concepts, rites and rules may be imperfect manifestations of that life, but they can never be identified with it. Life (which Moehler sometimes identifies with love) always assumes priority over knowledge. It is this life which unites men in faith and serves as the ultimate principle of unity for the church:

> Unity is found essentially in a life created immediately and continually by the divine Spirit who desires to manifest and perpetuate himself through the power of mutual love.[89]

Thus Christian tradition is not a matter of static, irreformable dogmas, but the living consciousness of faith as it achieves external expression through the centuries. Moehler wrote in Die Einheit:

> Tradition is the expression of the Holy Spirit enlivening the community of the faithful as it moves through all the ages, as it lives at each moment, as it takes flesh at all times.[90]

Moehler argues, therefore, that there is no opposition between Scripture and tradition. They are not two separate and sometimes conflicting sources of faith, but two facets of a single reality. Scripture and tradition blend into one another; "they exist one in the other."[91] Any opposition between the two is based on a false understanding of their relationship. The Scriptures are already a record of tradition, and tradition is the continuing incarnation of the gospel in the experience of believers. "The Scriptures are the 'incarnate' expression of the Holy Spirit at the beginning of Christianity, thanks to a special charism given to the apostles."[92] Thus the Scriptures are the first stage

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of a process by which the living gospel unfolds in the consciousness of the faithful.

Once again there is a parallel between Moehler's view of the Scripture/tradition relationship and the opinion defended by Schaff in his Principle of Protestantism. What Schaff describes as "formal dogmatic tradition" is quite similar to what Moehler has termed "the living gospel" that manifests itself by becoming "incarnate" in the life of Christians. Schaff wrote:

> Quite different. . .is the case of the formal dogmatic tradition. This is such as has not for its contents something different from what is contained in the Bible, but forms the channel by which these contents are conducted forward in history; the onward development thus of church doctrine and church life, as comprehended first dogmatically in the so-called rules of faith, above all in the Apostles' Creed, and then in the ecumenical creeds--the Nicene and Athanasian --and still further as orally carried forward, apart from all written statement, through the entire course of church history, so that everyone, before he wakes even to self-consciousness, is made involuntarily to feel its power. Tradition in this sense is absolutely indispensable.[93]

Both Moehler and Schaff seem to agree that tradition is a continuing stream of consciousness in Christian life, the continual re-awakening of the gospel through the power of the Spirit living in the church.

In Die Einheit Moehler's ecclesiology is pneumatocentric.[94] It is the Spirit that creates the mystical unity of believers, even though that Spirit remains independent, distinct from the church.[95]

But the development of Moehler's ecclesiology did not stop with Die Einheit. Like tradition it evolved. Seven years after the appearance of Die Einheit, in 1832, Moehler published a much larger work entitled Symbolik, oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensatze der Katholiken und Protestanten.[96] As the title of the work implies, Moehler sought to clarify the basic doctrinal differences between the two Christian confessions.

During the years between Die Einheit and Symbolik, a shift in Moehler's ecclesiology had occurred. In his earlier, pneumatocentric Die Einheit, the church appears simply as the new life born of the Spirit and manifested in the historical consciousness of believers. Peter Riga writes: "According to the Einheit, the Church is the totality of believers who have the plenitude of the Spirit; according to the Symbolik, the Church is the visible community of believers, founded by Jesus Christ in a body which now becomes His extension in time and space."[97]

This shift in Moehler's thinking was motivated, according to Riga, by the desire to focus greater attention on the relation between Christ and the church.[98] The earlier thought of Die Einheit had resulted in an almost exclusive emphasis on pneumatology that left little room for the visible structures of ecclesiastical life. In Riga's opinion:

> Moehler was correct in stating that the exterior and visible Church is, in a sense, born and develops in an organic way from penumatology and that this interior element is primordial; but he runs dangerously close to a sort of ecclesiological monophysitism, a confusion of the divine and human. Little room is left for the notion of Christ's action in the Church. It was this which led Moehler in 1835, [sic] in

> composing his last great work, Symbolik, to place Christ in the place of the Holy Spirit.[99]

Moreover, in Symbolik the optimistic anthropology of Die Einheit (man as part of an organic whole that is rooted in God) was exchanged for a more somber estimate of the human condition. Symbolik takes into account the darker aspects of human experience: the realities of sin, evil and failure.[100] The penumatocentrism of Die Einheit appeared to leave no place for the broken and sinful condition of humanity. By 1832 Moehler had begun to see that the church cannot adequately be defined merely as the communion-in-life of holy, just and righteous men. The problem of sinfulness in man and thus of sinfulness in the church forced Moehler to temper his earlier enthusiasm for the Spirit as the Lebensprinzip of the church.

As a consequence Moehler's Symbolik presents the church not simply as a Spirit-formed communion of love, but as the visible form of salvation established historically by Christ, the Son of God become flesh. In chapter 5 of Symbolik, Moehler offered the following formulation:

> Just as in human affairs nothing attains greatness except in society, so Christ also established a community. His divine Word, his living will and the love that flowed out of him have exerted an interior binding power on his followers. As a result, a living, closely-connected fellowship of the faithful sprang up. Of this fellowship it could be said: there they are; there is his church, his institution; he continues to live in it, his spirit continues to work in it; the word he spoke continues to resound in it. Hence, the visible church, seen from this point of view, is nothing less than the Son of God himself--manifesting himself among men in a

> human form--eternally young and ever renewed. For the church is his continuing incarnation, and thus Holy Scripture calls the faithful the "body of Christ".[101]

As Heribert Muehlen has observed, Moehler's description of the church as the "continuing incarnation" was meant to be taken analogously.[102] It was not Moehler's contention that the divine and the human elements in the church are united "hypostatically". But if that is so, then what really is the "divine" element in the church? According to strict Chalcedonian orthodoxy it is the divine Logos that constitutes the unique personhood of Christ. Can the church be described as an "ongoing incarnation" ("andauernde Fleischwerdung") without prejudicing the unique distinctiveness of the incarnation? Moehler thought it could. He argued that the church is Christ's "permanent manifestation" ("bleibende Erscheinung"); that it is at one and the same time human and divine ("göttlich und menschlich zugleich"); that it is the union of both humanity and divinity ("sie ist die Einheit von beidem").[103] In the church, as in Christ, humanity and divinity may not be separated.[104] Since it is Christ who, concealed under earthly and human forms ("in irdischen und menschlichen Gestalten verborgen") works in the church, so the church itself must be both divine and human in an unconfused, but inseparable fashion.[105] Christ, through his living Word and Spirit, constitutes the church in its visible, historical reality:

> As the Savior, he established his community through his Word and his Spirit; and in that

> community his Word lives forever, to be preserved and propagated. His Word can never be separated from the church; nor can the church ever be separated from his Word.[106]

In *Symbolik* Moehler attempted, perhaps unsuccessfully, to connect the divine and the human elements in the church by an analogous application of the Chalcedonian formula to ecclesiology.

As these texts show, the problem Moehler struggled with throughout *Symbolik* was, at root, the relation between the visible and the invisible aspects of the church. In *Die Einheit* Moehler's presentation of the church as a mystical communion generated by the Spirit had left him open to the charge that he ignored the Christological dimension of ecclesiology. *Symbolik* thus represents an attempt to redress an earlier imbalance by concentrating on the relation between Christ and the church, and by underscoring the necessity of structured social life for the church in history.

This problem of the connection between "visible" and "invisible" aspects of the church was not new to Roman Catholic ecclesiology. Under pressure from the sixteenth century reformers Robert Bellarmine had insisted on the social visibility of the Christian community. According to Bellarmine there could not be "two churches" (one earthly and sinful, the other heavenly and perfect). There could be but one church and it had to be visible:

> Nostra autem sententia est, Ecclesiam unam tantum esse, non duas, et illam unam et veram esse coetum hominum eiusdem christianae fidei professione, eorundem Sacramentorum communione

> colligatum, sub regimine legitimorum pastorum, ac praecipue unius Christi in terris vicarii Romani Pontificis.[107]

So concerned was Bellarmine to insist on the visible institution of the church that he produced the rather extreme formula: "Ecclesia est coetus hominum ita visibilis et palpabilis ut est coetus populi Romani vel regnum Galliae. . ."[108]

For Bellarmine, as for Moehler, the one church was both earthly and heavenly, human and divine, sinful and holy. Both men recognized, however, that one could distinguish between a mere external belonging and a genuine internal membership in the church. Bellarmine liked to quote Augustine's distinction between the soul and the body, as applied to the church:

> Ecclesiam esse corpus vivum, in quo est anima et corpus, et quidem anima sunt interna dona Spiritus Sancti, fides, spes, caritas etc. Corpus sunt externa professio fidei, et communicatio Sacramentorum.[109]

The Mercersburg theologians, too, struggled with the visible/invisible, human/divine, sinful/holy elements in the church. In What is Church History? Schaff distinguishes explicitly between the "invisible" and the "visible" church:

> The church, in its broad sense, and as manifested in the world, is composed of all who have been baptized into Christ, whether they be nominal Christians only or real. This, according to long traditional Protestant designation, is the visible, or, better, the mixed Church. In a narrower sense, however, and according to its inward and true character, the Church is the religious, spiritual and real communion of all true believers in Christ. This is the invisible or more correctly the pure Church. . .The visible

> Church is made up of different confessions, which in part hold a perfectly hostile relation to each other, as Catholics, Greeks, Protestants, &c. The invisible or true Church, on the other hand, is always one only; although her members are scattered in different sections of the visible Church.[110]

In this true church, Schaff asserts, men find the "uninterrupted presence of Christ, the God-man, in and among his people."[111]

A few years later, in his History of the Apostolic Church, Schaff adopts a position not unlike Moehler's later thought in Symbolik. Schaff speaks of Christianity as not merely "something subjective in single pious individuals, but also as an objective, organized visible society, as a kingdom of Christ on earth, or as a church."[112] That church is "in part a pedagogic institution to train men for heaven. . .in part the everlasting communion of the redeemed, both on earth and in heaven."[113] As the body of Christ the church is "an organic union of many members", "the dwelling-place of Christ, in which he exerts all the powers of his theanthropic life."[114] In sentences extremely reminiscent of Moehler, Schaff says:

> The Lord, therefore, through the Holy Ghost, is present in the church, in all its ordinances and means of grace, especially in the word and the sacraments; present, indeed, in a mystical, invisible, incomprehensible way, but none the less really, efficiently, and manifestly present, in his complete theanthropic person.[115]

In a word, the church is Christ's presence to men, even in their scarred and sinful condition; it is

> the continuation of the life and work of Christ upon earth, though never, indeed, so far

> as men in their present state are concerned, without a mixture of sin and error. In the church, the Lord is perpetually born anew in the hearts of believers through the Holy Ghost, who reveals Christ to us, and appropriates his work and merits to the individual soul.[116]

Here Schaff comes very close to Moehler's idea that the church is nothing less than the "*andauernde Fleischwerdung Christi*".

It may be noted that Moehler's *Symbolik* irritated and even angered F.C. Baur, who had been on the Protestant faculty at Tübingen since 1826.[117] In a letter of 1 February, 1833, Baur indicated that he was reading *Symbolik* and promised to "write something against this learned but malevolent opponent of Protestantism."[118] Baur did produce a critique that year, but Moehler interpreted it as a personal attack and from that point on relations between the two professors grew quite embittered. When Moehler accepted a professorship at Munich in 1835, Baur seems to have been relieved.[119]

This sketch of Moehler's ecclesiology reveals some striking affinities between him and the Mercersburg men. Several themes common to both have emerged: the organic wholeness of humanity; the mystical communion established between Christ and believers through the Spirit; tradition as the continual unfolding of the gospel among men; the church as a divine/human, visible/invisible, sinful/holy society in which the life and work of Christ continues to be present.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

One final influence must be studied before leaving this chapter. Of S.T. Coleridge (1772-1834) it has been said that despite the ambiguous and paradoxical character of much of his thought, "his very failures are such that beside them other men's successes look meagre."[120] Today, Coleridge's importance for theology in the ninettenth century is recognized widely by scholars.

What made Coleridge such a significant figure? As Claude Welch has noted, "What most distinguished his own account of the venture of faith. . .was his effort to explicate the rationality of it, to show that his venture is neither against nor beyond nor apart from reason, but is reason's own highest moment."[121] Coleridge's principal theological preoccupation was this: is real religious knowledge possible? If it is, how may it be validated as authentic? These questions were not unique to Coleridge. As I have already indicated earlier ~~in~~ this chapter, the conflict between the integrity of "higher criticism" and the claims of Christian faith was central to theological discussion in the early part of the nineteenth century. It will be my purpose in this section to outline what makes Coleridge's contribution to that discussion original and distinctive.

It must be remembered, of course, that Coleridge was not a systematic theologian. He left neither a *Summa* nor a *Dogmatik*. Much of his most imaginative theological

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speculation was scattered here and there in notebooks, occasional lectures and addresses. Perhaps the most systematic account of the development of his thinking is to be found in the Biographia Literaria, which appeared in 1817, seventeen years before his death.[122] A posthumous work, Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit, was published in 1840 and is valuable for Coleridge's later thought, particularly his attitude toward the Bible.[123] Aside from his poetry, Coleridge's most accessible work is probably the Aids to Reflection (1825), which presented a new apologetic for Christianity based on the idea that rational arguments and "evidences" are useless for validating the legitimacy of faith.[124]

Coleridge's theological program: It is possible to discern four levels of argument in Coleridge's theological program.[125] At each level his overriding interest in the nature of religious knowledge will be developed and refined. For, as Claude Welch notes, Coleridge perceived the cognitive problem of Christianity as "the problem of the rational character of faith and of the faithful character of reason."[126] In Coleridge's view none of the Christian theology and apologetic current in his time--deism, rationalism, evangelical supernaturalism, pantheism--satisfactorily addressed this cognitive problem.

Because the problem of knowledge is so central to Coleridge, it may be useful to outline his own theory of cognition before examining the four levels of argument in his

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theological program. This theory is treated explicitly in chapter 12 of the Biographia Literaria, and may be summarized as follows:

1. In every act of knowing, the objective (unconscious objects that exist outside ourselves) and the subjective (personal conscious intelligence) coincide, are united.[127] How can their coincidence in the act of knowing be explained?

2. Coleridge seeks to answer this question by finding a fundamental principle (starting point) of knowledge that is neither object nor subject simply, but the union of them both.[128]

3. This principle, Coleridge asserts, is nothing else than immediate self-consciousness (the "sum"; the "I am"; the "spirit"). For, "in this and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing are identical, each involving and supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject."[129]

4. According to Coleridge, then, immediate self-consciousness satisfies two conditions which every act of knowing must satisfy:

a. there must be both a "knower" (subject) and a "thing known" (object); and

b. these two must coincide, must be united, must be one. In the act of self-consciousness both these conditions are satisfied because the self is at once "knower" and "thing known"--and because the self is one, i.e., is an object only for itself and "only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject."

5. For Coleridge, then, the principle (starting point) for human knowing must be sought "within the sphere of our knowing." That is, the starting point for human knowledge must be something we ourselves can know. Thus "the act of self-consciousness is for us the source and principle of all our possible knowledge."[130] Self-consciousness is the unconditioned principle of human knowing, the "ground of possibility" for all human knowing.

From time to time, in our analysis of Coleridge's theological program, we will need to return to his theory of cognition.

Level 1: Reason and Understanding: Some of Coleridge's most hostile epithets are reserved for what is often called "evidence theology". Perhaps the best-known exponent of this theology was William Paley (1743-1805), author of the popular View of the Evidences of Christianity, which first appeared in 1794, the year Coleridge left his studies at Cambridge.[131] Paley and other "evidence theologians" were committed to the old argument from design, but they wished to refute the deist version of that argument, which made God look like a remote, absentee clockmaker. It was Paley's central argument that Nature discloses the works of a God who is personal and actively benevolent.

Although he was drawn to Paley's view as a young man, Coleridge later spent a long, painful time disengaging himself from it.[132] He came to regard the whole "evidences" program as hopelessly out of touch with the real nature of reason and faith. In Aids to Reflection he wrote:

> I more than fear the prevailing taste for books of Natural Theology, Physico-Theology, Demonstrations of God from Nature, Evidences of Christianity and the like. Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need for it; and you may safely trust to its own Evidence.[133]

Coleridge felt that evidences of the sort adduced by Paley proved nothing; they merely begged the question of faith. So he began his own exploration into the meaning of religious knowledge.

Coleridge's exploration was well underway by at least 1801, when we find his first recorded distinction between reason and understanding.[134] By this time he had secured an opportunity to acquaint himself with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.[135] The depth and degree of Kant's influence on Coleridge's thought about the relation between reason and understanding continues to be debated. B.M.G. Reardon argues that Kant's influence was considerable.[136] Claude Welch takes a more moderate view of the Kantian influence and dwells more on the history of Coleridge's personal religious experience as a source for his thought.[137] And J. Robert Barth is of the opinion that, while Coleridge certainly drew on Kant's distinction between Verstand and Vernunft, he handled it in his own unique way and even developed beyond

Kant's thinking (especially concerning the scope of the "practical reason").[138]

Whatever the precise nature of Kant's influence may have been, Coleridge explicitly testifies to the impact of reading Kant in the Biographia Literaria.[139] In a supplementary "Essay on Faith", intended as part of an additional volume to the Aids to Reflection, Coleridge defines reason as the organ of the "supersensuous", while understanding in "the faculty of the finite". Coleridge wrote:

> I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly alien from sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist is appetite, and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh.
>
> II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the world of the senses, inward or outward; that is, they partake not of sense or fancy. Reason is super-sensuous, and here its antagonist is the lust of the eye.
>
> III. Reason and its objects are not things of reflexion, association, discussion, discourse in the old sense of the word as opposed to intuition; . . .
>
> Reason is not the faculty of the finite. . .The faculty of the finite is that which reduces the confused impressions of sense to their essential forms--quantity, quality, relation, and in these action and reaction, cause and effect; thus raises the materials furnished by the senses and sensations into objects of reflexion, and so makes experience possible. Without it, man's representative powers would be a delirium, a chaos, a scudding cloudage of shapes; and it is therefore most appropriately called the understanding. . .[140]

As Coleridge sees it, then, reason is "the Power of Universal and necessary Convictions, the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense."[141] It is "a knowledge of that with which the self as self is concerned, an intuition of ourselves as related to the whole as a living reality, 'something one and indivisible', a knowing that is religious and poetic, a seeing that goes beyond space and time."[142] Understanding, on the other hand has the character of "scientific" reasoning (as that might have been understood by "evidence theologians" like William Paley). Understanding is the sort of thinking that likes to analyze, measure and classify; it is concerned about causes and effects, about means rather than ends.[143]

In Coleridge's judgment the critical error of the age was that men believed understanding was capable of doing the work which properly belongs to reason.[144] It is reason alone (defined as above) that can lead to and validate religious knowledge. There is, in other words, a way to get at the truth which is higher than understanding ("scientific" reasoning). Reason is no less valid a way to apprehend truth than is understanding. Indeed, religious experience is capable of knowing that it has an objective basis--and it can do this "without presumably having to render any account of itself in terms of an appropriate, and perhaps inconvenient, logic."[145]

In adopting this position Coleridge reveals his indebtedness both to Kant and to the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, of whom he was especially fond.[146] It has been Kant's position that the principle of pure reason (Vernunft; "pure speculative reason") was unable to demonstrate truth in the areas of metaphysics, ethics and theology. But in these Kantian limits to understanding Coleridge found an opening for his own position: viz., that a higher reason was necessary in order to validate the truths of spiritual experience. Beyond Kant's "pure speculative reason" (which Coleridge identified with "understanding"), there needs to be a "practical reason" as well.[147] Although Kant himself recognized this need for "practical reason", he would not have been willing to claim for it what Coleridge wanted to claim.[148] For Coleridge the dictates of practical reason are more than mere "postulates"; they not only serve as a basis for right moral action, they actually yield true religious knowledge. On this matter Coleridge's view of practical reason exceeds anything Kant would have been willing to entertain. Coleridge was interested in more than postulates for a morality; he was concerned about knowledge, the cognitive roots of religious experience, the conditions of possibility for knowing the truth about God.

Concerning Coleridge's quest for practical reason J. Robert Barth has this to say:

> Coleridge was interested in much more than morality alone in his use of the practical reason. Kant's Practical Reason yielded the three postulates--God, freedom, immortality--which he felt were necessary as conditions for true moral action. These postulates gave no increase in speculative knowledge even of themselves. They were principles of action alone, not of knowledge; to this extent at least, there was an effective dichotomy between Kant's Pure Reason and his Pure Practical Reason. Coleridge on the other hand was interested not only in principles of morality but also in religious knowledge, and he was now, profoundly unlike Kant, to conceive of reason as at once cognitive and volitional. Further, speculative reason and practical reason would be distinguishable in function, but they would work in harmony one with the other.[149]

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But Coleridge went further still--and this is where his attraction to Platonism enters the picture. The Cambridge Platonists held that faith and reason must never drift apart, that they are distinct but inseparable, that they operate in an essentially unified fashion. As we shall see, Coleridge was to adopt a similar position in his own insistence on the unity of reason and faith.

Level 2: Reason and Imagination: A vital aspect of Coleridge's interpretation of reason was his theory about the human faculty of imagination. His theological thought concerning the relation of reason to understanding paralleled his literary theory about the relation of imagination to "fancy". Like reason, "imagination stands above the mind of flesh. It is a creative act of the self."[150] While imagination unifies and recreates, fancy merely re-arranges experiences into new patterns. As Ray Hart puts it: "The imagination has a deep symbolizing power, while fancy can achieve only a skillful piece of photographic editing."[151]

The relation between reason and imagination in Coleridge's thought is extremely intimate. Although he seems to have resisted the impulse simply to identify the two, Coleridge perceived the imaginative act as an inseparable component in his idea of reason.[152] In chapter 13 of the Biographia Literaria Coleridge writes of the "primary imagination":

> The primary imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind

> of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.[153]

It was the special province of the imagination, Coleridge felt, to "incorporate the Reason in Images of the Sense". Imagination thus has a "reconciling and mediating power". A passage from Coleridge's The Statesman's Manual (1816; the first of the so-called "Lay Sermons") illustrates this point. There, Coleridge notes that the Scriptures are

> the living educts of the Imagination, of that reconciling and mediating power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors. . . Hence. . .the Sacred Book is worthily intitled the WORD OF GOD. Hence, too, its contents present to us the stream of time continuous as Life and a symbol of Eternity, inasmuch as the Past and the Future are virtually contained in the Present. . . In the scriptures therefore both facts and persons must of necessity have a two-fold significance, a past and a future, a temporary and a perpetual, a particular and a universal application. They must be at once Portraits and Ideals.[154]

Not only does imagination reconcile reason with the "Images of the Sense", it also gives rise to a system of symbols. Coleridge's thinking about symbols deserves some attention. In his view several qualities of the symbol emerge as particularly important:

1. First, it is imagination that gives symbols birth;

2. Second, the symbols generated by the faculty of imagination are "consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors". Here we can probably discern the

impact of the Cambridge Platonists on Coleridge's thinking. Like them Coleridge accepted the ancient notion of the consubstantiality of all being, an idea that is akin to what the medieval scholastic theologians called "the analogy of being" and to what sixteenth century writers sometimes referred to as "the great chain of being".[155] Because the symbol is "consubstantial" with the truth it "conducts", it participates in--and communicates--the reality it represents.

3. Third, symbols are different from metaphors precisely because symbols afford us an actual participation in the being they represent.

4. Fourth, symbols emerge when both reason (the faculty of the supersensuous) and understanding (the faculty of sensible knowledge) work conjointly under the aegis of the imagination.[156] A symbol, therefore, gives us access to both the temporal and the eternal, to the world of the senses and the world of supersensuous ideas. Through the symbol the supersensuous idea is grasped in terms of sensible reality in a single act of knowing. Indeed Coleridge maintains that the ideas of reason can only be apprehended by means of the symbol.[157]

5. The symbol, then, "incarnates" the supersensuous ideas of reason and renders them present to us through sensible images. Symbols are not accidental illustrations, but the very means by which we are able to know the ideas of reason. And since those ideas are the "most real of all realities", symbols are a fundamental way we know and apprehend reality.

6. A symbol, then, always has a two-fold significance. It is always: a) concrete, specific and particular; yet b) it leads to the apprehension of universal truths (the ideas of reason). Indeed precisely because the symbol is concrete and particular it can open up the horizon of universal truth and reality. Thus Coleridge can speak of the symbol as:

> characterized by a translucence of the Special in the Individual, or of the General in the Especial, or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal in and through the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity of which it is the representative.[158]

Coleridge's thought reveals that, through the system of symbols it generates, imagination unifies two distinct levels of experience (the temporal and the eternal, the particular and the universal). For this reason imagination may be described as "stereoscopic": "it stands at the intersection of two different perspectives, and so enables us to see 'in depth'."[159] And since, through symbol, imagination can identify with reality beyond the senses, it is able to unify knowledge of self and knowledge of God.

Here Coleridge's thought has come full circle. The immediate self-consciousness which provides the starting point and basic condition of possibility for human knowing is deepened and intensified through the symbolizing power of the imagination. And that intensified self-consciousness gives access to a real apprehension of God, a genuine knowledge of God:

> We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in GOD.[160]

Quickened by the symbolic imagination, self-consciousness thus becomes "for _us_ the source and principle of all _our_ possible knowledge. . .the fixt point, to which for _us_ all is morticed and annexed."[161]

Level 3: _Reason, Conscience and Will_: The third level of argument in Coleridge's theological program concerns the relationship between reason, conscience and will. For just as imagination is an inseparable dimension of reason, so also are conscience and will. Reason is intrinsically _moral_: "it is a will for the good quite as much as it is cognition of being."[162] Within the faculty of reason the authority of conscience is direct, unconditional and self-legitimating:

> [Conscience] unconditionally commands us to attribute Reality and actual Existence to those ideas, and those only without which the conscience itself would be baseless and contradictory, to the ideas of the soul, of free will, of immortality and of God. . .[163]

What Coleridge means by conscience is, then, practically synonymous with "practical reason", for reason itself

> contemplated distinctively in reference to formal (or abstract) truth. . .is the Speculative Reason; but in reference to actual (or moral) truth, as the fountain of ideas and the light of the conscience, we name it the Practical Reason.[164]

Although conscience may be distinguished from reason and will, it always acts in conjunction with them. As Robert Barth comments: "it is the faculty which provides the element of 'ought' in the acceptance of truth; it is then (to put it chronologically) joined by the action of the will, which chooses to respond to the imperative of conscience by accepting the ideas presented to it by the reason."[165]

Throughout his analysis of the relation between reason, conscience and will, Coleridge is concerned to show that human willing and human knowing always function together. Conscience does not simply "regulate" behavior, it is actually a constituting source of knowledge and behavior. Although we do not ordinarily regard conscience as a faculty of cognition, Coleridge holds that, in so far as conscience acts together with reason and will, it truly leads to authentic knowledge of self and God.

Coleridge's point about the role conscience plays in religious knowledge is important because it reveals that such knowledge is of two levels. On one level (the level of "speculative reason"), religious knowledge is based simply on the ability of reason to apprehend immaterial reality. But on another level (the level of "practical reason"), religious knowledge can be had only through the operation of conscience and will. It is this second level of religious knowledge (practical reason operating together with conscience and will) that yields the indispensable moral dimension of faith.[166]

Thus Coleridge contends that the full range of religious truth is available only when volition and cognition, will and intellect, operate together. Valid religious knowledge cannot be produced by either cognition alone or by volition alone. The ideas by which we know immaterial reality demand the operation of both speculative reason and practical reason (united with will and conscience). Conscience, in other words, has as much a role to play in religious truth as does speculative reason's power to discern "supersensuous realities". Religious knowledge results from the joint operation of intellect and will.

Level 4: Reason and Faith: Coleridge's understanding of the role conscience and will play in apprehending religious truth leads us to the fourth and final level of argument in his theological program. Since willing and knowing are inseparable in the apprehension of religious truth, and since both operate under the aegis of practical reason, Coleridge tends to identify practical reason and faith. This is why Claude Welch summarizes Coleridge's whole approach to theology in the phrase "reasoning faith and faithful reason".[167] Or, as Coleridge himself put the matter in a notebook entry of 1833:

> Faith is the Synthesis of the Will and the Reason. . . .Faith [is] more than the Reason because it included Reason, as one of its factors. . . Faith is more than reason as being Reason + Will"[168]

This synthesis of reason and will constitutes, for Coleridge, the "practical reason" which is faith. Speculative reason alone, while it has power to discern the immaterial

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realities faith seeks to know, can never produce that faith.

At this point Coleridge's entire theological program falls into place. His search for a better understanding of religious knowledge had led him to reject the "evidences theology" of men like William Paley. After a thorough examination of the sources of human cognition, the relation between reason and understanding, the role of imagination, and the contribution of conscience, Coleridge arrived at the conclusion that "evidences" of any sort are powerless to "prove" Christianity--even the rarified evidences of speculative reason.

It was Coleridge's conviction, therefore, that the ultimate "proof" of Christianity was an intensely practical one. The basis of faith is not argumentation, but experience. For Christianity is a life, not a philosophy; it is practical, not theoretical. Discursive reasoning, however sophisticated, cannot conclude to faith. As an approach to Christianity, rationalism is an bankrupt as "natural evidences" based on the argument from design. The truth of Christian faith cannot be discerned except through the personal religious experience of the believer. Christianity is "self-legitimating" in the sense that it generates its own proof out of the practical experience of those who live it. To the question "How can we prove the truth of Christianity?", Coleridge would have replied "Try it!"[169] For Coleridge Christianity is a life in process not a philosophy to be defended. As far

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as religious truth is concerned, the proof of the pudding is in the praxis.

Before leaving Coleridge's theology two further items need to be explored: his understanding of history and his view of the church.

History: Coleridge's understanding of history almost certainly owes a debt to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781). From him Coleridge derived the notion of history as a developmental process.[170] Perhaps more than any other Englishman of his time Coleridge was acquainted with the challenges to traditional Christian orthodoxy created by the rise of modern historical criticism in Germany. Although he was no exegete he appreciated the problem the critics discerned in the unthinking acceptance of the Bible as inerrant and infallible "history".

For his own part Coleridge regarded the Scriptures as a system of symbols. This did not mean, however, that the Bible conveyed nothing of history. It must be remembered that for Coleridge a symbol's power resulted precisely from its being concrete, specific and particular. The particularity of the symbol put man in touch with those "supersensuous realities" in which the symbol itself participates. Thus, although the symbol's particularity roots it in history, the symbol's power carries us into direct contact with the eternal reality it represents. The symbol is a kind of mediator between temporality and eternity. It puts us squarely in both worlds, unites both worlds in our experience.

This union is possible, Coleridge argued, because history itself (from within which symbols emerge) is characterized by "a transcendental unity--a unity of process".[171] In this Coleridge was not so very far from the thought of a man such as F.C. Baur. For Coleridge, as for Baur, history was a process governed by the presence of Ideas. Were it not for these Ideas, a coherent historical narrative would be impossible. According to Baur, Idea (the self-expression of Spirit) functions as the "'universal principle' by which the underlying unity and meaning of history can be fathomed in its individual parts."[172] Baur himself wrote:

> The vision of the historian. . .is. . . directed toward the Idea, toward a universal, a higher unity, to which the individual is subordinated. . .But no vital movement of the Idea is attained when it only soars above the sphere of phenomena with which it ought to be connected, not entering into an inner, immanent relation with those phenomena; and there thus remains as unfilled void between it and the life of history whose moving principle it ought to be.[173]

The historical development of the Idea, Baur argued, is always discerned in its concrete manifestations. For the Idea must "penetrate and vivify the historical material, as the soul animates the body"; it must become, through such an organic unity, the moving principle of the entire series of manifestations in which the history. . .takes place."[174] The Idea contains within itself "the principle of a vital development" in such a way that "the universal appears as determinative in the particular."[175]

Baur's conception of writing history involves the discernment of Ideas as they manifest themselves in the particular circumstances of space and time. Such discernment forbids the historian to impose any _a priori_ theories or assumptions upon the data of history, for the historian's principles are not "read into" history but rather _learned from_ it. Scientific objectivity requires two things of the historian: first, that he draw close to the data in order to examine it minutely; and second, that he maintain a certain distance from the material under investigation. In Baur's words:

> The first requirement of a presentation corresponding to the idea of history would seem to be above all that the historian stand as close to the object of his presentation as possible, in order to become acquainted with all the details that can be obtained only by immediate perception. But on the other hand, after further consideration, we are aware of the opposite: the data of history appear to us in their true light only when we consider them from a greater distance. . .[176]

Thus scientifically objective history results not from imposing external interpretations on data, but from following faithfully the development of the Idea as it is realized in successive stages of temporal manifestation:

> Historical presentation seems therefore to have. . .only the simple task of following the objectively given course, and of grasping and assembling everything so that it corresponds to the objectivity of the subject matter itself.[177]

Coleridge would have agreed that Ideas are always perceived in the particular (much as in the symbol the temporal and particular puts us in touch with the eternal and universal). But he and Baur would have differed over the method by which those Ideas are discerned. History is unique, for Coleridge, because its content is something human beings can live through and know from within.[178] The historian's job, therefore, is to enter into an imaginative identification with the person and events being investigated. The historian must experience the facts he studies in an immediate way. He must re-create, through the act of imagination, the events and emotions, the ideas and impulses that affected the consciousness of people in an earlier era.[179]

Thus the chief difference in the approach to history between a Coleridge and a Baur lies in the legitimacy of imagination for historical method. Coleridge would have denied that genuine historical objectivity should be identified with detached scientific impartiality. For, since history deals with Ideas, and since Ideas are grasped only by symbols,[180] and since symbols are generated by imagination, historical thinking must always be an imaginative act. Strict scientific impartiality renders history the merest mechanical narration of facts--and this, for Coleridge, is not history at all:

> The histories of highest note in the present age present a shadow-fight of Things and Quantities. . .[they] partake in the general contagion of mechanic philosophy, and are the product of an unenlivened generalizing Understanding. . .[181]

The historian must always remember that he is writing the history of men; he is the imaginative chronicler of human consciousness in all its diverse manifestations. It is his primary duty to correlate "the important influence of individual minds with the previous state of national morals and manners."[182] For Coleridge history is reconstructed, reconstituted by the imagination that engenders symbols and by the symbols that render Ideas present. Hence the Ideas of history are mediated for us through the action of symbolic imagination. The historian is not a detached observer who surveys history as something quite external to himself; rather, his imagination makes him part of the very process he narrates. The historian is, at all times, a self-conscious interactant with the changing configurations of consciousness that are revealed in history.

It should be noted that both Baur and Coleridge were concerned, ultimately, with the meaning of history. They were concerned about connecting event with interpretation so as to establish meaning. Neither of them would have judged the task of the historian as merely gathering data and arranging it in correct chronological sequence.[183] And both would have agreed that history's meaning is not written simply on the face of facts where even the most naive observer can read it. The method by which men discern meaning in history is something that the historian himself must bring to his task; it is part of his tool-kit, his critical apparatus.

But Coleridge and Baur would each have given a somewhat different answer to the question "What method is best for establishing the meaning of history through the connection of event to interpretation?" Historical meaning, in Coleridge's view, is mediated by the symbolic imagination. (It will be remembered that imagination, as Coleridge conceived it, has a reconciling, mediating power; it "incorporates Reason" in "images of the Sense"). In Baur's opinion, however, historical meaning is to be sought through a "critical" or "speculative" hermeneutic. What this hermeneutic amounts to is best described by Peter Hodgson:

> 'Speculation' is a way of thinking critically about the given of history, a thinking in which the historian transcends his subjective vantage point and the given presents *itself* in its own objectivity. Speculative thinking is two-directional or reflexive in character; it is a movement of the historian through the text to the subject matter, but at its climax it occasions a reversal in the flow of meaning such that the subject matter now unveils itself to the interpreter in its objective truth and meaning, and becomes the subject rather than the object in the act of knowing. The task of the historian is to 'transpose himself into the objective reality of the subject matter itself,' so that 'instead of making history a reflection of his own subjectivity, he may be simply a mirror for the perception of historical phenomena in their true and real form.'[184]

Baur, then, sees the historian as a mirror that reflects history in its own truth and actuality. Coleridge sees him as a self-conscious interactant with history through the power of imagination. Actually, these two positions, despite their verbal differences, are quite similar. In both cases the consciousness of the historian plays a vital role in establishing the meaning of history, because it is to that consciousness that the universal Ideas which govern historical process make themselves present.

Church: One important place where Coleridge perceived a universal Idea at work in history was the Christian church. His chief statement about the meaning of the church appears in the last work published during his lifetime, On the Constitution of the Church and State (1830).[185] This does not mean, however, that Coleridge had lacked interest in the church earlier. While he was still a student at Cambridge in the last decade of the eighteenth century, Coleridge had evinced a keen preoccupation over the relation between religion and politics.[186] Indeed, one motive for his leaving Cambridge before obtaining his degree was the desire to improve the unhappy social conditions he saw everywhere through the establishment of a utopian "communist" society.[187]

In his later years Coleridge came to see the church as a necessary component of human society, a providential response to the human hunger for unity. As a visible communion of persons the church possesses several distinguishing characteristics:[188]

1. First, the church is neither a part of the "world" nor a secular institution under the management and control of the state. It is, rather, the "appointed opposite of them all collectively, the sustaining, correcting, befriending opposite of the world; the compensating counter-force to the inherent and inevitable evils and defects of the

State."[189] The church is, then, independent of any particular cultural allegiance; it is free to exercise a critical, prophetic role in society.

2. Second, the church is a public, historical institution, not a secret gnostic organization. "Visible and militant under Christ", the church is "an institution consisting of visible and public communities."[190]

3. Third, there is no "single source of universal power" in the Christian church.[191] This is one of the characteristics that distinguishes the church from a state or kingdom. A "monarch" or "sovereign head" in the church would seem to place it in competition with other national bodies and would contradict the principle outlined in the first point above. This does not mean that the church lacks authority, but it does mean that the church can lay no claim to temporal power. Coleridge's ideal here is the ancient Christian community where

> every altar had its own bishop, every flock its own pastor, who derived his authority immediately from Christ, the universal Shepherd, and acknowledged no other superior than the same Christ, speaking by his spirit in the unanimous decision of any number of bishops or elders, according to his promise, where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.[192]

4. Finally, the church is universal. No single sector of the church (Latin, Greek, Roman, Gallican, English, etc.) can claim to exhaust its universal reality. On the other hand, the universal church is present wherever the genuine

characteristics of the church, outlined above, are found. As Coleridge himself expressed it:

> through the presence of its only Head and Sovereign, entire in each and one in all, the Church Universal is spiritually perfect in every true Church, and of course in any number of such Churches, of which from circumstance of place, or the community of country or of language, we have occasion to speak collectively.[193]

Coleridge's characteristics of the church remind one strongly of the position Philip Schaff adopted in his History of the Apostolic Church, as well as in What is Church History?. As Schaff put it, Christianity is "an objective, organized visible society. . .it embraces all, who are baptized, whether in the Greek, or Roman, or Protestant communion. . .The church is thus a society of men, yet it is by no means on that account a production of men, called into existence by their own invention and will."[194]

We may conclude this section on the thought of Coleridge by noting that his vision of Christianity, like that of the Mercersburg theologians later in the nineteenth century, was marked deeply by the notions of growth, process and development. For, as B.M.G. Reardon has observed, Coleridge saw Christianity as history, and "history under the form of moral freedom, in which alone its 'idea' can be realized."[195]

SUMMARY

In this chapter I have attempted to situate Philip Schaff and John Nevin in the context of the central issue facing Christianity in the first half of the nineteenth century: the conflict between the claims of an emerging historico-critical method and the claims of traditional Christian orthodoxy. I have done this by examining the work of four men: Ferdinand Christian Baur, August Neander, Johann Adam Moehler and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Each of these men responded to the conflict between modern criticism and traditional faith in a different way. To conclude this chapter it may be useful to summarize those responses.

Baur: For F.C. Baur it was clear that the critical challenge raised, among others, by F.D. Strauss, could not be responsibly ignored. The tools of scientific history had been developed--there was no denying it--and these tools were already being used. Christianity had no choice except "to submit its historical claims to the scrutiny of this tool and to defend them by its use."[196] In short Christianity could not afford to oppose the historico-critical method either by the techniques of eighteenth century rationalism or by a return to pietistic orthodoxy ("supernaturalism"). Rather, Christianity itself would have to be re-interpreted by the historico-critical method. Baur was thus led to seek a method that would go beyond both rationalism and supernaturalism. He proposed what Peter C. Hodgson has called a "speculative hermeneutic", which would allow the historian to establish the basic meaning of Christian faith without doing violence to either faith or scientific inquiry.[197] In Baur's view that basic meaning was reconciliation, the "unity and union of God and man, as that unity is perceived in the person of Christ."[198] This reconciliation was the fundamental "Idea" of Christian history in all its historical manifestations.

Neander: August Neander represented a response to the rise of historical criticism that differed radically from Baur's. For him Christianity demanded that one submit the claims of reason to the superior criticism of faith. An historico-critical method that challenged orthodox dogma must be rejected as brash and faithless. The task of the Christian historian is to put forward "the beauty and fragrance of the dedicated life, to make the study of Christian men and women an instrument of personal edification."[199] The strictly supernatural origin and destiny of the Christian church exempted it from the interpretations of ordinary historical criticism, however sophisticated they might be. For Neander, then, it is Christianity that judges criticism, not criticism that judges Christianity. Any conflict between criticism and faith must be resolved in favor of faith.

Moehler: Johann Adam Moehler, sometimes regarded as the "father of modern Catholic theology", began his career at Tübingen in 1823 while strongly under the influence of Schleiermacher. Moehler's earlier views, represented by Die Einheit in der Kirche, suggest a positive reaction to the emerging historical criticism of his day. His attitude toward tradition, for example, was remarkable for its evolutionary dynamism in a period when standard Catholic theology was largely reactionary. And his vision of the Christian church as a mystical communion of persons established through the Spirit was a refreshing departure from the juridical conception that prevailed among most Roman Catholic theologians. In his later work Symbolik, however, Moehler's thinking took a rather more traditional turn. As Peter Riga has observed, "the essential transformation in the Symbolik comes. . .from the fact that it is now the visible aspect in the Church which produces the invisible. The Church is now totally dependent on the authoritative body of the hierarchy."[200] In Symbolik the ultimate magisterial authority of the pope is reasserted as of divine origin. Thus the claims of criticism are subject to review, modification, rejection or acceptance by a divinely appointed custodian of orthodoxy, the bishop of Rome.

Coleridge: Finally, Samuel Taylor Coleridge's reaction to the claims of historico-critical method was examined. In his view both criticism and faith have need of re-interpretation. It is not a matter of choosing between one or the other, but of submitting both to a cognitive critique that takes self-consciousness as the fundamental starting point for knowledge of any sort at all. Coleridge's position led him to an appreciation of the role imagination and symbol play in religious knowledge. Like Baur, Coleridge recognized that Christianity could not go home again to the comfortable past of "evidences theology", rationalism or evangelical supernaturalism. What was needed was a transcendental critique of both knowing generally and religious knowing specifically. Using whatever resources were at hand (Kant, Lessing, the Cambridge Platonists, etc.), Coleridge attempted such a critical reassessment of knowledge. And he concluded that the ultimate test, the final proof, of Christianity is a practical one, rooted in the personal experience of believers.

The reactions of all four of these men to the conflict between criticism and faith will have an impact on our discussion of the Mercersburg theory of the church (chapter 3) and the sacraments (chapter 5).

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NOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1] Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Vol. 1: 1799-1870 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 22.

[2] Bernard M.G. Reardon, *Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1966), p. 39. See also Welch, *Protestant Thought*, pp. 24-29.

[3] Welch, *Protestant Thought*, p. 62.

[4] Ibid., p. 60. In *The Christian Faith*, Schleiermacher wrote: "When feeling and self-consciousness are...put side by side as equivalent, it is by no means intended to introduce generally a manner of speech in which the two expressions would be simply synonymous. The term 'feeling' has in the language of common life been long current in this religious connexion; but for scientific usage it needs to be more precisely defined; and it is to do this that the other word is added. So that if anyone takes the word 'feeling' in a sense so wide as to include unconscious states, he will by the other word be reminded that such is not the usage we are here maintaining. Again, to the term 'self-consciousness' is added the determining epithet 'immediate', lest anyone should think of a kind of self-consciousness which is not feeling at all; as, e.g., when the name of self-consciousness is given to that consciousness of self which is more like an objective consciousness, being a representation of oneself, and thus mediated by self-contemplation." See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans. and ed. H.R. Macintosh and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928), p. 6.

[5] Welch, Protestant Thought, pp. 45-46.

[6] Howard W. Bowden, *Church History in the Age of Science* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 43, note 37.

[7] Sydney Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 583-596.

[8] Ibid., p. 586.

[9] For further discussion of this point see Peter F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1975), pp. 238-239, 244-245.

[10] Ahlstrom, *A Religious History*, p. 587.

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[11] Welch, Protestant Thought, pp. 47-48.

[12] Ibid., p. 62. On elements of Hegel's system important for the theological debates of the nineteenth century see Frédéric Grégoire, Études Hégéliennes. Les Points capitaux du Systeme (Louvain: Publications Universitaries de Louvain, 1958), pp. 9-50.

[13] James Hastings Nichols, Romanticism in American Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 64-70.

[14] Ibid., p. 68.

[15] Ibid., pp. 65-66.

[16] See ibid., pp. 66-67, where Nichols also mentions the influence of the Roman Catholic Johann Adam Moehler on Philip Schaff's thought. We shall examine that influence in greater detail later in this chapter.

[17] Philip Schaff, "Neander as a Church Historian," Mercersburg Review 4 (1852), 566.

[18] Klaus Penzel, "Church History in Context: The Case of Philip Schaff," in James Deschner, ed., Our Common History as Christians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 228.

[19] On Baur and his place among the Tübingen critics see Horton Harris, The Tübingen School (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 11-54, 137-180.

[20] Ibid., pp. 27-39.

[21] Peter C. Hodgson, The Formation of Historical Theology. A Study of Ferdinand Christian Baur (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 86.

[22] Ibid., pp. 97-99.

[23] Peter C. Hodgson, trans. and ed., "General Introduction" to Ferdinand Christian Baur, On the Writing of Church History (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 13. Hereafter, Hodgson's introductory material will be cited as follows: Hodgson, "General Introduction", followed by the appropriate page reference. Baur's own work, as translated and edited by Hodgson will be cited: Baur, Church History, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[24] Hodgson, "General Introduction," p. 13.

[25] Ibid., p. 16.

[26] Peter Meinhold, Geschichte der kirchlichen Historiographie, 2 Vols. (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 93-97.

[27] Ferdinand Christian Baur, The Epochs of Church Historiography, trans. and ed. Peter C. Hodgson, in Ferdinand Christian Baur, On the Writing of Church History (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 178-179. Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: Baur, Epochs, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[28] Ibid., p. 180.

[29] Hodgson, Formation, pp. 58-59.

[30] Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neuste (Tübingen: F.C. Osiander, 1838), p. 725. The translation here is that of Hodgson, Formation, p. 59.

[31] Baur, Epochs, p. 213.

[32] Ibid., p. 214.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 221.

[35] Schaff, "Neander as a Church Historian," 566-567.

[36] Ibid., 567.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., 570.

[39] Philip Schaff, "Recollections of Neander," Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), 78.

[40] Neander also admired his pupil Philip Schaff. For evidence of this regard see Schaff, "Recollections," 89-90, where the text of an appreciative letter from Neander to Schaff is printed.

[41] See Philip Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, trans. Edward D. Yeomans (New York: Scribner, 1853), pp. 95-106. References to this work will be abbreviated as follows: Schaff, HAC, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[42] Ibid., pp. 101-103.

[43] Schaff, "Neander as a Church Historian," 571.

[44] Schaff, "Recollections," 79; emphasis added.

[45] Schaff, "Neander as a Church Historian," 569.

[46] Schaff, HAC, pp. 101-102.

[47] Schaff, "Neander as a Church Historian," 570.

[48] Ibid., 570-571.

[49] Ibid., 571.

[50] Schaff, HAC, p. 109.

[51] Schaff, "Recollections," 80.

[52] See Horton Harris, David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology (Monograph Supplements to the Scottish Journal of Theology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 41-57.

[53] David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. George Eliot and ed. Peter C. Hodgson (4th ed.; Lives of Jesus Series; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), pp. 80-81.

[54] Harris, David Friedrich Strauss, p. 68.

[55] Penzel, "Church History in Context," p. 239.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Philip Schaff, Autobiographical Reminiscences of my Youth til my Arrival in America for my Children. Commenced December 31, 1871 in New York; completed March, 1890 on the Atlantic, on a journey to Italy; Copied by Carl M. Adler, 1892 (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Archives of the Lancaster Theological Seminary of the United Church of Christ), pp. 115-116.

[58] Bowden, Church History in the Age of Science, p. 42.

[59] Ibid., p. 48.

[60] Philip Schaff, What is Church History?, trans. John Nevin (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1846), pp. 4-5. Hereafter, references to this work will be abbreviated as follows: Schaff, WCH, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[61] Ibid., p. 37.

[62] Penzel, "Church History in Context," p. 233.

[63] Ibid., p. 223.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Schaff, WCH, p. 78.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Penzel, "Church History in Context," p. 233.

[68] Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 580. See Penzel, "Church History in Context," p. 234.

[69] Schaff, HAC, p. 60.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Serge Bolshakoff, The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church in the works of Khomyakov and Moehler (London: SPCK, 1946), p. 231.

[72] Harris, The Tübingen School, p. 24.

[73] Johann Adam Moehler, "Review of Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechte (F. Walter)," Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift 2 (1823), 263-299.

[74] Ibid., 271; my translation.

[75] Ibid., pp. 272-275.

[76] Ibid., p. 273.

[77] Ibid., p. 284.

[78] References to this work will be made from the following: Johann Adam Moehler, L'Unité dans l'Église ou le Principe du Catholicisme d'après l'esprit des Pères des trois premiers siècles de l'Église, trans. Alan de Lilienfeld (Paris: Cerf, 1938). Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: Moehler, EK, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[79] Moehler, EK, p. 93; my translation.

[80] Ibid., pp. 94-95; my translation.

[81] See ibid., pp. 10-11.

[82] Ibid., p. 11; my translation.

[83] Ibid., my translation.

[84] Ibid., p. 12; my translation.

[85] John Williamson Nevin, The Mystical Presence, ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 4; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1966), p. 216. References to this work will be abbreviated as follows: Nevin, MP, followed by the appropriate page reference.

[86] Ibid., p. 217.

[87] John Williamson Nevin, "Introduction," to Philip Schaff, The Principle of Protestantism, trans. John Nevin and ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 1; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1964), pp. 50-51. Hereafter the following abbreviations will be used in the citation of this work: for Nevin's "Introduction"--Nevin, "Introduction," followed by the page reference; for Schaff's Principle--Schaff, PP, followed by the page reference.

[88] Moehler, "Review of Lehrbuch," 298; my translation.

[89] Moehler, EK, p. 20; my translation.

[90] Ibid., p. 49; my translation.

[91] Ibid., p. 51.

[92] Ibid., p. 49; my translation.

[93] Schaff, PP, pp. 115, 116.

[94] Peter Riga, "The Ecclesiology of Johann Adam Moehler," Theological Studies 22 (1961), 573-577.

[95] Henri Savon, Johann Adam Moehler, trans. Carl McGrath (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1966), p. 69.

[96] References to this work will be made from the following edition: Johann Adam Moehler, Symbolik, ed. Joseph Rupert Geiselmann (5th ed.; Cologne: Jakob Hegner, 1958). Unless otherwise noted, translations, where they appear, will be mine.

[97] Riga, "The Ecclesiology of Moehler," 576.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid., 575-576. 1835 was the year the fourth edition of Symbolik appeared; the first edition appeared in 1832. See Moehler, Symbolik, I, p. (32).

[100] See Moehler's treatment of sin in Symbolik, I, pp. 86-99.

[101] Ibid., I, p. 389.

[102] Heribert Muehlen, *Una Mystica Persona* (2nd. ed.; Munich: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), pp. 8-9.

[103] Moehler, *Symbolik*, I, p. 389.

[104] "...das Göttliche nicht von dem Menschlichen und dieses nicht von jenem getrennt werden mag": *Symbolik*, I, p. 389.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid., I, p. 390.

[107] Robert Bellarmine, *De Conciliis*, in *Disputationum de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus Haereticos*, 4 Vols. (Rome: Giunchi and Menicanti, 1836), Vol. 2, p. 90.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Bellarmine, *De Conciliis*, p. 90, speaks of taking the quotation from Augustine's "breviculo conlationis, conlat. 3". What Bellarmine refers to is Augustine's *Breviculus Collationis cum Donatistis*, ed. Michael Petshenig (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Vol. 53; Vienna: Tempsky, 1910), pp. 39-92. The quotation Bellarmine gives is actually a modification of Augustine's argument in the third "collation": "sicut non duo Christi....dictum est etiam de homine exteriore et interiore, quae cum sint diuersa, non tamen dici duos homines: quanto minus dici duas ecclesias, qui nunc boni tolerant permixtos malos et resurrecturi moriuntur, tunc nec mixtos malos habituri sint nec omnino morituri."

[110] Schaff, WCH, p. 30.

[111] Ibid., p. 36.

[112] Schaff, HAC, p. 7.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid., p. 8.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[117] Harris, *The Tübingen School*, pp. 20-23.

[118] Ibid., p. 25.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Bernard M.G. Reardon, *From Coleridge to Gore. A Century of Religious Thought in Britain* (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1971), p. 89.

[121] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 126.

[122] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Shawcross, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Hereafter this work will be cited as follows: Coleridge, BL, followed by the appropriate reference to volume and page.

[123] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, ed. Henry N. Coleridge in William C.T. Shedd, The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 7 Vols. (New York: Scribner, 1856).

[124] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection in the formation of a manly character on the several grounds of prudence, morality and religion, illustrated by select passages from our elder divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton, ed. Henry N. Coleridge in William C.T. Shedd, The Complete Works, Vol. 1. Hereafter this work will be cited as follows: Coleridge, AR, with appropriate reference to the volume and page of Shedd's edition of Coleridge's works.

[125] Welch, Protestant Thought, pp. 115-120.

[126] Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[127] Coleridge, BL, I, p. 174.

[128] Ibid., I, p. 182.

[129] Ibid., I, p. 183.

[130] Ibid., I, p. 186.

[131] Stephen Prickett, Romanticism and Religion. The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Victorian Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 77-78.

[132] J. Robert Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 3-8.

[133] Coleridge, AR, I, p. 272.

[134] Coleridge, BL, I, p. xli.

[135] Rene Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England: 1793-1838 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931), pp. 71-74.

[136] Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, pp. 71-72.

[137] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 114.

[138] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, pp. 24-34.

[139] Coleridge, BL, I, p. xli.

[140] Cited from Reardon, Religious Thought, pp. 248-249; emphasis added.

[141] Ibid., p. 242.

[142] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 116.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, p. 68.

[145] Ibid., p. 71.

[146] For some representative works of the Cambridge Platonists see Gerald R. Cragg, ed., The Cambridge Platonists (A Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). For the Platonists' influence on Coleridge see Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, pp. 20-21.

[147] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, p. 25.

[148] Ibid., p. 25. See also Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, p. 71.

[149] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, pp. 25-26.

[150] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 117.

[151] Ray Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 201.

[152] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 117.

[153] Coleridge, BL, I, p. 202.

[154] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, A Statesman's Manual in Lay Sermons, ed. Robert White (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 28-30.

[155] Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 67-98. See also Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, pp. 19-20. See further John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930), pp. 110-117.

[156] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, p. 21.

[157] It is important to understand what Coleridge meant by "ideas". Ideas are not simply mental abstractions. They have "an historical as well as a metaphysical existence." For Coleridge, ideas participate in and explain the actions of men; they govern the instinctive behavior of human beings. They are, thus,

the "most real of all realities." Ideas constitute the basic reality that the historian seeks out: "for Coleridge wished to show that history was not a natural process governed by abstract laws but rather a process governed by the consciousness of laws, that is, by Ideas." See Robert O. Preyer, "Coleridge's Historical Thought," in Kathleen Coburn, ed., Coleridge: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 152-153.

[158] Coleridge, A Statesman's Manual, p. 30.

[159] Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, p. 19.

[160] Coleridge, BL, I, p. 186.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 117.

[163] Coleridge, AR, II, p. 103.

[164] Coleridge, "Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion," I, pp. 241-242.

[165] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, p. 28.

[166] Ibid., p. 43.

[167] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 119.

[168] Cited in Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, p. 44.

[169] Welch, Protestant Thought, p. 119.

[170] Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, p. 81.

[171] Preyer, "Coleridge's Historical Thought," p. 156.

[172] Hodgson, "General Introduction," p. 33.

[173] Baur, Epochs, p. 205.

[174] Ibid., p. 241.

[175] Ibid., p. 257.

[176] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[177] Ibid., p. 48.

[178] Preyer, "Coleridge's Historical Thought," p. 153.

[179] Ibid., p. 154.

[180] Lancelot C. Knights, "Ideas and Symbol: Some Hints from Coleridge," in Kathleen Coburn, ed., Coleridge: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 112-113.

[181] Coleridge, A Lay Sermon, VI, p. 228.

[182] Ibid.

[183] For Baur's position on this issue, see Hodgson, Formation, pp. 162-163.

[184] Hodgson, "General Introduction," pp. 17-18. See also Hodgson, Formation, pp. 163-164, where Baur's own statement about the speculative hermeneutic is discussed.

[185] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On the Constitution of the Church and State, ed. Henry N. Coleridge, in The Complete Works, ed. William Shedd, Vol. VI.

[186] Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, pp. 5-13.

[187] Ibid., p. 5.

[188] Fuller discussion may be found in Welch, Protestant Thought, pp. 122-123; Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, pp. 87-88; Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, pp. 160-168.

[189] Coleridge, On the Constitution of the Church and State, VI, p. 98.

[190] Ibid., p. 99.

[191] Ibid., p. 100.

[192] Ibid., p. 104.

[193] Ibid., p. 105.

[194] Schaff, HAC, pp. 7-8.

[195] Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore, p. 81.

[196] Hodgson, Formation, p. 87.

[197] Hodgson, "General Introduction," pp. 17-36.

[198] Baur, Epochs, p. 244.

[199] George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 492.

[200] Riga, "The Ecclesiology of Johann Adam Moehler," p. 585.

CHAPTER III

ECCLESIOLOGY AT MERCERSBURG: 1843-1851

Having situated the Mercersburg movement within the context of the nineteenth century conflict between historical criticism and Christian faith it will be our purpose in this third chapter to explore the ecclesiology of Philip Schaff and John Nevin. Both men considered the recovery of a "churchly" viewpoint essential to the continued vitality of the Reformed tradition. With considerable invective they opposed the debilitating sectarian fragmentation that resulted from the lack of such a viewpoint among American Protestants. And they argued that fidelity to the Reformed theology of word and sacrament, as found in John Calvin and in the Heidelberg Catechism, required commitment to an "objective church system" which alone could overcome both sectarianism and the inclination to regard Christianity as a matter of purely inward and subjective piety.[1]

In our effort to outline the major dimensions of the Mercersburg ecclesiology as it had developed prior to the publication of the Provisional Liturgy of 1857, it will be necessary to examine several early writings of Nevin and Schaff. This chapter will, therefore, pay special attention to the following works: John Nevin's The Anxious Bench (1843); his sermons on "Catholic Unity" (8 August, 1844) and "The Church" (15 October, 1846); his "Introduction" to Schaff's Principle of Protestantism (1845); and his important essay on "Catholicism" (1851).[2] Also important for our purposes in this chapter will be Philip Schaff's The Principle of Protestantism (1844-1845); his What is Church History? (1846); and his detailed introduction to Christian historiography at the beginning of the History of the Apostolic Church (1851).

Two things will be especially important to notice in this chapter: 1) the anti-sectarianism and anti-revivalism of Nevin and Schaff, as well as their objections to the historico-critical methodology represented by F.D. Strauss and (to a lesser degree) F.C. Baur; and 2) their vision of an "evangelical catholicity" that represents a higher stage of organic development within Christianity than either contemporary Protestantism or contemporary Roman Catholicism.

HEATHENISM, ROMANISM AND SECTARIANISM

John Nevin and the Anxious Bench

On the occasion of his ordination to the ministry at Elberfeld, Germany, in April of 1844, Philip Schaff noted that the German Reformed community in America faced serious opposition on three fronts: "heathenism", Roman Catholicism and sectarian fragmentation.[3] In alerting his hearers to the problem of sectarianism in America Schaff was echoing what John Nevin had already railed against a year earlier (1843) in his polemical tract The Anxious Bench.[4] A spirited attack against "New Measures" revivalism, Nevin's tract complained that

> Upstart sects have set themselves to take possession if possible of the entire field. . . on the principle that the old organizations are corrupt and deserve to be destroyed. Their reliance in this work of reformation, is placed largely on New Measures! Thus a whole Babel of extravagance has been let loose upon the community, far and wide, in the name of religion, one sect vieing with another in the measure of its irregularities. In these circumstances, it has not been easy for the friends of earnest piety always in the regular churches, to abide by the ancient landmarks of truth and order.[5]

What was the "heresy of New Measures" that bothered Nevin so deeply? And how was this heresy connected to the "anxious bench"? According to Nevin, New Measures constitute a comprehensive system for promoting religious revivals, of which the anxious bench, as a technique for encouraging conversion and repentance, was a widespread example.[6] More specifically the New Measures, intimately associated with the evangelism of Charles G. Finney (1792-1875), included practices such as extemporaneous preaching, harsh diatribes against "unlawful practices", lengthy prayers that mentioned individual sinners by name, protracted prayer meetings in which even women were encouraged to speak up and "testify", and the uninvited appearance of revivalists at local parishes even against the ordained minister's wishes.[7] The anxious bench or "anxious seat" was actually a pew located at the front of a revivalist meeting place. To this bench a sinner worried about his conversion could come to be admonished and prayed over, while the rest of the congregation

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offered public intercession on his behalf. Nevin's own caricature of revival meetings at which New Measures were employed is rather colorful:

> If Finneyism and Winebrennerism, the anxious bench, revival machinery, solemn tricks for effect, decision displays at the bidding of the preacher, genuflections and prostrations in the aisle or around the altar, noise and disorder, extravagance and rant, mechanical conversions, justification by feeling rather than faith, and encouragement ministered to all fanatical impressions; if these things. . .have no connection in fact with true serious religion and the cause of revivals, but tend only to bring them into discredit, let the fact be openly proclaimed.[8]

The actual revival meetings, however, were much more colorful than Nevin's dour description of them.[9] Frances Trollope (1780-1863), a noted British writer of the period, visited the United States in the early 1830's and left an account of a camp-meeting she attended in "the backwoods of Indiana."[10] After noting the physical arrangement of the tents at the meeting, Mrs. Trollope described a scene that took place in one of them shortly before midnight. The tent was filled with about thirty people, and

> One of these, a handsome-looking youth of eighteen of twenty, kneeled just below the oepning through which I looked. His arm was encircling the neck of a young girl who knelt beside him, with her hair hanging dishevelled upon her shoulders, and her features working with the most violent agitation; soon after they both fell forward on the straw, as if unable to endure in any other attitude the burning eloquence of a tall grim figure in black, who, standing erect in the centre, was uttering with incredible vehemence an oration that seemed to hover between praying and preaching; his arms hung still and immovable by his side, and he looked like an ill-constructed machine, set in action by a movement so violent as to threaten its own

> destruction, so jerkingly, painfully, yet rapidly, did his words tumble out; the kneeling circle ceasing not to call, in every variety of tone, on the name of Jesus; accompanied with sobs, groans, and a sort of low howling inexpressibly painful to listen to.[11]

About midnight, according to Mrs. Trollope's account, the people withdrew from the private sessions inside the tents and gathered into a clearing for a public service conducted by a Methodist preacher who spoke about the "enormous depravity of man. . .and of his perfect sanctification after he had wrestled sufficiently with the Lord to get hold of him."[12] During this public service the crowd punctuated the preacher's words with shouts of "Amen!", "Jesus! Jesus!", and "Glory!". After the formal exhortation the preacher invited sinners to come forward to the "pen". In Mrs. Trollope's words,

> 'The pen' was the space immediately below the preachers' stand. . .The preachers came down from their stand, and placed themselves in the midst of it, beginning to sing a hymn, calling upon the penitents to come forth. . .[13]

Mrs. Trollope's vivid account mentions that nearly a hundred persons, mostly females, approached the pen while uttering "hysterical sobbings, convulsive groans, shrieks and screams":[14]

> They appeared to drag each other forward, and on the word being given, 'let us pray,' they all fell on their knees; but this posture was soon changed for others that permitted greater scope for the convulsive movements of their limbs; and they were soon all lying on the ground in an indescribable confusion of heads and legs. They threw about their limbs with such incessant and violent motion, that I was every instant expecting some serious accident to occur.[15]

One of the women who had come forward to the "pen" seemed near a state of delirium and kept crying out

> Wo! wo to the backsliders! hear it, hear it Jesus! when I was fifteen my mother died, and I backslided! take me home to my mother, Jesus! take me home to her, for I am weary! Oh! John Mitchel! John Mitchel! and after sobbing piteously behind her raised hands, she lifted her sweet face again which was as pale as death, and said, 'Shall I sit on the sunny bank of salvation with my mother? my own dear mother? Oh Jesus, take me home, take me home![16]

Mrs. Trollope noted that the penitential activity at the pen continued until daybreak, when a loud blast on a horn recalled the worshippers to private devotions inside their tents. About an hour later, everyone poured out of the tents to prepare and consume "their most substantial breakfasts as if the night had been passed in dancing."[17]

While one must allow for a bit of literary artifice and exaggeration in Frances Trollope's description of the revivalist camp-meeting in Indiana, other evidence contemporary with hers suggests that it was not fictional.[18] Nevin himself was not opposed to the idea of revivals as such, but he objected mightily to "the Anxious Bench, and its kindred extravagances", which he maintained were responsible for "a vast amount of evil" and for causing "the name of God to be blasphemed, and the sacred cause of revivals to be vilified."[19] Moreover Nevin refused to concede the merits of the bench as a powerful instrument for conversion, a claim its supporters cited as proof of its divine sanction. Nevin commented, somewhat wryly:

> An Anxious Bench may be crowded, where no divine influence whatever is felt. . .Hundreds may be carried through the process of anxious bench conversion, and yet their last state may be worse than the first. . .Piles of copper, fresh from the mint, are after all something very different from piles of gold.[20]

Even if the anxious bench technique were effective in converting some men to Christ, its success would not mean that it should become an integral part of the church's discipline and practice in its mission to proclaim the gospel.[21] Nevin warns, "There may be movements in the name of religion, and under the form of religion. . .which after all come from beneath and not from above."[22] Monasticism, Nevin suggested, was an example of one such movement in the Roman church.[23] "Monkery was to many in fact the means of conversion and salvation. And to this hour an argument might be framed in its favor. . .not less plausible. . .than any that can be presented for the use of the Anxious Bench."[24]

As he moved through his tract Nevin's opposition to the use of the bench stiffened. It was not merely dubious in its effectiveness, it was actually a form of religious quackery. In a couple of bitter sentences Nevin hisses:

> Quack lawyers, quack statesmen, quack scholars, quack teachers, quack gentlemen, quacks in a word of every name and shape, meet us plentifully in every direction. We need not be surprised then to find the evil fully at home also in the sphere of religion.[25]

Nevin puts the New Measures people in rather uncomplimentary company by likening their work to that of Simon Magus, "the prototype and prince of evangelical quacks".[26]

Clearly, Nevin felt that New Measures quackery was more than a silly passing fad. His objections to it were primarily theological. After spilling over fifty pages of bile on the anxious bench revivalists as "quacks" and charlatans, Nevin began to bring forward his more substantive arguments against this form of sectarian revivalism. A summary of his argumentation may be given here.

The forms of church life: Nevin first argues for reliance upon the traditional discipline and institutions hallowed by the (Neidelberg) catechism. The forms of church life enshrined in the catechism are the best way for a minister to awaken sinners since these traditions have nourished Reformed piety for centuries:

> Let the power of religion be present in the soul of him who is called to serve at the altar, and no strange fire will be needed to kindle the sacrifice. He will require no new measures. His strength will appear in resuscitating, and clothing with their ancient force, the institutions and services already established for his use.[27]

Nevin's defense of forms here is not simply the cry of a disgruntled traditionalist. Anticipating a line of argument he will use later in his defense of a visible, objective church system, Nevin maintains that "the form is the simple product of the power it represents, growing forth from it, and filled with it at every point."[28] Like S.T. Coleridge, Nevin believed that the "Idea" of Christianity is mediated to us in visible historical forms.[29] These forms are not to be despised, for they are the incarnate manifestations of the Idea of the church, a pledge of

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Christ's continuing presence to his people. In preferring the "system of the catechism" to the "system of New Measures", Nevin was already hinting at the ecclesiological and sacramental principles he would develop four years later in The Mystical Presence (1847).

Conversion and Regeneration: Nevin argued that exponents of the New Measures failed to distinguish adequately between conversion and regeneration. Complaining sarcastically of the ease with which the revivalists appealed to conversion, Nevin wrote:

> The Anxious Bench is made. . .to be the layer of regeneration, the gate of paradise, the womb of the New Jerusalem. Conversion is represented to be far easier here, than elsewhere. . .Their Anxious Bench, or the altar where their mourners kneel and roll, is commended to the world, as a more perfect organ of conversion. Once fairly within its grasp, the soul. . .is quickly set free; often in the course of a few minutes, and very commonly before the close of the meeting.[30]

In attacking the New Measures view of conversion, Nevin was striking out at a theme central to Charles Finney's theological system. In his Systematic Theology Finney repudiated as "unbiblical" the idea that conversion and regeneration are two distinct realities.[31] Instead he regarded both conversion and regeneration as signifying new birth, a new heart, a new moral character, holiness, "the resurrection from a death in sin".[32] In Finney's view both terms

> imply the simultaneous exercise of both human and Divine agency. The fact that a new heart is the thing done, demonstrates the activity of the subject; and the word regeneration, or the

> expression 'born of the Holy Spirit,' asserts the Divine agency.[33]

While Finney strongly asserted the agency of the Spirit in conversion/regeneration, he significantly omitted any references to baptism as a "sacrament of regeneration". In Nevin's view the revivalist position seriously compromised the essential characteristic of baptism as a sacrament that regenerates men through an objective communication of God's grace. But more radically, it undermined the necessity of the church, for the question of baptismal effectiveness was intimately connected in Nevin's mind with the objective reality of the church itself.[34] Finney's view implied that baptism was a minor ritual with negligible effect, and Nevin regarded such a position as an unacceptable departure from the system of the catechism.[35] Moreover Nevin argued that since the conversions connected with the use of the anxious bench were induced under conditions of wild psychological excitement, they were notoriously "precarious and insecure".[36] He compared the "decisions for Christ" made at New Measures revivals to the vows made by a drunkard: both are produced by a "moral tornado" that causes the brain to "reel with the bewildering, intoxicating element that surrounds it."[37] The result of such "conversions" is not a reflective decision to follow Christ, but a momentary hysteria that lacks "the true posture of conviction."[38]

Anti-Pelagianism: In short Nevin found the revivalists' use of the anxious bench and Finney's insistence on the identity of conversion and regeneration to be a species of

Pelagianism where reliance on human will replaces dependence upon the grace of God.[39] The New Measures are nothing more than "will-worship".[40] For this reason they must be considered heretical. In a succinct sentence Nevin charged that "Finneyism is only Taylorism reduced to practice, the speculative heresy of New Haven actualized in common life".[41] The conversion promoted by Anxious Bench techniques is not a supernatural event; it "begins and ends with the sinner himself".[42] According to Nevin, this results in a faithless form of self-justification:

> Religion does not get the sinner, but it is the sinner who 'gets religion'. Justification is taken to be in fact by feeling, not by faith; and in this way falls back as fully into the sphere of self-righteousness, as though it were expected from works under any other form.[43]

The new Measures form of Pelagianism is thus radically opposed to the view of religion and faith expounded by the Heidelberg Catechism. "The spirit of the Anxious Bench is at war with the spirit of the Catechism".[44] As a practical example of how the New Measures thwart the catechism system Nevin described the behavior of a minister with revivalist sympathies on a Sunday when celebration of the eucharist was scheduled:

> On the morning of a sacramental sabbath, his catechetical class was admitted, by profession of faith, to the Lord's table and full communion of the Church. On the very same evening, they were drawn forward to the anxious bench, for the purpose of conversion![45]

The System of the Catechism: Nevin suggested, then, that the only way to overcome the sort of Pelagianism associated with the New Measures was to reassert the system of the catechism. The problem of sin was one issue that, in Nevin's view, revealed the profound theological differences between anxious bench revivalism and the doctrines of the catechism. According to New Measures thought, sin was "simply the offspring of a particular will, putting itself forth in the form of actual transgressions".[46] But in the theological perspective of the catechism both sin and its cure were far more radical and comprehensive; sin is

> a wrong habit of humanity itself, a general and universal force, which includes and rules the entire existence of the individual man, from the very start. The disease is organic, rooted in the race, and not to be overcome in any case by a force less deep and general than itself.[47]

Thus if man is to be regenerated, if he is to be really restored, the action "must begin beyond the individual."[48] Such restoration can only be accomplished through a living union with Christ mediated through the church by the power of the Holy Spirit:

> humanity, fallen in Adam, is made to undergo a resurrection in Christ, and so restored, flows over organically. . .to all in whom its life appears. The sinner is saved. . .by an inward living union with Christ, as real as the bond by which he has been joined in the first instance to Adam. This union is reached and maintained, through the medium of the church by the power of the Holy Ghost. It constitutes a new life, the ground of which is not in the particular subject at all, but in Christ, the organic root of the Church.[49]

Once again Nevin insisted on the indispensable mediation of the church if genuine restoration from sin is to occur. No man, acting simply from within himself, can effect salvation,

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even if his efforts are accompanied by strenuous "noise, agitation, passion".[50] It is the church who is "truly the mother of all her children", who is "in no sense the product of individual christianity", that constitutes the essential environment for restoration from sin.[51]

A second illustration of the difference between New Measures religion and the system of the catechism arises out of the question about the baptism of children. Nevin argued that if one has the correct perception of "the relation of the church to the salvation of the individual", he will experience no difficulty in accepting the notion that infants "should be quickened into spiritual life. . .and spring up numerously, 'as willows by the water-courses,' to adorn the Christian profession, without being able at all to trace the process by which the glorious change has been effected."[52]

This is an important passage because it reveals that Nevin's view of the effectiveness of a sacramental ordinance like baptism does not depend on the conscious perception of the subject. Moreover the change (restoration, regeneration) effected in infant baptism is complete and instantaneous, not partial and gradual. In an explanatory note Nevin remarked:

> the idea of such a comparatively silent process of conversion, as something to be desired and sought in the case of infants and children, does not imply at all that regeneration in any case is a gradual change. . .Regeneration is instantaneous, but as such not to be perceived directly in any case by the subject. It can be perceived only in its effects. But these belong to conversion, the change that flows from regeneration. Regeneration may take place in the womb, or in infancy, or in early childhood, or

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> in adult age. In every case the symbol is the wind; thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth.'[53]

In adopting this position about the effectiveness of baptismal regeneration for infants, and in distinguishing conversion as a process separate from regeneration, Nevin was flying directly in the face of a thesis central to Charles Finney's theological program. In his *Systematic Theology*, Finney explicitly repudiated the very position Nevin advanced in *The Anxious Bench*:

> a sinner is not regenerated whose moral character is unchanged. If he were, how could it be truly said, that whosoever is born of God overcometh the world, doth not commit sin, cannot sin, etc.?. . .Throw out the idea of what is done, that is, the change of moral character in the subject, and he would not be born again, he would not be regenerated. . .[54]

According to Nevin, Finney's position would result in devaluing infant baptism to the status of a "barren sign".[55] And as a consequence the catechetical instruction of children would be neglected, to the general weakening of Christian family life.[56]

One may note in passing that Nevin's "high" vision of sacramental effectiveness was already discernible in *The Anxious Bench* (1843), a year before Schaff joined him on the faculty at Mercersburg and a full three years before his defense of the Reformed doctrine of the eucharist in *The Mystical Presence*. Further, it should be pointed out that Nevin's sacramental thinking, rooted in the system of the

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catechism, emphasized the idea that God's extraordinary action is always manifested in the ordinary:

> The extraordinary. . .is found to stand in the ordinary, and grows forth from it without violence. . .It is not the water-spout, but the fruitful plentiful shower, causing the fields to sing, and the trees of the wood to clap their hands for joy. Such is the true conception of a Revival. . .Wherever the system of the Catechism is rightly understood, and faithfully applied, it may be expected to generate revivals in this form. . .the ordinary and the extraordinary will be found continually coming closer and closer together, till in the end they may appear almost identical, and the church shall seem to bask, as on the "Delectable Mountains," in the perpetual sunlight of heaven itself.[57]

Here Nevin's vision of the "extraordinary" revealing itself in the "ordinary" is akin to Coleridge's view that the symbols generated by imagination manifest, by their very particularity, the universal ideas that exceed mere understanding.[58] But Nevin himself felt that by defending the system of the catechism he was merely re-asserting the position of the reformers. In themselves revivals are not gross fanaticism and quackery. Indeed they "belong constitutionally to the system of the Catechism."[59] "It was," Nevin remarked, "on this system that the Reformers of the sixteenth century relied. . .It might be denominated. . . with great propriety, the system of the Reformation. . ."[60]

What Nevin objected to in New Measures revivalism was not the notion of religious revival per se--that, he notes, was what the Reformation encouraged--but the sort of pentecostal quackery that turns the living body of the church into a "galvanised corpse":

> The Spirit of God, on the day of Pentecost, came like a mighty rushing wind on the disciples in Jerusalem, causing them to speak with tongues; but when a religious meeting is turned into a babel, to make it pentecostal, it deserves to be reprobated as savoring more of hell than heaven. Life is always beautiful in its place; but hideous and ghastly are the muscular actings of a galvanised corpse.[61]

Philip Schaff and The Principle of Protestantism

Nevin's view that the system of the catechism is the system of the Reformation was not popular in the 1840's. Anxious bench revivalism was sweeping the country and its proponents regarded the familiar formal structures of ecclesiastical life hopelessly antediluvian. In their pentecostal fervor, New Measures men warned Nevin that he risked opposing a movement raised up by the Spirit to reinvigorate Christianity.[62] But the same year (1844) Nevin published a second edition of The Anxious Bench, he also gained a valuable ally against revivalism in the person of Philip Schaff, who arrived at Mercersburg on 12 August.[63]

When Schaff arrived in the United States he was already the object of some bad press. His remarks on the occasion of his ordination (April, 1844) had already been bandied about in America and many of his German Reformed colleagues on this side of the Atlantic were annoyed by the grim picture of sectarian fragmentation Schaff had painted.[64] Though he was pronounced in good health theologically at his tentamen in October of 1844, Schaff had already aroused suspicion among conservative Reformed clergymen who were chary of the new

"German theology". Schaff's inaugural address on The Principle of Protestantism, given at Reading, Pennsylvania, later that year, did nothing to allay that suspicion. On the contrary the address showed the unmistakable influence of Schaff's professors at the universities of Tübingen, Halle and Berlin (chiefly Neander and Baur).

An historical consciousness of the sort Schaff proposed for understanding the position of Protestant Christianity would have baffled men like Dr. Joseph Berg, pastor of the influential Race Street Church in Philadelphia. Schaff's view of the Reformation as an organic development out of medieval Catholicism conflicted fundamentally with the unhistorical "Waldensian" theory espoused by Berg and others. This Waldensian theory maintained that the Reformed Church of the Palatinate was a lineal descendant of the Waldenses who, they surmised, formed an important link in preserving the purity of gospel faith from the apostolic age to the time of Luther.[65]

Unsympathetic reaction against Schaff's Principle thus ranged from sheer incomprehension to charges of "Romanizing". There were, however, some sympathetic hearers like the prestigious Charles Hodge of Princeton and Tayler Lewis, a theologian of the Dutch Reformed Church.[66] Nevin moved immediately to defend Schaff's position in a series of five articles on "Pseudo-Protestantism" that appeared in the Weekly Messenger.[67]

A brief outline of Schaff's argument in the Principle may help illustrate why the appearance of the treatise provoked such a vigorous reaction. Schaff argued that a true reformation, as distinct from a "revolution" or a "restoration", must fulfill two fundamental criteria:

1. It must be produced through an organic, historical development;

2. It must produce something new.[68]

There was, Schaff asserted, an inner impulse toward the Reformation within Roman Catholicism itself. Hence: "The Reformation is the legitimate offspring, the greatest act of the Catholic Church."[69] It was this organic historical development that gave the Reformation its "true catholic nature", its broad catholicity. By contrast the Church of Rome, through its stubborn immobilism, had exchanged true catholicity for particularity.[70]

In Schaff's opinion the Reformation thus satisfies the criterion of historical development. This criterion means that "all historical development in the church, theoretical and practical consists in an apprehension always more and more profound of the life and doctrine of Christ and his apostles--an appropriation, more full and transforming always of their distinctive spirit, both as to its content and its form."[71]

In the light of this sort of historical development Protestantism asserts its "material" or "life" principle: "the justification of the sinner before God by the merit of

Christ alone through faith."[72] Schaff argues that the Reformed doctrine of justification represents a notable advance over medieval soteriology, which was deficient in its view of human sinfulness, of the relation between justification and sanctification, and of its "Pelagianistic" estimation of good works. The material principle of Protestantism overcomes all such Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism by regarding justification as a juridical, declarative act of God. The merit of Christ is the only ground, the "efficient cause" of righteousness in the sinner. Schaff commented: "Man by justification steps into the place of Christ, as Christ had previously stepped into the place of man."[73]

As the doctrine of justification is the material principle of Protestantism, so its formal or "knowledge principle" is the Word of God "as it has been handed down to us in the canonical books of the Old and New Testament." This Word--and it alone--is "the pure and proper source as well as the only certain measure of all saving truth."[74] Thus, just as the doctrine of justification refers back to the doctrine of sin as a necessary presupposition, so the doctrine of the authority of the Scriptures refers to a corresponding view of the relation between natural reason and revelation. The Roman view, Schaff remarks, tends to regard Scripture and tradition as two parallel sources, mutually independent.[75] By contrast Protestantism views the relation between them as "ground and consequence", as "cause and effect", as "origin and process".[76] Thus the Scriptures have the character of fontal and normal authority vis-à-vis all human truth, ecclesiastical tradition, and synodical or conciliar legislation.

Schaff's view of tradition is important because it has a strong bearing on his ecclesiology. Tradition, such as it is exhibited in formulas like the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed, is "absolutely indispensable" for the life of the church. The problem arises only when the relation between Scripture and tradition is subverted through a disregard for the "fontal", normative authority of the Word. The proper relation is maintained only when tradition is seen as comprehended within the formal principle of Scripture:

> This tradition therefore is not a part of the divine word separately from that which is written, but the contents of the scripture itself as apprehended and settled by the church against heresies past and always new appearing; not an independent source of revelation, but the one fountain of the written word, only rolling itself forward in the stream of church consciousness.[77]

To this understanding of tradition, Schaff argues, Protestantism can and must surrender without compromise of its formal principle. Fidelity to tradition does not, however, destroy the further development of doctrine and church life.[78] The leaders of the Reformation recognized the church as indispensable in the work of salvation and they affirmed that all historical development "must maintain essential unity with the collective consciousness of the Christian Church."[79] Thus revelation and scripture, tradition and doctrinal development are all comprehended in the Word of

God that unifies the church as it moves through the vicissitudes of history.

It will be noticed that Schaff's understanding of the "material" and "formal" principles of Protestantism differs somewhat from Baur's notion that the governing Idea of Christianity is reconciliation, the "union and unity" between God and man.[80] For Schaff, the historical development of Protestant Christianity is governed by the material principle of "justification" and by the formal principle of Scripture ("tradition" understood as being comprehended within Scripture). For Baur, Protestantism stands on the recognition of two principles that form "the absolute condition under which alone the church can be recognized in manifestation as the Idea of the church, corresponding to Christian religious consciousness."[81] Those two principles are: the freedom of the subject and the autonomy of the state.[82] Where these two principles do not exist, the "absolute content" of Christianity--i.e., "the unity and union of God and men"--cannot be disclosed in its historical manifestations.[83] Thus Baur was forced to repudiate utterly the form of the church represented by papal Catholicism as "false and self-destructive", since that form both denies human freedom and asserts its absolute superiority over the state.[84]

Nevertheless Baur did not deny all justification for Catholicism in the past. Catholicism was justified, he argues, because "only by means of it could the Idea of the church progress to a new form of realization, and Christian consciousness to a higher level of development."[85] Baur goes on to say that Protestantism itself would remain incomprehensible "if it were to imagine another way of becoming what it has become than that by which its self-consciousness was mediated to it through Papacy and Catholicism."[86]

Here Baur's remarks, written in 1852, echo those of his former student Schaff, who wrote in 1844:

> . . .the entire Catholic Church as such . . .might be considered the legitimate bearer of the Christian faith and life, pressed with inward necessary impulse toward Protestantism. . .
>
> . . .the discipline of the Roman Church involved an inward struggle that became satisfied at last only in the evangelical emancipation of Protestantism.[87]

Just as Baur considered Catholicism essential to the Christian consciousness in its progress toward a "higher level of development", so Schaff considered the Reformation as the "legitimate offspring, the greatest act of the Catholic Church".[88] Schaff, however, was willing to carry this positive evaluation of Catholicism in history a bit further than Baur. Near the conclusion of his Principle Schaff remarked that "Protestantism cannot be consummated without Catholicism", that both are necessary in the search for a "higher orthodoxy" in the future.[89] We shall have occasion to return to Schaff's vision of an "evangelical Catholicism" in the second section of this chapter.

The Historian and His Church

In Chapter Two we had occasion to discuss the formative influence of two German church historians, F.C. Baur and A. Neander, on the thought and writing of Philip Schaff. Not long after he came to America Schaff produced his own contribution to the discussion of method and meaning in Christian historiography through a small volume entitled *What is Church History?* This was followed, a few years later, by his *History of the Apostolic Church* (1851; English edition, 1853), which included an extensive introduction dealing with the nature of church history and the method to be used in the research and writing of it. Both these works cover substantially the same territory, though Schaff's introduction to the second is more systematic. Since we have already commented upon the efforts of Baur and Neander to address the conflict between criticism and faith, and since we have explored Schaff's ambivalent relation to these two men, our concern here will be with Schaff's theology of the Christian church as it is represented in these two early works.

Church History as a Theological Act: Of Primary importance in this discussion is Schaff's view that writing church history is an intrinsically *theological* act, an act by which the writer defines and identifies himself as a believer. Church history is not a "neutral science" that can be written by anyone with sufficient skill, discipline and patience. For this reason Schaff defines church history not as a science involving the methodical correlation of texts, data and interpreation, but as

> the progressive execution of the scheme of the divine kingdom in the actual life of humanity; the outward and inward development of Christianity; the extension of the church over the whole earth, and the infusion of the spirit of Christ into all the spheres of human existence. . .[90]

To write church history is to do the work of a theologian. This point comes across powerfully in Schaff's assessment of the relation between biblical exegesis ("fundamental theology") and church history:

> where exegesis stops, church history begins; the two coming in contact, however, in the apostolic age. . .The exegetical theologian may be compared to a miner, who brings to light the gold of scriptural truth; the historian of the apostolic church is the artist, who works the gold and gives it shape.[91]

The method of writing church history must, therefore, be a theological method, one specifically different from that of philosophical speculation.

In an important footnote on the early pages of the History of the Apostolic Church, Schaff develops this distinction between philosophical and theological speculation.[92] These two forms of knowledge, Schaff asserts, will indeed "coincide in the absolute knowledge beyond the grave", but for the present they are different in both principle (starting point) and method:[93]

> The philosophical speculation proceeds from the self-consciousness (cogito ergo sum) and follows simply the laws of logical thought; the theological begins with the religious sense, or the consciousness of God, and seeks to understand God, man and the world, not only in accordance with reason, but by the help of revelation, and in agreement with it.[94]

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While philosophical method strives for logical consistency, theological method seeks "harmony with the word of God".[95] Ultimately reason can find its "true home" only in revelation. At present the two methods, and the knowledge they afford, "stand in a relative opposition, and ought not to be confounded."[96]

One might be tempted to see in Schaff's distinction between philosophical and theological speculation a parallel to Coleridge's thought about the relation of understanding to reason. But in fact the parallelism does not hold. Actually, Schaff's view is closer to Coleridge's distinction between "speculative" and "practical" reason. Yet even here, there is a crucial difference in the thinking of the two men. Schaff stresses the discontinuity between philosophical and theological speculation. On the other hand Coleridge emphasizes the continuity of reason, whether speculative or practical. (It will be remembered from the discussion of Coleridge in Chapter Two that "practical reason", when joined to will, means "faith".) Schaff calls for the submission of reason to revelation. For Coleridge, however, this submission would be quite irrelevant since both speculative and practical reason have one object only, an object that exists outside the changing forms of time and space. As J. Robert Barth has noted,

> with respect of man's knowledge of religious truths, there is one power which knows: reason. If it is not joined with the exercise of the will, it remains merely speculative; if it is 'co-adunated' with the will, the union of the two becomes the practical reason. Whether the religious

> truth in question is learned from special revelation or from human reflection is irrelevant to Coleridge in this context; so, too, the natural-supernatural distinction is irrelevant. If the practical reason has been exercise, then --whether the truth came from reason or revelation --grace has been given, a supernatural act has been performed.[97]

Coleridge emphasizes the unity of all religious knowledge, since such knowledge always proceeds from the same human power, reason. In contrast Schaff suggests an inevitable discontinuity between "natural" (philosophical) and "supernatural" (theological) knowledge.

We will return to this difference between Coleridge and Schaff in the third section of the present chapter. At this point we need only observe that by maintaining the distinction between philosophical and theological knowledge Schaff has said something pivotal about his vision of Christian history. First, its content is strictly supernatural: it is the "unbroken continuation. . .of Christ's incarnation", the "internal and external unfolding of the life of believers. . . who live and move and have their being in Christ."[98] Secondly, it is impossible to have an accurate apprehension of church history without a "right conception of the Church".[99] Schaff outlines that right conception as follows:

> In the Church, Christ carries forward, so to speak, his divine human life, heals the sick, wakes the dead to a new existence, takes even young children into his arms by baptism, gives believers his atoning flesh and blood to partake of in the Lord's supper, speaks by his word and ministers comfort, peace and blessing to all that seek his grace, is crucified anew by the hostile world in the persecutions of his people, but still repeats also his glorious resurrection and

> ascension, and continues evermore to visit his little flock, assembled with one accord for prayer, with the fulness of light and life by his Holy Spirit.[100]

According to Schaff, then, the Christian historiographer must fulfill two essential conditions: he must write as a man of faith, since without faith he cannot recognize the supernatural content of Christianity; and he must possess a "churchly" view.[101] In representatives of the Tübingen School like Baur and Strauss, Schaff saw neither of these conditions fulfilled. Of the "left wing Hegelian" Baur, Schaff said he was "too philosophical to be a faithful historian and too historical to be an original philosopher."[102] More bitterly, Schaff accused Strauss, one of the "infidel Hegelians",[103] of turning Christianity into a "Gnostic fable".[104] In Schaff's estimation neither Baur nor Strauss was able to make proper sense of the church. He suggested that the higher criticism of the Tübingen School will "meet the fate of the old Gnostic heresies", that it will "dry up like the streams of the desert."[105] Meanwhile, however, Schaff concedes a certain value to the historico-critical methods of the Tübingen professors: "Its investigations will act with stimulating and fertilizing power upon the church, calling forth. . .a deeper scientific apprehension and defense of the historical Christianity of antiquity."[106]

The Church in Process: However much Schaff may have despised Baur's "gnosticism", there can be little doubt that he was attracted to the latter's notion of Christianity as a process of evolutionary development.[107] When Schaff described history as the "self-evolution of God in time",[108] he was surely not far from Baur's conviction that history is constituted by the "self-mediation of Absolute Spirit" or by a "developing process of Spirit itself".[109] And when Schaff announces that history is a "living organism, whose parts have an inward, vital connection, each requiring and completing the rest,"[110] one cannot help but think of Baur's opinion that "history. . .is an endless tissue of varied manifestations, interpenetrating in the most manifold of relations."[111]

Schaff is even willing to say that the two "causes" or "agencies" of history, the human and the divine, are so intimately related that they work not "collaterally or independently", but "in and through one another".[112] Men are not merely "passive channels" in a history dominated by divine choice and action, they are "conscious, free" participants in an unfolding process by which God invites humanity into a "moral communion, the fellowship of love, with himself".[113] History, then, is ultimately the story of deepening communion between humanity and God. For this reason Jesus Christ is the "centre and turning point" of human history, since he "has brought humanity to its perfection in himself, reconciled it to God, and raised it to a permanent vital union with Him."[114] Here, one is reminded again of Baur's contention that the governing Idea of history is reconciliation, the "unity and union of God and man".[115]

Because history is an evolving process of reconciliation and communion, the Christian exists at the core of human development. For it is the very "essence" of the church to bring men into unity with God and with one another, thereby establishing an "eternal communion of saints".[116] Schaff's ecclesiology is developed on the model of a "mystical communion".[117] Central to such a model is the biblical metaphor of the church as the "body of Christ".[118] Schaff liked this metaphor and used it to defend his view that the church is both "an organic union of many members" and the "continuation of the life and work of Christ upon earth."[119] Thus the metaphor of the body permits Schaff to affirm both the continuing presence of Christ to the church, as well as the manifestation of that presence in the church's preaching and sacraments:

> The Lord, therefore, through the Holy Ghost, is present in the church in all its ordinances and means of grace, especially in the word and sacraments; present, indeed, in a mystical, invisible, incomprehensible way, but none the less really, efficiently, and manifestly present, in his complete theanthropic person.[120]

Schaff's model of the church as a "mystical communion" parallels the earlier ecclesiology of Johann Adam Moehler. In *Die Einheit in der Kirche*, Moehler wrote of the "mysterious participation of man in the life of God" effected by the direct communication of the Spirit's own essence to the believer:[121]

> Penetrating and enlivening all believers, the Spirit of God causes them to unite in a great collective life; it engenders a spiritual communion and makes them all a unity.[122]

Because of the Spirit's work, Moehler argued, there is created an "organic unity among the faithful", who consequently form "the body of Christ".[123] The Spirit is both the immanent and the transcendent principle of unity in the Christian church, since the church is a life and "only the Spirit engenders the spirit; only Life begets life."[124]

Moreover Schaff, like Moehler, views the church itself (and not just history generally) as "subject to the laws. . . of genesis, growth, development."[125] On this point there was fundamental agreement between the German Reformed Schaff, the Tübingen critic Baur and the Roman Catholic Moehler. Still, there were some important differences, especially between Baur and Schaff. Baur regarded the history of Christian dogma as "the unending work of Spirit struggling with itself, aspiring toward a free self-consciousness in the absolute content of dogma."[126] Hence Baur contended that "every new configuration of dogma" was a "new attempt by Spirit to become more certain of truth, to take deeper and more comprehensive possession of the content of dogma."[127]

Schaff was willing to agree with Baur that Christian doctrine is subject to a process of evolution: "the word of God. . .was not at once understood by the church from the beginning, in all its depth and comprehension, but gradually always more and more with the advancing age of the church."[128] He was also willing to concede that the "rationalists" (Schaff's term for the Tübingen critics like Baur and Strauss) were right in assessing the life and doctrine of the church as "something moveable and flowing".[129] But Schaff felt that the rationalist theory of development tended to be capricious, "without any unity. . .without any fixed and definite end", that it led to "the dissolution of previous church views" and to "an abstract religion of mere reason and nature".[130]

The chief factor in history was, Schaff argued, the "Spirit of Christ. . .uninterruptedly present in the church . . .to whose power all human factors. . .must be regarded as subordinate."[131] This is an important text because it reveals a fundamental difference between Schaff and Baur. According to the latter, the Spirit that struggles for self-manifestation in history is a broader, more comprehensive term than either "God" or "man". As Peter Hodgson remarks, Spirit "describes that quality of conscious Being which God and man have in common yet exemplify in different modes."[132] For Baur, Spirit was not to be identified with the Holy Spirit of traditional Christian dogma.

But Schaff identified the governing Spirit of history as "the Spirit of Christ", the divine, personal Spirit whose special work, according to the testimony of Scripture, is to draw men into mystical communion with God and with one another in Christ. It is the Holy Spirit that governs and guides the evolution of human history generally and of church history specifically. The "Spirit" spoken of by Baur was, in Schaff's opinion, an empty term, an abstract category, a bare formula of logic, a Gnostic phantom.[133] That "Spirit" can only lead to "logical Pantheism", a "denial of the personality of God" and consequently "an entire misconception of the personality of man."[134] Schaff thus defines his own theory of historical development in contrast to the "rationalists":

> . . .we conceive of historical movement as an ever-increasing stream, whose course has already been prescribed in the plan of everlasting wisdom before the formation of the world, and that now rolls itself forward according to divine laws, to empty itself finally into the ocean of eternity.[135]

Schaff described his own position on development in the following phrases: "regular or organic development"; "protestant, evangelically catholic ecclesiasticism."[136]

What Schaff meant by these phrases was this: Life of any sort at all is "in its inmost nature a genesis, movement, process, development."[137] This is true of the lower forms of life in the plant and animal kingdoms, but it is more especially true of man. Human life is pre-eminently developmental. The organic development of man's life may be described by the German word "aufheben", a term "much used, and. . .much abused. . .in the Hegelian philosophy."[138] "Aufheben" embraces three correlative meanings, all of which Schaff considered essential to his view of development: abolish, preserve and raise to a higher state.[139] Aufhebung of this sort not only governs the development of man, it also accounts for that of the Christian church. Schaff noted that in such a development

> Each new stage negates the preceding one, by raising its inmost being to a more adequate form of existence. Annihilation is thus required. The

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> seed must die, to make way for the plant. . .
> But it is only the outward, the transient, that
> is thus annihilated. The substance abides.[140]

The "substance" of Christianity can remain despite the annihilating aspects of Aufhebung because in Christ a "new principle of life" has been introduced into Christianity. This "new principle of life" will triumph "over all contradiction, all sin and all evil."[141] At root the organic development of the Christian church is simply the development of this new, Christic principle of life in history.

In rejecting the rationalist theory of "Spirit" and historical development Schaff moved toward the idea of organic wholeness and evolutionary process represented by Moehler in Die Einheit. For Moehler, as for Schaff, church history is "God's developing historical plan to prepare, through Christ, a glory and a worship worthy of himself--a glory that results from man's own free homage."[142] The motivating force that sustains this "developing plan of God with humanity" is nothing less than the Spirit of God, the Holy Spirit.[143]

Evangelical Catholicism: Since in Schaff's view an adequate theory of historical development demanded that the "substance" of Christianity be preserved by "mounting upwards to a more exalted mode of outward existence", any theory that resulted in a diminution of the basic content of Christianity must be rejected.[144] Rationalists like Baur would exalt process at the expense of content, Schaff complained. Moreover the rationalist program of historiography would actually destroy the justification for Protestantism. For Protestant Christianity "can be scientifically vindicated only on the theory of development, as a new phase of Christianity in the course of its history."[145] Baur's notion that Roman Catholicism was "indispensable, as the only basis, on which. . . freedom could arise" was rejected by Schaff as an utterly too negative basis for legitimating Protestantism.

Hence Schaff reasserted a point he had made earlier in The Principle of Protestantism: "Protestantism cannot be consummated without Catholicism."[146] Taken separately, neither Protestantism nor Catholicism "exhibit the full compass of Christian truth."[147] The limits of both must be transcended in a "higher form of church life":

> . . .we look forward accordingly. . .to a higher stadium of development, when error shall be effectually surmounted on both sides, and the divine element comprehended in each. . .in a higher form of church life, that shall be neither the one nor the other. . .[148]

According to Schaff neither Protestantism nor Catholicism made any sense without the other. Neither of them represented the full and final development of the church. Christians must look ahead toward a "Protestant Catholicity", an "evangelical Catholicism", that will overcome the "sad divisions" within Christianity by transcending the limited truth of both confessions.

John Nevin and "Radical Catholicity"

Form and Unity: The ecclesiological vision of the Mercersburg movement was shaped not only by Nevin's antirevivalist system of the catechism and Schaff's anti-rationalist historiography, but also by a search for the positive meaning of the credal formula: "I believe in the holy catholic Church." Four days before Schaff's arrival in Mercersburg, John Nevin preached a sermon on "Catholic Unity" before the joint convention of the Dutch and German Reformed Churches at Harrisburg (8 August, 1844).[149] Choosing as his text Ephesians 4.4-6 ("There is one body and one spirit. . ."), Nevin developed his sermon as a commentary on the article of the creed mentioned above. The ground of Catholic unity, he insisted, was the "mystical union" between Christ and believer, established through faith and baptism. This Christocentric basis reveals the ultimate reason for the church's essential visibility and objectivity:

> We are not Christians, each one by himself and for himself, but we become such through the Church. Christ lives in his people, by the life which fills his body, the Church, and they are thus all necessarily one before they can be many. . .It belongs to the proper conception of it that the unity of the holy catholic church should appear in an outward and visible way, and it can never be regarded as complete where such development of its inward power is still wanting.[150]

In this text Nevin returned to a theme that was very much on his mind in The Anxious Bench: the necessity of those visible outward forms without which "inward life can have no saving force."[151] This visibility is necessary for both anthropological and theological reasons. Man's human body is essential if he is to express himself in the world: "there can be no man where there is no body."[152] So also saved humanity, as a collectivity, must have a visible mode of self-expression in the world: "Humanity is neither a corpse, on the one hand, nor a phantom on the other. The Church, then, must appear externally, in the world."[153]

Nevin recognized that outward and inward unity were not achievements to be safeguarded but aspirations to be sought after. Full catholic unity, within and without, can be achieved "only in the way of development and process."[154] This development, Nevin noted, is neither blind nor compulsive; it is "moral, involving intelligence and will."[155] Neither will church unity be effected by "strategem or force". "To be valid", Nevin said, "it must be free, the spontaneous product of Christian knowledge and Christian love."[156] In a passage remarkable for its ecumenical sensitivity Nevin commented:

> All Christians, then, in their various denominational capacities, are required, as they love the Church and seek the salvation of the world, to encourage with all their might a closer visible connection between the different parts of Christ's body. . . .It is terrible to be concerned, however remotely, in dividing the Church, but a high and glorious privilege to take part. . . .in the work of restoring these divisions . . .[157]

The Idea of the Church: Two years later, on 15 October, 1846, Nevin addressed the Eastern Synod of the German Reformed Church at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and returned to the subject of the church's unity and nature.[158] Nevin began by speaking of the "Idea" of the church. In language reminiscent of Coleridge's views On the Constitution of the

Church and State, Nevin outlined his notion of the "Ideal Church":

> We take Idea here in its true sense, by which it expresses the very inmost substance of that which exists, as distinguished from its simply phenomenal character in time and space. . .All life is Ideal, that is, exists in the forms of possibility, before it can become actual; and it is only in the presence and power of this potential life, this invisible, mysterious living nature which lies behind and beyond all outward manifestations, that these last can ever be said to carry with them any reality whatever. In this sense only do we speak of an Ideal Church.[159]

Nevin was careful to distinguish his vision of an "Ideal Church" from private romanticist fantasies: this church is "no utopian dream of the closet."[160] It is "no device of the state", but rather "the most real of all realities that God has established in this world. . ."[161] The similarities between Nevin, Coleridge and Baur on this point are striking. In his On the Constitution of the Church and State Coleridge calls ideas "the most real of all realities", and he insists that the church is not "an estate of any. . .realm, kingdom, or state."[162] Along similar lines Baur regarded the idea as the "'universal principle' by which the underlying unity and meaning of history can be fathomed in its individual parts."[163] As the self-expression of Spirit in history, the idea contains within itself "the principle of a vital development" in such a way that "the universal appears as determinative in the particular."[164] There are echoes of Baur's thought in Nevin's remark that the Ideal is a "potential life", an "invisible, mysterious living nature which lies behind and beyond all outward manifestations."[165]

To speak of the "Idea" of the church is, for Nevin, to speak of the "new supernatural creation" that has been introduced into the history of the world in the person of Jesus Christ.[166] This "new creation" may also be called the "kingdom of God , and as such it represents "the highest possible form of humanity itself."[167] Thus the "Ideal Church" is "one and universal" because it is coextensive with the entire human race. In itself the idea of the church embraces the "inmost, deepest life of humanity", for when all is said and done Christianity is simply "human nature made absolutely complete."[168]

Here we may call attention to the Christological and anthropological bases of Nevin's thought about the church. In both idea and manifestation the church is Christocentric. The new creation introduced by Christ into human history constitutes the idea, the life potential that draws men into communion with God and with one another. Revealed originally in the person of Christ, this new creation "is here made constant among men, with all its resources, as a real historical process, reaching forward to the end of time."[169] That is why Nevin insists: "There can be no Church without Christ, but we may reverse the proposition also and say, no Church, no Christ."[170] And just as the idea of the church is Christocentric in both origin and historical manifestation, so also it is embedded in the very structure of humanity itself. The church is not in the first instance an external institution tacked onto the world by divine fiat; it is an internal necessity demanded by the very structure of human life as visible, social and evolving. For these reasons the church must be visible, catholic, historical and life-bearing.[171] These are the ancient marks of the church in the Creed and they must be uncompromisingly maintained if Christians are to avoid the "gnostic rationalism" that seeks to leave the church "without a liturgy, without sacraments, with history."[172]

"Radical Catholicity": On the first pages of the Mercersburg Review for January, 1851, Nevin published an article entitled "Catholicism".[173] Though it is relatively brief, this article has vast importance for the Mercersburg ecclesiology. In it Nevin presented a lucid defense of the idea of "organic wholeness" as it is found in Christianity. That vision of "wholeness" had far-reaching implications for the Mercersburg theology of the church, for the Christian mission in the world and (as we shall see in Chapters Five and Six) for the theory of sacraments and worship.

We have already seen that there is a strong anthropological element in Nevin's argument for the necessity of the church. In "Catholicism", Nevin refined and expanded his argument. The perfection (i.e., "completion") of humanity demands the presence of Christianity. That is, the very idea of humanity itself requires the idea of catholicity in the Christian church. Nevin wrote:

> Nothing really human can be counted legitimately beyond its scope; for the grand test of its truth is its absolute adequacy to cover the field of

> human existence at all points, its *catholicity* in the sense of measuring the entire length and breadth of man's nature. . .What is really human, a constitutive part of the original nature of man, may be indeed profaned. . .but can never be in itself profane. On the contrary if religion be the perfection of this nature, all that belongs to it must not only admit but require an inward union with religion, in order to its own completion; and as christianity is the end and consummation of all religion. . . it follows that such completion, in the case of every human interest, can be fully gained. . . only in the bosom of its all comprehensive life.[174]

It is important to catch the exact drift of Nevin's argument here. He is not speaking in the first instance about the *extensive* expansion of Christianity, its geographical dissemination among people all over the globe.[175] Nor is he defending the view that the primary Christian mission is to be identified with "making converts". Nevin is talking about "the *inner* mission of Christianity", about "its destination to raise humanity inwardly to a higher power."[176] The full catholicity of the church can never be realized through the simple expedient of evangelizing all people everywhere. Catholicity is, first of all, a matter of *intention* rather than extension. Thus the church can be truly "catholic" only to the degree that it "forms the true and proper wholeness of mankind, the round and full symmetrical *cosmos* of humanity."[177] Catholicity of this sort requires two things: 1) the *completion* of the idea of the world in man; and 2) "a real παλιγγενεσια or renovation also of the earth in its natural form."[178] Here Nevin suggests that the final destiny of man and of man's

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world (the environment in which he expresses himself) are intrinsically united. Catholicism means the gradual interior transformation of man, nature and history in the new creation already introduced into the world in the person of Christ. Nevin thus defined both history and humanity in an arc that stretches between the two Adams:

> As descended from him [Adam] by natural generation. . .we participate truly and properly in his very nature. We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. His humanity, soul and body, has passed over into our persons. And so it is in the case of the second Adam. . . the whole humanity of Christ, soul and body, is carried over. . .into the person of the believer, so that in the end his glorified body, no less than his glorified soul, will appear as the natural and necessary product of the life in which he is thus made to participate.[179]

Through this twofold Adamic solidarity, humanity and history are rendered complete; they become the living icons of a redemptive process that is already and everywhere present, intensively, at the interior of human experience. This, Nevin asserted, is catholicity.

For Nevin, therefore, "catholic" means "intensive wholeness", not extensive "all-ness". This distinction between "whole" and "all" is the pivot for his doctrine of the church. Noting that the concept of universality embraces both ideas, "all" and "whole", Nevin remarked: "The first ("all") is an abstraction derived from the contemplation or thought of a certain number of separate individual existences, which are brought together in the mind and classified collectively by the notion of their common properties."[180] "All" refers to numerical, empirical aggregation; it is "a totality which exists only by the mind and is strictly dependent on the objects considered in their individual character."[181] On the other hand, "whole" is always concrete; it is never "a mere notion added to things outwardly." Wholeness is characterized by being "wrought into the very nature of the things themselves. . . as the necessary and perpetual ground of their own being and life."[182] When we describe something as "whole", we are actually naming "an organic unity, where the parts as such have no separate and independent existence, but draw their being from the universal unity. . .in which they are comprehended, while they serve at the same time to bring it into view."[183]

Wholeness, catholicity, gives the Christian mission in the world its peculiar distinctiveness. The chief mission of the church consists in taking human nature "into itself intensively, as leaven works itself into the whole measure of meal."[184] Through a process of "progressive maturation" the church prosecutes its mission in and for humanity. For redemption can never be "real" unless it embraces humanity intensively, as a whole.[185]

Nevin's notion of catholicity brings together a number of points that are important for his theology of church and sacraments.

1. First, the redemptive event wrought by Christ (Nevin's term was "new creation") is always and everywhere

present at the interior of human experience; indeed, it is demanded by the very structure of both humanity and history;

2. Second, the power and effectiveness of this event can be apprehended pre-consciously, pre-reflectively; it is not dependent, for its presence, upon human reflection and choice. That is why Nevin spoke of the "living sense of Christianity" as the "consciousness of faith. . .as that which goes before all reflection and furnishes the contents with which it is to be exercised;"[186]

3. Third, the transcendent meaning of this event is not available in the ordinary categories of space and time, although its historical perception is available only in those categories. As Coleridge might have said, the transcendent meaning of the event is perceptible through reason, but not through understanding: imagination (a dimension of reason) can make the supersensible reality present to us through a system of symbols (concrete images of sense).

4. Thus the idea of Christianity is primarily intensive, not extensive. The organic wholeness of Christianity cannot be perceived by discursive analysis, but only by a kind of pre-reflective intuition.

According to Nevin, the opposite of wholeness (catholicity) is "all-ness", the inclination to see the Christ-event merely in its outward connections as a succession of historical forms, with the idea of Christianity running through those forms like a thread. All-ness views

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Christianity as a series of historical statistics to be interpreted like any other statistics. It overlooks the "inwardness" of Christianity, its interior unifying ground and sustaining power.

Perhaps one could borrow a couple of terms coined later in the nineteenth century by the English poet Gerard Manley Hopkins in order to describe more precisely what Nevin understood by catholicity or wholeness. It was Hopkins' conviction that all thinking represents an effort to attain unity. Every concrete object that confronts our experience and our thought reveals, in its inwardness, a connection--a unity--with everything else. (One may recall here Coleridge's notion, borrowed from the Cambridge Platonists, about the consubstantiality of all being.) This "connectedness", this unity Hopkins called inscape. In the words of James F. Cotter, "Inscape is the One 'in the midst' that generates and shapes the whole and each of its measureless, finite convolutions; it is also man's intuition of the One through individual concrete existences."[187] Inscape is not a matter of statistical analysis and generalized categorization. It is rooted in the very particularity of things, their concrete distinctiveness--much as Coleridge's symbols are always concrete, specific and particular.

When Nevin spoke about the catholicity of the church he had in mind a notion akin to inscape, the unity that "generates and shapes the whole" in its countless historical configurations. For the whole, he insisted, "is wrought into the very nature of things themselves, and they grow from it as the necessary and perpetual ground of their own being and life."[188] This is why Nevin said that the church must be both catholic and visible. It must be catholic because without such wholeness the church forfeits its inwardness and becomes simply another organization among many in the long line of history. It must be visible because wholeness can be intuited only through "individual concrete existences".

In his essay on "Catholicism", therefore, Nevin presented a new interpretation of catholicity: not extensive but intensive; not the outward communion of churches, but the unifying inscape of Christianity. With considerable justification Richard Wentz has called Nevin's position "radical catholicity".[189] True catholicism, for Nevin, results in a view of transcendence that combines both tangibility and otherness:

> the whole fact of Christianity gathers itself up fundamentally into the single person of Christ, and is found to grow forth from this literally as its root. The mystery of the incarnation involves in itself potentially a new order of existence for the world, which is as universal in its own nature as the idea of humanity, and by which only it is possible for this to be advanced finally to its full and perfect realization.[190]

Catholicity is neither an optional attribute of the church, nor a passing fad, nor a future possibility as yet unactualized. "As an article of faith", Nevin wrote, "the catholicity of the Church expresses a present attribute in all ages; it is not drawn simply from the future, as a proleptical declaration of what is to be true hereafter, though it be not true now; the whole presence of the new creation is lodged in its constitution from the start, and through all centuries."[191]

REINTERPRETING THE REFORMATION

According to Nevin and Schaff it was precisely the radical catholicity of the church that most of the nineteenth century movements--the historico-critical school of Tübingen, the Puseyites in England, the revivalist sectarians in America--failed to grasp and appreciate. Each of these movements, the Mercersburg men charged, missed the inscape, the sustaining catholic intention, of Christianity. And in so doing, they continued to misinterpret the meaning of the Reformation.

Baur and the Tübingen Critics

As we have already seen, Schaff frequently accused F.C. Baur and the Tübingen school of reducing Christianity to a form of gnosticism. But he also argued that men like Baur and Strauss missed the point of the Reformation by adhering too one-sidedly to its "negative aspect", its "protesting" character.[192] In his Epochs of Church Historiography Baur had maintained that Protestantism must be understood as standing in "an irreconcilable antithesis" against Catholicism.[193] "The Protestant," Baur wrote, sees the Reformation as "a transition from an obsolete form of the consciousness of the church to one newly emerging."[194] This transition was "epoch-making" because, whereas _before_ the Reformation "the Idea of the church. . .tended to enter into the reality of the world of manifestations and to merge with it," _after_ the Reformation "idea" and "manifestation" could be kept quite distinct.[195] While Baur did not deny that the visible church is the real form in which Christianity is manifested, he seemed to suggest that the Reformation minimized its importance.

The radical catholicity of Nevin and Schaff found Baur's view of the Reformation unacceptable. It is not sufficient, Schaff argued, to regard Roman Catholicism simply as an obsolete form of consciousness or as the negative principle in a process of development toward fuller human freedom. If that were true, Catholicism would have no _present_ significance; it would be reduced to the status of a bygone historical barnacle.[196] This is untenable, Schaff felt, because it runs contrary to the inward wholeness that keeps revealing itself in _all_ particular manifestations of the church "whether in the Greek, or Roman, or Protestant communion."[197]

What especially bothered Schaff about Baur's view was the latter's stress on the _discontinuity_ between the "Idea" and the "reality" of the church. Both Schaff and Nevin believed that a sound understanding of catholicity would result in an emphasis on the _continuity_ between the idea of the church and its historical expressions. The wholeness of

Christianity can be intuited only through concrete manifestations of it in history. This is why we find Schaff complaining that the rationalists (he has Baur and Strauss especially in mind) show a "most radical hostility to all concrete and individual human life."[198] This is also why we find him attacking the rationalist ecclesiology as "gnostic".

Nevin was no less opposed to gnostic rationalism than Schaff. In his 1846 sermon on "The Church" he delivered a bitter denunciation of the "spiritualism that turns all religion into a mere idea." The characteristics of this spiritualism, Nevin contended, are clear:

> It will not confess that Jesus Christ _has come in the flesh_; that is, it refuses to acknowledge practically a real, historical Christ, in whom the divine nature has come to a full, abiding union with the human, and who has become thus the origin and constant principle of a new supernatural creation in the Church and that can never fail till the whole world shall be reclaimed from corruption and vanity by its power. . .Let us beware of the Gnostic, unchurchly, Nestorian Spirit. Let us cleave to Christ in the flesh, in the abiding revelation of his presence in the Church.[199]

The Mercersburg men thus indicted Baur for favoring the _idea_ of the church at the expense of its real visibility, its fleshliness, its concreteness in all ages. Baur transformed Christianity into a bloodless abstraction, an idea that loses its connection with the historical process itself. According to the Mercersburg ecclesiology catholicity means that the new creation has been with Christianity from the beginning, grounding and sustaining its development in all times and places. Although Baur and the Mercersburg theologians would have agreed that Christianity involves both idea and manifestation, they disagreed over the relationship between the two. For Baur the relationship was entrinsic and somewhat accidental; it was the genius of the Reformation that it dissolved and absolute identification between idea and manifestation, thereby freeing the church to develop toward a higher, truer consciousness of Christianity. For Schaff and Nevin on the other hand, the relationship between idea and manifestation was intrinsic and necessary. The true nature of the church did not suddenly appear in the sixteenth century; it has been present from the beginning. The Reformation was not a revolution but a birth, the "legitimate offspring" of the Catholic Church.[200] The inwardness of the church can be grasped only in its outward fleshliness, its visible historical life.

Thus the quarrel between Mercersburg and the Tübingen critics was not over the notion of development itself--both accepted it--but over its exact meaning. Development, Schaff kept saying, is "regular" and "organic"; it unfolds not by abolishing past forms but by incorporating them into a higher level of life. In contrast Baur seemed to say that development occurs only through the abolition of an earlier form of consciousness and life. Schaff held that the final result of development "returns always with new wealth to the beginning."[201] Baur would have rejected this view as effectively eliminating any real change, since it would mean that "in the entire historical sequence of the church everything remains as it was from the beginning and no change can take place by which the substantial forms of the church might be essentially altered."[202] Schaff accused Baur of destroying history by means of the idea; Baur would have charged that Schaff destroyed development by saying that "the more things change the more they remain the same."

Thus Baur believed that with the coming of the Reformation "the perception of the church has become essentially different."[203] "The idea of the church," he wrote, "is torn away from its manifestation of the visible church; it [the Idea] is itself the driving and moving principle of progression away from one form of consciousness, in which as an untrue existence it can no longer remain, to another form, in which it is freely related to the manifestation in the same proportion that it stands above it."[204] But Schaff could make no sense of a Reformation that was severed in this way from "its catholic union with the past."[205] A true Reformation, as we have seen, is neither revolution (the "radical and violent overthrow of an existing system") nor restoration (a return to dead forms). If it is to be authentic a reformation must fulfill two conditions; it must preserve an organic unity with the past and it must produce something new. This is why Schaff remarks that a reformation "must attach itself organically to what is already at hand, and grow forth thus from the trunk of history, in regular living union with its previous development."[206] To Schaff's way of thinking, Baur made the sixteenth century reformation into a revolution.

The Puseyite Program of Restoration

If Baur made too much of the Reformation by transforming it into a revolution, the Puseyites made too little of it by reducing it to a restoration. We know that Schaff had first-hand experience of the Oxford Movement since he spent six weeks in England on his way to America in 1844 and travelled there again during the 1850's.[207] On his earlier trip he met both John Henry Newman and Edward Pusey as well as F.D. Maurice, whose work on The Kingdom of Christ impressed him quite favorably.[208]

Neither Schaff nor Nevin could accept the program of the Oxford Movement. In his History of the Apostolic Church Schaff dismissed Puseyism as the "extreme right wing of orthodox Protestantism".[209] He saw the movement as an attempt at restoration which was sure to be short-lived: "Puseyism, as such, will hardly be able to endure long. Its more consistent leaders, completing their own principle, will pass over to Rome, as a number of the English clergy, with Newman at their head, have quite recently done already; others will fall back to the ordinary high church standpoint."[210] Nevin was perhaps more sympathetic toward the Oxford men. He felt the movement was "specially serious", that it was not be ignored as mere "accident or caprice".

Although Nevin regarded Puseyism, like popery, as an error, he opposed those who tried to refute it by reducing the concept of the church to the "level of a temperance society".[211] Such a refutation, he argued, "strips the ministry of its divine commission and so of its divine authority, reduces the sacraments to mere signs, turns all that is mystical into the most trivial worldly sense, and so exalts what is individual above what is general and catholic, as in fact to throw open the door to the most rampant sectarian license. . ."[212] The answer to Puseyism is not unchurchly sectarianism but authentic catholicity.

The Mercersburg men, therefore, regarded Puseyism as a legitimate, even necessary, reaction against the chronic Protestant "diseases" of rationalism and sectarianism.[213] In agreement with the Oxford program Schaff insisted that "we. . .may not seek the perfection of our own communion, apart from the perfection of the entire Christian church."[214] Nevertheless, Puseyism is crippled by a "grand defect": it misapprehends "the divine significance of the Reformation" by interpreting it as little more than apostasy from the true church.[215] The Puseyites lack an understanding of historical process, of development. This deficiency is especially apparent, Schaff noted, in their view of episcopal succession. A full-fledged return to episcopal government for all Protestants would do nothing to stop the inroads made by rationalism and sectarianism. "We need something higher and better," Schaff remarked wryly, "than anointed lord and consecrated gentlemen."[216] Ultimately Puseyism looks backward in nostalgic longing for a mythical Christianity that never existed. It seeks a "premature catholicity" that has no future.

Evangelical Catholicism

Against rationalism (Baur), restoration (Pusey) and sectarianism (Finney and the New Measures crowd), Schaff and Nevin proposed a new interpretation of the Reformation. Catholicity existed--and continues to exist--in both Protestantism and Catholicism. The Reformation sought neither to abolish a past consciousness of the church nor to substitute a new form of dogmatism for an old one. Its motto was "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." For this reason Schaff wrote:

> Protestantism cannot be consummated without Catholicism; not in the way of falling back to the past, but as coming into reconciliation with it finally in a higher position, in which all past errors shall be left behind whether Protestant or Catholic, and the truth of both tendencies be actualized, as the power of one and the same life, in the full revelation of the kingdom of God. The consummation of both will be at the same time their union.[217]

Thus, while Protestantism does represent "an actual advance of the religious life and consciousness of the church," it does not and cannot exhaust the meaning of organic wholeness, of catholicity.[218] As Nevin put it, Protestantism, in its present state, does not form "the true, complete, symmetrical and ultimate state of Christianity."[219] It is "interimistic" and "can save itself only by passing beyond itself."[220] The meaning of the Reformation can continue only if both Protestantism and Catholicism evolve together toward a "Protestant Catholicism". Because it is organic this evolution does not imply either a destruction of doctrine (rationalism) or a return to past forms of ecclesiastical life (Puseyism).

EVALUATION OF THE MERCERSBURG ECCLESIOLOGY

The major themes of the Mercersburg ecclesiology and the viewpoints it opposed (rationalism, restoration, revivalism) have now been outlined. It remains to offer an evaluation of the methods and models of that ecclesiology.

It is commonplace to categorize the Mercersburg movement as "traditional", "churchly", "sacramental" and "romantic", as an example of the "Catholic tendency" in American Protestantism.[221] These categories are based on a twofold assumption: 1) that, faced with increasing sectarian fragmentation, American Protestantism needed a renewed emphasis on discipline and structure; and 2) that the challenge of European rationalism (the historico-critical method of the Tübingen school) threatened to extinguish traditional Christian orthodoxy entirely. Accordingly, the Mercersburg theology represents a romantic reaction, a strategy of churchly conservation against sectarian fundamentalists on the right and rationalist critics on the left.

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While I certainly do not deny the present of romantic and conservative elements in the Mercersburg theology, I doubt if these two adjectives sufficiently account for what Nevin and Schaff intended to do. In my opinion an appeal to "romanticism" misses the real contribution the Mercersburg men were trying to make to the nineteenth century debate between criticism and faith. Nevin and Schaff were not simply seeking a strategy to defend traditional dogma. They were searching for a new hermeneutic that would permit them to take both the emerging historical consciousness and the Christian tradition with full seriousness. In the pages that follow I hope to outline what I call the "catholic hermeneutic" of the Mercersburg school.

A "Catholic Hermeneutic"

Three questions preoccupied Nevin and Schaff in their early days at Mercersburg: 1) What does Christianity really mean?; 2) How can we perceive what it means in history?; and 3) Does what Christianity means make any difference? To this last question Nevin and Schaff unhesitatingly answered yes. But the first two questions were more difficult, and they are the ones we need to look at more closely. Both Nevin and Schaff were convinced that in Christianity the parts (concrete historical instances) must be interpreted by the presence of the whole. For the meaning of Christian faith emerges from neither the parts taken alone (the old fundamentalism), nor from the parts connected outwardly and mechanically (the "earlier" rationalism), nor from the whole (the "Idea") taken in isolation from the parts (the "later" rationalism of the Tübingen critics).[222] The meaning of Christianity is available only when both parts and whole are interpreted together as distinct but inseparable. The "catholic hermeneutic" seeks to discern the inward unity that generates and shapes the whole in its countless historical configurations.

Assumptions of the catholic hermeneutic: There are several assumptions in the Mercersburg theology on which this "catholic hermeneutic" rests. These can be outlined as follows:

1. The idea of humanity demands incarnation for its completion. Humanity is structured in such a way that it has an inbuilt openness to the mystery of the incarnation. That is why Nevin argued that while the original nature of man may be profaned, human nature itself is never profane. Human nature not only admits, it actually requires "an inward union with religion, in order to its own completion."[223] Here Nevin anticipated a type of theological anthropology developed by twentieth century theologians like Karl Rahner. A passage from an essay by Rahner "On the Theology of the Incarnation" will help illustrate this point:

> . . .the transcendence which we are and which we accomplish brings our existence and God's existence together: and both as mystery. And here we must always remember that a mystery is not something still undisclosed. . .This would be

> to confuse mystery with the still undiscovered unknown. Mystery on the contrary is the impenetrable which is already present. . .It is the indomitable dominant horizon of all understanding, that which makes it possible to understand other things by the fact that it is silently there as the incomprehensible.[224]

What Rahner calls "mystery" Nevin would have called "wholeness": the wholeness that is always present to man, that gives him his meaning, his comprehension of God and his final completion. That wholeness (mystery) makes it possible for man to know himself and to acknowledge that "being human" means "being in relation to God". Although he obviously did not use the vocabulary of transcendental Thomism as Rahner does, Nevin seems to have regarded human nature as "an active transcendence towards the absolute being of God," not as a passive, inert essence. From this point of view the incarnation is not something adventitiously tacked onto humanity; it is the supreme actualization of what "being human" means.

2. The incarnation is the inscape of Christianity; it embraces the entire mystery of salvation. A "living fact" rooted in the personhood of Christ, the incarnation is not "an arrangement or economy. . .in the divine mind which Christ came into the world to serve in an outward and instrumental way."[225] Nevin asserted quite bluntly: "All rests on the mystery of the Incarnation. That is itself Christianity, the true idea of the gospel, the new world of grace and truth. . .Here is an order of life which was not in the world before, the Word made flesh, God and man

brought into living union in the person of Jesus Christ, as the nucleus and fountain of salvation for the race."[226]

Nevin's insistence on the person of Christ is noteworthy. We may recall that F.C. Baur described the Idea of Christianity in quite similar terms as "the unity and union of God and man." For Baur, too, this unity is "perceived in the person of Christ", and it is this perception which becomes a "fact of Christian consciousness," the "substantial content of the historical development of the Christian church."[227]

Considering the Mercersburg distaste for the Tübingen school, this similarity between Nevin and Baur may seem surprising. Their quarrel, however, was not over the centrality of the incarnation for Christian faith, but over the mode by which that mystery was to be mediated in the course of historical development. As we have seen, Baur stressed the discontinuity between Idea (reconciliation/incarnation) and reality (visible church), while Nevin and Schaff emphasized their continuity and inseparability. This leads us to a third assumption in the catholic hermeneutic.

3. If incarnation is the inscape of Christianity, then this inscape must be perceptible in visible forms. While the true nature of Christianity is intensive and inward, it is never abstract. The ultimate meaning of Christian faith (wholeness established through incarnation) must be mediated to us in visible historical forms. Here

we can see how important Nevin's Christology was to the catholic hermeneutic. The person of Christ was neither an idea nor an instrument. It was the very mediation itself between God and man. Since Christ's mediating person was historical, visible and tangible, it established the permanent pattern by which men know and experience God. The Mercersburg men argued that Baur's view of the relation between Idea and reality minimized the importance of visible mediating forms. That is why Nevin warned that the Tübingen rationalists would leave the church "without a liturgy, without sacraments, without history."[228]

4. The visible church is the self-expression of the incarnation in history. The history of the church is consequently the continuing history of that "intimate mystical union of Christ with believers," a union fully established in the incarnation. This union is not dependent for its effectiveness on the conscious perception of those whom it affects. It is, to borrow the vocabulary of Karl Rahner, "the indomitable dominant horizon of all understanding. . .silently there as the incomprehensible."[229]

5. If it is to be adequate a Christian theology must be able to account for both catholicity (wholeness) and development in the church. This can be done only by taking the incarnation as the starting point for theology, since that mystery comprehends them both. We can thus begin to see why the Mercersburg men were so sensitive about issues of New Testament criticism. Not only were the Scriptures

the "formal principle" of Protestantism in Schaff's view; they were also the normative witnesses to the fact of the incarnation. If the Bible is nothing but "mythological conceits",[230] than Protestantism loses its formal principle and theology lacks a starting point.

The catholic hermeneutic, then, works on the principle that there is a strict coherence between the living truth (mystical union) established through the incarnation and our historical consciousness of this truth. That coherence is mediated to us in the visible forms of church life, even when those forms reveal a church of "dying sinners" rather than one of "perfect saints".[231] By using such a hermeneutic Nevin and Schaff were attempting to overcome the (rationalist) tendency toward "ecclesiological monophysitism", a practical denial of the salvific import of the church's humanity. Their appeals for an "objective church system" were not conservative laments for a sagging authority structure, but a plea for theologians to take the humanity of the church seriously.

That is why Nevin and Schaff were so disappointed with the Puseyite program. They appreciated its emphasis on the visible structures of church life, but felt it had misunderstood what catholicity really means. Catholic wholeness is located at the interior of Christianity; indeed, it can never be generated by extrinsic adjustments in church government.

It is quite important to notice that for Nevin and Schaff catholicity was not an "eschatological" quality, something not yet achieved, but only hoped for in the future. Nichols seems to suggest that it was.[232] But Nevin's essay on "Catholicism" makes it clear that catholicity (wholeness) is an abiding characteristic of the church, even in its present condition of sinfulness and division. The power of the incarnation continues to draw people into mystical union with Christ. Incarnation remains the inscape of Christianity, the intensive power that "generates and shapes the whole and each of its measureless, finite convolutions".[233]

Deficiencies of the catholic hermeneutic: It seems to me that the catholic hermeneutic championed by Nevin and Schaff suffered from three significant deficiencies: the lack of an adequate cognitive theory; insufficient attention to symbols and how they function; and the absence of an understanding of "mythopoeic language" in theology. Each of these deficiencies deserves some comment.

1. Lack of an adequate cognitive theory: In our discussion of Coleridge in Chapter Two, we had occasion to outline the English poet's theory of cognition as found in his Biographia Literaria. We noticed that by establishing "immediate self-consciousness" as the principle (starting point) for human cognition Coleridge was able to provide a solid basis for knowledge in all its forms, including religious knowledge. According to Coleridge self-conscious-

ness not only satisfies the fundamental conditions for knowing (coincidence of knower and thing known), it also unites the "objective" (unconscious objects that exist outside ourselves) with the "subjective" (personal conscious intelligence).

Although Coleridge exerted influence on the Mercersburg men,[234] they do not seem to have grasped his theory of cognition. The History of the Apostolic Church, for example, shows Schaff still struggling with the distinction between philosophical and theological speculation. Unable to resolve the apparent dichotomy between them, Schaff failed to discern that both these kinds of thinking and knowing find their common source in self-consciousness. Coleridge's achievement allowed him to overcome the false opposition between "natural" and "supernatural" modes of knowing. For Coleridge reason reveals all knowledge of super-sensible realities as a continuum, a unity that renders the natural/supernatural dichotomy irrelevant.[235] Schaff on the other hand continued to contrast the philosophical speculation that starts with self-consciousness with the theological knowledge that begins with consciousness of God. He could find no way to unite them without turning the objectivity of religious knowledge into rationalistic subjectivism.

The cognitive problem of the Mercersburg men is somewhat surprising in view of their theological anthropology and their motto "Nihil humani alienum a me puto."[236] If "being human" means "being in relation to God", if human nature is "never profane",[237] if the very idea of humanity demands the idea of incarnation, then a continuity between self-consciousness and consciousness of God is surely possible. The reluctance of Nevin and Schaff to follow Coleridge in affirming a transcendental unity of knowledge suggests their inability to reconcile criticism and faith. This may be one reason why Coleridge welcomed the emerging historical and biblical criticism on the continent,[238] while the Mercersburg theologians feared it as faithless and gnostic. Coleridge held that religious experience (including knowledge) was neither "objective" nor "subjective" simply, but an indivisible union of the two brought together through the power of reason. This union Nevin and Schaff were unable to grasp.

2. Insufficient attention to symbols: Another important element present in Coleridge but absent in Nevin and Schaff was an appropriate theory about the symbolic imagination and how it works. As we have seen, Coleridge placed great confidence in the human faculty of imagination. It not only gives rise to a system of symbols, but those symbols afford us access through their concrete particularity, to a real knowledge of God. Nevin's theory of catholicity as an intensive wholeness visible in historical forms of church life comes close, in some respects, to Coleridge's notion of how symbols function. But once again the absence of a cognitive theory cripples the Mercersburg effort.

Coleridge could back up his understanding of symbols by showing the connections between self-consciousness, reason, imagination and the symbolizing power of the human mind. But Nevin appealed to the mystery of the incarnation to support his view of catholicity, and this mystery is the result of a free gracious act of God. How this act and man's historical consciousness of it can come together is not specified. It is simply asserted that, under the power of faith, they do.

3. Absence of an understanding of "mythopoeic language": Philip Wheelwright has written:

> it is the task of mythopoeic language to find ways of symbolically indicating the chronic ambivalence of the proto-religious affirmation, and of keeping the possibility of it alive despite opposition from literal believers on the one side and sceptical iconoclasts on the other.[239]

Had Nevin or Schaff written this passage they might have substituted "revivalists" for "literal believers" and "rationalists" for "sceptical iconoclasts". Although they do not specifically address the problem of religious language, both men were obviously concerned about it. That is one of the reasons why they insisted on a structured liturgy based on an official prayerbook. There was an "ominous affinity", they argued, between "free worship" and "free thinking in religion".[240]

Once again we find that Coleridge had reflected on the problem of religious language in a way that Mercersburg men had not. As a poet Coleridge understood the power of words

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not merely in their outward rhetorical effect but in their interior impact on human consciousness. In Aids to Reflection Coleridge wrote:

> . . .if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most importance to mankind are actuated, combined and humanized.[241]

According to Coleridge the important thing about words is that they have a history. They do not come to us as pure novelties. They are resonant, bearing within themselves part of the history that has influenced the development of human consciousness. Language is luminous, an open window on self-knowledge. And like imagination, language is "stereoscopic": it stands at the intersection of two levels of reality and permits us to see in depth.

Thus in Coleridge's view language not only enables us to express ourselves, it also locates us in the evolving history of human consciousness. In other words, language not only expresses and interprets reality, it actually constructs reality. There is a transcendent property to language. As in the case of symbol, the very particularity of language permits us to stretch beyond it in order to grasp supersensible (eternal) realities. Stephen Prickett can thus speak of Coleridge's "tensional theory of language".[242] To describe language as "tensional" or "tensive" is to affirm its ambiguous, connotative, metaphoric potential. It is to assume, as Philip Wheelwright has observed, that there are real and important truths which the criteria of maximal exactness in language cannot reach.[243] It was Coleridge's conviction that tensive (his word was "esemplastic")[244] language has the power to shape and unify experience, to put us in touch with supersensible truth. The language of the Bible, for instance, is tensive: its very particularity shapes our experience and gives us access to timeless truth. Tensive (esemplastic) language is not less real than the ordinary "language of the market".[245] But it seeks to encompass real meanings and intentions that are not directly available to empirical investigation.

In my opinion Nevin and Schaff sensed the need for such a "mythopoeic" or tensive language in theology and worship, but could not quite formulate a theory to defend its use. When, for example, Nevin appealed to the "churchly", "sacramental" sense in worship, it is clear that he was calling for an appreciation of symbol in word and act.[246] But unlike Coleridge he had not developed a theory of imagination and of language that would permit him to defend symbols as real ways to know the truth.

As a result the Mercersburg men often fell back on an appeal to Reformed tradition as represented by the catechism to defend their view of church and sacraments. This sometimes gave their theology the appearance of a rear-guard conservative reaction, when in fact it was quite progressive. For despite their severe distaste of the Tübingen school, the Mercersburg theologians were not only willing to admit its positive contribution to the doctrine of the church, they actually incorporated many elements of it into their own notion of organic development. In short they sought a theological hermeneutic that combined the best features of the older pietism (as in Neander) with the newer rationalism (as in Baur). What they lacked--but could have found seminally in Coleridge--was a more exact understanding of cognition and language as these are related to religious experience.

The Mercersburg Use of a "Communion Model" for the Church

Earlier in this chapter we noticed that the Mercersburg ecclesiology was based on a model of "mystical communion". There it was also observed that this model has some striking affinities with the earlier "pneumatocentric" ecclesiology of Johann Adam Moehler. Indeed in The Principle of Protestantism Schaff himself admitted that many Protestants would feel more comfortable with Moehler and Bellarmine than they would with F.D. Strauss.[247]

As Avery Dulles has noted, however, "communion models" of the church inevitably face a plaguing problem: what is the connection between the visible church and the spiritual church?[248] Can the church be both sinful and holy? Nevin and Schaff seem to have wanted to answer this question affirmatively. Against F.C. Baur they stressed the continuity between idea and reality in the church. In his essay on "Catholicism" Nevin constantly reiterated the opinion that catholicity is an abiding attribute of the church in all times and places, despite the presence of sin and failure.

Still, there are passages in the early Mercersburg writings that make one wonder whether Nevin and Schaff felt entirely comfortable with this emphasis on the continuity between the visible and the invisible church. In his History of the Apostolic Church, for example, Schaff defined the "true essence" of the church as "the eternal communion of saints. . .only. . .the regenerate and converted."[249] But this leaves the question of the sinner's place in the church ambiguous. Is the sinner simply "outside the pale"? And if that is so, does this "true essence" of the church actually exist anywhere?

In an essay on "The Church of Sinners", Karl Rahner has suggested that the conflict between the visible and invisible dimensions of the church can be resolved only if we admit that real sinners belong to the real church.[250] Rahner writes: ". . .those who sin and fail form a part of the embodiment and manifestation of that divine salvation and that divine grace which we call 'Church'."[251] The real visible church of sinners is simultaneously the holy sign of salvation among men. Sinners belong not merely to the "external, juridical forms" of church life; they belong to its inwardness as well. To use John Nevin's term, catholicity (the "holy wholeness" of the church) embraces salvation as it is present simultaneously to both saint and sinner. Though they were aware of it, the

Mercersburg men were never quite able to resolve this problem in their ecclesiology.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have explored the Mercersburg ecclesiology as it began to develop in the early writings of Nevin and Schaff. We have seen that in an effort to counteract revivalistic sectarianism and "gnostic" rationalism the Mercersburgers stressed the visible "churchly" character of Christianity. Rooted in the doctrine of the incarnation, the Mercersburg ecclesiology relied on what I have called a "catholic hermeneutic". The success of this hermeneutic was limited, however, by the lack of a fully developed theory of cognition, language and symbol. In the chapters that follow we shall see how this limitation was dealt with in the Mercersburg theory of liturgy and sacrament.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1] John Nevin, "Introduction" to Philip Schaff, The Principle of Protestantism, trans. John Nevin and ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 1; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1964), p. 40. Hereafter the following abbreviations will be used: Nevin, "Introduction," followed by the page reference; Schaff, PP, followed by the page reference.

[2] John Nevin, "Catholicism," Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), 1-26.

[3] George H. Shriver, "Philip Schaff: Heresy at Mercersburg," in George H. Shriver, ed., American Religious Heretics (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), pp. 33-35.

[4] Citations of this work will be from the following edition: John Nevin, The Anxious Bench (2nd. ed.; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: Publication Office of the German Reformed Church, 1844). Hereafter the work will be abbreviated: AB, followed by the page reference. For Nevin's opposition to New Measures revivalism during 1834 and 1835 while he was teaching at the seminary in Pittsburgh, see James Hastings Nichols, Romanticism in American Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 15.

[5] Nevin, AB, pp. 16-17.

[6] Ibid., pp. 12-15.

[7] Ibid., p. 25.

[8] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[9] Ibid., pp. 40-42. In this passage Nevin describes the revivalist meetings.

[10] See Frances Trollope, "A Camp Meeting," in Vergilius L. Ferm, ed., Issues in American Protestantism (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 152-158.

[11] Ibid., p. 154.

[12] Ibid., p. 155.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 156.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 157.

[17] Ibid., p. 158.

[18] Abundant examples may be found in Bernard A. Weisberger, They Gathered at the River (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp. 83-124.

[19] Nevin, AB, pp. 30-31. For Nevin's more positive assessment of revivals see his remarks about Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, AB, pp. 56-57.

[20] Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[21] Ibid., p. 37.

[22] Ibid., p. 38.

[23] Ibid., p. 39.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 50.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., p. 54.

[28] Ibid., pp. 55-56.

[29] For a discussion of Coleridge see Chapter Two of this dissertation, pp. 100-124.

[30] Nevin, AB, pp. 76-77.

[31] Charles Finney, Systematic Theology, ed. John H. Fairchild (abridged ed.; Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, Inc., 1976), p. 220.

[32] Ibid., p. 223.

[33] Ibid., p. 220.

[34] Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 236-247.

[35] Nevin, AB, p. 88.

[36] Ibid., p. 83.

[37] Ibid., p. 90.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[40] Ibid., p. 95.

[41] Ibid., p. 114. Nevin's comment about "Taylorism" and the "speculative heresy of New Haven" is a reference to Nathaniel William Taylor (1786-1858), who became a leading figure in the effort to provide an adequate theological basis for evangelical revivalism. Taylor and his colleagues at Yale emphasized God's moral government rather than his sovereign will (as Jonathan Edwards had done). He was convinced of man's "entire moral depravity" and insisted that this depravity was man's by nature (an idea Finney was to support). On Taylor and his ideas see Sydney Ahlstrom, ed., Theology in America (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 211-249. Taylor's important "Concio ad Clerum: A Sermon on Human Nature, Sin, and Freedom" is given on pp. 213-249. For Finney's view see Systematic Theology, pp. 164-194.

[42] Nevin, AB, p. 115.

[43] Ibid., p. 116.

[44] Ibid., p. 119.

[45] Ibid., pp. 119-120.

[46] Ibid., p. 124.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid., p. 125.

[49] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[50] Ibid., p. 127.

[51] Ibid., p. 129.

[52] Ibid., p. 130; emphasis added.

[53] Ibid., p. 131.

[54] Finney, Systematic Theology, p. 219. Finney always identified conversion with an actual "change in moral character."

[55] Nevin, AB, p. 131.

[56] Ibid., pp. 132-133.

[57] Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[58] See Chapter Two of this dissertation, especially pp. 108-111.

[59] Nevin, AB, p. 143.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., p. 56.

[62] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[63] See The Weekly Messenger 9 (No. 49), (August 21, 1844), p. 1863, where Schaff's arrival at the Mercersburg seminary is described.

[64] Shriver, "Philip Schaff: Heresy at Mercersburg," pp. 21-22.

[65] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[66] Ibid., p. 33.

[67] Nevin's essays on "Pseudo-Protestantism" appeared in The Weekly Messenger for August 13 - September 10, 1845.

[68] Schaff, PP, p. 57.

[69] Ibid., p. 73.

[70] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[71] Ibid., p. 76.

[72] Ibid., p. 80.

[73] Ibid., p. 87.

[74] Ibid., p. 98.

[75] In his earlier work the Roman Catholic Johann Adam Moehler would have tended to agree with Schaff. See Chapter Two of this dissertation, pp. 87-92.

[76] Schaff, PP, p. 98.

[77] Ibid., p. 116.

[78] I have not gone into the question of Schaff's approach to the development of doctrine as compared in all its points to the approach of John Henry Newman (in his Essay on Development of 1845).

[79] Schaff, PP, p. 116.

[80] Peter C. Hodgson, "General Introduction," to Ferdinand Christian Baur, On the Writing of Church History, trans. and ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 33.

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[81] Ferdinand Christian Baur, The Epochs of Church Historiography, trans. and ed. Peter C. Hodgson, in Ferdinand Christian Baur, On the Writing of Church History (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 249. Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: Baur, Epochs, with the page reference.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., p. 244.

[84] Ibid., p. 250.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid., p. 251.

[87] Schaff, PP, pp. 71-72.

[88] Ibid., p. 73.

[89] Ibid., pp. 216, 230-231.

[90] Philip Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, trans. Edward D. Yeomans (New York: Scribner, 1853), p. 16. Hereafter this work will be cited: Schaff, HAC, with the page reference.

[91] Ibid., p. 18.

[92] Ibid., pp. 18-19, note 1.

[93] Ibid., p. 18.

[94] Ibid., p. 19.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

[97] J. Robert Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 44-45.

[98] Schaff, HAC, p. 16.

[99] Philip Schaff, What is Church History?, trans. John Nevin, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1846), p. 37. Hereafter this work will be cited: Schaff, WCH, with the page reference.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Schaff, HAC, p. 110, note 1. Johann Adam Moehler had also addressed himself to the necessity of a "churchly sense" in Christian historiography: "Wenn man nemlich die Geschichte der christlichen Kirche mit Erfolg studiren und in das Wesen derselben eindringen will, so wird erfordert, dass man *einem christlichen und kirchlichen Sinn und Geist mitbringe*." See Johann Adam Moehler, *Gesammelte Schriften und Auffässe*, ed. Johann Doellinger, 2 Vols. (Regensburg: Verlag Manz, 1839), II, p. 282.

[102] Schaff, HAC, p. 109.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., p. 112. This charge of gnosticim was one Moehler made in *Symbolik* against Protestantism generally. See HAC, p. 113, note 1. See also Johann Adam Moehler, *Symbolik*, ed. Joseph Rupert Geiselmann, 2 Vols. (Cologne: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1961), I, pp. 292-302.

[105] Schaff, HAC, p. 113.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Schaff was not hesitant about acknowledging his debt to Baur on this score.

[108] Schaff, HAC, p. 3.

[109] Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Introduction to Lectures on the History of Christian Dogma*, ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson, in Ferdinand Christian Baur, *On the Writing of Church History* (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 306.

[110] Schaff, HAC, p. 3.

[111] Baur, *Epochs*, p. 47.

[112] Schaff, HAC, p. 4.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid., p. 6.

[115] Baur, *Epochs*, p. 250.

[116] Schaff, HAC, p. 8.

[117] On this model see Avery Dulles, *Models of the Church* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 43-57.

[118] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[119] Schaff, HAC, p. 8.

[120] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[121] Johann Adam Moehler, L'Unité dans l'Église ou le Principe du Catholicisme d'après l'esprit des Perès des trois premiers siècles de l'Église, trans. Alan de Lilienfeld (Paris: Cerf, 1938), p. 6. Hereafter, references to this work will be made as follows: Moehler, EK, with the page reference.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid., p. 7.

[124] Ibid., p. 24. See also Pierre Chaillet, "Le Principe mystique de l'unité," in Pierre Chaillet, ed., L'Église est une. Hommage à Moehler (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939), pp. 198-199.

[125] Schaff, HAC, p. 9.

[126] Baur, Introduction to Lectures on Dogma, p. 306.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Schaff, WCH, p. 81.

[129] Ibid., p. 82.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Hodgson, "General Introduction," p. 22.

[133] Schaff, HAC, p. 114.

[134] Ibid., p. 113.

[135] Schaff, WCH, p. 82.

[136] Ibid., p. 83.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid., p. 85.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid., p. 92.

[141] Ibid., p. 93.

[142] Moehler, Gesammelte Schriften, II, p. 263; my translation.

[143] Moehler, EK, pp. 8-21.

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[144] Schaff, WCH, p. 85.

[145] Schaff, HAC, p. 134.

[146] Schaff, PP, p. 216.

[147] Schaff, WCH, p. 98.

[148] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[149] Text in James Hastings Nichols, ed., The Mercersburg Theology (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 35-55.

[150] Nevin, "Catholic Unity," p. 41.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid., p. 43.

[155] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[156] Ibid., p. 47.

[157] Ibid., p. 49.

[158] For the text of Nevin's sermon on "The Church" see James Hastings Nichols, The Mercersburg Theology, pp. 57-76.

[159] Nevin, "The Church," p. 58.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[162] See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On the Constitution of the Church and State, in William G.T. Shedd, ed., The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 7 Vols. (New York: Scribner, 1856), VI, p. 98.

[163] Hodgson, "General Introduction," p. 33.

[164] Baur, Epochs, p. 257.

[165] Nevin, "The Church," p. 58.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid., p. 59.

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[168] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[169] Ibid., p. 66.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ibid., p. 67.

[172] Ibid., p. 75.

[173] John Nevin, "Catholicism," Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), 1-26.

[174] Ibid., p. 17.

[175] Nevin does mention and defend the extensive mission of Christianity ("world evangelization"), but he considers it secondary and subordinate to the intensive mission of the church.

[176] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 11.

[177] Ibid., p. 5.

[178] Ibid.

[179] Nevin, "Catholic Unity," pp. 38-39.

[180] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 2.

[181] Ibid., p. 3.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid., p. 9.

[185] Ibid., p. 10.

[186] Ibid., p. 2; emphasis added.'

[187] James F. Cotter, Inscape: The Christology and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), p. 18.

[188] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 8.

[189] Richard Wenta, "Radical Catholicity," Anglican Theological Review 58 (1976), 3-23.

[190] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 19.

[191] Ibid., p. 20.

[192] Schaff, HAC, p. 115.

[193] Baur, Epochs, p. 243.

[194] Ibid.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Schaff, HAC, p. 113.

[197] Ibid., p. 7.

[198] Schaff, WCH, p. 77.

[199] Nevin, "The Church," pp. 75-76.

[200] Schaff, PP, p. 73.

[201] Schaff, WCH, p. 84.

[202] Baur, Epochs, p. 96.

[203] Ibid., p. 248.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Schaff, PP, p. 59.

[206] Ibid., p. 57.

[207] David S. Schaff, The Life of Philip Schaff (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), pp. 84-87. See also Schaff, PP, p. 158.

[208] David S. Schaff, The Life of Philip Schaff, p. 84. Maurice was strongly attracted to the ideas of Coleridge. See Bernard M.G. Reardon, From Coleridge to Gore. A Century of Religious Thought in Britain (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1971), p. 61.

[209] Schaff, HAC, p. 134.

[210] Schaff, WCH, p. 101.

[211] Nevin, "Catholic Unity," p. 54.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Schaff, PP, p. 157. Schaff wrote: "Rationalism is theoretic sectarianism; sectarianism is practical rationalism" (PP, p. 155).

[214] Ibid., p. 160.

[215] Ibid., pp. 160-161.

[216] Ibid., p. 163.

[217] Ibid., p. 216.

[218] Ibid., p. 223.

[219] Nevin, "Introduction," p. 41.

[220] Ibid., p. 42.

[221] See Nichols, *Romanticism*, p. 3.

[222] See Schaff, WCH, pp. 60-80 for the distinction between "earlier" and "later" rationalists.

[223] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 11.

[224] Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," in *Theological Investigations Volume IV*, trans. Kevyn Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), p. 108.

[225] John Nevin, "Wilberforce on the Incarnation," in Nichols, *The Mercersburg Theology*, p. 79.

[226] Ibid., p. 80; emphasis added.

[227] Baur, *Epochs*, p. 244.

[228] Nevin, "The Church," p. 75.

[229] Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," p. 108.

[230] Schaff, HAC, p. 110.

[231] Schaff, WCH, pp. 93-94.

[232] Nichols, *Romanticism*, p. 136.

[233] Cotter, *Inscape*, p. 18.

[234] Nichols, *Romanticism*, p. 37. See also Schaff, HAC, p. 104, note 2.

[235] Barth, *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine*, p. 44.

[236] Schaff, WCH, p. 121.

[237] Nevin, "Catholicism," p. 11.

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[238] Stephen Prickett, Romanticism and Religion. The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Victorian Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 19-31.

[239] Philip Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain (Rev. ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 28.

[240] The Liturgical Committee, The Liturgical Question with Reference to the Provisional Liturgy of the German Reformed Church (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1862), p. 15. The "Liturgical Committee" was unquestionably John Nevin.

[241] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, ed. Henry N. Coleridge in William C.T. Shedd, The Complete Works, 7 Vols. (New York: Scribner, 1856), VI, p. xvii.

[242] Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, p. 30.

[243] Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 19-20, 45-69.

[244] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Shawcross, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), I, p. 107.

[245] Ibid.

[246] The Liturgical Committee, The Liturgical Question, p. 38.

[247] Schaff, PP, pp. 134-135.

[248] Dulles, Models of the Church, pp. 55-57.

[249] Schaff, HAC, p. 8.

[250] Karl Rahner, "The Church of Sinners," in Theological Investigations Volume VI, trans. Karl Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon, 1969), pp. 253-269.

[251] Ibid., p. 258.

CHAPTER IV

PATTERNS OF LITURGICAL REFORM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In Chapters Two and Three I have attempted to show the ambivalence of the Mercersburg theologians when they were confronted with the central theological debate of the nineteenth century: the conflict between the claims of an historical-critical method and the claims of traditional Christian orthodoxy. On the one hand, John Nevin and Philip Schaff found themselves partially committed to the liberal program of historical criticism represented by the Tübingen School and, specifically, by the "speculative hermeneutic" of Ferdinand Christian Baur. On the other hand, the Mercersburg men found themselves drawn toward the "pietist" program of a church historian like August Neander. Schaff's indebtedness to both Baur and Neander in the matters of ecclesiology and church history has already been discussed.

The present chapter will focus attention on five patterns of liturgical reform that developed in the early and mid-nineteenth century. These patterns, it will be argued, are part of the larger debate that divided those who supported a relentless application of historical-critical method to the contents of Christian faith from those who either rejected this method as utterly heterodox or attempted (as Nevin and Schaff did) to combine elements of both liberalism and pietism into their theological program. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that the patterns of liturgical reform in the first half of the nineteenth century were part of a much deeper "theological awakening" that affected both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians.

For the nineteenth century controversies about the meaning and purposes of worship were not, as is often supposed, superficial skirmishes between "high churchmen" and "low churchmen", between those who advocated ceremonial and ritual in liturgy and those who scoffed at it. The conflict was deeper and the stakes were higher. The liturgical reform movements of the nineteenth century are examples of a conflict of hermeneutics. What divided liturgical reformers of the nineteenth century was not vestments and incense but more serious issues of interpretation: how does worship give rise to meaning? how does liturgy serve as a vehicle for the expression of faith? These issues produced both conflicting proposals for liturgical reform and conflicting patterns of liturgical interpretation.

The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, twofold. First, I shall outline some major nineteenth century patterns of liturgical reform and interpretation, in order to reveal both the similarities and the differences among them. Secondly, I shall attempt to situate these patterns in the larger framework of theological debate in that period. This analysis will supply the necessary background for understanding the Mercersburg approach to sacramental theology and worship--an approach that will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six. For, as I shall argue in those chapters, it is not sufficient to interpret the Mercersburg proposals for liturgy as simply another romanticist high church movement or as merely an attempt to "recover" the classical Reformed doctrine of worship and sacraments rooted in the theology of John Calvin. Nor can a document like the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 be understood simply by ferreting out its literary sources. It can be understood only by uncovering the hermeneutic and theological method used by Nevin and Schaff to interpret the entire body of Christian doctrine and faith.

Chapter Four, then, will explore several patterns of liturgical reform that emerged in the nineteenth century. In the case of each pattern, an effort will be made to raise and answer two questions: 1) What sort of hermeneutic is implicitly suggested by this reform? 2) What theology of worship resulted from the impact of this hermeneutic on the texts and rites of the liturgy? Examples of liturgical reform from both the Protestant and Roman Catholic traditions will be studied. The chapter will conclude with an attempt to locate these examples of liturgical reform within the larger framework of the nineteenth century theological "awakening".

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PATTERN 1: AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PRELUDE.

"POLITICAL JANSENISM" AT PISTOIA:

An important prelude to the liturgical reform movements of the nineteenth century, especially within Roman Catholicism, was the diocesan Synod of Pistoia. Under the presidency of Scipio de Ricci, bishop of Prato-Pistoia in Tuscany, this synod met in seven sessions from 18-28 September, 1786.[1] In addition to specifically liturgical matters the issues discussed at Pistoia included church order and discipline, the rights of diocesan bishops, the support and training of clergy, Christian catechesis, regulations governing marriage, and questions arising from dogmatic and moral theology.[2]

The immediate occasion for convoking the Synod of Pistoia was a circular letter sent on 2 August, 1785, by Peter-Leopold, Grand-Duke of Tuscany, to the three archbishops and five bishops in his duchy.[3] This letter, sent at Ricci's behest, ordered the Tuscan prelates to convoke local synods within their dioceses within two years' time. A little over five months later, on 26 January, 1786, Leopold followed up his earlier letter with a request for a national council of all the bishops in Tuscany.[4] Among the items he wished to see discussed were reform of the missal and breviary, the possibility of using the vernacular for administering the sacraments, reform of ecclesiastical studies according to the doctrine of St. Augustine, and the reform of popular devotional life (processions, the cult of the saints, church music, and devotions connected with the Blessed Sacrament).[5]

Ricci, who owed his appointment as bishop in 1780 to Leopold,[6] wasted no time in calling a synod for his own diocese. In a letter of 31 July, 1786, he ordered the synod to meet, beginning on 18 September of the same year.[7] Ricci stressed that the synod would make its decisions according to the ancient canonical discipline of the church, i.e., through unanimous consent of the bishop together with his presbyterium.

From the beginning of his episcopal tenure, actually, Ricci had prepared the way for such a synod through a number of pastoral instructions. For example, on 3 June, 1781, Ricci had published an instruction on devotion to the Sacred Heart wherein he warned of its innovative dangers and argued that the feast, though permitted in 1763, had not been imposed as obligatory on the whole church.[8] The following year, in an instruction of 2 May, 1782, Ricci had attacked popular superstitions connected with the invocation of saints, veneration of relics and use of images.[9] In 1783, Ricci established an ecclesiastical "Academy" designed to raise the cultural level of the clergy.[10] Pastors and young clerics were to study there, and their education was to be formed not by the "dessicated arguments" of the scholastic theologians, but by the teachings of Augustine on important doctrines like grace and predestination.

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The Academy's library was to be stocked with works by men like DuPin, Arnauld, Colbert and Quesnel.[11] These authors were, of course, intimately associated with the history of Jansenism. Ricci's Jansenist sympathies were revealed, too, in a collection of works which he ordered translated and published in twelve volumes shortly after his promotion to the episcopal office. At least two of these volumes, numbers 8 and 12, contained material that was to influence the liturgical proposals made at the Synod of Pistoia in 1786.[12] In volume 8, Ricci reprinted a Lettre du docteur Dupin sur l'ancienne discipline de l'Eglise touchant la celebration de la messe (20 November, 1707).[13] DuPin's writings, officially condemned and put on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1757, stressed the simplicity of the primitive Christian eucharist.[14] In Volume 12, Ricci included material which argued that the faithful should always receive communion at Mass and that communion outside Mass, using hosts previously consecrated, was not properly sacramental and did not have the effects of a sacrament.[15] Ideas of this sort, similar in tone to some forms of Jansenist sacramental theology, were to dominate the liturgical reforms proposed at the Synod of Pistoia.

These Jansenist influences have contributed to the view that the Synod of Pistoia is simply an example of Jansenism as it had evolved and blossomed in Italy during the eighteenth century. That Scipio de Ricci was influenced by the theological opinions of the earlier French Jansenists like

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Antoine Arnauld and Pasquier Quesnel is undeniable. But by the late eighteenth century Jansenism had become a many-faceted movement which included at least as many elements from politics as from theology. Indeed, as S.J. Miller has noted:

> The Jansenism of the eighteenth century was scarcely a theological movement at all; it had its morally rigorous aspects but its real distinguishing features might be listed as follows: co-operation with Christian princes in purifying the Church (a fatal trend once princes ceased being Christians at the end of the century) and reorganizing it according to what actually were or were believed to be the practices of the Primitive Church; an attempt to restore to the bishops the rights and duties which had been eroded by centralization of ecclesiastical power in the Roman Curia since the Council of Trent; a tendency to consider the monastic orders corrupt, inefficient, too wealthy, and too privileged and as bad and inefficient educators. All of this was coupled with a desire to see the secular clergy better educated, better paid, and wholly capable of leading Christians along the path of salvation without the prayers and good works of the regulars. Jansenism could also assume characteristics which are lumped together in our day as aggiornamento: use of vernaculars in the liturgy, emphasis on the rights and duties of priests as co-sharers in episcopal power (Richerism), and an effort to educate the laity in a practical, non-mystical Christianity.[16]

What Miller describes as "political Jansenism"[17] is exemplified in almost every detail by the discussions held at the Synod of Pistoia in 1786, and by the meeting of the Tuscan bishops at Florence in 1787. A brief review of some of these discussions will illustrate this point.

Episcopal prerogatives: According to Scipio de Ricci, the bishop's pastoral role in the local church was his by

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divine right, not by papal appointment. In a long memorandum written after the meeting at Pistoia and delivered to all the bishops of Tuscany assembled at Florence on 2 May, 1787, Ricci spoke of the full and absolute jurisdiction of bishops in their own dioceses.[18] The relation of bishops to the pope was, he argued, like that of the apostles to Peter. Just as the apostles carried on their mission in virtue of their own legitimate apostolic authority, without constant recourse to Peter, so the bishops must maintain the right to exercise the pastoral office without interference from the papacy. The pope, Ricci contended, is not a monarch, but is simply first among brother bishops. Primacy belongs to him, but not sovereignty,[19] since all legitimate ecclesiastical power derives directly from Christ alone. As depository of faith and as first guardian of the church's canons, the pope has the right and the responsibility of overseeing the work of his brother bishops in order to insure the faithful fulfillment of the ministry entrusted to all by Jesus Christ. But bishops have all the powers necessary to fulfill their function in virtue of the episcopal office itself, as established by Christ. Thus, while the pope may correct, suspend, or even defrock a bishop, he cannot deprive that man of his episcopacy as such, anymore than the deposition of an individual pope could deprive the papacy of its primatial role in the church.[20]

Ricci maintained, further, that in the earlier period of the church's life the pope's role was primarily consultative, not legislative.[21] Because of its prestige, cases were referred to the Roman see for advice and consultation. Roman bishops were asked to clarify doubts or to prescribe rules based on the authority of common tradition, but their advice was not considered absolutely binding. Later, Ricci argued, the influence of spurious documents like the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals caused the advisory and consultative functions of the Roman bishops to be transformed into sovereign pronouncements having the binding force of law. The result had been an exorbitant and uncanonical limitation of ordinary episcopal authority.[22] It was Ricci's hope that the bishops of Tuscany might use the opportunity of their meeting at Florence to reassert their ancient power and claim their former rights.

Ricci's position about the role of bishops in the church was quite similar to the Gallicanism of seventeenth and eighteenth century French prelates.[23] It asserted the independence of bishops from Roman domination, attacked the notion of papal infallibility--as yet undefined in Catholic dogma, though widely admitted by theologians--and denied papal claims to temporal power. Views like these were extremely compatible with the "political Jansenism" described above. They had already been set forth in the seventeenth century by Edmond Richer (1559-1631), a canonist who had defended the rights of the Sorbonne against encroachments by religious orders like the Jesuits.[24] Richer's De ecclesiastica et civili potestate (1611) had been condemned in 1612.[25] In that work Richer had supported the following points: 1) the superiority of ecumenical councils over the pope; 2) the view that the pope is merely the "ministerial head" of the church; 3) the opinion that the deposit of revelation had been entrusted by Christ not merely to the hierarchy, but to the ordinary faithful as well; 4) the conviction that bishops should have immediate jurisdiction in their own dioceses, independent of papal intervention; and 5) that the temporal governments could maintain mastery of their own realms against any and all encroachments from the pope.[26]

Edmond Richer's ideas, perhaps as filtered through the Jansenist writers Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719), are clearly reflected in the long memorandum Ricci presented to the Tuscan bishops at the assembly of Florence in May of 1787.[27] But a more immediate influence on Ricci's theories of episcopal power was the "Josephinism" of Emperor Joseph II and his brother the Grand-Duke Leopold.[28] This Josephinism was an Austrian species of "Febronianism", an eighteenth century German movement whose chief motive was to curtail papal intervention in the temporal affairs of politics and government.[29] Both Febronianism and Josephinism were counterparts of the Gallican ideas represented by Richer. Thus, Ricci's theories about episcopal power were hardly original. They were part of a much larger ideological complex (Gallicanism, Febronianism, Josephinism) that had its remote origins in the medieval political theory which asserted the responsibility of Christian princes for protecting the rights and well-being of the church.[30] The prince, according to common medieval doctrine, was an advocatus ecclesiae. But by the eighteenth century, with the gradual appearance of modern national states, this principle of advocacy began to clash thunderously with traditional papal claims to temporal sovereignty and power.[31]

Ricci's doctrine of episcopal prerogatives tended, therefore, to make the bishop a political ally of the prince in the latter's role of advocatus ecclesiae. The bishop was not the pope's representative in a local diocese, but a co-operator with the prince in the latter's work of promoting Christian life in his realm. The prince's name, for example, was inserted directly after that of the bishop in the liturgy of the Mass. Such a doctrine of alliance between bishop and prince, together with a strong thrust toward episcopal independence from Rome, was bound to conflict with growing theories of papal sovereignty that were to culminate, during the nineteenth century, in the definition of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council (1870).[32] As will be seen, Ricci's brand of political Jansenism was to have a direct impact on the proposals for liturgical reform that emanated from the Synod of Pistoia in 1786.

Ecclesiology and sacraments: A second indication of political Jansenism at Pistoia can be seen in the synod's theology of church and sacraments. Ricci's own ecclesiology was quite conservative. Following traditional Roman Catholic formulations, the Synod testified that both the church and its priesthood were divinely instituted by Jesus Christ.[33] The promises of the new covenant, sealed in Jesus' blood, are absolute; no error can prevail against them. The church itself, as represented by its body of pastors, who are vicars of Christ, is competent to judge erroneous doctrine. That competence is infallible; however, infallibility is not localized in the Roman Pontiff, but rather in the whole body of legitimate pastors.[34] Because the new covenant is decisive and irrevocable in Christ, the church has no power to establish new dogmas or altar old ones. Its role is to preserve and pass on the received tradition based on Scripture.[35] The church calls its members to a strictly disciplined moral life. In language strongly reminiscent of Jansenist theory, the Synod argued that the demands of this Christian moral life cannot be fulfilled without special grace from God.[36] The operation of such grace is irresistible, though it remains possible to refuse cooperation with it.

The Jansenist understanding of grace spilled over into the Synod of Pistoia's decrees on the various sacraments. The Synod's discussion of penance, held at the fifth session on Monday, 25 September, 1786, is particularly revealing.[37] At this session, attended by the largest number of persons present at any of the synod's proceedings (246), it was agreed that much harm results from admitting undisciplined, unknowledgeable people to the sacrament of penance.[38] Moreover, too much attention to items like sacramental matter and form, numbers and distinctions of sins (perhaps an implicit criticism of Trent's rules for the material integrity of the sacrament) led to a depreciation of the real issue at stake in penance: viz., the dispositions of the penitent, his desire for conversion of heart. The Synod noted that fear is an insufficient motive for changing the human heart: only the love of God can destroy the inclination toward concupiscence and so allow the penitent to pass from sin to grace.[39] This love is not supplied by sacramental absolution; it is a condition for effective reception of absolution. Thus the Synod of Pistoia argued that the efficacy of sacramental penance consisted in fortifying charity in such a way that a person is placed in the state of renewed justice and holiness.[40]

Pistoia's statements about the nature of sacramental penance and the dispositions required for its effective reception follow the Jansenist theses of Arnauld and Quesnel.[41] Both these men held that for a valid reception of the sacrament the love of God is a necessary condition.[42] This love is manifested by a total hatred of sin and an ardent desire to make satisfaction for it. A "conversion" interrupted by lapses into sin is proof that the human heart has not really been changed. To grant absolution in such cases of recidivism is to expose the penitent to further sin and possibly to sacrilege. The Jansenists also argued that since the heart arrives at grace only by degrees, any sudden conversion born of excitement and emotion is suspect.[43] The Synod of Pistoia seems to have adopted these Jansenist theses on penance. It decried "new practices" like parish missions that aimed at exciting sudden but insubstantial conversions.[44] It also insisted on the importance of the penitent's performing practices like fasting and prayer before the reception of the sacrament, in order to strengthen the charity that should possess the sinner's heart when absolution is finally given.[45] The delegates at Pistoia also expressed their admiration for those early centuries of the church's life when the rule of a single opportunity for penance after postbaptismal sin was in effect.

The Synod of Pistoia thus sought to bolster what it felt was a sagging and indiscriminate sacramental discipline in the Catholic Church. To do this, it combined elements of Jansenist rigor with a strong admiration for the discipline and sacramental practice of the primitive Christian community. This combination of elements, it will be seen, contributed to the proposals for liturgical reform advocated by Scipio de Ricci and adopted at Pistoia in 1786.

Liturgical Reform: Even before the Synod of Pistoia met under Ricci's presidency, some attempts at liturgical reform inspired by the eighteenth century forms of Jansenism, Gallicanism and Josephinism had been made. The seventeenth century French Jansenists had not cultivated a reputation for liturgical reform. Indeed, they had avoided liturgical

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innovation, even though their theological positions often led them to a deep appreciation for the practices of primitive Christianity. The partisans of Port-Royal, for example, were scrupulous in their adherence to the Council of Trent's discipline governing public worship.[46] But by the eighteenth century Jansenism had readily combined, as we have seen, with congenial ideologies like Gallicanism and Febronianism. This combination resulted in a discernible shift of ideas about Christian worship. For example, in France, after Louis XIV's death (1715), local experiments with the liturgy began to crop up here and there. Some French dioceses, for instance, began to allow the recitation of the eucharistic prayer in a loud voice so that all the people could hear and participate actively in the liturgy.[47] This practice became sufficiently widespread to attract notice and to generate opposition from bishops who did not sympathize with Gallican ideas. Thus the cathedral chapter of Bayeux (in 1729) and Bishop Étienne de la Fare of Laon (in 1737) issued instructions forbidding priests to proclaim the eucharistic prayer aloud.[48]

But modest experiments of this sort did not satisfy those late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Jansenists who felt that a more thoroughly systematic reform of worship was long overdue. Demands were increasingly made to reform the liturgy through a return to primitive Christian sources. One of the most notable of these demands was made by Jacques Jubé, the cure d'Asnières.[49] Significantly Jubé had been educated at the seminary at Saint-Magloire, where Pasquier Quesnel had spent a number of years.[50] Later, Jubé's commitment to Jansenist and Gallican ideas was strengthened at the Sorbonne. There he joined the battle against Pope Clement IX's constitution Unigenitus Dei Filius (8 September, 1713), which identified and condemned one hundred and one propositions derived from Quesnel's works.[51] Anticipating some of Pistoia's liturgical innovations, Jubé insisted on austere church architecture, on a simple altar without extravagant embellishment, and on restricting celebrations of the eucharist to Sundays and solemn feasts.[52]

Moreover, under Jubé's direction the eucharistic liturgy at d'Asnières was radically reformed.[53] The celebrant processed into church preceded by a large cross. The introit antiphon was then recited by the celebrant and responded to by the whole assembly. During the liturgy of the Word the celebrant remained seated at his chair; the readings (epistle and gospel) were done by other ministers. At the "offertory", bread and wine were brought to the altar by the faithful, who might also bring fruit and fresh produce in the spring of the year. The cup and the paten were brought in from the sacristy at this point and placed on the altar. The deacon joined with the priest in lifting up the gifts and saying, in the name of the people, the words of the offertory prayers. The eucharistic prayer was said aloud and, at communion, men and women mingled in approaching the holy table. At Sunday Vespers, a woman was permitted to read the gospel aloud in French.

It does not appear that Jubé's efforts at liturgical reform were widely imitated. Nevertheless there are other examples of reform in the eighteenth century prior to the proposals made at the Synod of Pistoia. For example, in 1742, the Cistercians of the abbey of Orval introduced a number of changes into the rubrics and texts of the Missal.[54] These changes seem to have been influenced by the liturgies planned and celebrated by Jacques Jubé at d'Asnières.

But France was not the only place where experiments were being conducted in order to involve the laity more directly in the faith and worship of the church. During the 1780's, Emperor Joseph II himself had begun a campaign to simplify liturgical ceremonial and to eliminate the superstition that attached to many Catholic devotional practices.[55] Joseph's campaign was a two-pronged attack; he hoped to dissolve many of the monasteries in his empire, since they often seemed to be bastions of backward thinking, and he sought to restrict popular devotions that smacked of superstition. The emperor's attack against the monasteries, begun in 1782, appears to have been motivated, at least in part, by economic considerations. He anticipated, rightly, that compulsory dissolution of the monasteries would yield large amounts of money for the imperial treasury. The scheme worked and soon Joseph was able to use monastic revenues for the support of unbeneficed secular clergy who at that time were often forced to live at the level of abject poverty. By 1786, Joseph had managed to dissolve 738 religious houses and to reduce the number of monks and nuns by a significant number.[56] In terms of cold cash, the emperor's closure of monasteries and convents had yielded him about 32.5 million florins by 1786.[57] Joseph's monastic policy is thus a good example of political Jansenism in action, for it was a central tenet of this form of Jansenism that the monastic orders were "corrupt, inefficient, too wealthy and too privileged."[58]

The emperor was less successful, however, in his attempts to reform the liturgical rites and to eradicate superstition. The peasant population considered the traditional devotions and ceremonies a vital part of their social and religious identity, and they were reluctant to part with them.[59] In some regions of the empire, like Carinthia, peasants actually organized vigilante groups for the protection of their statues, plaques and images. Imperial military officials sent to remove these objects were unceremoniously run out of the villages and some priests who attempted compliance with the emperor's orders were actually injured. Faced with this degree of opposition, Joseph decided to let the peasants have their way. Chapels and shrines were reopened; images and statues were replaced; liturgical rites were left undisturbed.[60]

Prior to the opening of the Synod of Pistoia in September of 1786, therefore, there had been liturgical experiments inspired by that cluster of political and theological ideas we have called "political Jansenism". What made Pistoia's recommendations for liturgical reform remarkable was not their utter novelty but the systematic thoroughness with which they were applied to all areas of Christian worship. In Ricci's hands the liturgical rites became pedagogical tools. It was his overwhelming concern to instruct and educate the faithful in a practical, disciplined Christianity through a simplified set of ceremonies based, he felt, on the best practices of the primitive church. As will be seen, Ricci's formula for reform (good liturgy equals good pedagogy) implied a very definite hermeneutic, one that resulted in a theology of worship which influenced proponents of a second pattern of liturgical reform in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries--the pattern based on principles of the "Catholic Enlightenment".

The earlier eighteenth century liturgical experiments inspired by political Jansenism must be kept in mind as one reviews the mandates for reform proposed at the Synod of Pistoia. On Wednesday, 27 September, 1786, the delegates at the synod took up the question of public and private prayer.[61] Noting that unceasing prayer is the primary obligation of every Christian, the synod emphasized the importance of praying in the name of Jesus:

> To pray in the name of Jesus Christ is, properly speaking, to rely on his charity and his merits, to unite oneself to the prayer and sacrifice of the one mediator.[62]

The sole appropriate object of Christian prayer is Jesus Christ, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Adoration of one part of Jesus' humanity, e.g., the Sacred Heart, is erroneous and perverse.[63] For this reason the synod condemned images that portray "false dogmas" (such as statues of the Sacred Heart) as well as images that encourage people to place superstitious reliance on saints or the Blessed Virgin.[64] Cults attached to a devotion of questionable value, such as that associated with the "Virgin's cincture" in the cathedral church at Prato, should be abandoned.[65] These practices, the synod argued, encourage "vain and puerile" hopes and are to be abolished.[66]

Since Christ in his mysteries is the primary focus of Christian prayer, believers ought to let the liturgy form their devotional practices. Reiterating the idea of incessant prayer, the synod noted that since the unceasing prayer of the heart is not always possible, the church has set certain specific times for public prayer.[67] That said, the synod immediately made some suggestions for the practical reform of common worship. Among these were the following:

1. In the eucharistic prayer the prince's name should be mentioned immediately after that of the local bishop.[68]

2. In order to discourage superstitious devotions for the souls in purgatory, the first Sunday of each month is to be set aside for special prayers for the dead. Each pastor, with his assistants and the people, was instructed to assemble in the parish church to pray for the dead by

chanting or saying Vespers, plus the first nocturn and Lauds of the Office of the Dead. The next morning (Monday), a Requiem Mass should be celebrated for the faithful departed. These recommendations were designed to counteract the popular impression that the prayers of the living benefit only those dead persons who are explicitly named in prayer.[69]

3. Pastors were instructed, further, to see to it that the faithful participate regularly in public prayer, especially in official liturgies of the church like Mass and the Divine Office.[70]

4. Both the breviary and the Missal were to be reformed. Non-biblical readings, especially those used on saints' feasts should be purged of fables and errors. Scriptural readings were to be so arranged that the whole Bible could be read through in a year's time. The Synod approved and adopted a pastoral letter sent by Ricci on 1 January, 1786, which required each bishop to choose men capable of accomplishing this work of correction and reform.[71]

5. A ritual or manual for use of the city and diocese of Pistoia was to be drawn up. This manual, similar in content to the English "prymers", should include the church's prayers and rite, psalms and hymns, offices for principal feasts, the ordinary of the Mass, as well as catechetical instruction and explanatory material.[72]

6. The number and style of public processions was to be revised. Processions were limited to the following days: Palm Sunday, Holy Thursday and Candlemas. These processions

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were to be held inside the church, although on Corpus Christi and the Rogation Days they could take place outdoors. All other processions, especially those that involved relics of saints or images, were to be abolished. These, the synod observed, were often occasions for indecent banqueting and frivolity. The people should be reminded that the whole Christian life is a continual feast and an everlasting canticle for the Lord.[73]

7. The celebration of Christmas was to be reformed. All the festivities formerly observed at night on Christmas Eve were to be transferred to the following morning, after sunrise.[74]

8. In order to emphasize the role of the parish church as the local center of worship, the synod forbade the regular clergy to open the doors of their churches to the public on Sundays, feasts, and during the solemn ceremonies of Holy Week.[75]

In a series of six memoranda sent to Grand Duke Leopold for his consideration, the synod also recommended the suppression of feasts transferred to Sundays.[76] At the same time it demanded a reduction in the number of festivals, since they tend to degenerate into orgies of eating and drinking. Moreover, the synod noted, such feasts permit the rich to play, while they only make the poor more conscious of their misery and destitution.[77] Leopold responded to these memoranda on 4 November, 1786, and indicated his general approval of the synod's recommendations.[78]

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In addition to all these decisions about public prayer and private devotion, the Synod of Pistoia decreed several significant changes in the celebration of the eucharist. Noting that the eucharistic body of Christ is not "un corpo animale" but "spirituale e vivificante", the synod stated that eating the eucharist means eating in faith.[79] The eucharistic sacrifice is celebrated for all, for all faithful believers still living on earth and for all who have died. While it is possible to make a special commemoration of persons living or dead in the eucharist, the synod warned that such commemorations do not limit the value of the sacrifice only to the persons explicitly mentioned.[80] The synod likewise warned against leaving people with the impression that the money they offer for the celebration of Mass somehow "purchases" the eucharist for particular intentions.[81]

Working on these principles, the Synod decreed several changes in the eucharistic ritual:

1. The faithful should receive communion from bread consecrated at the Mass they actually attend. Although all Christians should communicate at the liturgy, those who decline to do so should not be condemned.[82]

2. Only as much of the sacrament is to be reserved as is necessary for use in communicating the sick or for grave emergencies. The sacrament should be kept in a place where it can better receive the attention and reverence of the faithful. When benediction is given, it should be done with

the ciborium, rather than with a monstrance, so that less emphasis is placed on visible adoration of the eucharistic elements.[83]

3. There should be only one altar in the church. This altar is to be kept simple, unencumbered with reliquaries, flowers and other objects.[84]

4. The music used at Mass should be simple, modest, well adapted to the sense of the texts. The playing of the organ, from the preparation of the gifts until the post-communion prayer, is forbidden.[85]

5. The celebrant should pronounce all the words of the ritual carefully and distinctly, without undue haste.[86]

To persons acquainted with Roman Catholic liturgical reforms of the twentieth century, Pistoia's proposals may seem unremarkable. But to many Catholics of the late eighteenth century they were astonishing and suspect. Official reaction to the Synod of Pistoia came eight years later in the form of Pope Pius VI's letter Auctorem Fidei (28 August, 1794).[87] Immediate reaction assumed the more colorful form of rioting. A few words about each of these reactions is in order.

Ricci's ideas about liturgical reform failed to meet approval among the ordinary believers in the diocese. In the city of Prato especially, feeling against some of the synodical decrees ran high.[88] As has been mentioned, there was a relic in the cathedral church at Prato said to be the "holy cincture of the Blessed Virgin Mary" and preserved on a

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silver-gilt altar. It was customary, on certain high solemnities, for the priest to bless the people with this relic. Ricci found the practice repulsive and wanted it stopped.[89] Some of the decrees of Pistoia were obviously directed against this and similar practices. On 20 May, 1787, the people of Prato rioted over the affair.[90] They broke into the bishop's house and burned his ample library of Jansenist books. Demanding that the holy cincture and the silver altar be left intact, the people marched on the cathedral, broke in and tore down the episcopal throne.[91]

Confronted with such defiant acts of hostility, Ricci tried to defend both himself and the decrees of the Synod of Pistoia in a pastoral instruction of 5 October, 1787.[92] But he met with little success. Meanwhile, Ricci was also losing ground with another public on another front: his fellow bishops in Tuscany. In order to prepare for a national council of bishops, Leopold had convened the bishops (as we have seen) in a preliminary session at Florence in May of 1787. At this meeting Ricci discovered that his support among the Tuscan bishops, never very secure, had eroded badly. He was able to elicit only moderate approval for the liturgical reforms recommended at Pistoia.[93] Many of the Tuscan bishops felt Ricci's proposals were extravagant, perhaps even heretical.

By 1790, Ricci's influence had declined even further. That year, Leopold had succeeded Joseph II as emperor. Within a short time (24 April, 1790), a revolution in that region of

Tuscany forced Ricci to flee Pistoia and to seek refuge in Florence.[94] His reform program a shambles, Ricci resigned his episcopal see on 3 June, 1791.[95] When Leopold himself died in 1792, Ricci's last important defender was gone. These events paved the way for Pius VI's bull of condemnation, Auctorem Fidei.

Pius' bull was unsparing in its attack on the decrees approved at Pistoia. The document declared that Ricci's vision of liturgical reform, signified by things like simplicity in ritual, the possible use of the vernacular, and one altar in each church, was "temeraria".[96] Similarly, Pistoia's decrees against images that might lead the faithful into superstition and against the introduction of new festivals that would detract from the ordinary celebration of Sunday, were labelled as "falsa, temeraria, scandalosa, ecclesiae iniuriosa."[97] So thorough was Pius' condemnation of the synod's work that Auctorem Fidei concluded with the warning that anyone who read or possessed a copy of the synod's decrees was subject, *ipso facto*, to immediate excommunication.[98]

This severe papal condemnation did not totally destroy the work done at Pistoia under Ricci's guidance. As will be seen, the ideas for liturgical reform promoted by Ricci's brand of political Jansenism reasserted themselves among supporters of the "Catholic Enlightenment" during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Before moving to that discussion, however, some attention needs to be given to the hermeneutic that governed Ricci's approach to liturgical reform, and to the theology of worship which that hermeneutic implied.

The hermeneutic that inspired Pistoia's proposals for reform seems to have been a pedagogical one: good liturgy equals good pedagogy. Ricci regarded worship as the supreme norm and expression of sound doctrine. This point of view is, of course, neither unusual nor heterodox; it is another testimony to the ancient adage lex orandi statuit legem credendi. But what made Ricci's "pedagogical" approach to liturgical reform startling to many of his contemporaries was his understanding of how the truths embedded in worship are mediated to believers. I shall argue here that Ricci's vision of how worship mediates meaning and truth arose from his commitment to two positions: 1) his understanding of the Augustinian notion of sign, and 2) his conviction that worship is an expression not only of faith but of civic loyalty as well (the prince is an advocatus ecclesiae and the bishop is his primary political ally).

From his reading of Augustine, possibly through the eyes of Jansenist commentators, Ricci derived his conviction that visible signs can lead people to the contemplation of invisible realities.[99] It is significant that the opening paragraph of Pistoia's decree on the sacraments (22 September, 1786) begins this way:

> In every age there must be a religion of the sort that permits man to approach his Creator through certain visible signs, and thus to rest in the

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> contemplation of invisible things. . .as Augustine says, men would not be able to unite in forming a religious society--whether true or false--without such external signs, which serve as a kind of texture that allows all to acknowledge that they profess the same religion . . .The necessity of such signs has been greatly intensified since the fall of Adam. . .[100]

The decree continues by acknowledging the presence of such signs in the religion of Israel and by suggesting that the "shadowy" sacraments of the old dispensation have become clear and distinct in the revelation of faith through Jesus Christ.[101] Thus, the synod sees in the external signs of religion not only an anthropological necessity (human beings can approach the invisible reality of God only through visible signs), but also an example of the divine pedagogy. Man is created with a need for visible signs; that need is intensified through the fall of Adam; God responds to the need for signs through the "shadowy sacraments" of the Law given through Moses; and finally, God teaches his people the fulness of truth through the clear and visible signs revealed in the life and work of Jesus. Accordingly the sacraments are "public sensible signs" that unite believers in the "sacred army of Jesus Christ our head."[102]

The sacramental signs of the Christian church are, therefore, a continuation of that pedagogy by which, from the beginning, God has taught and nurtured his people. They "promise the grace they contain and they proclaim the glory we hope for."[103] But the synod suggests that if signs are to be effective they must be intelligible; and if they are to be intelligible they must be clear and unambiguous. This appeal to the intelligibility and clarity of signs appears in the opening paragraph of the synod's decree on the eucharist, wherein most of Pistoia's proposals for liturgical reform are to be found.[104] Since the eucharist is a "sensible rite" that respects human nature's need for signs,[105] and since Christ "imparts his grace, life and salvation through an external sign,"[106] the liturgy ought to be characterized by "greater ritual simplicity."[107] As an action "common to both priest and people,"[108] therefore, the liturgy mediates its truth and meaning through signs that are unmistakably clear and intelligible. Liturgical practices that interfere with the unambiguous intelligibility of sacramental signs are to be reformed or eradicated.

It is possible, of course, to argue that Pistoia's liturgical interests were rooted in a kind of romantic archaeologism which assumes that everything ancient is good and everything modern is wicked. Indeed, the appeals to "ancient custom" or to the "practice of the primitive church"[109] are frequent in Pistoia's decree on the eucharist. But these appeals to antiquity are always placed in the larger context of God's pedagogy: human beings are taught the truth gradually through the medium of signs. Thus, for example, in speaking of the eucharist as sacrifice, the Synod notes that the mysteries of Christ were "prefigured through the law of nature, through the actions of the Israelites," and finally were "brought to completion and perfection" through Jesus' own offering of himself.[110] And since God has taught people through such signs and prefigurements, it is entirely appropriate, the synod maintains, that the eucharist be celebrated as a "visible and external sign" of Christ's sacrifice:

> With St. Augustine we hold that [the eucharist is] the sign and sacrament of a true and invisible sacrifice. . .we believe. . .that the victim is not carnal but spiritual and incorruptible.[111]

To this emphasis on clear and intelligible signs in the liturgy the Synod of Pistoia added a second principle derived from the political Jansenism advocated by men like Emperor Joseph II and Grand Duke Leopold: worship is an expression of civic loyalty, of the public good. Good liturgy is not only good pedagogy, it is also good politics. Worship not only identifies the church as a community of faith, it also identifies it as part of that larger social structure where prince and bishop share responsibility for the well-being of the realm. As we have already seen, political Jansenism relies on a principle common in medieval political theory: the prince as *advocatus ecclesiae*. To this bit of political theory was added the notion, common to all forms of Gallicanism and Josephinism, that the bishop's pastoral office is quite independent of papal sovereignty. The bishop is not the pope's delegate in a diocese; he is a useful civil servant, accountable ultimately to the prince, who has the primary responsibility for overseeing the welfare of the realm.

According to the tenets of political Jansenism, the real "overseer" (*episkopos*) of Christian faith and worship is neither pope nor bishop, but prince. This theory comes across quite forcibly in the letter which Grand Duke Leopold had sent to the bishops of Tuscany (26 January, 1786),[112] advising them to convoke diocesan synods. The letter begins as follows:

> His royal highness considers it his chief and primary duty to see to it that the exercise of our holy religion be cleansed of all abuses and prejudices and that it be freed of anything at all that might prevent its return to a just and true perfection, simplicity and splendor. Especially close to his heart is the supreme and exact obligation (which belongs to princes) of seeing that the people are carefully instructed in the duties of their religion through its true principles. (It is also his duty to see that), in their holy and important ministry, the clergy and ministers of the church conduct themselves in a manner that is praiseworthy and useful to the public. . .and to see that ecclesiastical matters conform, in so far as possible, to the sacred canons and the ancient discipline of the church. . .[113]
>
> To this end, his royal highness has decided to consult. . .all the bishops of Tuscany. . .and to pass along to them certain points for discussion and resolution at synods of the respective dioceses. . .[114]

The letter is followed by a list of 57 points for discussion, most of them dealing with matters of ministerial competence, religious education for the people, and liturgical reform.[115]

It is clear from the opening lines of the letter cited above that Leopold regarded himself as the "ultimate pastor" of the people in his duchy. As an enlightened ruler, he considered himself charged with responsibility for the life of the realm in all its public aspects. Among those public aspects were items like Christian faith and worship. As civil servants of the prince, the bishops were responsible for carrying out his program of reform in Christian catechesis and liturgy. As Leopold said, ecclesiastical ministers are useful to the public. Worship is not only the public praise of God, it is also the effective sign of a realm that is well-regulated by enlightened rulers. As both good pedagogy and good politics, the liturgy is a sign of the moral order willed by God and of the political order governed by the prince.

Pistoia's hermeneutic of liturgical reform was, then, based on an alliance of theological conviction and political expediency. Working from the Augustinian theory of sign, men like Ricci arrived at the dual principle of intelligibility and clarity in the sacramental rites of the church. And from the political theory of Josephinism was derived the principle that the enlightened ruler is actually the chief pastor of his people, with the bishops as his civil servants. The liturgy of the church thus mediates its meaning and truth through the pedagogy of visible signs and through the politics of a realm wisely governed by enlightened men. Worship is the expression of both divine teaching and the public good.

Pistoia's political and pedagogical hermeneutic of reform resulted in a theology of worship distinguished by a rigorous devotion to moral duty. The moral education of the laity was a paramount aspect of Leopold's recommendations to the bishops of Tuscany. To this end he prescribed that the "books used for the instruction of the people and the rules governing the studies of the clergy be uniform in every region and in every diocese."[116] The reform of worship was an important way to re-instill moral discipline in a church that had become, in the minds of men like Leopold and Ricci, lax and undisciplined. The effectiveness of worship was not limited to the teaching of sound doctrine, it extended as well to the moral life of believers. A primary purpose of worship was to produce people single-mindedly dedicated to the pursuit of evangelical perfection.

Such high moral seriousness, almost puritanical in tone, is reflected time and again in the decrees that emanated from the Synod of Pistoia. Processions that give rise to "indecent banqueting and frivolity" were to be suppressed.[117] The sacrament of penance was not to be administered too readily, lest the penitent be exposed to the danger of further sin or even blasphemous presumption.[118] The number of festivals was to be reduced since these celebrations often degenerate into orgies of eating and drinking for the rich, and of increased misery for the poor.[119] The liturgical rites were to be brought in line with ancient custom and reformed in the direction of "greater simplicity".[120]

Pistoia's theology of worship was, then, the logical coefficient of its hermeneutic of reform. Pedagogy and politics combined to produce a style of worship that was austere both in its external rites and in its demands on the moral responsibility of believers. Although Pius VI's bull

Auctorem Fidei officially squelched Pistoia's proposals for reform, it did not utterly eradicate the synod's influence. The liturgical proposals of men like Scipio de Ricci re-emerged in the early decades of the nineteenth century, especially among spokesmen for the "Catholic Enlightenment". It is to this movement that we turn our attention now.

PATTERN 2: THE "CATHOLIC ENLIGHTENMENT" IN GERMANY

The movement of ideas in eighteenth century Europe known as the "Enlightenment", with its characteristic emphasis on human powers of reason, observation and experiment, was vigorously attacked by Catholic popes and prelates. Its emphasis on respect for personal freedom and choice led, it was felt, to religious indifferentism and rationalism. These "errors" were frequently denounced by popes in the first half of the nineteenth century. Leo XII (1823-1829), for example, lashed out against "tolerantismus" in his encyclical letter "Ubi primum" (5 May, 1824).[121] Gregory XVI (1831-1846), whose ultramontane sympathies were never disguised, rejected the idea that liberty of conscience ought to be the norm in the search for religious truth.[122]

Despite such papal disapproval, however, there arose, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a number of Roman Catholic churchmen who were attracted by Enlightenment ideas. This "Catholic Enlightenment" manifested itself in a variety of ways: through the acceptance by Catholic theologians of philosophical positions

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associated with Immanuel Kant; through Gallican and Febronian attitudes toward church government and polity; through dramatic changes in ecclesiastical art and architecture; and through attempts to reform the church's liturgy.[123]

On the surface the Synod of Pistoia appeared to represent "Catholic Enlightenment" ideas, at least in the areas of church government, art and liturgical change. Yet for all its flamboyance and bravado, Pistoia can hardly be called "radical". Both its hermeneutical principles--pedagogical and political--were rooted in common medieval theory. The Augustinian notion of signs had been explicitly invoked in the sacramental theology of Thomas Aquinas,[124] and the view of a prince as advocatus ecclesiae was also standard in medieval thought. In spite of its rhetorical flourishes against the vanities of scholasticism,[125] Pistoia was itself curiously medieval in outlook. Although Grand Duke Leopold bristled at "Rome's abusive usurpation of ancient episcopal rights,"[126] he himself did not hesitate to assume the "supreme and exact obligation. . .of seeing that the people are instructed in the duties of their religion."[127] Despite its liturgical innovations and its profound distrust of papal power, the Synod of Pistoia kept Christian faith and worship firmly under the control of "the authorities": an "enlightened" prince surrounded by co-operative bishops.

But during the first decades of the nineteenth century, the political Jansenism advocated at Pistoia had begun to give way to another impulse. Pistoia's approach to reform had been rather autocratic; recommendations were handed "from the top down", from an enlightened Christian prince through willing bishops on down to the pious faithful. By the early nineteenth century it had become clear that enlightened princes were not always interested in being Christians. As the political winds of Europe shifted, so did the fortunes of Christianity. It was possible, of course, to withdraw from this process of historical change and to condemn it as the fruit of faithless rationalism. Pope Gregory XVI, for example, was intransigent in his condemnations of "liberal democracy".[128] Such liberalism was incompatible, in Gregory's mind, with the changeless truths and institutions defended by Catholic Christianity. But other Catholics, especially theologians in the universities, began to suggest that the church itself needed a reform of doctrine and worship--and that this reform had to arise "from the bottom up", i.e., from a broad base of popular support among the laity.

One center of reform-minded Catholicism in the early nineteenth century was the Catholic faculty at the University of Tübingen. The ecclesiological work of one prominent member of that faculty, Johann Adam Moehler, has already been discussed.[129] A colleague of Moehler's, Johann Baptist Hirscher (1788-1865), extended the demand for reform to the area of worship and sacraments.[130] Hirscher's work, and the hermeneutic on which it was based, will occupy our attention in this second section of Chapter Four.

Johann Baptist Hirscher had received his theological education at Fribourg-im-Breisgau (1807 to 1809) and was ordained to the priesthood in 1810.[131] Two years later, Hirscher began teaching in the Roman Catholic seminary at Ellwangen, where he had the young Moehler as a student. When the seminary moved to the University of Tübingen in 1817, Hirscher assumed the chair of moral and pastoral theology. After spending twenty years in this position, Hirscher moved on to the University of Fribourg (1837), where he taught moral theology until 1863, two years before his death.[132]

Hirscher's career as a university professor was crisscrossed with controversy. His work De Genuina Notione Missae (1821) earned him a condemnation by the Sacred Congregation of the Index (20 January, 1823).[133] Later, at Fribourg, his Die kirchlichen Zustände der Gegenwart (1849) was also condemned (25 October, 1849).[134] Both these works will figure in our discussion of the proposals for liturgical reform advanced by Hirscher. Because of his controversial ideas Hirscher was twice passed over as a candidate for the episcopacy, though he did become a canon of the cathedral chapter in Fribourg.[135]

As will be seen, Hirscher's proposals for the reform of Catholic worship arose out of his conviction that liturgy belongs, first and foremost, to the people. It is, as he repeats time and again in De Genuina Notione Missae, the "ordinary, public celebration of the entire community of the faithful."[136] This "populist" vision of worship was supported, in Hirscher's thinking, by a populist approach to questions of church order and government.[137] The liturgy was not to be reformed through initiatives undertaken by an enlightened prince and carried out by cooperative bishops; it was to be reformed from the bottom up, by providing believers with forms of worship in which they could participate actively and immediately. As Hirscher said in Die kirchlichen Zustände, "a reform in which the people play no part is bound to fail."[138] Let us, then, turn to Hirscher's understanding of Christian worship, especially the eucharist, as outlined in his De Genuina Notione Missae.

In the De Genuina Hirscher was concerned about two things: 1) the theological meaning of the Lord's Supper according to the witness of the Scriptures, the testimony of the ancient Church Fathers, and the liturgical traditions of East and West; and 2) the need for a thorough liturgical reform in the Roman Church. While Hirscher may have been familiar with the work done at the Synod of Pistoia, he never alluded to it--not even in his section entitled "Critical observations on some attempts at reforming the Mass in our times."[139] Hirscher's inspiration for reform seems to have come from his reading of historians of Christian worship. He cites Roman Catholic scholars like Cardinal Bona (1609-1674), the Oratorian Jean Morin (1591-1659), Pierre le Brun (1661-1729), and the Maurist Benedictine liturgist Edmond Martene (1654-1739).[140] But Hirscher did not restrict himself to Roman Catholic authors; he also cited the Origines Ecclesiasticae of the Anglican scholar Joseph Bingham.[141]

In his citations of these Catholic and Protestant works, Hirscher was frequently cryptic and incomplete. Often he was content to cite a passage from an ancient liturgy without identifying the text or the translation which he followed. Some examples will illustrate this point. On page 75 of De Genuina, Hirscher cited from a eucharistic prayer of the "Coptic Liturgy" in order to show the dialogal nature of the text, which alternates between proclamations said by the priest and responses made by the people. It is quite possible that Hirscher cited this prayer from the second volume of Pierre le Brun's Explication de la Messe.[142] Le Brun's text itself, however, relied on the Latin translation of the Coptic rite made by the orientalist Eusebius Renaudot (1646-1720).[143] Hence, Hirscher's acquaintance with the "Coptic Liturgy" was probably third-hand. While this fact does not seriously compromise his argument (viz., that the eucharistic prayer is properly a dialogue between priest and people), it does suggest that Hirscher's familiarity with liturgical texts was derived primarily from the historical descriptions and translations of others, rather than from an intensive investigation of his own.

Another illustration of Hirscher's somewhat unscientific approach to liturgical texts occurs on pages 13 and 14 of De Genuina. There, the author cites two passages in order to show that the eucharist celebrates, above all, God's love for humanity. One of these texts is from the "Liturgy of Constantinople", while the other is from "the Nestorian Liturgy (Malabar)". In neither instance does Hirscher indicate his source. The passage from the "Liturgy of Constantinople" appears to be a partial quotation from the anaphora of St. John Chrysostom or of Basil:

> Domine!. . .qui summo hominem amore complecteris, cum coelestibus virtutibus dicimus: tu sanctus es, et infinita gratia tua est. Ita mundum dilexisti, ut filium tuum unicum dares, ut non pereat, qui in eum credit, sed ad vitam aeternam perveniat. . .gratias proinde Domino agamus! Resp. Dignum et justum est.[144]

In this case Hirscher cannot have depended on Le Brun's Explication, since Le Brun cites the liturgies of St. John Chrysostom and Basil only in French.[145] Perhaps Hirscher relied on J. Goar's Euchologion; but if he did, he has freely altered Goar's text and translation.[146] The other text cited at this point, from the "Nestorian Liturgy", can be found in Le Brun, although Hirscher did not identify him as a source:

> clamate ad Deum fortem toto corde vestro, et tota anima vestra, quoniam Deus pater benignus et misericors et clemens et non vult perire plasma suum, sed ut convertatur, et vivat. Super omnia decet nos orare laudare adorare unum Deum patrem Dominum omni adoratione dignissimum, qui per Jesum Christum filium suum Dominum fecit nobis spem bonam. . .[147]

In Hirscher's defense it must be said that he made no claims to liturgical scholarship in De Genuina. His interests were theological and pastoral; he sought to recover "the original power and significance of the Mass" and to

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suggest changes in the liturgy that could make that power bear greater fruit in the lives of believers.[148] Hirscher's own two formulas for the eucharistic celebration given in German at the end of De Genuina, are primarily "exercises" designed to illustrate his theological understanding of the Lord's Supper as the "public and ordinary" act of worship by Christians.[149]

Hirscher's Understanding of the Eucharist

Hirscher's vision of the "ultimate intention" (*destinatio*) of the eucharist was shaped by his analysis of the New Testament and of early testimonies found in the literature of the patristic age. Two things about the New Testament's description of the Lord's Supper struck him: its emphasis on the meal as a *proclamation of the Lord's death*,[150] and its description of the Supper as a *joyful public celebration by the entire community*.[151] As the solemn proclamation of Jesus' death, Hirscher contended, the Supper accomplished two things: 1) it affirmed God's majesty and love;[152] and 2) it offered believers the promised forgiveness of sins.[153] As a joyful celebration of the entire community, the Supper is the "actio, celebratio et exsecutio Novi Testament,"[154] the "festival of the Christian religion." Hirscher criticized the Roman Mass of his time as failing to express the truly communal nature of Christian worship.[155] He also complained, sometimes sarcastically, about the use of an unintelligible language (Latin) in the church's liturgy.[156] In the paragraphs that follow it will be seen how Hirscher's eucharistic theology and his criticism of Roman liturgical practice led him to propose a number of drastic changes in the church's worship.

Hirscher's opinion that the eucharist was a proclamation of the Lord's death was based largely on his exegesis of the Letter to the Hebrews.[157] In that New Testament document, Hirscher felt, lay the key to understanding the soteriological significance of Jesus' death--and thus of the Supper that proclaims his death. Jesus' death was not simply another external act of sacrifice, for as such it could not have abolished the power of sin.[158] If Jesus' sacrifice was to have any effect at all, it had to be inspired and vivified by an internal spirit of holiness.[159] Thus, the true meaning of Jesus' self-offering was not his betrayal and bloody destruction as a criminal victim, but the personal spirit of holiness that inspired his offering. Because he died in holiness, Jesus' death effects human salvation. As Hirscher put it:

> Unde hic D. Pauli sensus statuendus est: Jesum Christum in coelum ipsum (Hebr. 9, 24) introivisse ut appareat nunc vultui Dei pro nobis; idque non rei alicujus externae, sed sanctitatis oblatione effecisse, cum missis oblationibus, per semetipsum ad Deum accesserit (7, 25); et per spiritum sanctum semetipsum immaculatum Deo obtulerit--emundans hinc conscientiam nostram ab operibus mortius, ad serviendum Deo viventi (9, 14).[160]

According to Hirscher, Jesus' sacrifice, accomplished through the spirit of holiness, provided an answer to a fundamental human question: how can we find peace of soul in the face of our failure and sin? That answer is as follows: by frankly acknowledging our sinfulness;[161] by candidly confessing that we cannot find forgiveness through our own merits and works;[162] by freely handing ourselves over to the love of God that can raise us to newness of life;[163] by believing in Christ as "head" and "guide" of all believers and as the one who has, through his own offering, cleansed us from sin;[164] by confiding in the merits gained for us through the "priestly death" of Jesus;[165] and by relying on the healing offered us through Jesus' suffering.[166] It is in doing all these things, Hirscher argued, that we "proclaim the Lord's death":

> . . .mortem Domini nostri expiatoriam praedicare et annuntiare nihil aliud est, quam illum morte sua sancta sacerdotem sponsorem atque mediatorem nostrum factum esse confiteri, ac dicto modo eidem consociari atque conjugi. Et hic rectus mortem Domini expiatoriam annuntiandi modus est, si quae dicta sunt, *confiteamur, doleamus, credamus, intueamur, mente reponamus, sentiamus, faciamus atque cum fiducia speremus*.[167]

If Jesus' death-in-sacrifice consisted in holiness, and if our participation in his sacrifice consists in a share of that holiness, then we have a clue as to why the Holy Supper "was instituted to proclaim our Lord's death".[168] The "ultimate intention" of the eucharist is the discovery that we have been liberated, through the utterly free and gracious act of God in Christ, from sin and death.[169] The very words of institution in the eucharist reveal that the central effect of Jesus' sacrifice is our liberation and forgiveness: "this is my body broken for you"; "this is the cup of my blood poured out. . .for the remission of sins".[170] Even the Council of Trent, Hirscher noted, acknowledged the power of the eucharist to forgive the penitent when it declared:

> . . .in divino hoc sacrificio, quod in Missa peragitur, idem ille Christus continetur, et incruente immolatur, qui in ara crucis semel seipsum cruente obtulit, docet sancta synodus, sacrificium illud vere propitatorium esse, per ipsumque fieri, ut, si cum corde et recta fide, cum metu et reverentia, contriti, ac poenitentes ad Deum accedamus, misericordiam consequamur, et gratiam inveniamus in auxilio opportuno. Huius quippe oblatione placatus Dominus, gratiam et donum poenitentiae concedens, crimina et peccata etiam ingentia dimittit.[171]

The proclamation of Jesus' death in the Holy Supper is, then, a declaration of God's majesty and love:

> Quicumque igitur mortem illam annuntiat, tremendam etiam et sanctam voluntatis divinae per omnem terram inviolate custodiendae majestatem confitetur. Hic (amor) ex eadem dominica morte permultis s. scripturae locis demonstratur. Ipse Dominus Ioh. 3, 16. ait; sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut filium suum unigenitum daret. . .[172]

And this love of God achieves its most intense revelation in the forgiveness of sins. Several times in De Genuina Hirscher returns to this relationship between God's love, the Lord's Supper, and forgiveness. He notes, for example, that in numerous ancient liturgies the formula that accompanied the distribution of holy communion included a reference to the remission of sins.[173] Toward the end of his treatise, Hirscher protested strongly against the custom, common among German Catholics at that time, of abstaining from communion unless one had gone to private auricular confession immediately before.[174] The Council of Trent, he observed, required such abstention only in the case of extremely grave ("mortal") sin and only if a sufficient number of confessors were available:

> S. Synodus igitur illis tantum (et quidem supposita copia confessoris) sacramentalem confessionem necessarium esse declarat, quos conscientia peccati mortalis gravat; reliquos omnes, praetermissa confessione auriculari, s. cibum sumere permittit.[175]

Moreover, the question of what actually constitutes "mortal" sin is notoriously difficult to answer. Noting this point, Hirscher suggested that one should abstain from the Lord's table only if he is conscious of a sin so gravely serious that it would demand excommunication;[176] otherwise, one should unhesitatingly approach the eucharist. He remarked:

> Quare qui capitalia peccata non commiserunt, lachrimis et orationibus debent levibus satisfacere, atque de cetero peccandi voluntatem non habere, ut possint securi et intrepidi ad ss. eucharistiam accedere. . .Possunt igitur ad ss. mensam accedere (omissa confessione sacramentali) omnes, qui peccata mortalium nota non insignita commiserunt, dummodo non habeant de cetero peccandi voluntatem et sincere de illis doleant.[177]

The whole pastoral situation would be vastly improved, Hirscher concluded, if the Mass formula contained "confessiones publicae", since these would be more fruitful than auricular confession by individuals.[178] As will be seen, Hirscher's own proposals for liturgical reform included such public declarations of sinfulness and pardon.

But the Holy Supper is not only God's word of forgiveness to humanity, it is also humanity's public response of thanksgiving to God. In a succinct formulation Hirscher

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called the eucharist "the festival of the Christian religion", "Novi Testamenti actionem, celebrationem et exsecutionem."[179] In the community's celebration of the eucharist, the kingdom of God is rendered present in human history and a new relationship between God and people is established and sustained:

> SS. coenae celebratio igitur, secundum scripturam, regni coelestis in nos adventus est et vera illius in nobis sustenatio, quo omnia, quaecunque ipsum lucis habet, virtutis, gratiae atque solatii, fidelibus porriguntur, et ab his accipiuntur atque manifestantur. Festum ipsius proin christianae religionis unicum proprium definitum et essentiale est, quod Dominus noster instituit, et *in quo novam, quam condidit Deum inter et homines relationem sancta a suis et aeterne custodiendam deposuit*.[180]

Because it is the very "celebration of the New Testament", the eucharist has several inalienable characteristics: 1) it is a *public act* that demands the active engagement of both priest and people;[181] 2) it is a *dialogue*;[182] and 3) it must be *intelligible* to those who celebrate it.[183]

This last point about intelligibility launched Hirscher upon a long diatribe against the use of Latin in the liturgy. "We utterly reject," he complained, "this use of a foreign language in worship for our people. If ever we hope to revitalize the celebration of the eucharist, this (use of Latin) must be eliminated--indeed, in our judgment, forbidden."[184] The use of an unintelligible foreign language not only offends against Paul's principle that speaking and preaching should "edify" the hearers, it also undermines the

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very nature of the eucharist itself as a public communal action.[185] Hirscher wrote:

> Si vero Missa semper in ecclesia ut actus publicus et fidelibus congregatis communis valuit: quomodo linguae exterae in ea usus cum eadem ecclesiae mente erit conjungendus, utpote quo pari modo ac in Missis privatis Sacerdotes prohibentur, dicere: Dominus vobiscum, vel sursum corda?--Dicunt quidem, sed profecto quasi non dicant.[186]

Hirscher thus rejected the arguments brought forward by partisans who insisted on maintaining Latin in Roman Catholic worship. To the argument that use of the vernacular would result in irreverence toward the eucharist, Hirscher replied that use of an unfamiliar tongue breeds an even worse mischief: the idea that the eucharist is "magic".[187] To the argument that use of the vernacular would detract from the church's world-wide unity, Hirscher replied with the sarcastic rejoinder: "How sweet it is when the unity of our faithful consists in their common ignorance of an unknown language!"[188] According to Hirscher, use of the vernacular in worship is not simply an advisable bit of pastoral strategy. There is a theological principle at stake: an unintelligible language deprives the people of their essential role in the celebration. It turns the eucharist into an act of private devotion, rather than the "ordinary, public and solemn continuation of the Holy Supper through all the ages of Christian faith until now."[189]

There was another point about the theology of the eucharist that also concerned Hirscher: the role and action of the Holy Spirit.[190] Noting that an invocation of the

Spirit is to be found in most ancient liturgies,[191] he argued that the Spirit's presence not only effects a change in the elements of bread and wine, but also effects the real and invisible union of Christ and believers. Hirscher observed that the Fathers of the Church spoke frequently of this "real and invisible communion (conjunctio) established by the Spirit between Christ and the faithful:

> ut quemadmodum corpus humanum per Verbi carnem et sanguinem realiter nutritur ad immortalitatem, pari modo anima humana per ejusdem Verbi Spiritum sanctum pascatur ad veritatem atque sanctitatem, quo perfecta fidelium cum Christo conjunctio, quae cibo eucharistico externe significatur, interne revera conficiatur.[192]

The eucharist is thus the effective external symbol of an indissoluble relation established between Christ and his people.[193] Hence, the eucharist not only feeds the bodies of believers with the real food of Christ's body and blood, it also nourishes the "mystical union" between the Lord and his people through the operation of the Holy Spirit:

> quemadmodum pane et vino intus-susceptio nutrimur corporaliter; pari modo communicatione Spiritus Sancti et conjunctione cum Domino nostro mystica nutriamur spiritualiter.[194]

Hirscher's Proposals for Liturgical Reform

Hirscher's theology of the eucharist is therefore based on three fundamental principles: 1) as sacrifice, the eucharist continues that interior offering accomplished by Jesus through the spirit of holiness and proclaims the forgiveness of sins; 2) as the public, communal "festival of the Christian religion" and as "actio, celebratio et exsecutio Novi Testamenti," the eucharist continues what was begun in the Supper shared by Jesus and his disciples; it proclaims the advent of the kingdom in human history; and 3) as the effective external symbol of "the indissoluble union between Christ and believers," the eucharist reveals the power and presence of the Holy Spirit who establishes this union. Let us see how these theological principles were incorporated in Hirscher's proposals for liturgical reform.

1. Sacrifice and Forgiveness: We have already noticed Hirscher's opinion that a public proclamation of sin and forgiveness in the eucharist would be preferable to the practice of abstaining from the eucharist unless one had gone to private auricular confession immediately before. This opinion takes flesh in Hirscher's "First Formula" for the celebration of Mass. This formula begins in the following manner:[195]

> First Formula
>
> (The celebration begins with the song: "Come, Holy Ghost!" After it has been concluded, a brief pause follows. Kneeling, the priest prays for public faults, as follows:)
>
> Priest
>
> Before God and before you, beloved brothers, I, a poor sinner, acknowledge that I have sinned often and grievously in thoughts, words and deeds. O my fault!--my fault!--O my grievous fault!"
>
> (after a short pause:)
>
> Therefore I ask you, brothers! Plead for me to God, our Lord!

People

May almighty God have mercy on you; may he forgive your sins, and lead you to everlasting life!

Priest

Amen!

People

I a poor sinner--acknowledge before God--and before you, O priest--that I have sinned often and grievously--in thoughts--in words--in deeds and in the omission of good works.--O my fault--my fault--O my grievous fault!"

(after a short pause:)

Therefore I ask the saints of heaven--and you, O priest!--Plead for me--to God, our Lord!

Priest (standing)

May almighty God have mercy on you; may he forgive your sins; and accompany you to everlasting life!

People

Amen!

Priest

May the almighty and merciful God grant us forgiveness of sins and remission of our faults!

People

Amen!

Priest

Lord, have mercy on us!

People

Lord, have mercy on us!

Priest

Christ, have mercy on us!

People

Christ, have mercy on us!

Priest

Lord, have mercy on us!

People

Lord, have mercy on us!

Priest

God! Rich in mercy! We humbly stand before you
to fulfill the ordinance of your Son, our Lord
Jesus Christ! Be gracious to us!

People

Amen!

This brief "penitential rite" concluded, the celebration of Mass continues with a reading from the gospel (no reference is made to other readings), the Creed, the sermon, the bringing of bread and wine to the altar and a rather lengthy introduction to the eucharistic prayer.[196]

This introduction to the eucharist prayer is an overwhelmingly didactic piece that contains numerous allusions to Scripture and stresses the supper as the memorial of Christ's death. Its format is an alternating dialogue between the celebrant and the people:[197]

Priest

The Lord be with you!

People

And with your spirit!

Priest

Let us pray!--Jesus Christ! You have instituted
the holy supper so that we could celebrate it

at all times and thereby show that we are yours. Grant that we may celebrate it rightly and, through you, give glory to God!

People

Amen!

Priest

You established this (supper) as the remembrance of your death--as an everlasting memorial of your obedience toward your heavenly Father even to death on a cross.--Who is the One to whom every creature bows in adoration; whose holy will must be done by all beings at all times?--(The One) to whom even Jesus Christ proved his obedience unto death; yes, even unto death on a cross?

People

You, the only God!--You, the Holy One!--You, the almighty One!

Priest

To him be adoration!

Only, everlasting God! Holy Father! Heaven is your throne; earth is your foot-stool; the whole world is the work of your hands. You speak; it happens! and it is. You breathe forth; and it lives. You take away your breath; and it decays. Your hand and your eye reach from end to end. With your finger you show the stars their path, the sun its course; like sheep following their shepherd they follow you. You hollow out the depth for the sea; the bed for the stream; and you point out the way for the stream. You will it; and so sprouts every plant. You will it; and so every root dries up.

What is man? What are the mighty ones of the earth? What is the pride of the nations? What is a glorious master? Princes are they, every one. The sun appears and it withers them. What is the wisdom of this earth; what is its cleverness; what is the villain at midnight?--The boasting of men in folly; their plotting is a morning mist; quickly you unmask the crimes, O God!

One alone there is, and all things are through him. One alone there is, and all adore before

> him. Cherubim and Seraphim, Thrones and Powers, and all the choirs of blessed spirits. Before him, Jesus Christ the only-begotten prays: Father, not my will but yours be done; and he was obedient even unto the death on the cross. --To him, to the everlasting and only God, be adoration!
>
> **People**
>
> (To Him) who is Love;--who is our Father!
>
> **Priest**
>
> Our Father!--You loved the world so much that you gave your only-begotten Son, so that everyone who believes in him might not be lost, but might have everlasting life. You did not send your Son to condemn the world, but so that the world might be saved through him.
>
> Brothers! God gave his only Son over to death, so that we might be saved:
>
> Lift up your praise and thanks to him!
>
> **People**
>
> Praise him and thank him!

At this point the priest begins, "in the tone of the preface",[198] the eucharistic prayer proper.

It will be noticed that Hirscher's introduction to the eucharistic prayer combines two themes: God's supreme love for the world manifested through Jesus' sacrificial death on the cross; and God's majestic power in the act of creation (as contrasted with the feeble plans of men). The latter theme, prominent in the section of Hirscher's formula that begins "Only, everlasting God", recalls the lengthy account of creation found in the anaphora of the _Apostolic Constitutions_, Book VIII.[199] Hirscher was familiar with the liturgical material contained in the _Apostolic Constitutions_ and he cited it at least eight times in De Genuina.[200] It is quite possible that the introduction to the eucharistic prayer found in his "First Formula" was consciously patterned after phrases found in the Apostolic Constitutions. Indeed, Hirscher had cited the text of this fourth century church order in order to emphasize the theme of God's majesty revealed in the Lord's Supper:

> Illa, quae in constitionibus [sic] apostolicis habetur, divinae majestatis in ss. coenae celebratione confessionem sequenti modo emittit: Sac. vere dignum et justum est ante omnia laudare te verum Deum. . .[201]

Thus, the opening portions of Hirscher's "First Formula" reveal an important principle already discussed in his eucharistic theology: viz., that the eucharist proclaims God's love and majesty as manifested supremely in the sacrificial death of Jesus. To proclaim the Lord's death in the Holy Supper is to celebrate God's majestic love for humanity:

> . . .ss. coenam in mortis dominicae annuntiationem sciamus institutam; Dei sanctam majestatem, et admirabilem erga nos peccatores et inimicos suos, quos non vult perire, sed vivere, amorem in eadem (ss. coena) liquet annuntiari debere, credi, praedicari, et alta mente reponi.[202]

Moreover, to proclaim the Lord's death in the eucharist is to announce the joyful news of forgiveness. Hirscher wrote:

> . . .s. scriptura in dominicae mortis annuntiatione, ac proinde in ss. coenae celebratione recolendum proponit, peccatorum nostrorum memoria, agnitio, et confessio est.[203]

This "remembrance" (memoria) and "confession" (confessio) of our sins at the Lord's Supper has, as its purpose, their forgiveness:

> Peccatorum enim in ss. coena praeceptam agnitionem et deprecationem, remissio sequitur. . .[204]

The "penitential rite" and the "introduction" to the eucharistic prayer in Hirscher's "First Formula" thus function as illustrations of his theology: the Holy Supper offers believers forgiveness by announcing and celebrating God's majesty and love at work in the sacrifice of Jesus. This sacrifice, in turn, was not merely an "external" offering (which would have been ineffective for remitting sin), but an internal offering made in the spirit of holiness.[205]

2. Eucharist: symbol of union between Christ and believers: In his effort to show that the eucharist is not a private exercise of devotion but a public "actio et celebratio Novi Testamenti," Hirscher stressed, as we have seen, certain criteria essential to the nature of Christian worship. According to these criteria, liturgy must be public, dialogal and intelligible.[206] In the eucharistic prayer found in Hirscher's "First Formula", these criteria are clearly expressed. The anaphora is to be proclaimed by the celebrant aloud; it is composed as an alternating dialogue between priest and people; and it uses the vernacular. A look at the text of this prayer will help to illustrate how Hirscher applied his criteria for public worship:[207]

(In the tone of the Preface):

Priest

Praise him and thank him, the everlasting good Father,--who loved us even when we were enemies, --who sent his own dear Son for our salvation, --and who, full of immeasurable love, gave him up to death on the cross for the ungrateful. --Let every human soul thank him with jubilation; --let the song of the saints extol him with glowing thanks;--let the company of those who have fallen asleep in the Lord look to him with praise and rejoicing;--let men tell his name, one to another, from generation to generation. --His will is holy, his judgments are gracious and above all merciful;--Blessing flows over his creatures, and bliss rules over his creation; --To do his will is to practice love, and to glorify him through love.--

Therefore may his name be hallowed;--his will fulfilled in every place;--his love visible through all men;--and with the delighted shouts of the deathless spirits, may we join our thankful cries:

People

Holy--Holy--Holy,--inexpressibly holy--are you, O God of the heavenly hosts!--All the world is full of your glory--of your love,--Jesus Christ, the everlasting witness of your grace.

Priest

Once again, dear brothers! We celebrate the Supper of our Lord--the remembrance of his death. For after supper on the night he was handed over, our Lord took bread in his holy and venerable hands; he lifted his eyes to you, God! his almighty Father; he thanked you and broke it (the bread), and gave it to his disciples, and said: take and eat of this all of you: this is my body! which will be given up for you.

People

Amen.

(When the priest says the words: "Jesus Christ took, and so forth", he takes the bread in his hands, and, following the sense of the other words, he looks toward heaven, blesses it (the bread), and holds it before the eyes of the community as he says: "this is my body!" Then there follows a silence. Only the ringing of the bells should be heard.--He conducts himself in a similar way for the consecration of the holy chalice.)

Priest

In the same way, after the meal, Jesus took the cup in his holy hands, thanked (you), gave it to his disciples, and said: drink from this, all of you: for this is my blood; the blood of the new covenant; which will be shed for many for the remission of sins. As often as you do this, do it in my memory.

People

Amen.

Priest

Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord; who died for us--our Redeemer, our Mediator, our Finisher!

People

We knew him not; we loved him not; we supported him not: nevertheless, he laid down his life for us. For this we could give him nothing; there is nothing in us but poverty and sin: still, he died for us. No one forced him; he went to his death because he wanted to. He sought no glory, for that he had from eternity. He sought no advantage, for the world is his. He sought only us, the fallen, the unfortunate.

Behold the love of Jesus Christ! Take to heart the love of the Son who gave his life to fulfill the Father's will and to save men!

People

O Holy One--O One worthy of love!

Priest

Therefore God has given him a name before which all knees bend, of those in heaven, on earth and under the earth. Therefore God has established him as Head and Ruler over us all.

--Thus has Jesus Christ acquired a community. We are members of his community, we are his. Through a death done in love he has gone to the Father. We have been given to him as a gift. He is our holy Pathfinder. He will cleanse us through his Holy Spirit. Through him we find grace before God, and confidence of everlasting life. Yes, we are yours, Lord Jesus Christ! Yours we wish to be and to remain!--(Pause)

But are we really yours?--

Are they yours who have abandoned your love through their instability?

People

They are not yours.

Priest

(Are they yours) who serve the pride of life, the pleasures of this world and the goods of this earth?

People

They are not yours.

Priest

(Are they yours) who do not love God with their whole soul and who do not do to their neighbors what they would wish to have done to themselves?

People

They are not yours.

Priest

Jesus Christ! become man, humble, suffering, dying, full of love, gracious, giver of blessing, Prince of life!

Hear our cry at the meal of your death: Break our rocky hearts open, so that in the Spirit we might behold you, the One rich in love; so that we might feel mercy and well-being.

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> Shatter our pleasure-seeking hearts, so that in the Spirit we might behold you, bleeding for love; so that (we may learn to) subdue ourselves, deny ourselves, deprive ourselves and suffer!
>
> Destroy our darkness, our pride and our vanity--for you came out of love in the form of a servant, you let yourself be hung on the gibbet of shame; and you taught us to serve others and to sacrifice our self-love!
>
> Through the love with which you loved us even to death; through the obedience toward the heavenly Father through which you mounted the cross-you became our Head and Priest: O faithful Redeemer! Grant that, through the Spirit, we may give back to you, our Head and Priest, even this love and this obedience!
>
> People
>
> Amen.

By contemporary standards, Hirscher's eucharistic formula seems unnecessarily didactic and verbose. Moreover, it lacks some of the elements twentieth century liturgiologists might regard as normal in the structure of the eucharistic prayer: e.g., an epiclesis, a clear anamnesis, a concluding Trinitarian doxology. The central portion of the prayer is the institution narrative, which Hirscher has surrounded with a number of petitions, exhorations to the people and quasi-homiletic comments. The address of the prayer shifts frequently: sometimes it is addressed to the Father, sometimes to Christ, and sometimes directly to the people.

Nevertheless, Hirscher's prayer does illustrate his notion that public worship should be an alternating dialogue between priest and people.[203] In addition to its scriptural allusions (e.g. to the hymn in Philippians 2.6 ff., and to the Christological titles derived from Ephesians ("Head") and Hebrews ("Finisher", "Pathfinder")), the prayer also underscores themes prominent in Hirscher's eucharistic theology: Jesus' death as a revelation of God's love; the Supper as the celebration of the whole Christian community; the role of the Spirit in uniting believers to Christ. As far as the format is concerned, Hirscher may well have been influenced by what he calls the "Coptic Liturgy"[209] (actually an Alexandrian version of the anaphora of St. Basil).[210] This liturgy contains frequent interventions by the people in the form of short acclamations (e.g., "We believe!", "Amen!", "We praise you, we bless you, we give you thanks!").[211] As can be seen from the text cited above, this pattern of popular acclamations is imitated in Hirscher's "First Formula". Several times the priest invites the people to respond either by an acclamation of his own (e.g." Priest: "Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord. . ."; People: "Blessed be Jesus Christ our Savior!"), or by asking a question (e.g.: Priest: "But are we really yours?. . ."; People: "They are not yours!"). The technique is perhaps a bit artificial, but it serves to exemplify Hirscher's concern for getting the people directly involved in the liturgical action.

After the eucharistic prayer, Hirscher's "First Formula" continues with a long set of intercessions for the needs and conditions of people everywhere.[212] Following these, there are a number of items that lead up to the distribution of holy communion:[213]

A renewal of baptismal promises: Although Hirscher did not call this section a "renewal of baptismal promises", the content of this part of his "Formula" seems to justify the title I have given it. Here, in part, is a translation of the text:[214]

> Priest
>
> Who knows how soon our last hour may strike!
>
> (Song.)
>
> (There follows a hymn alternated by the community divided into two choirs)
>
> Priest (joining in:)
>
> Jesus Christ! who suffered for us on the cross and died; but who lives and is seated before the Father as our intercessor; who lives--and reigns until he has overcome all sins.
>
> Christian! Examine your heart; lay your hand on your breast; ask yourself and answer before God and before your Savior here present:
>
> Do I renounce the evil Fiend, with all his suggestions and his deeds?
>
> Do I renounce the pride of life? the lusts of the flesh? and the greediness for earthly goods?
>
> Do I renounce (these things) truly, from the heart, from the ground of my heart?
>
> People
>
> I do renounce (them)--God help me!
>
> Priest
>
> Do I love Jesus Christ the Lord? Do I want to fulfill his commandments, to walk in his

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> footsteps, to keep his love in mind, to imitate his behavior?--to forgive, to be forbearing, to endure, to help, to counsel, to serve and to work; to glorify God and his holy name?

People

> I do want (to)--God help me!

As can be seen, these questions and responses follow closely the examination of candidates for baptism (renunciation of Satan, adherence to Christ as Lord).

"Lamb of God": After the renewal of baptismal promises, there follows a version of the "Lamb of God", sung traditionally in the Roman Mass to accompany the breaking of the bread. The format is a dialogue alternated between priest and people:[215]

Priest

> Only Jesus Christ is our Redeemer, our Mediator and our Finisher. Savior, I behold your blood that was shed for us. I see you treated like a sinner, and in faith I cry out: Lamb of God, you take away the punishment of our sins!

People

> Lamb of God, you take away the punishment of our sins.

Priest

> We are yours. I look to you as the Mediator and representative of us all. You are seated in the presence of God. God himself loves us now, for we are yours. He no longer regards us as sinful creatures; he regards us as disciples of his holy, obedient and well-beloved Son.

People

> On account of your will, Lord Jesus Christ! God regards us sinners graciously!

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Prayers for mercy, purification from sin: Following the "Lamb of God", Hirscher's "First Formula" contains a series of prayers that appeal to God's mercy and end with an acclamation of praise to the God whose power is revealed in the grace and compassion of Christ. Once again, these prayers take the form of a dialogue between priest and people:[216]

Priest

> Compassionate Savior, tempted by all the trials and sufferings of life, have mercy and compassion on us--look graciously on our need, on our rebellious hearts, and on our weakness!

People

> Look graciously on our need--on our rebellious hearts--and on our weakness.

Priest

> And have patience with us!

People

> O Lord! Patience!

Priest

> I see you in the Spirit, Lord Jesus Christ! the one humiliated for a time, but the one to whom all power in heaven and on earth has now been given.--Mighty Head of your believers! You will blot out our sins; you will lead us to the prize, you wish and you will to make us pure and to perfect us.

People

> You can--you wish--you will to make us pure and to perfect us.

Priest

> You can, you wish, and you will to stop the evil we have done in its path, and to blot out the consequences of our sins forever.

People

You can--you wish--and you will to remove this burden from our souls.

Priest

Hallelujah! To him to whom all power in heaven and on earth has been given; who takes away our sins, who blots out our misdeeds, and who destroys the evil we have done--who is our intercessor, our Mediator, our Representative, and our Finisher in the Father's presence--to him be praise and love forever!

People

Amen!--Praise and love forever!

Priest

Our pardon and our joyful hope is God's high gift and Christ's faithful work.

People

Not our work;--Christ's work--and God's uncreated grace.

Priest

High praise be to God the Father, who is Love! and to Him who reigns over believers and who will come again in his name.

People

Amen!

These prayers seem to be another effort on Hirscher's part to emphasize a theme central to his theology of the eucharist: viz., that in the Lord's Supper believers find assurance that their sins are forgiven.

Prayer of preparation for communion: The ritual of communion in Hirscher's "First Formula" is introduced by a lengthy prayer said by the celebrant alone.[217] The priest concludes the prayer with a kind of acclamation: "Prince of Life, Awakener of the Dead, Food of everlasting life! When finally our last hour strikes, call us to yourself, and let us be--beloved Lord and Shepherd--where you are!"[218] To this the people reply: "Humbly we say:--Look kindly upon your believers!--And let this happen according to your word!"[219]

Communion: At this point, the distribution of the eucharist takes place. Hirscher's rubric directs that the bread be distributed with the words: "The body of the Lord!" The cup is delivered with the words: "The blood of the Lord!"[220] In both cases the communicants respond: "Amen!" The rubric directs, further, that while the faithful are communicating "silence should reign."[221]

Lord's Prayer, thanksgiving and dismissal: After all have received, the Lord's Prayer is said by the people.[222] In a footnote, Hirscher observes that according to "trustworthy witnesses. . .the Apostle Peter consecrated the elements of the Supper using the Lord's Prayer alone."[223] It is possible that Hirscher picked up this idea from his reading of Joseph Bingham's Origines Ecclesiasticae. In Book 15, chapter 3, of his work, Bingham writes:

> And Gregory the Great was of opinion, that the apostles used only the Lord's prayer as the form of their consecration. And Cyprian probably was of the same opinion; for he thinks, that petition in the Lord's prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread," may be understood both in a spiritual and common sense, to denote the body of Christ, which is our bread, that we pray may be given us every day.[224]

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Both Hirscher and Bingham cite the same passage in Gregory the Great,[225] but Hirscher also adds references to St. Jerome and to Walafrid Strabo (ca. 803-849).[226]

The Lord's Prayer finished, the people sing a German hymn.[227] Then the priest dismisses the congregation with the following formula:[228]

Priest

The Lord be with you!

People

And with your spirit!

Priest

The Lord watch over you; his grace remain with you; his Spirit work in you; his blessing surround you! Assemble again with clear consciences at the table of the Lord!

May almighty God bless you: Father, Son and Spirit!

People

Amen!

Priest

Go now in peace!

Hirscher's Hermeneutic of Reform

The texts of Hirscher's "First Formula" presented above leave little doubt that his proposals for liturgical reform were meant to be a significant departure from the Roman liturgy celebrated in his day. Not only did the author insist on use of the vernacular, but he also radically restructured the liturgies of both Word and Eucharist. The question now arises: what prompted Hirscher to move in this

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direction of reform? What hermeneutic lay at the bottom of his conviction that a drastic change in the pattern of Christian worship must occur if the church is to remain a vital force in the world?

I will argue that Hirscher's hermeneutic of reform was rooted in a "populist" ecclesiology. By "populist" ecclesiology I mean one that holds for direct popular participation not only in worship but in the process of making all those decisions that affect the lives of church members. If the Synod of Pistoia's reforms were grounded in the common medieval political theory that the prince is *advocatus ecclesiae*, then Hirscher's proposals were based on the "democratic ideal" that stressed the consent of the governed. Some of this spirit has already been noticed in our discussion of the early ecclesiology, strongly anti-papal, of Johann Adam Moehler. In Hirscher's work, however, this sort of populism was to assume a much more significant role.

Immediately after the condemnation of *De Genuina Notione Missae* in 1821, Hirscher withdrew from controversial writing and lecturing. He devoted himself to the areas of pastoral and moral theology and to practical issues in religious education. He also published a variety of devotional books, largely collections of meditations and sermons on gospel texts. During this long interval of teaching and writing, however, Hirscher seems not to have lost his interest in church reform. Following the wave of revolutions that swept

Europe in 1848, Hirscher spoke up once more in the interests of reforming ecclesiastical institutions and practices.[229] His book *Die kirchlichen Zustände der Gegenwart*, published at Tübingen in 1849, caused something of a sensation. Within a year it had gone into a second printing and had also been condemned and placed on the Index. By 1851, a French translation had appeared,[230] and by the following year an English translation was published as well.[231]

In an introductory essay, Hirscher's English translator A.C. Coxe, who eventually became Episcopal bishop of Western New York, tells us that many reactions to *Die kirchlichen Zustände* were hostile. Hirscher was accused of Jansenism, of attempts to create an independent national German Church, and of imitating the work of Scipio de Ricci and the Synod of Pistoia.[232] Also unpopular, at least among adherents of ultramontanist views of papal sovereignty, was Hirscher's implied suggestion that the pope ought to divest himself of all claims to temporal power and return to the more primitive notion of the bishop as pastor of a local church.[233]

Hirscher enunciated his fundamental principle for the reform of church life and government by saying: "Where there is no participation, there can be no interest. . .No one interests himself in a matter in which he can take no real part".[234] It was his staunch conviction that lay people in the church must be given an immediate, active voice in the running of ecclesiastical affairs. To this end, Hirscher demanded a number of reforms. These included the following:

1. "The revitalization of diocesan synods with direct lay participation.[235] It is no longer sufficient, Hirscher argued, merely to "consult" the laity or to seek their involvement through unofficial and voluntary Church Unions.[236] These organizations, he claimed, are utterly ineffectual. "The people in our day," Hirscher noted, "are submissive only to such ordinances and regulations as they themselves have had a share in establishing, and of which the utility and the reason are perceptible."[237]

2. Lay involvement in the selection of ministers. Since the powers of intercession and ministry belong radically to the entire body of believers, Hirscher argued for direct lay involvement in the selection of bishops, presbyters and deacons.[238] Citing Acts 15 (the "Jerusalem Council") and I Corinthians 5 (the rôle of the community in the case of incest at Corinth), Hirscher maintained that the New Testament's vision of church order and ministry was grounded in the notion that the whole community participated in decisions which affected the life of faith.[239]

3. Repudiation of "monarchic" style in church government. "Pure monarchy," Hirscher wrote, "has become an impossibility. It is equally true in the Church."[240] He warned bishops not only against the blatant and autocratic forms of imperialism in church life, but also against more subtle forms of manipulation. Diocesan Synods, for example, should not be "packed" with people who would merely affirm the bishop's own ideas: ". . .any Synod of this description would be sure to

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lack fairness and reality, and in the same degree the confidence of the public."[241]

4. Need for a revitalized program of Christian education. An effective reform of ecclesiastical institutions can occur, Hirscher believed, only through a strong program of religious education for all the people.[242] Such a program must do more than provide information about Christian belief; it must help form people in a way of living.[243] Special attention must be given to the poor, who are frequently denied the advantage of a sound education.[244]

5. Need for a thorough-going liturgical reform. Further, Hirscher repeated the plea he had made more than twenty-five years earlier in De Genuina Notione Missae, for massive reforms in worship. He called once again for a complete revision of liturgical formularies; for use of the vernacular; for communion under both species; for simplification of rubrics and ceremonial; and for a thorough reform of the church's penitential disciplines.[245] A reform of the lectionary was also proposed.[246] Reiterating his position that "the genuine idea of worship" is "a public and common act for common edification,"[247] Hirscher noted that it would not do simply to translate the existing Latin liturgy.[248] New forms were needed for new times.

6. Reform of clerical life. Finally, Hirscher argued that people no longer regard the priesthood with the "indulgence" they were once willing to accord it.[249] In addition to the need of good education for ministerial

candidates, he advised the abolition of compulsory celibacy.[250] Moreover, while Hirscher did not deny the permanence of ordination, he demanded that a process of secularization, both voluntary and compulsory, be established.[251] Such a process would require the resignation of incompetent ministers and, at the same time, permit others to retire from active ministry without any canonical penalties.[252] Persons who freely chose to be "secularized" should be able to continue their lives in full communion with the church.[253]

These sweeping proposals for change were received with cold horror at Rome. As has been noted, condemnation came to Hirscher swiftly and thoroughly on 25 October, 1849.[254] Obediently, Hirscher submitted to the Roman rejection of his work. From that time forward, until his death in 1865, Hirscher seems to have written nothing further on the topic of liturgical or ecclesiastical reform.[255]

Hirscher's hermeneutic of reform, implied in De Genuina in 1821 and explicitly formulated in Die kirchlichen Zustände in 1849, seems, then, to have resulted from a combination of two factors: his commitment to a "populist" vision of the church, and his dedication to "liberal democratic" political ideals of the sort widespread in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The church, Hirscher contended, cannot be identified, either in theory or in practice, with the hierarchy--even if that hierarchy were to

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forfeit (as he argued it should) its imperialist predilections. The people are the church. To the whole body of believers Christ has entrusted the power of intercessory prayer and the responsibility for ministry and order. Faced with a serious crisis of survival, the church can no longer prosecute its mission in the world unless the laity are directly involved in deciding questions of government, policy and discipline. To quote Hirscher again: "Where there is no participation, there can be no interest;" "the people in our day are submissive only to such ordinances and regulations as they themselves have had a share in establishing."[256]

But this ecclesiological populism was not Hirscher's only motive for seeking reform. Coupled with his "power to the people" notion was a strongly political view of the church.[257] In this sense there is a kinship between Hirscher and the Synod of Pistoia: both tended to employ political models to interpret the structure and mission of the church. But whereas Pistoia's political model stressed the imperial advocacy of an "enlightened prince" in the conduct of church affairs, Hirscher's stressed the indispensable role of the laity in governing and making decisions. Monarchy, even enlightened monarchy, had no place in Hirscher's understanding of ecclesiastical structure as outlined in Die kirchliche Zustände. Hirscher's Christianity was a rough and tumble form of political activity where the conflict and resolution of ideas could occur only in the context of free debate.

His view of a diocesan synod was more like a raucous town-meeting than a refined exchange of views among imperial courtiers. What Hirscher wanted was a church of people, not a church of enlightened princes supported by cooperative bishops.

Thus, although Hirscher shared many of the concerns voiced at the Synod of Pistoia--the reform of worship, better education for clergy and laity, a restoration of authentic episcopal authority at the local level--his method of reform differed vastly from that pursued by Ricci and Grand Duke Leopold. As we have seen,[258] Pistoia's hermeneutic of reform proceeded from the top down and was dedicated to the principle that "the prince knows what is best for the people." Hirscher's method proceeded from the bottom up and was founded on the thesis that "the people know what is best for themselves." Ideas like "self-determination" and "the consent of the governed" were congenial to Hirscher's hermeneutic. His proposals for liturgical reform reflected this point: he sought to bring the people into an active dialogue with the presiding celebrant.[259] He also stressed the community's power of intercession,[260] as well as its public responsibility for the church's faith, worship and mission.[261]

In short, Hirscher's populist ecclesiology and his "power to the people" political model combined to provide him with a hermeneutic of reform that resulted in a view of Christian worship as the "public action of priest and people."[262]

PATTERN 3: PROSPER GUÉRANGER AND THE RECOVERY OF COMMON RITUAL SYMBOLS

At first glance nothing could seem more opposed to Johann Baptist Hirscher's "power to the people" model for liturgical reform than the work of Prosper Guéranger (1805-1875). Guéranger was the tireless champion of a re-established monasticism in nineteenth century France. Intentionally or not, Guéranger established for himself a reputation as a royalist, an ultramontanist, a rabid defender of "papal monarchy". He is remembered, too, for his indefatigable devotion to the Roman liturgy and his interest in the revival of plainchant.[263] Unlike Pistoia and Hirscher, Guéranger's notion of liturgical reform did not consist in proposing new patterns of worship. Rather, he was eager to restore the full integrity of the Roman liturgy in a country where local diocesan usages had multiplied rapidly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries under the influence of Gallican ideas.[264] For Guéranger, reform meant the restoration of a liturgical heritage that had nearly been lost.

In recent years Guéranger's reputation as a howling conservative who was utterly hostile to change of any sort--social, political or religious--has begun to be revised. Revisionist historians like Dom Louis Soltner and R.W. Franklin have offered a different interpretation of Guéranger's life and work.[265] In their view the abbot of Solesmes was not a liturgical reactionary but a man devoted to the integrity, the wholeness of Catholicism. According to Guéranger, the integrity of Catholicism depends upon the integrity of its symbol system. And that system is perserved most fully in the church's official public worship. Hence, the revisionist view suggests that Guéranger's opposition to the Gallican diocesan breviaries and missals was based on a positive concern for the wholeness of Christian faith itself, as mediated through liturgical symbols.

We will return to this point about Guéranger's concern for common symbols later. For the moment, however, let us turn to the abbot's own work in the area of liturgy. Three things will concern us here: 1) Guéranger's critique of the Gallican liturgical books; 2) his theological vision of Christian worship; and 3) his hermeneutic of reform.

Guéranger's Critique of the Gallican Books

As a young diocesan seminarian Guéranger had been nourished on the Gallican liturgical books.[266] But during the first year after his ordination to the priesthood in 1827, a colleague introduced him to the Roman missal and breviary.[267] From that time on, Guéranger was "converted" to the Roman usages. Indeed, his earliest piece of published writing dealt with the qualities of good liturgy ("ancient, universal, authorized, devout") and appeared in Mémorial catholique, a review inspired by the political and religious thought of Felicite de Lamennais.[268] Thus, when Guéranger embarked on his mission to restore Benedictine monastic life at the priory of Solesmes in 1833, he already carried with him a devotion to the liturgy generally and to the Roman Rite specifically.[269] As he was to tell his monks often in later years, the premier obligation of Benedictines is "liturgical service".[270]

But liturgical service, in Guéranger's opinion, meant fidelity to the church's long historical tradition of public worship. The Gallican missals and breviaries represented a serious breach with that tradition. In his Institutions Liturgiques, the second volume of which appeared in 1841, Guéranger presented a systematic critique of the Gallican books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He saw them as an unholy alliance between Gallicanism, Jansenism and rationalism. Such charges aroused considerable anger among the older French clergy, most of whom had been brought up in the Gallican traditions of liturgical practice.[271]

Perhaps unintentionally, Guéranger's attacks had started a liturgical revolution in France. The controversy became so bitter that Msgr. Gousset, the Archbishop of Rheims, finally sent a letter to Pope Gregory XVI in 1842, asking about a local bishop's competence in matters liturgical.[272] Perhaps because he feared political repercussions from the Gallican party, Gregory politely declined to answer Gousset's "delicate questions".[273] So Gousset wrote to Guéranger, who was less hesitant about responding. In his lengthy Letter à Monseigneur l'Archeveque de Reims sur le droit de la Liturgie,[274] Guéranger not only attempted to answer Gousset's questions, he also replied to his own critics. Gousset's questions had been three: 1) what is a bishop's authority in the area of liturgy in a diocese where the Roman Rite is presently used? 2) what is a bishop's authority in the area of liturgy in a diocese where the Roman Rite is not presently used?, and 3) what policy should a bishop follow in a diocese that abandoned the Roman Rite after it had received Pope Pius V's bull?[275]

In his reply to Gousset, Guéranger noted first that the liturgy must be characterized by qualities of antiquity, universality and authority.[276] He then pointed out that the liturgy is not only the prayer of the church, it is also the church's "most common and most solemn form of teaching".[277] Since, therefore, the liturgy is actually a solemn expression of the church's magisterium, it must be respected with the greatest exactitude. After developing his argument in a series of sixteen propositions drawn from theology, history and canon law,[278] Guéranger answered Gousset's questions. He replied: 1) Dioceses already using the Roman Rite are strictly bound to accept all the additions, changes and new liturgical materials decreed by the Congregation of Rites;[279] 2) If a diocese possesses a legitimate liturgy envisioned by the bull of Pius V (i.e., one that had existed at least two hundred years by 1568), the bishop had certain limited rights to change or correct that liturgy;[280] 3) If a diocese has abandoned the Roman Rite after the full of Pius V, two possibilities are present: if the local diocesan rite is actually the Roman liturgy with some minor variations that respect local customs, then the bishop has the right to adjust those customs;[281] if, however, the local diocesan rite represents a substantial departure from the Roman liturgy, the bishop is bound to work for the full restoration of the Roman Rite.[282]

These responses may seem like canonical hair-splitting, but they clearly reveal the seriousness with which Guéranger regarded the integrity of the Roman Rite. What did he find so objectionable about the Gallican breviaries and missals? To answer this question it is necessary to look briefly at what Guéranger wrote in the four volumes of his Institutions Liturgiques.

It was Guéranger's opinion that the seeds of Protestantism planted in France during the period of the Reformation had borne fruit in the movements known as Jansenism and Gallicanism.[283] Like Protestantism, Guéranger argued, Jansenism was "antiliturgical" and sought to strip worship of all its mystery.[284] Moreover, again like the Protestant reformers, the Jansenists virtually denied the effectiveness of the sacraments by making them practically inaccessible to ordinary believers.[285] According to Guéranger, this Jansenistic anti-liturgical spirit reached a climax in events like the Synod of Pistoia. Scipio de Ricci was nothing more than a disciple of the Jansenists.[286] Like all adherents of the "anti-liturgical heresy" from Luther onward, Guéranger fumed, Ricci and Grand Duke Leopold, used the same methods of reform: replacement of traditional prayers by Scripture alone; abolition of saints' festivals; hatred of popular devotions like the rosary; suspicion of images and relics.[287]

But Guéranger's chief objection to Pistoia and to the Gallican liturgical books was doctrinal. If the liturgy is the "most common and most solemn form" of the church's teaching, if it is actually a magisterial expression of the church's doctrine, then to tamper with the rites handed on by tradition is to threaten the integrity of the faith itself. The Gallican books did just that: they compromised the wholeness of Catholic faith by downplaying doctrines they regarded as embarrassing or offensive. One such doctrine, Guéranger noted, was the Petrine authority of the bishop of Rome.[288] Gallican breviaries and missals tended to minimize the role of the papacy. An example of this tendency, deplored by Guéranger, may be found in a breviary published for use in the archdiocese of Paris in 1828.[289] In its "commons", used for the feasts of saints, this breviary makes no special provision for popes. But even more revealing is how the Paris Breviary of 1828 handles the feast of "Peter's Chair". The full title given to the feast is already revealing: "Pontificatus, seu Cathedras Petri, qua primum Antiochiae sedit, tum Romae."[290] The title suggests that the compilers of the Paris Breviary wanted to make it quite clear that Peter was a bishop in Antioch before he ever got to Rome. That is, of course, an indirect way of hinting that Antioch might have more claim to episcopal primacy than Rome. Moreover, the Paris Breviary omits entirely the text of a responsory commonly used at the office of matins in the Roman books for Petrine feasts.[291] The omitted text is this:

> Tu es pastor ovium, princeps Apostolorum; Tibi tradidit Deus omnia regna mundi: Et ideo tibi traditae sunt claves regni coelorum.[292]

A Gallican, of course, would not have appreciated the implication that if Christ gave Peter "all the kingdoms of the world", he might also have given the same to the bishops of Rome, for this would have implied some claim to temporal power on the part of the papacy.

Omissions like the one just described infuriated Guéranger. He regarded them as sure signs of animosity toward the authority of the Holy See.[293] Guéranger also complained about the tendency of the Gallican books to downplay the veneration Catholics have traditionally given to Mary in the liturgy. An example of this phenomenon may be found in the Paris Breviary of 1828. There, the title given to the festival celebrated on 25 March is: "In Annuntiatione, et Incarnatione Domini."[294] The absence of any direct mention of Mary in the title of the feast struck Guéranger as highly objectionable.[295] He pointed out that in the liturgical traditions of both East and West this festival has always celebrated the "great mystery of the Incarnation of the Word" by a special reference to Mary's role in the economy of salvation.[296]

Another change introduced into the Gallican books also bothered Guéranger: the hymn versions. These too, the abbot thought, manifested a Jansenistic "anti-liturgical" flavor. One such change in the version of a hymn that particularly rankled Guéranger occurred in the Office of Vespers for the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross (14 September). The Gallican redactors of liturgical books tended either to omit or to alter the strophe of the hymn "Vexilla Regis" that began with the words "Ave, crux, spes unica", since this sounded a "bit too strong".[297] Once again the Paris Breviary of 1828 exemplifies the sort of thing Guéranger despised. Here, in parallel columns, is the text of the hymn for vespers of the Holy Cross from the Paris Breviary and from the traditional Breviarium Romanum:

Paris Breviary (1828)[298]	Breviarium Romanum[299]
Crux alma, salve, crus venerabilis, Torrente Christi sanguinis ebria; Testis dolorum, tu suprema Verba Dei morientis audis.	Vexilla regis prodeunt: Fulget crucis mysterium, Qua vita mortem pertulit, Et morte vitam protulit.
Tu celsa sedes, unde suos docet; Vitalis, in quo nos peperit, thorus; Currus triumphantis, tribunal Judic, atque litantis ara.	Quae, vulnerata lanceae Mucrone diro, criminum Ut nos lavaret sordibus, Manavit unda et sanguine.
Non rapta caesis hostibus impia Hic arma fulgent; nec domiti duces Graves catenis hic trahuntur: Nobilior crucis est triumphus.	Impleta sunt quae concinit David fideli carmine, Dicendo nationibus: Regnavit a ligno Deus.
Orbis redempti qualia pignora! Crux tincta Christi sanguine adhuc madet: Sperate, mortales: salutem Plena necis monumenta praestant.	Arbor decora et fulgida, Ornata regis purpura, Electa digno stipite Tam sancta membra tangere.
Crux certa coeli semita, quae Patris Thronum petenti pandis iter Deo: Nunc altera nobis nefas est Ire via male delicatos.	Beata, cuius bracchiis Pretium pependit saeculi, Statera facta corporis Tulitque praedam tartari

Laus summa Patri qui creat
omnia, Natoque mundum qui
reparat cruce: Qui cuncta
replet, summa sancto Spiritui:
tribus una semper.

O Crus, ave, spes unica,
In hac triumphi gloria
Piis adauge gratiam,
Reisque dele crimina.

Te, fons salutis, Trinitas,
Collaudet omnis spiritus:
Quibus crucis victoriam
Largiris, adde praemium.

It can be seen immediately that the Paris Breviary of 1828 does something far more radical than the alteration of a strophe: it substitutes another hymn entirely in place of Venantius Fortunatus' "Vexilla Regis".[300] While the hymn in the Parisian redaction bears thematic resemblance to the Roman version--e.g., both contain salutations to the cross as the instrument of salvation ("Crux alma, salve. . ." / "O Crux, ave. . .")--still it was sufficiently different to cause chagrin to a man like Guéranger.

Many of the objections Guéranger raised against the Gallican liturgical books may seem trivial to persons living in an age of rapid changes in worship. But it must be remembered that Guéranger's critique of the Gallican redactions was based on his contention that liturgy is the church's "most common and most solemn form of teaching."[301] In the Gallican versions Guéranger saw not merely minor variations in texts and in choice of materials, but thinly disguised attacks on doctrine, tradition and authority. "The immutability and the inviolability of the liturgy is important for maintaining the very deposit of faith," he wrote to Archbishop Gousset of Rheims, "for *legem credendi statuat* *lex supplicandi*."[302] In the project of restoring the Roman Rite in France, Gueranger saw the opportunity of reviving authentic Catholic doctrine in a country ravaged by the "anti-liturgical" heresies of Jansenism and Gallicanism.

Gueranger's theological vision of worship

Dom Louis Soltner has written that Gueranger's theological vision of worship was dominated by the twin themes of incarnation and church.[303] The accuracy of this statement is confirmed by a reading of *Institutions Liturgiques*. For example, the reason for Gueranger's objection to omitting the reference to Mary in the Gallican versions of the "Annunciation" festival on 25 March was his conviction that such an omission impoverished the human meaning of the incarnation itself.[304] Indeed, as Gueranger argued in the first volume of *Institutions Liturgiques*, a primary motive for the incarnation was to bring worship to perfection:

> il se donna à *voir*, à *entendre*, à *toucher* aux hommes, et, descendu du ciel pour créer des adorateurs en esprit et en vérité, il vint, non détruire, mais accomplir et perfectionner les traditions liturgiques. . .A la dernière cène, ou il célébra le grand Acte liturgique, et pourvut à son accomplissement future jusqu'à la fin des siècles, il préluda par le lavement des pieds que les Peres ont appelé un mystère,. . . Peu d'heures après, sa vie mortelle, qui n'était elle-même qu'un grand acte liturgique, se termina dans l'effusion du sang sur l'autel de la croix. . .[305]

The incarnation, itself brought to completion through Jesus' sacrifice on the cross, inaugurated "a passage to new mysteries, a new tabernacle, an everlasting ark of the covenant."[306] In the Word made flesh liturgy began its final stage of perfection on earth.[307]

In his "First Letter to the Bishop of Orleans" (Msgr. Fayet),[308] written in 1846, Guéranger gave this incarnational principle a succinct formulation:

> Nul ne va au Père que par le Fils; nul ne va au Fils que par le mystère de l'Incarnation, et nul ne precoit les fruits célestes de l'Incarnation que par la Liturgie instituee par Jésus-Christ, et sanctionée par l'Église.[309]

The Father is grasped through the Son; the Son is grasped through the incarnation; and the incarnation is grasped through the liturgy. Thus, it is precisely the incarnation that serves as the radical source for all liturgical symbolism in the life of the church. If the Christian religion is a vast network of symbols,[310] this is because in the humanity of Jesus Christ, believers have access to the invisible mystery of God. And this, Guéranger maintained, is exactly what symbols do; through visible objects and events they disclose invisible realities.[311]

Guéranger's stress on the visibility of the incarnation carried over into his understanding of the church.[312] The need for the church as a visible society of believers is rooted in the mystery of the Word made flesh. In an essay entitled "Formation de l'Église par Jésus-Christ et charactères essentiels qu'il lui attribue", Guéranger wrote:

> Le Verbe s'est incarné pour ramener à Dieu le genre humain, en réunnissant les croyants en une famille unique et universelle: l'Église.[313]

The incarnation is, therefore, the radical source of unity for the human family generally and for the church specifically. But unity in faith is not possible, Guéranger went on to say, without a visible unity in the church. There must be a palpable principle of the unity that exists among believers. As Guéranger wrote: "Comme l'Église est une société visible, son principe d'unité doit l'être également."[314] Ultimately, this principle is "Christ, pierre angulaire, docetur et pasteur universel."[315] But since Christ is no longer visible in his earthly life, there is need for another principle of unity. In conformity with the economy of the incarnation, Guéranger thus argued, Christ willed to remain visible among his people in the person of Peter and of Peter's successors in the Roman episcopacy.[316] What Christ now is invisibly for the church, the pope is visibly: the center and source of unity.[317] Bishops, in virtue of their own episcopal character, are cooperators with the pope in the service of this ecclesial unity. Whatever rights the pope may reserve to himself are based on the need for unity in the church.

Moreover, the liturgy itself has, as its final intention, the same service of unity Christ came to establish in the incarnation and to continue through the visible episcopal ministry of the bishop of Rome and his fellow-workers in the episcopate. As Guéranger wrote in his "Third Letter to the Bishop of Orleans", the whole purpose of law and discipline in the church is to tend toward unity.[318] The same is true of worship: "l'esprit de la discipline ecclésiastique dans la Liturgie est de tendre à l'unité."[319] The principle of unity in worship is thus founded in the integrity of Christian doctrine and in the very constitution of the church itself.[320] Guéranger commented:

> La Liturgie est donc une vraie profession de foi; elle contient la foi de l'Église; . . . donc la Liturgie doit tendre à l'unité, par les nécessités mêmes du dogme dont elle est l'expression et le dépôt.[321]

Rooted in the economy of the incarnation and in the mystery of the church, therefore, the liturgy must be a source and expression of unity in faith. This unity is not merely an external one based on the coercive uniformity of discipline and law, but an internal one founded on God's plan to bring the human family together in the visible society of the church. These facts have definite consequences for understanding the role of worship in the life of faith. In his "Letter to the Archbishop of Rheims", Guéranger outlined some of these consequences:

1. He noted, first, that the "immutability and inviolability" of the church's liturgy stems from the fact that it is part of the very deposit of revelation.[322] The authority of liturgical formulas derives from their role as a "partie essentielle du dépôt de la Révélation."[323] The arbitrary desire to change or in any way alter these formulas is thus tantamount to an attack on the sources of revelation itself.[324] Moreover, since the purpose of liturgy and the purpose of ministry in the church is the same, viz., the

service of unity, to tamper with the liturgical formulas is to subvert that unity which the hierarchical structure of the church intends to preserve.[325]

2. The inviolability of the church's liturgy also serves a pastoral purpose: the maintenance of faith among the people.[326] The unity of the Christian family, "the most sacred of social forms",[327] results from the daily influence of the liturgy. Unauthorized changes in worship confuse people and result in an erosion of faith and morality.[328] For, Guéranger insisted, the people can be convinced of the permanent value of doctrine and faith only through the changeless forms of worship: "ce peuple juge par les sens, et qu'il croira à l'immobilité du fond quand ses yeux et ses oreilles seront bien convaincus de l'immobilité de la forme."[329]

3. But if liturgy is so immobile, how can it ever develop or make any progress? Guéranger addressed this question by stating that the unity proposed by the church in its worship "n'est pas l'unité materielle et judaïque; mais l'unité vivante, animée par un progrès légitime et sans péril."[330] Moreover, Guéranger admitted that liturgical forms are subject to historical development.[331] But this development must represent a faithful continuity with the most ancient liturgical forms.[332] If such a development is to occur without danger to the deposit of revelation contained in the liturgy, Guéranger argued, it must be

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guided by that authority in the church whose final responsibility it is to safeguard the visible unity of faith (i.e., by the pope).[333]

4. Thus, the unity of the church's worship does not consist in a rigid uniformity. A variety of liturgical customs and usages is consistent with ecclesial unity, so long as this variety does not jeopardize the integrity of faith.[334] In support of his view, Guéranger appealed to a verse of Psalm 44: "La robe de l'Épouse est diversifiée dans ses couleurs."[335] Nevertheless, the variety of liturgical usages cannot be defended, as the Gallicanists would have it, by appealing to the right of a local diocesan bishop to change the texts and ceremonies of worship as he sees fit. Such a "right" has been excluded by Pius V's Bull of 1568, except in the case of those churches which possess a legitimately ancient ritual (one existing at least 200 years prior to the sixteenth century). All others are bound to embrace the missal and breviary reformed by Pius V.[336]

For all these reasons--theological, pastoral and canonical--Guéranger insisted that local churches have the serious obligation to seek and preserve liturgical unity.[337] Any authentic reform of worship must consist in the search for such unity. In the case of the Gallican books, reform must take the shape of restoration. The authentic Roman Rite, as promulgated by Pius V, must be restored in those French dioceses that either abandoned or altered it. Otherwise, the unity of faith, grounded in the economy of the

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incarnation and in the mystery of the church, is seriously imperilled.

Guéranger's Hermeneutic of Reform

In Guéranger's view, then, the search for liturgical unity is actually a search for common symbols that mediate the realities of faith to believers. Any form of liturgical eccentricity, whether local (diocesan) or national, endangers those common symbols and thereby threatens the catholic integrity of faith. These points will become clearer as we examine the principles that governed Guéranger's hermeneutic of liturgical reform (restoration).

Guéranger's hermeneutical principles achieve perhaps their most lucid expression in his "Second Letter to the Bishop of Orleans" (1846).[338] In 1845, Bishop Fayet of Orleans had published a book (Examen des Institutions liturgiques) accusing the abbot of Solesmes of setting himself up, without authority, as a reformer of the church in France.[339] Guéranger's whole liturgical system rested, Fayet charged, on a basic theological error. That error consisted in the abbot's contention that the external acts of liturgy have some intrinsic connection with the virtue of religion.[340] Religion, Fayet claimed, consists in the production of interior acts of adoration, praise and repentance. These acts do not necessarily depend on the external ritual of the church's liturgy. Whatever its value may be, the liturgy is not absolutely essential to the exercise of the virtue of religion.

Fayet's attack on the liturgical doctrine found in Institutions Liturgiques gave Guéranger the opportunity to present a public and systematic defense of his ideas about the restoration of the Roman Rite in France. It will be useful to summarize Guéranger's defense here, since it contains, germinally, the ideas that dominated his method of seeking liturgical reform.

1. Worship as the key to Scripture: Guéranger had no trouble in acknowledging the centrality of Scripture in the life of the church. As the words inspired by the Holy Spirit, the Scriptures lead believers into the mysteries of God.[341] But the same Spirit that inspired the Scriptures has also inspired, in an analogous way, the formation of the liturgy.[342] The forms of worship are themselves works of the Spirit. Moreover, it is the liturgy that provides the key to understanding the Scriptures. Guéranger wrote:

> Quant au sens de ces livres divins, c'est à l'Église seule qu'il appartient de le déterminer dans les controverses qui s'élèvent sur l'intelligence du texts; mais si l'Église exerce, à de longs intervalles, son droit de jugement sur les textes sacrés pour confondre les hérétiques, elle a un devoir de tous les jours a remplir a l'égard de ses fidèles: celui de leur expliquer la parole de Dieu. Or, la clef de cette divine parole est surtout dans la Liturgie.[343]

Although Guéranger did not reject the private reading of the Bible by individuals,[344] he did insist that the full depth of the mysteries revealed in God's Word is accessible only

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through the church's worship.[345] This is not to say that the Bible is somehow inferior to the liturgy, but it is to claim that worship provides the most appropriate context for hearing the Word in faith. Guéranger implied, then, that the liturgy is the most basic and the most secure hermeneutical tool for interpreting the Scriptures.[346]

2. *The authority of the liturgy is superior to that of the Fathers and the theologians*. Worship is not only the "key to the Scriptures", it is also the faithful deposit of Catholic doctrine:

> . . .la Liturgie n'est pas seulement le guide que l'Église nous donne pour l'intelligence des mystères de l'Écriture; elle est encore, par ses formules de style ecclésiastique, le dépôt de la doctrine catholique.[347]

As the "principle instrument of the tradition",[348] worship is superior in authority to the writings of the Fathers and of theologians.[349] Guéranger commented:

> L'autorité de l'Église est donc plus haute et plus sensible dans la Liturgie qu'elle ne l'est dans les écrits des Pères: l'erreur qui se rencontre quelquefois dans les écrits des Pères ne saurait donc se trouver dans la Liturgie, toutes les fois que cette Liturgie est proclamée par l'autorité souveraine dans l'Église. Ce que nous disons de l'autorité des Pères doit s'entendre *a fortiori* de l'autorité des Theologiens. . .[350]

This point is confirmed by the fact that theologians themselves appeal to the liturgy to prove or support their arguments.[351] For Guéranger, the liturgy is not simply one among many equal sources of doctrinal authority; it is the supreme "inviolable rule of faith".[352] The very fact that

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heretics throughout the ages have wished to alter the liturgical formulas is proof, Guéranger asserted, that even they understood the principle "legem credendi statuat lex supplicandi."[353] Otherwise, they would not have been so anxious to introduce innovations into the church's worship. The liturgy is, then, the principal means by which the dogmas of Christianity are expressed, communicated, preserved and interpreted. Theology must ever remain subservient to the superior authority of liturgical prayer, for "ou la Liturgie s'est arretée, la Théologie s'arrete aussi. . ."[354]

3. *The authority of liturgy thus blends in with the authority of the universal church; both are immune from error.*[355] God gives the same immunity from doctrinal error to the liturgy that he gives to the highest organs of teaching authority in the universal church. If this were not the case, Guéranger declared, then the whole church might find itself professing an erroneous doctrine in the words of the liturgy.[356] And if this were to happen, faith itself would be perverted and the promises of Christ violated:

> Si donc l'erreur pouvait se rencontrer dans ces formules, ses rites, ses usages de l'Église universelle, cette erreur se trouverait professée par l'Église universelle, et dès lors la foi serait renversée, l'Église anéantie, les promesses de Jésus-Christ violées; conclusions qu'on ne pourrait admettre même pour un seul jour, pour un seul instant, sans renoncer à la foi catholique.[357]

Unlike the formulations of theologians, the texts of the liturgy must be regarded as free from doctrinal error. For Guéranger, however, this did not mean that the liturgical texts of every local church are free from suspicion of heresy. It is the liturgy of the Roman church that enjoys this unique authoritative character. Local churches can be certain that their liturgical formulas are orthodox only to the degree that they depend upon the Roman liturgy:

> Il n'est aucun catholique qui ne sache que l'Église de Rome, qui est la Pierre fondamentale de toute l'Église a recu de Jésus-Christ, dans ce qui tient à la doctrine, une autorité contre laquelle les portes de l'enfer ne sauraient prévaloir; d'ou il suit que l'Église universelle ne saurait être catholique, ni apostolique, si elle n'etait pas romaine; et que les églises particulières, les pasteurs, et les simples fidèles eux-mêmes, ne sauraient se flatter d'appartenir à l'Église de Jésus-Christ, s'ils n'etaient pas unis, avec une veritable dependance, à l'Église romaine, dans la foi et la doctrine.[358]

In the liturgy, therefore, Guéranger discerned the same kind of divine guarantee he was to see in the doctrine of papal infallibility. The "infallibility" of worship was founded on the same divine promise that guaranteed the pope's freedom from doctrinal error: the promise of unity and integrity in faith. To Guéranger's way of thinking, it was inconceivable that doctrinal truth might be subverted through false dogmas communicated in the church's official prayer. For this reason he never tired of repeating phrases like "the liturgy is the principal instrument of tradition" and "the liturgy is the immovable, inviolable deposit of doctrine."

4. The purpose of liturgy, as indeed the purpose of all ecclesiastical law and discipline, is to preserve the church's unity and charity.[359] In his "Third Letter to the Bishop of Orleans" (1847),[360] Guéranger noted that the discipline governing worship has no higher purpose than the preservation of charity and unity in the church. This is certainly one reason why the abbot of Solesmes insisted so strongly on the need for a single liturgy (the Roman Rite) in all the churches.[361] In a real way, Guéranger thought, the internal unity of the church, its oneness in love, depends upon the unity of its expression of faith in liturgical prayer. Apart from "unity in the formulas of prayer", there could be no unity of belief, no unity of discipline and no unity of charity.[362] But when all the churches use "the same prayers, the same praises, in the same form," they manifest their communion with the universal church.[363]

Taken together, these four principles--the liturgy as the key to Scripture; the superiority of the liturgy over theology; the "infallibility" of worship; and the liturgy as the source of the church's unity and charity--reveal the hermeneutic at work in Guéranger's approach to liturgical reform. Despite his frequently juridical and overtly polemical tone, Guéranger's chief interest was neither the exaltation of papal privilege nor the utter destruction of his opponents. As Dom Louis Soltner has said, Guéranger's premier concern was for ecclesial unity.[364] For this reason he reacted against the two most common forms of individualism prevalent in his day: a "personal individualism" that exalted private prayer over public worship, and a "national or regional individualism" that sought immediate gain at the expense of common good.[365]

In Guéranger's thought, *the action of worship itself becomes the hermeneutic*, i.e., it becomes the interpretative principle which discloses all the layers of meaning present in the church's faith, doctrine and life. This is an important point because it means that for Guéranger, *the worshipping community* is the primary *locus theologicus*. In the people gathered for worship, in the Christian "family" assembled at the altar, Guéranger perceived the primary source for interpreting doctrine, tradition, and even the Scriptures themselves. His insistence on liturgical unity was actually a way of calling attention to the Christian community itself as the place where God continues to reveal his presence and action. Common liturgical symbols, Guéranger implied, would lead to a stronger sense of the church's social identity as the community of salvation. Common rituals would intensify that unity and charity which worship exists to preserve. As R.W. Franklin has written in a recent essay:

> . . .Dom Guéranger differed from a host of contemporaries in relating buildings and rites to what he perceived to be a social need, the necessity of community. His zeal for ritual led to a new evaluation of its importance: ritual could overcome alienation if people understood

> what it meant. In the midst of an actively worshipping congregation a community is born . . .The Church grows from communal worship.[366]

Guéranger's thirst for liturgical unity, his search for common ritual symbols that mediate faith and tradition, thus became a campaign against all those individualisms, personal and national, that threatened to fragment and dissolve the Christian community's identity. The Gallican liturgical books exemplified such individualism on the regional level. So did events like the Synod of Pistoia. Guéranger's bitter opposition to Scipio Ricci and Pistoia in Institutions Liturgiques was based on his conviction that the synod's "anti-liturgical" fervor was nothing less than an attack on the peoples' center of social life. For, as the abbot pointed out:

> Les démonstrations liturgiques sont éminemment populaires; elles tendent à réunir les masses dans le temple catholique, comme dans le centre de leur vie sociale; elles resserrent le lien qui les attache au sacerdoce. . .[367]

Pistoia's reform, Guéranger argued, would have denied people access to familiar common symbols. And by denying them access to such symbols, it would have denied them the experience of unity which Christ's incarnation intended to bring into the world.

It may be said, then, that Guéranger's hermeneutic of reform was inspired by the impulse to "universalize" ritual symbols. To cite R.W. Franklin once again:

> Solesmes was, above all, a revolt against the national and particular in religion. Its argument was that the more objective symbols

> are, the more are they capable of expressing the interior religious states of many individuals and providing a center around which a community can form. . .[368]

Although he did not develop a formal theory of symbolism in Institutions Liturgiques, Guéranger seems to have been convinced that the more universal a ritual symbol was, the more powerful it became for the creation of a social identity. An authentic reformation of worship depended on the restoration of universal symbols that would mediate the Catholic tradition in all its fullness. For, as the "principal instrument of tradition," the liturgy seeks to disclose "invisible mysteries" through "visible realities". And this disclosure creates the community called church.

PATTERN 4: LUTHERANS IN NORTH AMERICA

Europe was not the only scene of liturgical reform activity in the first half of the nineteenth century. Appeals for the reform and/or the restoration of worship were being heard in America as well. Some of these appeals for reform were motivated by a reaction against the excesses of "revivalistic religion" that swept over America in the early decades of the nineteenth century. We have already seen the reaction of Nevin and Schaff at Mercersburg against the "anxious bench" and the "new measures" of revivalist preachers.[369] A similar reaction appeared in some quarters of the Lutheran community in the United States at this period. As Theodore Tappert has observed:

> Opposition to revivals was greatly strengthened by the influx of new immigrants from Germany and the Scandinavian countries and by the arrival of new periodicals and books from Europe. Antiquarian copies not only of old books of dogmatics but also of liturgical specimens of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were diligently sought out and eagerly bought up. Hand in hand with an attachment to the doctrinal formulations of an earlier age went a predilection for older forms of public worship.[370]

This thirst for older forms of public worship among Lutherans in America was not, however, a purely "archaeological" and "antiquarian" phenomenon. Lutherans like Charles Porterfield Krauth, an occasional contributor to the Mercersburg Review, were certainly interested, as Nevin and Schaff were, in a more "churchly" pattern of worship.[371] But like the Mercersburg theologians, Krauth and others were vehemently opposed to what they derisively called "Puseyistic ritualism".[372] Thus the movement toward liturgical reform among American Lutherans in the first half of the nineteenth century must not be written off as simply another "high church" movement inspired by the Oxford Tractarians. Among some writers, of course, the influence of Oxford was certainly felt. The German Lutheran liturgist, Wilhelm Loehe, (1808-1872) whose work had an eventual impact on the American Church Book for the Use of Evangelical Lutheran Congregations (1868), did not escape falling under the spell of Oxford, at least partially.[373] But for the most part, this desire for a reform of worship seems to have been motivated by the need to recover a "cultus. . .distinctively Lutheran", one that would serve as an "expression of its principles and faith."[374]

In this section of the chapter we will briefly examine some of the characteristic features of this movement of liturgical reform among American Lutherans toward the middle of the nineteenth century. In order to do this, we will investigate some essays by typical representatives of the movement, Matthias Loy and Sigmund Fritschel. We will also take a look at Wilhelm Loehe's proposals for liturgical reform addressed in the 1840's to Lutherans in Missouri. Loehe's "Puseyistic" sympathies will serve as a transition to the final pattern of nineteenth century liturgical reform to be analyzed in this chapter: the one associated with the work of John Mason Neale and the "Cambridge Camden Society".

Matthias Loy: the need for a set form of liturgy

Search for a "via media": Matthias Loy was convinced that a set form of liturgical prayer was essential for the continued vitality of the Lutheran community in America. "The church needs a good liturgy (Loy argued)--again, not the minister merely but the church--a liturgy in which the rights of the people shall be respected and their devotional wants supplied."[375] Loy feared that without such an established pattern of prayer two things would happen: 1) the people would be unable to exercise their responsibility to worship,[376] and 2) the church would be subjected to the whims and moods of individual ministers and local congregations.[377] "Christianity teaches us," he noted, "neither to shriek in pain nor to shout in pleasure."[378] Free "extemporized" public prayer quickly degenerates into a "diarrhea of words and constipation of ideas."[379] Although he does not mention them by name, Loy's objections seem to be directed against the revivalists, with their camp meetings, their "anxious bench" and their "new measures" for promoting conversion. His complaints against the "spasmodic flights and tortuous windings" of ministers who pray extemporaneously are strongly reminiscent of John Williamson Nevin's diatribe against revivalism in The Anxious Bench.[380]

Convinced of the need for set forms of liturgy, Loy sought a "via media" between the excessive pageantry of Roman Catholicism[381] and the unhistorical biblicism of the Reformed churches.[382] The worship of the Roman church was, in Loy's view, an exercise in Pelagianism. It had substituted the pageantry of sacrifice for the substance of sacrament.[383] Moreover, the liturgy of Roman Catholicism has denied the laity their rightful role in the church's cultus:

> The laity have very little to do therefore with public worship. They need not participate with song and response. It is not even important that they should understand the language; the church can speak as well, by proxy, in Latin. . . the rite and ceremony has moral worth in itself apart from the laity's subjective condition.[384]

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But according to Loy, the austerity of Reformed worship was little better than the voluptuous excess of the Romans. By a different route, the Reformed churchmen had arrived at the same error the Romans had made: the error of Pelagianism, the exaltation of "natural enthusiasm" over the work of the Holy Spirit.[385] The bleakness of Reformed liturgy resulted from too vigorous an emphasis on the "formal principle" of Protestantism (the Bible as ultimate norm for faith), to the detriment of its "material principle" (justification).[386] The patterns of worship in Reformed churches are "unhistorical", Loy complained.[387] By taking the Bible along as a "new starting point", the Reformed have failed to acknowledge the intrinsically historical nature of Christianity, its openness to development and change.[388] This lack of sympathy for the historical development of the church has led further to a failure to appreciate "the Lord's life continued in his mystical body."[389] As a result, the Reformed liturgy has lost all understanding of the church year, of the central place of Easter in Christian celebration, and of baptism and Lord's Supper as sacraments rather than as mere "memorials".[390] Loy wrote:

> They (the Reformed) do not believe in the real, active presence of the Saviour in his church. They do not assemble to receive from the Lord so much as to bring to him their offerings. Their cultus is altogether sacrificial. . .This depreciation of the sacramental exerted its influence also in preventing a proper development of the sacrificial. They received little and therefore had little to give. Hence the sermon in time became not only the center but also the sum of the cultus.[391]

Once again, Loy's argument recalls an objection raised by John W. Nevin against the Reformed liturgy of his day: it had become a "pulpit liturgy" rather than an "altar liturgy".

Between these two extremes--Roman excess and Reformed austerity--Loy proposed the classic liturgical patterns of sixteenth century Lutheranism as a model for reform.[392] Although the Augsburg Confession left churches free in regard to rites and ceremonies,[393] Lutherans never regarded the forms of worship as a matter of indifference. Loy cited a portion from the Pommeranian Agenda of 1569 to support his point:

> . . .there can be no doubt that the adoption and preservation of uniform, spiritual, and useful ceremonies. . .is a service highly acceptable to his external divine Majesty. . . Therefore the prescribed order in hymns, lessons, and ceremonies shall be observed in our churches. . .No one shall be allowed arbitrarily to oppose this order or make alterations according to his own pleasure.[394]

It was precisely this respect for order in public worship, Loy maintained, that caused the Lutheran liturgical reformers ~~of the~~ sixteenth century to preserve most of the important historical developments in the liturgy: the weekly eucharist, the church year, Sunday as "the weekly festival of the Lord's resurrection",[395] a love for sacred art and architecture, the altar as "the symbolical representation of the place where the Lord dwells",[396] and a "characteristic ministerial dress".[397] All these things witnessed to the Lutheran appreciation of the historicity of Christian faith. They also testified to the strong Lutheran

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conviction about "the Lord's real presence in his church."[398] Loy thus contended that the distinctively Lutheran approach to reform, in liturgy as in doctrine, was based on a respect for both developing historical tradition and the supremacy of scripture as the norm of faith.[399] Because of this, "the Lutheran Reformation never was completed and, in the spirit of the Lutheran Church, never can or will be."[400] The need for set forms of liturgy is grounded, therefore, on both the distinctively Lutheran understanding of church reform and on the need of all believers to exercise their priesthood through the public confession of faith in the church's cultus.[401]

The role of public worship in the Lutheran tradition: In Loy's view, then, the need for a set liturgy was not merely a pragmatic one arising from the desire for good order and decorum.[402] Of far greater theological importance was the fact that in its cultus, the church expressed itself--its life, its principles and its faith. We may summarize Loy's theological understanding of liturgy as set forth in "The Nature of Public Worship", in the following four points:

1. In the church Christ is really present, continuing his own divine life in the life of his "mystical body".[403] This continuing life of Christ is historically visible in the evolution of Christianity through the centuries.[404]

2. Liturgy is the visible expression of the church's faith.[405] Its influence is, and necessarily must be, deeper and wider than the "symbolical writings of the church".[406]

3. The distinctively Lutheran approach to worship and its reform depends upon a correct understanding of the relation between sacrament and sacrifice. In a succinct formula Loy commented: "We are recipients in the sacraments, we are donors in sacrifices of prayer and praise for gifts received and to be received from heaven. The chief stress is thus necessarily laid upon the sacramental part of the cultus."[407] It is therefore the proper perception of a sacrament that makes cultic sacrifice possible.[408]

4. Any authentic reform of worship must, consequently, be based on principles that are conservative, historical and sacramental.[409] It must "prove all things and hold fast to what is good,"[410] (the "conservative" principle); it must respect the fact that Christian tradition represents historical development (the "historical" principle); and it must place sacrament (the free gift of redemption in Christ) over sacrifice (our offering of prayer and praise) (the "sacramental" principle). Pelagianism, whether of the Roman or the Reformed variety, must be rejected, as must the "mad shrieks and shouts" of extemporaneous revivalists.[411] If these principles are followed, Loy felt,

> Our sanctuaries will then no longer be filled with yawning, gaping crowds who never seem to think that they have any duty or privilege in church beside that of hearing a speech. And then, too, we may hope that our mother will arise and put on her beautiful garments and be a praise in the earth while she prepares her millions for glory in heaven.[412]

Sigmund Fritschel: Freedom and conformity in worship

Matthias Loy accepted the Augsburg Confession's position that a rigid uniformity of worship is not essential to the life and faith of the church. But as we have seen, he also appealed forcefully to the need for set patterns of liturgical prayer. About thirty years after Loy's essay was published, Sigmund Fritschel espoused very similar views in an article in the Lutheran journal Kirchliche Zeitschrift. In "A Proper Understanding of Freedom in Worship", Fritschel developed, in somewhat more systematic form, the liturgical principles suggested by Loy.[413] The date of Fritschel's article (1882) reveals that the debate about public worship in the American Lutheran community was still alive several decades after the middle of the nineteenth century.[414]

The "requirement of Scripturalness" and the "requirement of confessional conformity":[415] Fritschel's overriding concern was this question: how free is the Christian community in the matter of its liturgical practice? Noting that worship is precisely "an expression of the common Christian life. . .exhibited in a solemn, public fashion," Fritschel went on to say that "Christian worship must be just as free as this life."[416] Liturgical freedom is not, however, to be equated with anarchy:

> For freedom of worship, like all moral freedom, is not arbitrariness but self-determination, the right and power of the Christian life to be governed in its cultic expression, activity, and self-delineation only by the norms and laws that are given in that life itself and to make its own decisions accordingly.[417]

It is, then, the nature of Christian faith itself that establishes the appropriate norm for worship. Faith is not only man's communion with God (sacrifice), it is also God's communion with man (sacrament).[418] These two dimensions of faith, distinct but inseparable, are exhibited in every liturgical action. Fritschel sought and found support for this point of view in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1530):

> Sacramentum est ceremonia vel opus, in quo Deus nobis exhibet hoc, quod offert annexa ceremoniae promissio, ut baptismus est opus, non quod nos Deo offerimus, sed in quo Deus nos baptizat, videlicet minister vice Dei, et hic offeret et exhibet Deus remissionem peccatorum etc., iuxta promissionem: Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit. Econtra sacrificium est ceremonia vel opus, quod nos Deo reddimus, ut eum honore afficiamus.[419]

Worship is comprised of an intertwining of the sacramental and sacrificial dimensions of faith.[420]

As the "self-expression of the Christian life of faith," liturgy must, submit to two essential requirements: the "requirement of scripturalness" and the "requirement of confessional conformity".[421] These two requirements are not external impositions laid on liturgy from without, they are demanded by the internal structure of faith itself.[422] The requirement of scripturalness derives from the fact that in the Scriptures alone "we possess the Word of God authentically."[423] This does not mean, Fritschel notes, that liturgy is bound to a literal imitation of New Testament practices:

> Certainly all the passages of the New Testament which deal with the practice of worship in the

> apostolic church have significance for the shaping of Christian worship today. . .But only for our instruction, not as a law.[424]

Together with Matthias Loy, Fritschel criticizes the biblical literalism of Reformed worship.[425] What is required is not a literal reproduction of primitive Christian customs but agreement with the "content" of the Scriptures.[426] By "content" Fritschel means the Word of God as "received, known and experienced" by believers, not as literally written on the pages of the Bible.[427] As Fritschel puts it:

> The requirement of scripturalness does not encroach at all on the freedom that is essential to worship, the freedom to be shaped not by external rules but only by the inner impulse and the need that is peculiar to the life of faith which is represented in that worship, the freedom to choose among various possible forms, the freedom to decide in favor of one form and against another according to circumstances and necessities.[428]

Scriptural conformity, therefore, neither demands biblical literalism (the Reformed error), nor permits liturgical practices clearly contrary to the Word of God (the Roman error).[429] Scripture is not, however, the only criterion that shapes the freedom granted to Christians in worship. Liturgy is not the possession of individuals; it is "the self-representation of the church's life of faith."[430] Worship represents faith according to its "social structure" and, consequently, it is the faith of the ecclesiastical community that must find adequate expression in the formulas of the liturgy.[431] The "requirement of confessional conformity" is thus rooted in the social structure of faith itself:

> Not what the individual but what the fellowship of the church acknowledges as the correct and necessary preaching of the gospel and the properly administered sacrament, and what this is according to the judgment of the community, can be normative in the sacramental parts of worship.[432]

Since it exhibits the belief of the whole fellowship of believers, liturgy is not subject to the arbitrary whims of individuals.[433] Still, Fritschel admits that since the church of God "exists in a multiplicity of congregations," freedom of worship belongs to the local congregation.[434] But to say that the local congregation possesses freedom of worship is not to affirm liturgical eccentricity on the parish level. It is not permissible to "make arrangements for worship in one congregation without taking the other congregations into account."[435] The requirement of confessional conformity is thus "conservative" and "ecumenical" in character.[436] It is the very contrary of that eccentricity and individualism which inspires "free prayer (erroneously called prayer of the heart)."[437]

The need for set forms of liturgy: Both scriptural and confessional conformity consequently demand adherence to prescribed forms of worship. Whether one is dealing with the sacramental or the sacrificial dimension of liturgy, Fritschel argues, "common prayer necessarily requires such a treatment that not only an individual but all may participate directly in the prayer, that all may pray together, that one does not say a prayer and the others at best echo it."[438] Ecumenicity

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(i.e. concern for the unity of all local congregations in the Lutheran communion) and conservatism (i.e. respect for the historical tradition of worship) require a "definite form" of liturgical prayer.[439] There are, of course, some moments in worship when free and spontaneous expression is appropriate. The homily, for example, "should take place in a free and individual rather than in a generally prescribed manner."[440] Announcements (e.g. publication of marriage banns) and invitations to prayer may also be done freely. But in no case may the minister and the congregation presume as uninhibited permission to say and do whatever they please:

> In the sphere of the liturgical, properly speaking, unlimited freedom on the part of individuals would make a truly common service of worship altogether impossible. Freedom of worship can never consist of this.[441]

In Fritschel's systematic exposition of the requirement of scripturalness and the requirement of confessional conformity, one can perceive a development of the thought represented by Matthias Loy. Oddly enough, both these nineteenth century American Lutheran liturgists share a conviction found in the writing of Dom Prosper Guéranger, the abbot of Solesmes. Since the liturgy is the church's expression of faith, all forms of personal individualism or national eccentricity are to be avoided. For Guéranger the liturgy is "the principal instrument of tradition"; for Fritschel and Loy it is the "self-representation of the church's life of faith." In both these cases one discerns a preference for what is "conservative" and "ecumenical" (in the sense of these words described above) over what is merely "local" and "individualistic". The pattern of liturgical reform (or "restoration") found in both Guéranger and Fritschel/Loy is based on a vision of ecclesiastical unity, a unity that is expressed and celebrated in the forms of liturgical prayer. We will see a similar concern for unity, "ecumenicity" and "conservatism" in the liturgical proposals of Wilhelm Loehe. It is to his work that we now turn.

Wilhelm Loehe and the "Agende für christliche Gemeinden des lutherischen Bekenntnisses" (1844):[442]

In the "Forward to the First Edition" of his Agenda, addressed to "Mr. Friedrich Wyneken of St. Louis, Missouri", Wilhelm Loehe writes:

> As far as the sectarians are concerned. . .I wish nothing more for the kingdom of God than that the almighty assistance of the Lord work against their plans and purposes. . .By contrast, I perceive that the liturgies of the so-called "Lutheran Church", whose historical roots have sprung from those of the Romans, (. . .but which do not share their service of false teaching) . . .could become a weapon of truth--against the Romans--for the salvation of the German brethren in North America.[443]

In these words Loehe reveals his perception of the liturgical situation many German Lutherans in America found themselves in during the first decades of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, these immigrants were threatened by the chaotic "free prayer" methods of revivalist sectarians; on the other, they were confronted with the elaborate ritual traditions of

Roman Catholicism. Of these two perils, Loehe seems to have perceived more danger from the sectarian impulse than from the Roman one. He reminds his American readers of Article 24 in the Augsburg Confession, which declares that the Lutheran reformers have not abolished the liturgy (of the Mass) but rather retained it with the highest earnestness and reverence.[444] Loehe notes further that if one charges his proposals with a "Romanizing" tendency, one would have to indict the entire Lutheran tradition on the same charge, since the early Lutheran liturgies bore unmistakable resemblances to their Roman ancestors.[445]

Loehe's defensiveness about the charge of "Romanizing" was not unfounded. He has been accused of this both before and after the first publication of his Agenda.[446] To accusations of this sort Loehe replied:

> I have abstained throughout the whole (Agenda) from taking anything from the Roman liturgies--except what is already to be found in the ancient Lutheran agenda.[447]

It was Loehe's contention, therefore, that his liturgical proposals contained nothing contrary to the intentions of the sixteenth century Reformers or to the provisions of the Augsburg Confession. He admiteed, as Loy did about ten years later, that "constitution and organization, liturgy and ceremonies,. . .do not, in the true sense of the word, make a church."[448] Liturgy, Loehe observed, is "the fruit of the church but not its roots."[449] Nevertheless, "the liturgies seemed to our Fathers to be constituent parts of the church orders."[450] In the Lutheran tradition the forms of worship have not been considered a matter of indifference. Even though liturgical forms have been recognized as subordinate in importance to Word and Sacrament, their value for the life of ecclesial communities have been proven.[451] Loehe concludes his "Forward to the First Edition" by saying to his North American brethren:

> Perhaps you may still doubt whether, today, such a richly varied order of service (as I have given here) can be introduced. I would only ask that you make the attempt. . .Especially must I beg you not to make a judgment about this *Agenda* merely by reading it or looking it over silently. I would not pass a weighty judgment on anything unless it was based, if not on an actual trial, at least on a reading through of it aloud. . . I know that people in our days are not very willing to try out holy things. It seems to be a profanation of the holy if one experiments with it. And yet this only appears to be the case. Even for holy things there is no other proof than living experience--and this can be gained only through actual practice.[452]

The contents of Loehe's Agenda: In his effort to provide the German Lutheran community in North America with a "true liturgy", Loehe went back to the numerous *Kirchenordnungen* of the sixteenth century.[453] However, as he tells his readers, he did not simply reproduce any of these liturgies in their entirety: "Out of these two hundred or so ancient Agendas or Church Orders, I sought to bring together what seemed to me to be the best in them."[454] Loehe's principle of selectivity became, later in the nineteenth century, a kind of "rule" governing the use of liturgical texts from the Reformation period: "The common consent of

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the pure Lutheran liturgies of the sixteenth century, and when there is not an entire agreement among them the consent of the largest number of greatest weight".[455]

The contents of Loehe's Agenda thus resemble those of the sixteenth century Lutheran Kirchenordnungen. In addition to the Communion Service for Sundays (Hauptgottesdienst),[456] Loehe included a number of other items: a table of moveable and immoveable feasts; a collection of devotional prayers for the pastor; an appendix to the Communion Service giving material from early Lutheran sources and from Eastern Christian liturgies; a form of public service for Sundays and festivals when the Lord's Supper is not celebrated; a form of celebrating Lauds and Vespers on Sundays and weekdays, followed by a comparative table showing sources for these celebrations in the Roman Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran traditions; a form of prayer for use at catechism and at special services of preaching.[457] In addition to all these materials Loehe also included a generous sampling of introits and collects for use on Sundays and feasts, several forms of the Litany and its collects, forms of general intercession and confession, and a large collection of occasional prayers.[458] And in a later edition of his work, Loehe also provided liturgies for the ordination and installation of a pastor, for baptism of children and adults, for confirmation, for confession and absolution (both private and general), for the reconciliation of an excommunicated person, and for marriages.[459] Services for the churching of women after childbirth, for communion of the sick, and for the death and burial of a christian were also included.[460]

Here, we will limit our attention to Loehe's Communion Service for Sundays, since it is this liturgy that came to exert the most influence on American Lutherans in the nineteenth century.[461] It will be useful, first of all, to outline Loehe's service before commenting on any of its details:[462]

Order of Worship

1. Hymn ("Komm, heiliger Geist" or a similar hymn)
2. Confession of sin and absolution (three forms of the "Confiteor" are provided)
3. Introit with "Gloria Patri"
4. "Kyrie" and "Gloria in Excelsis"
5. Greeting of the people by the pastor, followed by the collect of the day
6. Epistle
7. Alleluia, followed by a German hymn
8. Gospel
9. Creed (Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed)
10. Sermon
11. Offertory (verses of a psalm or hymn may be sung while the people bring forward gifts for the poor and sick, as well as bread and wine for the eucharist)
12. The general intercessions ("prayers of the faithful")
13. The eucharistic prayer
    a. Opening dialogue ("The Lord be with you", etc.)
    b. Preface (variable)
    c. Sanctus

   d. Words of institution ("Consecration")
   e. Lamb of God (German version)

14. The Lord's Prayer
15. The kiss of peace
16. Distribution of communion (with several options for administering the sacrament)
17. The "Nunc Dimittis" (Canticle of Simeon)
18. The postcommunion collect (three formulas are provided)
19. "Benedicamus" and final blessing

To anyone acquainted with Luther's *Formula Missae* of 1523 or even his *Deutsche Messe* of 1526, Loehe's order of worship holds few surprises.[463] True, Loehe's eucharistic service includes some items that were not mentioned in Luther's formulas of 1523 and 1526 (e.g. the variable "Prefaces" of the eucharistic prayer and the "Nunc Dimittis" after the distribution of communion). Moreover, Loehe admits that he has *rearranged* some of the parts of the eucharistic service so that they are different from the familiar pattern found in the very oldest Lutheran liturgies.[464] A case in point is the arrangement provided by Loehe for the preface, *Sanctus*, words of institution (consecration), *Agnus Dei* and Lord's Prayer. The following comparison reveals the differences between Loehe's *Agenda* for this part of the service and Luther's "Formula Missae" of 1523:

Loehe's Agenda[465]	Luther, 1523[466]
1. The Lord be with you!	1. The Lord be with you!
And with your spirit.	And with thy spirit.
Lift up your hearts!	Lift up (your) hearts!
We lift them up to the Lord.	Let us lift them to the Lord.
Let us give thanks to the Lord our God!	Let us give thanks unto the Lord our God!
It is just and right.	It is meet and right.
2. Preface:	2. Preface:
Truly it is just and right, appropriate and salutary, at all times and everywhere, to give you thanks, holy Lord, almighty Father, everlasting God, through Christ our Lord. Through him the angels praise your majesty, the principalities adore you, the powers fear you, the heavens and all the powers of heaven with the blessed Seraphim praise you and glorify you with one voice. With them, let our voices also join to worship you, saying:	It is truly meet and right, just and salutary for us to give thanks to Thee, always and everywhere, Holy Lord, Father Almighty, Eternal God, through Christ our Lord.
3. Holy, Holy, Holy is God, the Lord of hosts. Heaven and earth are full of your glory. Hosanna in the highest! Blessed is Mary's Son, who comes in the name of the Lord. Blessed is the Paschal Lamb, who comes in the name of the Lord. Hosanna in the highest!	
(There follows a brief but deep silence)	

Loehe's Agenda	Luther, 1523
4. Our Lord Jesus, on the night in which he was betrayed, took bread, gave thanks, broke and gave it to his disciples, and said: Take and eat, this is my body, which will be given for you. Do this in memory of me.	3. Who the day before he suffered took bread, giving thanks, broke and gave to his disciples, saying, Take, eat. This is my body, which is given for you.
In the same way he took the cup, after the meal, gave thanks, and gave it to them, and said: Drink of this, all of you; this is my blood of the new covenant, that will be shed for you and for many unto the forgiveness of sins. Do this, as often as you drink it, in memory of me.	Similarly also the cup, after He supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood which is poured out for you and for many in remission of sins. As often as ye shall do this, do it in memory of me.
5. Agnus Dei (German version sung by choir)	4. "The Consecration ended, let the choir sing the Sanctus, and when the Benedictus is sung, let the bread and chalice be elevated according to the rite in use up to this time."
Christ, Lamb of God, you who take away the sins of the world, have mercy on us. Christ, Lamb of God, you who take away the sins of the world, have mercy on us. Christ, Lamb of God, you who take away the sins of the world, grant us your peace. Amen.	
6. Lord's Prayer Let us pray: Our Father. . .	5. "After this the Lord's Prayer is read."
	6. "Then let him communicate himself first, then the people; in the meanwhile let the Agnus Dei be sung."

The change of pattern which Loehe introduced in this part of his Agenda was made consciously. In an "Appendix", Loehe defends his "innovations" and contrasts them with examples from the oldest Lutheran Kirchenordnungen.[467] It will be noticed, of course, that Loehe's arrangement outlined above tends to follow the typical Roman pattern for the eucharist, except that the Agnus Dei is placed before the Lord's Prayer.[468] Loehe defends the position he has assigned to the Agnus by arguing that, in Luther's view, this piece was actually a "proclamation of the Lord's death".[469] As such a proclamation, the Agnus logically follows the words of institution which emphasize Jesus' death for the remission of sins.[470]

It should also be noted that western influences were not the only ones which affected Loehe's thinking about the eucharistic service. He was familiar with Eusebius Renaudot's collection of oriental liturgies, and he even provides a German translation of part of the Liturgy of St. Basil based on Renaudot's Latin translation of the same.[471] Moreover, Loehe did not hesitate to cite Roman Catholic authorities for the defense of some parts of his Agenda. Cardinal Bona's Rerum Liturgicarum Libri Duo is cited, for example, to defend Loehe's interpretation of the "Kyrie" used in the earlier part of the eucharistic celebration.[472]

Although Loehe's proposals for liturgical reform by no means won universal approval, they did, as we have noted, exert some influence on the American Church Book for the Use

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of Evangelical Lutheran Congregations of 1868.[473] For example, some of Loehe's rubrics for consecrating additional bread and wine at the eucharist (should the initial supply run low) are repeated almost *verbatim* in the 1868 Church Book:

Loehe's Agenda[474]	*Church Book of 1868*[475]
During the distribution, in case the bread and wine are spent and there is need for more, (the pastor) will consecrate anew, (saying the words) aloud. . .the organ and singing should cease, as at the original consecration. . . Only that portion of the words of institution is used which make necessary for the newly consecrated elements. . .	If the consecrated bread or wine be spent before all have consumed, the minister should consecrate more, saying aloud so much of the words of institution as pertaineth to the element to be consecrated. During the consecration the singing shall cease.

Theodore Tappert notes that "this rubric reflects the reintroduction in the nineteenth century of a notion of consecration that implied some sort of mutation in the bread and wine."[476]

Loehe's *Agenda*, then, represents a blending of elements drawn from a variety of traditions: early Lutheran (the sixteenth century *Kirchenordnungen*), Roman Catholic, Anglican, the Eastern churches. It is easy to see why some of Loehe's colleagues in the Lutheran ministry found his proposals objectionable and even dangerously "Roman".[477] Proposals like the ones he made for private "penance",[478] for instance, were bound to disturb some members of the Lutheran community, even though Loehe could appeal to Luther and to the *Augsburg Confession*.[479] For the most part, therefore, Loehe's Agenda was destined to remain a "literary liturgy", a sourcebook for later efforts at reform.

Method of Reform: Taken together, the ideas of Matthias Loy, Sigmund Fritschel and Wilhelm Loehe suggest a pattern of liturgical reform that was at work in some quarters of the American Lutheran community during the mid-nineteenth century. Characteristic of this reform movement were some basic hermeneutical principles aimed at disclosing the meanings embedded in Christian public worship. To summarize, it will be helpful to review these hermeneutical principles and to show how they influenced this Lutheran effort at reform.

1. Christian worship can be properly interpreted only if it is seen as the "self-expression of the community's faith": The liturgical ideas put forth by Loy, Fritschel and Loehe represent a reaction against eccentricity and individualism in two forms: 1) the exaggerated reliance on extemporaneity fostered by American revivalism, and 2) the presumptuous Pelagianism encouraged by Reformed biblical literalism and Roman Catholic ritual excess. A proper understanding of the relation between sacrament and sacrifice, such as that found in the Augsburg Confession, can overcome these errors.[480]

2. The liturgy must be characterized by qualities of historicity, ecumenicity and conservatism: Christian faith is not only social, it is historical as well. The life of Christ continues in that of his mystical body; the Savior is really and actively present in the historical existence of the church. Worship must therefore be interpreted not only in accord with God's Word in Scripture, but also in agreement

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with the historical confession of the church. Further, although a local church is free to regulate its pattern of worship, this cannot be done without regard for the unity of all the local churches in the confession of the same faith and in the celebration of the same sacraments (ecumenicity). Thus, every authentic reform of worship must also be guided by a "conservative" principle, i.e., it must agree with the whole community's historical confession of faith as represented by its reverence for Word and Sacrament. Practically speaking, this often means a return to the ancient source of that community's liturgical tradition (e.g., the sixteenth century *Kirchenordnungen*).

3. Finally, priority must be given to the sacramental in the interpretation and reform of worship: As the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession* says, citing Augustine, the sacrament is a "visible word".[481] As such, it bears the mandate of God and his promise of grace.[482] Loy, Fritschel and Loehe all agreed that, from the beginning, the Lutheran tradition had insisted on the necessity and importance of sacraments. As one of the sacraments of the New Testament, therefore, the Lord's Supper should retain (or be restored to) its central place in the weekly worship of the community.

It is possible to discern, I believe, a rather close correlation between the hermeneutic of reform followed by these Lutheran liturgists and that found in the work of Prosper Gueranger. In both cases we are dealing with men who sought a liturgical expression appropriate to their distinctive religious tradition. In both cases, too, we perceive a strong impulse to counteract the forces of individualism, personal or national, by seeking common liturgical symbols that can sustain the identity of the ecclesial community and defend the integrity of its faith. In both cases, further, we see an appeal to the ancient sources of a tradition. Neither Guéranger nor the Lutheran theologians discussed here denied the fact that liturgical forms change and develop historically. Nor did either of them utterly reject the propriety of local custom in matters liturgical. But both of them relied on a staunch ecclesiological conviction: that Christ continues to be present and active in the church.

Although they appear to be strange bed-fellows, the Lutheran pastors Loy, Fritschel and Loehe, and the Roman Catholic abbot Guéranger had embarked on a similar quest: the restoration of a liturgical tradition. This desire for restoration was not based on a reactionary conservatism, but on what might be called an "ecumenical conservatism", on the desire to maintain the unity of the church and the integrity of its confession through common ritual symbols that could be grasped by all believers.

PATTERN 5: JOHN MASON NEALE AND A "SYMBOLIC HERMENEUTIC"

The last pattern of liturgical reform and restoration to be analyzed in this chapter is that associated with John Mason Neale (1818-1866) and the "Cambridge Camden

Society" in England.[483] Neale himself is perhaps best known as a writer and translator of liturgical hymns, many of which still appear in twentieth-century hymnals.[484] But he is also remembered for his "ritualistic" High Church ideals, some of which eventually led him into conflict with A.T. Golbert, the bishop of Chichester.[485] In May of 1839, Neale and a group of like-minded friends established the Cambridge Camden Society devoted especially to the study of ecclesiasiastical art and architecture.[486] Through its monthly journal The Ecclesiologist, the Society pressed its views about "Catholic sacramentality", symbolism and liturgical tradition.[487] Unlike most of the other patterns of reform we have seen in this chapter, Neale's approach was based primarily upon the relation between faith, worship and architecture rather than upon the creation of new liturgical texts or the restoration of old ones.[488] It will be our purpose here to study some of Neale's views on sacramentality and symbolism as they are presented in a lengthy essay, "Sacramentality: A Principle of Ecclesiastical Design", with which the author prefaced his translation of the first book of William Durandus' Rationale Divinorum Officiorum.[489]

Sacramentality and the "Catholick architect": One thing that particularly bothered Neale was the tendency of Christian architecture to become a mere "profession", "the means of gaining a livelihood."[490] It was the view of the Cambridge Camden Society that the work of a Christian architect was an act of "profound meditation", capable of being achieved only "in the contemplative life."[491] In the early pages of his essay on "Sacramentality", Neale wrote:

> A Catholick architect must be a Catholick in heart. Simple knowledge will no more enable a man to build up God's material, than His spiritual, temples. . .And we have every reason to believe, from God's Word, from Catholick consent, and even from philosophical principles, that such must always be the case.[492]

An authentic architecture must be inspired, Neale insisted, by the principle of sacramentality. This principle needs to be carefully distinguished from other terms with which it is sometimes confused: allegory, symbol, type and figure. In a trenchant note Neale offers the following distinctions:

> Allegory employs fictitious things and personages to shadow out the truth: Symbolism uses real personages and real actions (and real things) as symbols of the truth. . .Sacramentality is symbolism applied to the truth , the teaching of the Church, by the hands of the teacher: a Type is a symbol intended from the first: a Figure is a symbol not discovered till after the thing figurative has had a being.[493]

It is important to notice that according to Neale, sacrament and symbol are not unreal flights of imagination run wild, but real persons, actions and things that disclose real meanings. By the term "sacramentality", therefore, Neale hoped "to convey the idea that, by the outward and visible form, is signified something inward and spiritual: that the material fabrick symbolizes, embodies, figures, represents, expresses, answers to, some abstract meaning."[494] The sacramental is thus not opposed to the real, but raises reality to the fuller expression of truth.[495] Unlike allegory, which fictionalizes the real, sacramentality extends, develops and deepens reality, bringing it closer to truth.

The expression of Christian faith in architectural form must inevitably, therefore, be symbolic and sacramental. The building of a church is in fact "the material expression of the church's mind."[496] If there has been a decline in Christian architecture, it is because the essential principle of symbolic expression has been either lost or forced into allegorical distortion.[497] For Neale recognized that, as was the case with the ancient Gnostics, Christian symbolism can be perverted.[498] Symbols can be stretched and exaggerated to a point at which they lie rather than tell the truth.[499] Such perversions can be avoided only if the mind of the architect is informed by a genuine "religious _ethos_", a "contemplative" grasp of faith rooted in an inward knowledge of the church's ritual and worship.[500]

For, correctly understood, ecclesiastical architecture is part of the church's ritual system. As Neale puts it:

> . . .if Catholick worship is expressed and represented by Catholick ritual, and if Church architecture is a part of this ritual, then is Church architecture itself an expression and exponent of Catholick worship.[501]

Neale notes that symbolism in church architecture need not always have been the result of a conscious intention by the builder. Symbols, indeed, may often have arisen unconsciously and unintentionally, only later to become part of an intentional symbol system.[502] Moreover, the relation between architecture and ritual is reciprocal: the material building shapes and influences ritual activity, while ritual activity effects "certain peculiar adaptations of the material building in which they are to be celebrated."[503]

A philosophy of symbolism: Neale felt that his theory of sacramentality could be defended on philosophical grounds. He claimed that every interaction of an intelligent human subject with material realities inevitably results in symbolizing:

> . . .we would allege that everything material is symbolical of some mental process, of which it is indeed only the development: that we may see in everything outward and visible some inward and spiritual meaning. It is this that makes "books in everything:" finding in everything objective the material exhibition of the subjective and unseen. . .[504]

Neale argues that the human body itself is the best exemplification of his point. Because human persons are an inseparable composite of both matter and spirit, the body itself symbolically reveals interior conditions and movements.[505] That is why all ritual systems, which characteristically involve physical gesture and movement, are inherently symbolic.[506]

Symbols are not, therefore, mere objects to which superstitious believers have attached a (perhaps unwarranted) religious significance. For Neale, symbols result from the interaction between thinking human agents and the material world. The connection between "symbol" and "what is symbolized" is not an arbitrary external one, but an intrinsic and necessary one rooted in man's existence as spirit/matter. Thus, symbolism renders the "disconnected facts" of the visible world intelligible:

> . . .the whole group of separate facts become linked together and adjusted, and so resolve themselves into a great fabrick of truth, which . . .is consistent and real and intelligible, when seen from any point, under any circumstances, or in any light.[507]

A system of ritual symbols thus provides a coherent source of intelligibility for human life in the world. Neale's use of the "fabrick" image as a way to speak about symbolism is significant. Symbols do not arise as individual isolated objects in human experience; together they form a fabric, a pattern or system of meaning. At one point in his essay on "Sacramentality", Neale provides an example of this "patterned" nature of symbols: the use of doors in church and architecture.[508] Noting that the metaphor of the door is used scripturally of Jesus,[509] Neale observes that doors have been used by church builders for a variety of symbolic purposes: to reveal the entrance of the blessed into the heavenly kingdom; to show the entrance of sin into the world to symbolize Christian marriage as entrance into a new life of communion and love. All these significances contribute to the pattern of meaning symbolized architecturally by the creation of doorways.[510]

Through examples like the one just discussed, Neale seems to imply that symbols are ambiguous, open to meaning on many different levels.[511] Moreover, he explicitly acknowledges that symbols may develop.[512] Sometimes this development happens in the direction of allegory, the use of "fictitious representations to set forth real truths".[513] Neale notes that allegory can often appear in architecture when artists and builders become excessively preoccupied about realistic detail.[514] Such detail may, however, obscure the richer symbolic resonances that are suggested by an image. The crucifix, Neale observes, is a case in point. The tendency of modern painting and sculpture to dwell on literal detail often turns the cross into a "miserable display of anatomical knowledge."[515] In contrast to such literalism, earlier representations of the cross used flowers, foilage and even jewels to suggest that the cross is not only the instrument of shame, but the source of hope and glory as well. Here Neale hints at the notion that crass allegorical literalism is the enemy of symbolic nuance.

The triumph of literalism: Unfortunately, Neale suggests, modern ecclesiastical art and architecture are committed far more strongly to literalism than to the "principle of sacramentality".[516] It is, indeed, the decline of the sacramental idea that has produced the greatest discrepancy between ancient and modern churches:

> . . .the cuase of that indefinable difference between an ancient and modern church. . .is neither association of ideas, nor correctness of detail, nor picturesqueness, nor of a mechanical nature, but, (in the most general point of view) is the sacramentality, the religious symbolism.[517]

Neale supports his thesis about the decline of sacramentality by giving a bitterly sarcastic description of "a Protestant place of worship".[518] Such a place, for example, lacks the

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traditional east-west orientation of church-buildings "it stands North and South, for all idea of fellowship with the Church Catholick is looked on as mere trifling, or worse."[519] "The Altar," Neale observes further, "stands under the organ gallery, as being of no use, except once a month. . .The Font, a cast-iron vase on a marble pillar, stands within the Altar rails; because it there takes up no room."[520] The whole scene, Neale notes angrily signifies "spiritual pride, . . .luxury,. . .self-sufficiency,. . .bigotry."[521] The people who worship in these places "close their pue doors" against the poor and the infirm, "lest themselves should be contaminated, or their cushions spoilt, at the same time beseeching God to give their fellow-creatures the comfort which they refuse to bestow."[522]

Over against the literalist vision of liturgical squalor which he sees in the "Protestant place of worship", Neale proposes "the symbolism of a Catholick church".[523] In a liturgical space inspired by the principle of sacramentality, the Font, for example, is not a "cast-iron vase" but a "deep and capacious" spring:

> Close by us is the Font; for by Regeneration we enter the Church: it is deep and capacious; for we are buried in Baptism with Christ: it is of stone; for He is the Rock: and its spiry cover teaches us, if we be indeed risen from its waters with Him, to seek those things that are above.[524]

Similarly, the altar, symbol of Christ's presence, is not hidden away "under the organ gallery" but stands in splendor at the east end of the church:

> . . .there, heart and soul and life of all, the Altar with its unquenched lights, and golden carvings, and mystick steps, and sparkling jewels: even Christ Himself, by Whose only Merits we find admission to our heavenly Inheritance.[525]

Neale acknowledges that his vision of sacramentality in church architecture is likely to arose opposition from the literalists. Such liberal-minded people, he observes, will always want to press symbolism to absurd lengths. As a symbol of the church, for instance, Noah's ark is not to be taken literally--as though the church too were built by men and would perish. Father, the point of similarity between ark and church is that both were saved by water.[526] The relation between symbol and what is symbolized does not demand literal similitude at all points; indeed, if it did, one would have a "fac-simile", not a symbol.[527] "For in all symbolism," Neale remarks, "it is quality and not essence in which resemblance is sought."[528]

The rise of ritualism: Although its earliest work was devoted to the study of ecclesiastical architecture and to restoration of ancient church buildings in England, the Cambridge Camden Society also promoted a revival of interest in the ritual practices of an earlier age. Between 1843 and 1848, a number of pamphlets on the history of rite and ceremony in the English tradition were published.[529] As a sourcebook of liturgical customs in the English Church, the Hierurgia Anglicana became especially important to proponents of "ritualism" in the Anglican communion especially after the decisions handed down by the Royal Commission on Ritual in 1867.[530]

In the "Preface" to the first edition of the Hierurgia Anglicana, dated 1848, there is a spirited defense of ritual and liturgical ceremonies. The anonymous author of the preface, citing the "Introduction" to the first pamphlet published in 1843, complained:

> The Great Rebellion of course violently interrupted the whole Church system, and many practices were found at the Restoration difficult to be re-established. . .It was never the intention of the compilers of our present Services that their work should be considered as a new fabric, but as a reformation of the existing system. Consequently many things then in actual use, and always intended to be retained, were not expressly commanded, any more than they were distinctly forbidden, in the new rubric. . .The design of the present work is to produce, in a collected form, the historical facts concerning the retention of certain rites and usages since the Reformation. . .[531]

As these words reveal, the members of the Cambridge Camden Society did not regard themselves as liturgical "innovators". They viewed their call for increased attention to rite and ceremony in worship as a legitimate appeal to customs that had commonly existed in the English Church prior to the Great Rebellion of 1642. These customs (including such things as use of eucharistic vestments), the author of the preface argued, had never been formally commanded or forbidden after the Restoration in 1660.[532] Thus it is perfectly legitimate to encourage such things as "altar-lights,. . .vestments, processions, incense, crucifixes, mitres, waferbread, the mixed cup; the consecration of fonts, altars, chalices,. . ."[533] Such practices by the medieval church had also been observed "by the Elizabethan and Caroline prelates and clergy, and in particular, by Andrewes, Laud, and Cosin."[534]

It was not innovation then, that the members of the Cambridge Camden Society felt they were promoting, but a restoration of liturgical customs that were widely followed in the English Church from the period after the Reformation until the Great Rebellion. As the preface to the 1848 edition of Hierurgia Anglicana puts it:

> Let us endeavour to restore everywhere amongst us the daily Prayers, and (at the least) weekly Communion; the proper eucharistic vestments, lighted and vested altars, the ancient tones of prayer and praise, the meet celebration of fasts and festivals. . .but let us be careful not to retard the general return of the clergy to rubrical regularity, by attempting as individuals, and by the adoption of isolated practices, to do more than our Church sanctions in the ceremonial departments of her services.[535]

In support of their arguments favoring a "rich and stately ceremonial in the celebration of. . .public worship," the compilers of the Hierurgia Anglicana made much of a section in the "Act of Uniformity" that prefaced the Prayer Book of 1662. That section read:

> . . .be it enacted, that such ornaments of the church, and of the Ministers thereof shall be retained, and be in use, as was in this church of England by the authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward the sixth, until other order shall be therein taken, by authority of the Queens Maiesty, with the advice of her Commissioners appointed and authorized under the great seal of England, for

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> causes ecclesiastical or of the Metropolitane of this Realm.[536]

Members of the Cambridge Camden Society contended that this provision--retention of the liturgical ornaments in use in the second year of Edward VI's reign (1548)--had never been revoked.[537] They maintained, further, that the "ornaments rubric" of 1662 actually referred back to the arrangements for vesture mentioned in a rubric of the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI (1549):

> Upon the daye, and at the time appointed for the ministracion of the holy Communion, the Priest that shall execute the holy ministery, shall put upon hym the vesture appoincted for that ministracion, that is to saye: a white Albe plain, with a vestement or cope. And where there be many Priestes, or Deacons, there so many shal be ready to helpe the Priest, in the ministracion, as shal bee requisite: And shall haue upon them lykewyse, the vestures appointed for their ministery, that is to saye, Albes, with tunacles.[538]

Although this rubric was not repeated in the Second Prayer-Book of Edward VI (1552),[539] the author of the preface to Hierurgia Anglicana insisted that the obvious intention of the men who worked on the Prayer-Book of 1662 was to support the liturgical customs reflected in the first Edwardine book (1549) and in the "Elizabethan settlement" of 1559.[540] Thus the appeal for a return to "rubrical regularity" was based on the conviction that the English Church's own existing law actually required such things as eucharistic venture and lights on the altar--since these liturgical practices were still commonly followed "in the second year of the reign of King Edward the sixth."[541] The purpose of Hierurgia Anglicana was to provide specific historical documentation that would clarify just what "ornaments of the church" were common from roughly 1548 until 1642. The compilers derived their documentation from both Anglican and Puritan sources, the latter often witnessing in a negative way to ceremonial and ritual customs they regarded as objectionable.[542]

The members of the Cambridge Camden Society acknowledged that a mere restoration of vestments, lights and ornaments would not effect a blazing revival of faith among adherents of the Anglican communion. Still, as John Mason Neale insisted, "These poor, to whom the Gospel is preached, are much influenced by these outward and visible signs."[543] Neale went on to say:

> They may be taught the Real Presence of their Saviour in that ordinance: but how are they to believe it, when they see the altar itself and its furniture such as no man would presume to set before an earthly superior: when month after month they behold the miserable deal table . . .the ragged linen cloth, the battered pewter vessels, and the black bottle?. . .We do not say that a golden chalice and paten will of themselves lead any one to realise the awfulness of "verily and indeed taking and receiving" the Body and Blood of his Saviour; but it will at least teach him that those who have provided them consider that Bread and that Wine as worthy of all reverence.[544]

Neale's remarks recall Prosper Guéranger's insistence that the liturgy is the most important tool of teaching available to the church. In the final analysis the chief motive for liturgical reform and/or restoration is not aesthetic but catechetical. The need for instruction and nurture in Christian faith is met more effectively by the powerful symbols of worship than by clever sermons in a "chapel of the Establishment".[545] The statement made by the Catholick "principle of sacramentality" in church architecture is more powerful than a "gas-lighted chandelier" in a "puerented Episcopal chapel".[546]

The concerns of the Cambridge Camden Society were not, then, confined to a desire for liturgical splendor and sheer ritual elegance. More basically, the Society's interest in overcoming "Puritanical laxity, shabbiness and irreverence" in worship was motivated by a concern for liturgy as an important teaching tool and by the need to recover the principle of sacramentality/symbolism.[547] Unquestionably, the work of John Mason Neale and other members of the Society did contribute to the "ritualist movement" that gained prominence in some quarters of Anglicanism later in the nineteenth century.[548] And Neale's work in the area of hymnody had an appreciable impact on the compilation of the English Hymnal (first edition, 1906), in which his name appears 72 times as the source of either a hymn text or translation.[549]

The ritualism promoted by members of the Cambridge Camden Society also attracted the interest of Roman Catholics in America during the second half of the nineteenth century. Over a period of about fourteen years, Father Isaac Hecker's popular journal The Catholic World ran occasional essays on American ritualism.[550] These essays, most of them anonymous, vacillate between sentiments of patronizing admiration and nati-Protestant suspicion. In the essay on "The Future of Ritualism", for example, we read:

> Let us say at once, and in all candor, that our sympathy is with the movement which is called Ritualism, and that from its beginning we have earnestly prayed to God to bless it to the conversion of many souls. . .Ritualism means a good deal more than mere rites and ceremonies. We do not take our good friends who put on Catholic vestments as automatons. . .There is doctrine beneath all this external ritual which is intended to show forth the sacrifice of the mass, and the real presence of our Lord in the holy eucharist.[551]

In another article, "Ritualism and its True Meaning", the work of John Mason Neale in the ritualist movement is explicitly recognized and applauded.[552] But on the whole these articles by Roman Catholic authors judged the ritualist movement negatively. While congratulating it as the "most important movement from the doctrines and worship of Protestants toward the ancient and unchangeable faith of the Catholic Church," the Catholic writers in nineteenth century America tended to condemn it as "wholly untenable. . .neither Protestantism nor Catholicity," a movement that "can never stand either the test of time or that of reason."[553]

The liturgical theories of J.M. Neale and other members of the Cambridge Camden Society thus provoked reaction both within the Anglican communion and within Roman Catholicism. As we have seen, the movement was not simply an attempt at nostalgic antiquarianism; it sought to restore ritual as an important medium of church teaching and as a powerful source of sacramental symbolism. Writing in the July, 1867, issue of Galaxy, Father Dix, rector of Trinity Church in New York

City and a vocal American proponent of ritualism, expressed some of the movement's ideals in the following way:

> . . .There must be ritual of some kind where there is religion. . .Such ritualism must be a teacher; it must symbolize something, and express as forcibly as possible what it symbolizes; a ritualism without a meaning, and representing no truth which the intellect can grasp, is but a piece of trifling and a sham.[554]

The Cambridge Camden Society and its hermeneutic of reform: Hopefully, our description of the thinking of the Cambridge Camden Society, and of J.M. Neale in particular, has revealed some of the hermeneutical principles that inspired these men to seek a reform and restoration of Anglican worship. Here, it will be useful to summarize those principles and to indicate how they may be related to other patterns of liturgical reform studied in this chapter.

1. Concern for the integrity of the Anglican tradition as both reformed and Catholic: The Camden Society did not regard itself as a fifth column of Romanizers in England. In their view, the English Church could legitimately claim to be both reformed and Catholic.[555] The Reformation in England had never intended to "lower her (the Church of England) to a level with the platform of Geneva."[556] Anti-ceremonialism could find no legitimate justification in the English Church between the period of the Reformation and the time of the Great Rebellion. Even the concessions made to Puritan interests at the Savory Conference of 1661[557] did not entail the destruction of liturgical custom that had prevailed prior to the Great Rebellion of 1642.[558] As both reformed and

Catholic the integrity of the English rite depended upon obedience to "existing written law"--an obedience sworn by every Anglican bishop, priest and deacon.[559] As the author of the preface to the Hierurgia Anglicana put it: "Disobedience to the Church's written enactments by addition and excess, is, in our apprehension, as wrong as a refusal to act up to its requisitions."[560] The Camden Society members did not feel they were seeking "ceremonial excess" but simply compliance with the existing liturgical regulations of the English Church. Such compliance was essential if the distinctive character of the Reformation in England (reformed yet Catholic) was to be maintained.

2. The principle of sacramentality: The Camden Society did not regard symbolism in worship as a mere decorative extravagance. For them, symbols were real persons, things and events that disclosed real meanings. Just as all religion needs ritual, so all church architecture needs the "principle of sacramentality" if it is to be "Catholick". Symbolism in both architecture and ritual interprets Christian doctrine by mediating its truth to believers through material reality and physical movement. The principle of sacramentality thus has both anthropological and ecclesiological roots: it has its source in the intelligent activity of human persons[561] and it seeks expression in ritual forms that render a community's beliefs visible.[562] Sacramentality is not, therefore, something one can "take or leave" according to fashion; it is essential to the Christian perception of reality.[563]

3. Symbolism and ritual are indispensable to Christian catechesis: As Dix put it, "ritualism must be a teacher."[564] Members of the Camden Society were not interested in multiplying "dumb rites" that would mystify people, nor were they interested in that brand of puritan literalism that would empty symbols of meaning. Symbols and ceremony can and must teach: "the poor," Neale suggested, "must have the gospel preached to them" through visible signs.[565]

It is my contention that these principles--the integrity of the Anglican tradition, the principle of sacramentality, and the relation of symbolism and ritual to catechesis--comprise the heremenutic of reform fostered by the Cambridge Camden Society. Like other nineteenth-century patterns of reform, notably those of American Lutherans and of Prosper Guéranger, the Anglican "ritualist movement" was committed to the restoration of a liturgical tradition. But this desire for restoration should not be confused with sheer archaeologism. What R.W. Franklin has said of Guéranger can also be said of the Cambridge movement: it represented a search for common ritual symbols that would a) respect the integrity of the church's faith, and b) promote the social cohesion of the ecclesial community.

Further, like the Lutherans Matthias Loy and Sigmund Fritschel, the members of the Cambridge Camden Society sought a return to regularity in established patterns of common worship. Moreover their appeals to the ceremonial as it existed "in the second year of the reign of King Edward the

Sixth" resemble Wilhelm Loehe's arguments in behalf of liturgy in the "most ancient" Lutheran Kirchenordnungen. Both Wilhelm Loehe and John Mason Neale freely acknowledged that medieval Roman Catholic worship had influenced their own churches' liturgical tradition. This was not, for them, a source of embarrassment. Indeed, Loehe and Neale might well have agreed with Philip Schaff when he wrote, in thesis 33 of The Principle of Protestantism:

> . . .the Reformation is the greatest act of the Catholic Church itself, the full ripe fruit of all its better tendencies, particularly of the deep spiritual law conflicts of the Middle Period. . .[566]

The Cambridge "ritualist" movement operated, therefore, out of a hermeneutic which insisted that worship be interpreted as part of an historical tradition that is both reformed and Catholic. The supporters of the movement wanted nothing to do with either Genevan plainness or Roman papalism. Indeed, one of the Cambridge group's most prominent spokesmen, Richard Frederick Littledale (1833-1890), wrote a widely publicized volume entitled Plain Reasons against Joining the Church of Rome.[567] The Cambridge movement was neither Romanism in Anglican clothing nor medievalism disguised as modernity. It sought to restore the vital sacramental principle that undergirds liturgical symbolism in both architecture and ritual.

SUMMARY

The five patterns of liturgical reform investigated in this chapter reveal both similarities and differences,

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especially in regard to the hermeneutic, implicit or explicit, that governed the various attempts at reform. Here it will be useful to summarize the results of our investigation.

1. The Roman Catholic Patterns of Reform: In some places during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Roman Catholic theology underwent a vigorous reaction against scholasticism both as a theological method and as a systematic exposition of traditional Christian doctrine. Aspects of this anti-scholastic reaction have already been discussed in the theological work of Johann Adam Moehler of the Tübingen School.[568] But a similar anti-scholasticism was also evident in the "political Jansenism" that inspired the decisions of the Synod of Pistoia. Grand Duke Leopold's objections to scholasticism took the form of recommendations that theology be taught in all ecclesiastical institutions "according to the doctrine of St. Augustine" (rather than Aquinas and the later scholastic commentators).[569] Moreover, the Synod itself instructed pastors to avoid scholastic subtleties in their catechesis on sacraments like the eucharist. The people were to be taught the church's doctrine about the real presence of Christ in the sacrament "with simplicity and a firm faith".[570]

Pistoia's anti-scholastic reaction was shared even by theologians who did not support the Synod's ideology of political Jansenism. The "Catholic Enlightenment" theologians at Tübingen, Johann Adam Moehler and Johann Baptist Hirscher, are cases in point. As Gerald A. McCool has observed, Hirscher was "the most antischolastic of the Tübingen theologians."[571] His De Genuina Notione Missae is a good illustration of virulent antischolasticism. In that work there are numerous appeals to the Church Fathers, to the ancient Christian liturgies, to the Scriptures and even to the Council of Trent; but there are no references at all to the work of Thomas Aquinas or to the later medieval scholastics.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, therefore, Roman Catholic antischolasticism assumed more than one form. The Pistoian form was embedded in a political model for ecclesiastical reform that emphasized the directive role of an "enlightened prince", an advocatus ecclesiae who knows what is best for his church and his people. The Tübingen form, represented by men like Hirscher, operated on a different principle. It emphasized, as Gerald McCool has noted, "the living presence of the Holy Spirit within the ecclesial community."[572] The Spirit's power belonged to the people, and any method of reform in the church must take this "populist" principle into serious account.[573] In the opinion of theologians like Hirscher, scholasticism was too narrowly individualistic and too juridical to account for the inherently social structure of Christian faith, morality and worship.[574] A method in theology was needed that would exhibit greater sensitivity to the values of history, tradition and community.[575]

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In my opinion, then, an accurate understanding of Roman Catholic efforts at liturgical reform in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries depends on our ability to see these efforts as part of a much larger debate about theological method. People like Ricci and Grand Duke Leopold hoped to replace the sterile discussions of scholasticism with a practical, non-mystical theology based on "the doctrine of St. Augustine", as interpreted through seventeenth and eighteenth century Jansenist writers.[576] This "Augustinian" method proposed at Pistoia relied heavily on a restoration of "ancient custom and discipline".[577] But it relied even more heavily, as we have seen, on a position derived from common medieval political theory: the advocary of an enlightened prince assisted by a core of cooperative bishops. Pistoia's "Augustinianism" is therefore less a theological method than a political strategy for reform.

At Tübingen, however, the attempt to find a viable alternative to Thomism in theological method was more sophisticated. Like their Protestant colleagues at the same university, men like Moehler and Hirscher were influenced by post-Kantian idealism.[578] This idealism was based on an epistemology and a metaphysics which were quite different from those of scholastic Thomism. As Gerald McCool has written:

> In post-Kantian philosophy,. . .the Infinite Absolute "went out of itself" through its finite self-manifestation in the dynamic universe of nature and spirit. Furthermore, in a manner

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> reminiscent of Plotinus' neo-Platonism, the world of nature and spirit was conceived to be an organic universe of interrelated forms or souls. And, as in the Plotinian universe, each natural species had its own specific "idea" which realized its virtualities through its embodied development in and through the individual member of the species. In the same way, each natural human community in the spiritual universe had its own specific communal idea which achieved the perfection of its realization through the free activity of individual members.[579]

According to the method of post-Kantian idealism, both faith and history had to be reinterpreted. History became "the unfolding of a formative idea which reached its own perfection through the conscious exclusion of its opposites."[580] Faith became as an intuitive act through which the members of an organic community (like the church) received the self-disclosure of noumenal reality.[581] The theological method inspired by post-Kantian idealism thus emphasized both the evolutionary character of history (history as an organic process of development) and the "communal idea" which disclosed and realized itself through free actions by individual members of a community.

This new theological method promoted by some members of the Catholic faculty at Tübingen in the early decades of the nineteenth century was viewed with suspicion in many circles. Other movements--like the French traditionalism of Félicité de Lammenais--sought to meet the challenge posed to traditional Catholic theology in another way by developing an apologetics based on man's social nature: since society is built on commonly accepted moral and religious truths, these must be true. The universal agreement of society thus becomes the chief criterion in matters of religious belief and moral practice.[582] In his _Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion_ (1817), de Lammenais insisted that _individual_ human reason is ineffective in the search for truth. It is society itself that "tames" the wilder impulses of individual human reason and "primes" it for the acceptance of truths without which there could be, practically, no society at all. De Lammenais' "traditionalist" method for theology was thus based on the assumption that "the common consent of society" and "the assent to religious truth" are fundamentally the same: Both are rooted in a universal impulse of human nature. Moreover, as McCool remarks:

> . . .since the common consent of men is the ultimate criterion of truth, reason can neither criticize nor vindicate it. Once we know, however, that common consent rests upon the natural impulse of our created nature, we are certain that to reject its testimony means intellectual self-destruction. Skepticism is therefore a practical impossibility and, since the only alternative to skepticism is faith, man has no choice but to live on faith.[583]

Lammenais' practical "apologetics of equation" (the conviction of reason can be equated, practically, with the assent of faith) received enthusiastic support at first. As we have seen, Prosper Guéranger's first published article appeared in _Memorial catholique_, a revue committed to de Lammenais' theological and political views. But eventually, de Lammenais came into conflict with the ultramontane Pope Gregory XVI. In an encyclical letter entitled "Mirari vos arbitramur" (15 August, 1832), Gregory XVI accused de Lammenais, without actually naming him, of propagating the doctrine of "indifferentism".[534]

Despite his condemnation and his eventual disassociation from Catholicism, de Lammenais' views remained influential, especially in France. His stress on the social criterion for truth (the "common consent of society") provided Catholics with a way to combat individualism and subjectivism in the search for common religious values. It is at least plausible that de Lammenais was an important theoretical source for some of Guéranger's liturgical ideas.[535] Certainly the two shared a common horror of that "national" individualism represented by Gallicanism.[536]

Both Prosper Guéranger and Johann Baptist Hirscher were, therefore, strongly influenced by theological methods that were sensitive to ideals of human and religious community. Both men rejected individualism, but while their rejection sprang from similar theological sources,[537] their work in liturgical reform led to quite different results. For Guéranger, the way to maintain Christian community in the face of individualism was through the common ritual symbols preserved in the Latin Roman liturgy. For Hirscher, Christian community could be safeguarded only through a direct participation by the people in vernacular rites of worship and in the responsibilities of church government. The two men agreed on the power of liturgy to express the deepest beliefs of a community; they disagreed on the means by which that power could be most effectively released.

The Catholic reform movements studied in this chapter--Pistoia, Tübingen, Solesmes--thus shared several features in common. All were concerned about 1) an intelligent, educated participation in liturgical prayer; 2) forms of worship that were simple yet solemn;[588] 3) a liturgy that would exhibit the social character of Christian faith and life. Although the hermeneutic of reform differed in each case, the three movements agreed on one significant point: worship had to be reformed if the vitality of the church was to be preserved.

2. The Protestant Patterns of Reform: The hostility toward individualism shared by Hirscher and Guéranger seems also to have been shared by the Lutheran and Anglican liturgists studied in this chapter. For Loy and Fritschel, worship must be the "self-expression of the church's faith", the public manifestation of a common religious tradition. Set forms of worship save the community from the unbridled eccentricities of ministers who want to pray "freely". Moreover, such established patterns of liturgy make the community conscious that it is praying from within an historical tradition of faith. Wilhelm Loehe's investigations into the sixteenth century Lutheran Kirchenordnungen convinced him that this historical tradition was rooted in even earlier liturgical sources from East and West.

To these "historical", "ecumenical" and "conservative" concerns, however, the Lutheran liturgical reformers of the nineteenth century added another: an emphasis on sacramentality in worship. Loy and Fritschel reiterated the Lutheran commitment to Word _and_ Sacrament, and they cited documents like the _Augsburg Confession_ in support of their view. In their opinion, neither Reformed biblicism nor Roman pageantry adequately corresponded to the definition of a sacrament found in the _Apology of the Augsburg Confession_: "a ceremony or act in which God offers us the content of the promise joined to the ceremony." Through their emphasis on _sacrament_ (as distinct from sacrifice), Loy and Fritschel sought to avoid the Pelagianizing tendencies they discerned in both Reformed and Roman Catholic worship.

Despite confessional differences, these Lutheran liturgists shared Guéranger's distaste of individualism. Their stress on the "ecumenicity" of worship arose, like Guéranger's, from a deep concern for the integrity of the church's faith. And this concern for integrity was, in turn, based on the conviction that in the historical life of the church the Lord continues to be active and present; the life of the church is the life of Christ's mystical body.

As in the case of their Roman Catholic brethren, the liturgical reform efforts of the Lutheran pastors and theologians studied in this chapter arose from within a larger movement of "awakening" in theology. This early nineteenth century Lutheran "awakening", like its Catholic counterpart, was many-faceted. Men like Wilhelm Loehe were champions of what Theodore Tappert has called a "confessional awakening",[589] a view which held that the development of Christian doctrine must be organic, i.e., "statements in the confessions might be elaborated or extended but not contradicted." Loehe contended that it was because of his intense commitment to the earliest Lutheran confessions of faith that his vision of the supreme importance of Christian worship developed.[590] Many of his contemporaries, of course, regarded Loehe's "sacramental Lutheranism" as thinly disguised Romanism. Others, like August Vilmar (1800-1868), shared many of Loehe's ecclesiological and sacramental views.[591] Loehe believed strongly that the church was the "bride of Christ", the "Lord's loveliest creation of love," the "eternal communion founded by God and the fellowship of elect souls with one another and with him."[592] But under the influence of Roman Catholic theologians like Johann Adam Moehler, Vilmar extended Loehe's ecclesiological vision even further by claiming that the church is the "continuing incarnation" of Christ.[593]

Although Vilmar's incarnational model of the church was almost unanimously rejected by other Lutheran theologians, there can be little doubt that the "confessional awakening" of the nineteenth century resulted in an increased emphasis on the role of the visible church in the economy of salvation. In his Three Books about the Church (1845), Loehe insisted on the "churchly" character of the Reformation. He wrote:

> There was recognition among the Reformers of a development and interpretation of apostolic doctrine in the course of history and an understanding that in the course of time the one Word had revealed its treasures even more richly. There was respect for the history of the church and a sense of continuity with the past. There was no desire to cut loose from the preceding centuries and build something new and something as independent as possible; on the contrary, the intention was to find continuity with the ancient apostolic church in the threads of Holy Scriptures and to do away with the innovations.[594]

Loehe also argued for a very broad answer to the question, "who belongs to the church?" Although he confidently asserted that the Lutheran confession of faith is the one "most faithful to the Scriptures,"[595] he also claimed that the visible church exists "wherever there is a call and people who are called":[596]

> It is difficult to find the way to life through the clouds of strange doctrine in some communions, but it is still possible, and at the last day there will be many examples of this from the history of the nations. If one admits this, one must also admit that the invisible church to which the chosen belong has members in other communions. Why then will one not admit something much less. . .that in these communions too there are persons who are called, that the visible church also embraces them, and, in a word, that the church exists wherever there is a call and people who are called?[597]

Loehe's broad understanding of membership in the visible/invisible church is, of course, quite similar to Philip Schaff's "evangelical Catholicism" and to John Nevin's "radical catholicity".[598] It helps to explain why Loehe was so attached to historical forms of worship. These forms, he argued, were not destroyed by the Reformers.[599] The liturgical freedom of the Reformation must not be equated with an unrestricted license to change old liturgies and produce new ones: "He who has not tested the old cannot create something new."[600] The church's worship is an ancient dance "full of loveliness and dignity"; and in this dance the children of God gather "around the universal Father and the Lamb, and the Spirit of the Lord of lords guides their steps."[601]

Loehe's use of the "dance" matephor for Christian worship leads logically to the fifth and final pattern of liturgical reform seen in this chapter. If the metaphor of dancing disclosed the meaning of worship to Wilhelm Loehe, the architectural metaphor disclosed its meaning to John Mason Neale. It is possible to argue that Neale too was caught up in a larger theological "awakening": the Oxford Movement. Neale was 15 years old when on 14 July, 1833, John Keble preached his shattering sermon on "National Apostasy". Although at a later period it became fashionable to associate the ideals of the Oxford Movement (especially in the areas of ecclesiology and sacraments) with "Anglo-Catholic" ritualism, the early Tracts for the Times reveal no overwhelming interest in liturgical reform and/or restoration.[602] Indeed, in Tract 3 ("Thoughts respectfully addressed to the Clergy on alterations in the liturgy": 9 September, 1833), John Henry Newman appealed for restraint in altering the Anglican services:

> There are persons who wish the Marriage Service emended; there are others who would be indignant at the changes proposed. There are some who wish the Consecration Prayer in the Holy Sacrament to be what it was in King Edward's first book; . . .But once begin altering, and there will be no reason or justice in stopping, till the criticisms of all parties are satisfied. Thus will not the Liturgy be in the evil case described in the well-known story, of the picture subjected by the artist to the observations of passers-by?[603]

Other early *Tracts* defended the length of the services and the Scripture lessons appointed in the liturgy of the *Book of Common Prayer*.[604]

Thus the Oxford Movement was not, at least in its origins, a "liturgical reform movement". Nevertheless, its early emphasis on the related notions of incarnation, church and sacrament,[605] unquestionably assisted men like Neale in formulating a "Catholic" principle of sacramentality. Moreover, it is instructive that among the earliest Oxford *Tracts* were two given over to Bishop John Cosin's (1594-1672) *The History of Popish Transubstantiation* (written 1656; published 1675), a work which defended the Anglican doctrine of the eucharist as "Protestant and Reformed according to the ancient Catholic Church."[606] Cosin was known for his deep love of liturgical ceremony and ritual, and his work was also cited by members of the Cambridge Camden Society in the *Hierurgia Anglicana*. Neale's principle of sacramentality in church architecture may therefore be seen as the "spatial"

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extension of the Tractarians' insistence that "rites and ceremonies, far from being unmeaning, are in their nature capable of impressing our memories and imaginations with the great revealed verities."[607]

In conclusion, it may be argued that each of the five patterns of liturgical reform investigated in this chapter was part of a larger "awakening" in theology that affected thinkers in the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican communions. I have suggested, further, that each of these five patterns was based on a distinctive hermeneutic, i.e., on a method of interpretation that sometimes led men who shared similar ideas (e.g. the anti-individualism of both Hirscher and Guéranger) to quite different conclusions on the practical level of reform and/or restoration. Common to all these patterns of liturgical reform were two items: 1) the search for common ritual symbols that could serve as a basis for revitalizing Christian community life; and 2) a vigorous reaction against individualism in both its personal and national forms.

In Chapters Five and Six, we will see how this theological awakening in the first half of the nineteenth century affected the work of John Nevin and Philip Schaff. More particularly, it will be seen how the "post-Kantian idealism" prevalent among European theologians at this period affected the theological anthropology and sacramental theory of the Mercersburg men.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1] See the "Introduction" to the entry "Synodus Pistoriensis et Congregatio ab Hetruriae Archiepiscopis et Episcopis Florentiae Habita" in Johannes Dominicus Mansi, ed., Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio (Graz: Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1961; reprint of the 1907 edition), Vol. 38, cols. 989-998. Further references to the Synod of Pistoia from Mansi's edition will be cited as follows: Mansi, 38, followed by the reference to the appropriate column(s).

[2] Mansi, 38, cols. 990-995.

[3] Ibid., col. 989.

[4] Ibid., col. 990.

[5] Ibid., cols. 997-1000, where there is printed the text of the letter sent, in the name of Grand-Duke Leopold, by Count Albert of Tuscany to the archbishops and bishops of the duchy.

[6] Ibid., cols. 990-991.

[7] Ibid.

[8] See Jacques Carreyre, "Pistoie, (Synode de)," in Andre Vacant, Éugene Mangenot, and Étienne Amann, eds., Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, 15 Vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1930-1972), Vol. 12/2, cols. 2139-2140. Hereafter, the Dictionnaire will be cited as DTC, with appropriate references to volume number and page.

[9] Ibid., col. 2140.

[10] Ibid., cols. 2140-2141.

[11] Ibid., col. 2141.

[12] Ibid., cols. 2138-2139.

[13] Ibid., col. 2138.

[14] See Louis DuPin, The History of the Church, trans. anonymous (3rd. ed.; London: Bernard Lintot, n.d.), pp. 76-81 for a description of the early Christian eucharist.

[15] Carreyre, "Pistoie," DTC 12/2, col. 2138.

[16] Samuel J. Miller, "Portugal and Utrecht: A Phase of the Catholic Enlightenment," The Catholic Historical Review 63 (1977), 226.

[17] Ibid.

[18] For the text of Ricci's memorandum, see Mansi, 38, cols. 1107-1114.

[19] See Brian Tierney, "Origins of Papal Infallibility," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 8 (1971), 841-864 for a discussion of the terms "primacy" and "sovereignty" used in reference to the authority of the Bishop of Rome.

[20] Mansi, 38, cols. 1132-1133.

[21] Ibid., cols. 1131-1132.

[22] Ibid., col. 1131.

[23] See Éugene Preclin, *Les Luttes Politiques et Doctrinales aux XVII^e^ et XVIII^e^ Siècles* (A. Fliche and V. Martin, *Histoire de l'Église*, Vol. 19/1; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1955), pp. 220-233.

[24] On Richer's career see Louis Willaert, *Après le Concile de Trente: La Restauration Catholique, 1563-1648* (A. Fliche and V. Martin, *Histoire de l'Église*, Vol. 18; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1960), pp. 367-375.

[25] Ibid., p. 356.

[26] Ibid., pp. 369-370.

[27] Preclin, *Les Luttes Politiques*, pp. 796-797.

[28] Ibid., pp. 781-801.

[29] Ibid., pp. 769-778.

[30] Miller, "Portugal and Utrecht," p. 225.

[31] Ibid., pp. 225-226.

[32] Tierney, "Origins of Papal Infallibility," pp. 842-848.

[33] Mansi, 38, cols. 1013-1014.

[34] Ibid., col. 1015.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., cols. 1017-1019. For the similarity of Pistoia's position with that of Antoine Arnauld, see Preclin, *Les Luttes Politiques*, p. 196.

[37] Mansi, 38, col. 1042.

[38] Ibid., col. 1044.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Preclin, Les Luttes Politiques, pp. 193-210.

[42] Carreyre, "Pistoie," DTC 12/2, col. 2153.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Mansi, 38, col. 1045.

[45] Ibid., cols. 1045-1046.

[46] See René Taveneaux, La Vie Quotidienne des Jansénistes aux XVII^e et XVIII^e Siècles (Paris: Hachette Litterature, 1973), p. 127.

[47] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., p. 129. See also Preclin, Les Luttes Politiques, pp. 253-254.

[50] Taveneaux, La Vie Quotidienne, p. 129.

[51] See Henricus Denzinger and Arnold Schönmetzer, eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Editio XXXIII; Rome: Herder, 1965), nos. 2400-2502. Hereafter references to this work will be made as follows: Denzinger-Schönmetzer, followed by the appropriate number(s).

[52] Taveneaux, La Vie Quotidienne, p. 129.

[53] Ibid., pp. 129-130.

[54] Ibid., p. 131.

[55] See Paul J. Bernard, Joseph II (Twayne's Rulers and Statesmen of the World Series, No. 5; New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968), pp. 111-112.

[56] Ibid., p. 111.

[57] Ibid., p. 112.

[58] Miller, "Portugal and Utrecht," p. 226.

[59] See Ernst Wangermann, From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials (Oxford Historical Monographs; 2nd. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 30-31, 118-119.

[60] Ibid., pp. 114, 118-119.

[61] Mansi, 38, cols. 1069-1079.

[62] Ibid., col. 1071; my translation.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., col. 1073.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., col. 1074.

[68] Ibid., col. 1075.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., cols. 1075-1076.

[71] Ibid., col. 1076.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., col. 1077.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., col. 1079.

[76] Ibid., cols. 1085-1102.

[77] Ibid., cols. 1090-1091.

[78] Ibid., cols. 1101-1102.

[79] Ibid., col. 1036.

[80] Ibid., cols. 1037-1038, 1041.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid., col. 1040.

[83] Ibid., col. 1037.

[84] Ibid., col. 1039: "Poichè l'ordine de'divini ufizj, e l'antica consuetudine della chiesa persuadono esser cosa conveniente, que in ciascun tempio sia un solo altare, piace però al sinodo di ristabilire questo uso."

[85] Ibid., col. 1039: "Riguardo alla musica ed al canto delle chiese, considerando il sinodo, che questo secondo la mente dei padri fu introdotto perinsinuare maggiormente nello spirito dei fedeli i sentimenti di religione, ed accendere i varj affetti di pietà che con essa si esprimono; e riflettendo che per sostenere questo fine la musica debbe essere semplice, grave, modesta, pia e adattata al senso delle parole, proibisce quella musica che sia spoliata di tali qualità."

[86] Ibid., col. 1038: "Vuole poi il sinodo, che i sacerdoti osservino con diligenza tutte le ceremonie e riti prescritti; che proferiscano tutte le parole distintamente e devotamente; e che non accelerino l'azione, nè usino una tardità soverchia ed incomoda agli assistenti."

[87] Ibid., cols. 1261-1280 (the text of Auctorem Fidei).

[88] Carreyre, "Pistoie," DTC 12/2, col. 2197.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid., cols. 2200-2203.

[93] Preclin, Les Luttes Politiques, p. 798.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Carreyre, "Pistoie," DTC 12/2, col. 2203.

[96] Mansi, 38, cols. 1269, 1275.

[97] Ibid., col. 1276.

[98] Ibid., col. 1280.

[99] Ibid., cols. 1026-1027.

[100] Ibid.; my translation.

[101] Ibid., col. 1027.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., col. 1035.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid., col. 1037.

[107] Ibid., col. 1040.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid., cols. 1039-1040.

[110] Ibid., cols. 1037-1038.

[111] Ibid., col. 1038; my translation.

[112] Ibid., cols. 997-1000.

[113] Ibid., cols. 997-998; my translation.

[114] Ibid., col. 999; my translation.

[115] Ibid., cols. 999-1012.

[116] Ibid., col. 999; my translation.

[117] Ibid., col. 1090.

[118] Ibid., col. 1042.

[119] Ibid., cols. 1090-1091.

[120] Ibid., col. 1040. Pistoia did not decree the vernacular for the eucharist, though it seems to have regarded its use as praiseworthy.

[121] Denzinger-Schönmetzer, no. 2720.

[122] See the encyclical letter "Mirari vos arbitramur" (August 15, 1832) in Denzinger-Schönmetzer, nos. 2730-2732.

[123] See Anton Mayer, "Liturgie, Aufklärung und Klassizismus," Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft 9 (1929), 67-127.

[124] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, QQ. 60-63.

[125] Mansi, 38, col. 1036 (an example of Pistoia's anti-scholastic attitude).

[126] Ibid., col. 1001.

[127] This point has already been discussed earlier in this chapter.

[128] On Pope Gregory XVI's opposition to "liberal democracy", see Jacques Leflon, La Crise Revolutionnaire, 1789-1846 (A. Fliche and V. Martin, Histoire de l'Église, Vol. 20; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1949), pp. 442-452.

[129] This point has been discussed in detail in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[130] For biographical details relative to Hirscher's life and work see Eugene Mangenot, "Hirscher, Jean-Baptist," in DTC 6/2, cols. 2512-2514.

[131] Ibid., col. 2512.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., col. 2513.

[135] Ibid., col. 2512.

[136] Johann Baptist Hirscher, Missae Genuinam Notionem Eruere ejusque Celebrandae Rectam Methodum Monstrare (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1821), p. 61. Hereafter, references to this work will be made as follows: Hirscher, Missae, followed by the appropriate page reference. The text of Hirscher's treatise was written in Latin; to it there were appended two formulas for celebrating Mass written in German.

[137] For this use of the term "populist", see George Tavard, "The Papacy and Christian Symbolism," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 13 (1976), 350-351.

[138] Johann Baptist Hirscher, Sympathies of the Continent, trans. Alexander C. Coxe (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1852), p. 131. This English translation of Hirscher's Die kirchlichen Zustände was made with the knowledge and personal approval of Hirscher himself (see Coxe's introduction, pp. 22-23). Coxe, the translator, eventually became Episcopal bishop of the diocese of Western New York.

[139] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 89-92.

[140] Ibid., pp. 61, 75 (references to Bona); p. 79 (reference to Morin); pp. 7, 72 (references to LeBrun); pp. 16,72 (reference to Martène).

[141] Joseph Bingham, Origines Ecclesiasticae, 2 Vols. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852; reprint of the original edition, 1708-1722). For Hirscher's references to Bingham, see Missae, pp. 27, 46, 67, 72. For Bingham's own discussion of early Christian worship, see Origines Ecclesiasticae, I, pp. 429-676; II, pp. 677-856.

[142] Pierre LeBrun, Explication de la Messe, 4 Vols. (Paris: F. Delaulne, 1726; reprinted by Gregg, 1970), II, pp. 490-492.

[143] Eusebius Renaudot, ed., Liturgiarum Orientalium Collectio, 2 Vols. (2nd. ed.; Frankfort: J. Baer, 1847; reprinted by Gregg, 1970). Renaudot's first edition appeared in 1716. See Vol. I, pp. 63-71 for the text under discussion here. For LeBrun's dependence on Renaudot's translation, see LeBrun, Explication, II, p. 490.

[144] Hirscher, Missae, p. 13. See the text of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom in Francis E. Brightman and Charles E. Hammond, eds., Liturgies Eastern and Western (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896; reprinted, 1965), pp. 309-352.

[145] See LeBrun, Explication, II, pp. 384-418. LeBrun does not actually cite the full text of the Liturgies of St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom; he merely describes them and cites occasional passages in French translation.

[146] Jacobus Goar, Euchologion sive Rituale Graecorum (2nd. ed.; Venice: B. Javarina, 1730; reprinted by Graz Akademische Druck und Verlagsanstalt, 1960), pp. 61, 141-142.

[147] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 13-14. See also LeBrun, Explication, III, p. 480.

[148] Hirscher, Missae, p. 4.

[149] Ibid., p. 61.

[150] Ibid., p. 21.

[151] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[152] Ibid., p. 10.

[153] Ibid., p. 27.

[154] Ibid., p. 59.

[155] Ibid., pp. 63-68.

[156] Ibid., pp. 68-78.

[157] Ibid., pp. 29-47.

[158] Ibid., p. 30. Hirscher based himself on an exegesis of the tenth chapter of the Letter to the Hebrews.

[159] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[160] Ibid., p. 32.

[161] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

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[162] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[163] Ibid., pp. 36-39.

[164] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[165] Ibid., p. 40.

[166] Ibid., p. 41.

[167] Ibid., p. 42 (italics in the original).

[168] Ibid., p. 42.

[169] Ibid., p. 43.

[170] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[171] Ibid., p. 44. Compare Hirscher's position with that of the Council of Trent as found in Denzinger-Schonmetzer, no. 1743.

[172] Ibid., p. 10.

[173] Ibid., p. 45.

[174] Ibid., pp. 79-86.

[175] Ibid., p. 81.

[176] By "a sin so gravely serious that it would demand excommunication", Hirscher seems to have had in mind those offenses that, in an earlier age of the church's penitential discipline, would have required public canonical penance (i.e., scandalous crimes like murder or apostasy): See Hirscher, Missae, pp. 82-83.

[177] Hirscher, Missae, p. 83.

[178] Ibid., p. 84.

[179] Ibid., p. 59.

[180] Ibid., pp. 59-60 (italics in the original).

[181] Ibid., p. 65: "actus publicus, et sic instituta sit, ut omnis populus praesens una cum Celebrante s. ritum absolvat."

[182] Ibid.: "Sacerdos in illa cum populo alternans orat et praedicat" (emphasis added).

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[183] Ibid., pp. 68-78.

[184] Ibid., p. 69.

[185] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

[186] Ibid., p. 71.

[187] Ibid., p. 74.

[188] Ibid., p. 78.

[189] Ibid., p. 61.

[190] Ibid., pp. 50-60.

[191] Ibid., p. 50, note.

[192] Ibid., p. 51 (italics in the original).

[193] Ibid., p. 52: "populi nimium cum Christo indissolubilis conjunctio externo symbolo in ss. coena exprimatur."

[194] Ibid., p. 57.

[195] In the citations from Hirscher's proposed eucharistic formulas that follow, rubrics suggested by Hirscher will be put in parentheses. The sections that are translated in this chapter are found in Hirscher, Missae, pp. 108-110.

[196] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 110-113.

[197] The sections of Hirscher's "First Formula" that are found in this chapter are found in Missae, pp. 111-113.

[198] Ibid., p. 113.

[199] See Anton Hänggi and Irmgard Pahl, Prex Eucharistica (Spicilegium Friburgense, Vol. 12; Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1968), pp. 83-95, especially 85-86.

[200] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 12, 19, 22, 23, 45, 54, 60, 67.

[201] Ibid., p. 12. Hirscher continues the passage with a citation from the preface to the eucharistic prayer in Book VIII of the Apostolic Constitutions.

[202] Ibid., p. 11 (italics in the original).

[203] Ibid., p. 27 (italics in the original).

[204] Ibid., p. 29.

[205] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[206] See the discussion presented earlier in this chapter.

[207] See Hirscher, Missae, pp. 113-118 for the text.

[208] Hirscher, Missae, p. 75.

[209] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[210] See Renaudot, Liturgiarum Orientalium Collectio, I, pp. 63-71. See also Hänggi and Pahl, Prex Eucharistica, pp. 348-357.

[211] Hänggi and Pahl, Prex Eucharistica, pp. 350-353.

[212] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 118-120.

[213] In the sections that follow, the division titles (e.g., "renewal of baptismal promises") are mine. Hirscher provides no titles of his own in the text of the "First Formula."

[214] Hirscher, Missae, pp. 121-122.

[215] Ibid., pp. 122-123.

[216] Ibid., pp. 123-124.

[217] Ibid., pp. 125-126.

[218] Ibid., p. 126.

[219] Ibid., p. 127.

[220] Ibid.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Ibid.

[224] Bingham, Origines Ecclesiasticae, II, p. 774.

[225] The passage from St. Gregory the Great may be found in Peter Ewald and Laurentius M. Hartmann, eds., Gregorii I Papae Registrum Epistolarum, 2 Vols. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica; Epistolarum Tomus II; Berlin: Weidmann, 1887), II, pp. 59-60 (Letter of Gregory to John, Bishop of Syracuse): "Orationem vero Dominicam idcirco mox modo orationem oblationis hostiam consecrarent..."

[226] The passage from St. Jerome is found in his Dialogus contra Pelagianos, Book III, paragraph 15. For the text, see: Jean-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologia Latina, 221 Vols.; Paris: Imprimerie Migne, 1844-1864), Vol. 23, col. 612:

"Sic docuit apostolos suos, ut quotidie in corporis illius sacrificio credentes audeant loqui: 'Pater noster, qui es in coelis'..." The text from Walafrid Strabo (ca. 808-849) may be found in Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 114, col. 944: "Et relatio majorum est ita primis temporibus missas fieri solitas, sicut modo in Parasceve Paschae (in quo die apud Romanos missae non aguntur) communicationem facere solemus, id est praemissa oratione Dominica; et sicut ipse Dominus noster praecepit, commemoratione passionis ejus adhibita, eos corpori Dominico communicasse et sanguini, quos ratio permittebat....Et Romani quidem usum observationum a Beato Petro principe apostolorum accipientes, suis quique temporibus, quae congrua judicata sunt, addiderunt."

[227] Hirscher, Missae, p. 128.

[228] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[229] On the repercussions of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, especially in their impact on the pontificate of Pope Pius IX, see: Roger Aubert, Le Pontificat de Pie IX (1846-1878) (A Fliche and V. Martin, Histoire de l'Église, Vol. 21; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1952), pp. 27-40.

[230] See Adolphe Stappaerts, trans., L'État actuel de l'Église suivi d'une étude sur la messe (3rd. ed.; Paris: Borrani et Droz, 1851). The section of this translation entitled "Étude sur la messe" is actually a French version of Hirscher's Erörterungen über die religiösen Fragen der Gegenwart (3rd. ed.; Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Karl Alber, 1846).

[231] Hirscher, Sympathies of the Continent, pp. 77-78.

[232] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

[233] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[234] Ibid., p. 131.

[235] Ibid., pp. 101-103.

[236] Ibid., pp. 132-133.

[237] Ibid., p. 149.

[238] Ibid., pp. 106, 108-109, 121-122.

[239] Ibid., pp. 108-109.

[240] Ibid., p. 125.

[241] Ibid., p. 129.

[242] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[243] Ibid., p. 155.

[244] Ibid., p. 162.

[245] Ibid., pp. 180-181.

[246] Ibid., p. 181.

[247] Ibid., p. 192.

[248] Ibid., p. 195.

[249] Ibid., p. 189.

[250] Ibid., p. 181.

[251] Ibid., p. 190.

[252] Ibid., pp. 190-191.

[253] Ibid., p. 191.

[254] Mangenot, "Hirscher," DTC 6/2, col. 2513.

[255] Ibid., cols. 2513-2514.

[256] Hirscher, Sympathies of the Continent, p. 131.

[257] Tavard, "The Papacy and Christian Symbolism, pp. 346-358.

[258] See the discussion of the liturgical reforms promoted by the Synod of Pistoia in the first section of this chapter.

[259] See the eucharistic prayer found in Hirscher's "First Formula" as translated in the second section of this chapter.

[260] See the "penitential rite" contained in Hirscher's "First Formula" as translated in the second section of this chapter.

[261] See the "renewal of baptismal promises" contained in Hirscher's "First Formula" as translated in the second section of this chapter.

[262] Hirscher, Missae, p. 65.

[263] Louis Soltner, Solesmes et Dom Guéranger (1805-1875) (Solesmes: Presse de Solesmes, 1974), pp. 61-85.

[264] See Aubert, Le Pontificat de Pie IX for a description of the Gallican rites of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (pp. 473-476).

[265] See Richard W. Franklin, "Guéranger: A View on the Centenary of His Death," Worship 49 (1975), 318-336.

[266] Prosper Guéranger, Institutions Liturgiques, 4 Vols. (2nd. ed.; Paris: Société Générale de Librarie Catholique, 1878), I, p. xxix (introductory material written by Dom Alphonse Guépin). Hereafter, references to this work will be made as follows: Guéranger, IL, followed by reference to the volume and appropriate page. References to Guépin's introductory material will be cited as follows: Guépin, "Introduction," followed by the page reference.

[267] Paul Delatte, ed., Dom Guéranger, abbé de Solesmes, 2 Vols. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1909-1910), I, p. 33.

[268] On Félicité de Lamennais, see: Jean Leflon, La Crise Revolutionnaire, 1789-1846, pp. 442-452. Leflon discusses the relationship between Guéranger and Lamennais, particularly on pp. 442-444. See also Guépin, "Introduction," p. xxx.

[269] On the restoration of Benedictine monastic life in France during the nineteenth century, and especially on the re-foundation of the Abbey of Solesmes, see Soltner, Solesmes, pp. 31-60.

[270] Guéranger, IL, I, p. xxiv.

[271] Ibid., p. xlii.

[272] Ibid., p. xliv.

[273] Ibid., p. xliv. The text of Gregory XVI's response to Gousset is printed in Latin and French, in Guéranger, IL, III, 574-577.

[274] Guéranger, IL, III, pp. 453-590.

[275] Ibid., III, p. 454. The Bull of Pius V was "Quod a nobis" (1568). It may be found, for example, in virtually all Roman breviaries published prior to the reforms of the II Vatican Council. See: Breviarium Romanum. Ex Decreto SS. Concilii Tridentini Restitutum Summorum Pontificum Cura Recognitum, 2 Vols. (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1961), I, pp. v-viii. The text which particularly impressed Guéranger was this: "Ac si etiam abolemus quaecumque alia Breviaria vel antiquiora, vel quo vis privilegio illorum usuam de omnibus orbis Ecclesiis, Monasteriis, Conventibus, Militiis, Ordinibus, et locis virorum et mulierum, etiam exemptis, in quibus alias Officium divinum Romanae Ecclesiae ritu dici consuevit, aut debet: illis tamen exceptis, quae ab ipsa prima institutio, ducentos annos antecedat, aliis certis Breviariis usa fuisse constiterit."

[276] Guéranger, IL, III, p. 454.

[277] Ibid., III, p. 455.

[278] Some of these propositions will be discussed below, in the section of this chapter that deals with Guéranger's theology of worship.

[279] Guéranger, IL, III, pp. 540-541.

[280] Ibid., III, pp. 550-558, 570.

[281] Ibid., III, pp. 558-561.

[282] Ibid., III, pp. 571-572.

[283] Ibid., II, pp. 2-3.

[284] Ibid., II, p. 11.

[285] Ibid., II, pp. 17-18.

[286] Ibid., II, p. 529.

[287] Ibid., II, pp. 531-534.

[288] Ibid., II, pp. 46-47.

[289] Breviarium Parisiense. Ad usum dioeceseon in quibus idem ritus usurpatur, 4 Vols. (Paris: Gauthier, 1828). Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: BP, followed by references to the volume and page.

[290] Ibid., I, pp. 509-514.

[291] Ibid., I, p. 508.

[292] Guéranger, IL, II, p. 46. See also Breviarium Romanum, I, p. 1165.

[293] Guéranger, IL, II, p. 45.

[294] BP, II, p. 486.

[295] Guéranger, IL, IV, p. 108.

[296] Ibid., IV, p. 108.

[297] Ibid., II, p. 361. It seems that the man responsible for the hymn versions used in the Parisian redactions of the breviary was Charles Coffin (+ 1749). See Guéranger, IL, II, p. 252. Coffin apparently objected to the idea that the cross, rather than Christ, is "our only hope."

[298] BP, IV, pp. 404-405.

[299] Breviarium Romanum, I, p. 791.

[300] The Breviarium Parisiense also omitted the hymn "Vexilla Regis" for the offices of Passiontide. See BP, II, p. 250.

[301] Guéranger, IL, IV, p. 354: "La Liturgie de l'Église est le principal instrument de sa Tradition."

[302] Ibid., III, pp. 458-459.

[303] Soltner, Solesmes, pp. 61-62.

[304] Guéranger, IL, II, pp. 286-287.

[305] Ibid., I, p. 21.

[306] Ibid., I, pp. 21-22.

[307] Ibid., I, p. 22.

[308] Ibid., IV, pp. 245-321.

[309] Ibid., IV, p. 317.

[310] Ibid., IV, p. 317-318.

[311] Ibid., IV, pp. 317, 319.

[312] Ibid., I, p. 21. Here Guéranger cites and comments on the biblical text, I John 1.1.

[313] Text cited in Soltner, Solesmes, p. 63.

[314] Ibid.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Ibid.

[317] Guéranger developed this notion of the papacy in his famous De La Monarchie Pontificale (3rd. ed.; Paris: Victor Palmé, 1870), especially pp. 245-251.

[318] Gueranger, IL, IV, p. 489.

[319] Ibid., IV, p. 497.

[320] Ibid., IV, p. 504.

[321] Ibid., IV, pp. 508-509.

[322] Ibid., III, p. 458.

[323] Ibid., III, p. 459. Guéranger defended the use of Latin in worship by appealing to the need for a "sacred language" for the proper expression of revealed doctrine (IL, III, p. 460).

[324] Ibid., III, p. 467.

[325] Ibid., III, p. 473.

[326] Ibid., III, p. 474.

[327] Ibid., III, p. 475.

[328] Ibid., III, pp. 476-478.

[329] Ibid., III, p. 479.

[330] Ibid., III, p. 492.

[331] See Guéranger's "Second Letter to the Bishop of Orleans" in IL, IV, pp. 385-386.

[332] Ibid., III, pp. 493-496.

[333] Ibid., III, pp. 496-497.

[334] Ibid., III, p. 500.

[335] Ibid.

[336] Ibid., III, p. 541.

[337] Ibid.

[338] Ibid., IV, pp. 333-449.

[339] Ibid., I, p. liii.

[340] Ibid., I, p. liv.

[341] Ibid., III, p. 81.

[342] Ibid., III, p. 81.

[343] Ibid., IV, p. 389.

[344] Ibid., III, p. 72.

[345] Ibid., IV, pp. 389-391.

[346] Ibid., IV, p. 392. In this passage Gueranger argued that worship is a more secure guide to the meaning of the Scriptures than the commentaries of exegetes and theologians.

[347] Ibid., IV, p. 394.

[348] Ibid., IV, p. 399.

[349] Ibid., IV, p. 370.

[350] Ibid., IV, p. 371.

[351] Ibid., IV, p. 393.

[352] Ibid., IV, p. 399.

[353] Ibid., IV, p. 405.

[354] Ibid., IV, p. 383.

[355] Ibid., IV, p. 354.

[356] Ibid., IV, p. 354.

[357] Ibid.

[358] Ibid., IV, pp. 359-360.

[359] Ibid., IV, pp. 486, 497.

[360] Ibid., IV, pp. 455-583.

[361] Ibid., IV, p. 496.

[362] Ibid., IV, p. 506.

[363] Ibid., IV, pp. 504-505.

[364] Soltner, Solesmes, p. 78.

[365] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[366] Franklin, "Guéranger: A View," p. 323.

[367] Guéranger, IL, II, p. 540.

[368] Franklin, "Guéranger: A View," p. 327.

[369] See the discussion of this point in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[370] Theodore G. Tappert, ed., Lutheran Confessional Theology in America, 1840-1880 (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 299.

[371] Charles P. Krauth, "The Liturgical Movement in the Presbyterian and Reformed Churches," Mercersburg Review 16 (1869), 599-647.

[372] Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology, p. 300.

[373] Ibid. See also John Wright, Early Prayer-Books of America (St. Paul, Minnesota: privately printed, 1896), pp. 229-247.

[374] Matthias Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," in Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology, p. 307. Hereafter, Loy's work will be cited as follows: Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," followed by the reference to the appropriate page in Tappert.

[375] Ibid., p. 311.

[376] Ibid., pp. 310-311.

[377] Ibid., pp. 311-312.

[378] Ibid., p. 314.

[379] Ibid., p. 315.

[380] Ibid.

[381] Ibid., p. 304.

[382] Ibid., p. 305.

[383] According to Loy, sacrifice is what the people offer to God; sacrament is what God graciously bestows on people in the event of worship.

[384] Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," p. 304.

[385] Ibid., p. 307.

[386] For the distinction between the "formal" and "material" principle of Protestantism, especially in Philip Schaff's The Principle of Protestantism, see the discussion in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[387] Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," p. 305.

[388] Ibid., pp. 305-306.

[389] Ibid., p. 306.

[390] Ibid.

[391] Ibid., pp. 306-307.

[392] Ibid., p. 303.

[393] Hans Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche (6th. ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1967), p. 61: "Item docent quod una sancta ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit. Est autem ecclesia congregatio sanctorum, in qua evangelium pure docetur et recte administrantur sacramenta. Et ad veram unitatem ecclesiae satis est consentire de doctrina evangelii et de administratione sacramentorum. Nec necesse est ubique similes esse traditiones humanas seu ritus aut cerimonias ab hominibus institutas; sicut inquit Paulus: Una fidea, unum baptisma, unus Deus et pater omnium etc." (Confessio Augustana, VII, 1-3).

[394] Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," p. 303.

[395] Ibid., p. 308.

[396] Ibid., p. 309.

[397] Ibid.

[398] Ibid.

[399] Ibid., p. 307.

[400] Ibid. Compare Philip Schaff's point about the "unfinished" character of the Reformation: "In any view... the Reformation must be regarded as still incomplete. It needs yet its concluding act to unite what has fallen asunder, to bring the subjective to a reconciliation with the objective." (Thesis 46, PP, pp. 225-226.)

[401] Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," p. 310.

[402] Ibid., p. 312. Loy does, however, invoke the pragmatic argument for "good order" in worship.

[403] Ibid., pp. 306, 307, 309.

[404] Ibid., pp. 307, 316.

[405] Ibid., pp. 307; 320-321.

[406] Ibid., p. 316. Compare Prosper Guéranger's point about worship as superior in authority to the writings of the Fathers and the theologians.

[407] See Luther D. Reed, The Lutheran Liturgy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1947), pp. 230-232.

[408] Loy, "The Nature of Public Worship," p. 310.

[409] Ibid., p. 307.

[410] Ibid.

[411] Ibid., p. 317.

[412] Ibid., p. 321.

[413] Sigmund Fritschel, "A Proper Understanding of Freedom in Worship," in Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology in America, pp. 322-339. Hereafter, Fritschel's work will be cited as follows: "Proper Understanding," followed by the reference to the page in Tappert's edition.

[414] The debate about public worship also continued in the German Reformed Church for several decades. The final Directory of Worship did not appear until 1884, nearly thirty years after the publication of the Provisional Liturgy of 1857.

[415] Fritschel, "Proper Understanding," pp. 328, 330.

[416] Ibid., pp. 322-323.

[417] Ibid., p. 323.

[418] Ibid., pp. 323-324. This same distinction between sacrifice and sacrament was made by Matthias Loy.

[419] Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, p. 354.

[420] Fritschel, "Proper Understanding," p. 324: "Even in the administration of the sacraments the sacrificium is intertwined with the sacramental act in its liturgical performance."

[421] Ibid., pp. 328-330.

[422] Ibid., p. 325.

[423] Ibid.

[424] Ibid., p. 327.

[425] Ibid., p. 326.

[426] Ibid., pp. 327-328.

[427] Ibid., p. 328.

[428] Ibid.

[429] Ibid.

[430] Ibid., p. 329; emphasis added.

[431] Ibid.; emphasis added.

[432] Ibid., p. 330.

[433] The reaction of Fritschel against exaggerated individualism recalls a similar reaction in the liturgical work of Prosper Guéranger.

[434] Fritschel, "Proper Understanding," p. 332. Fritschel cites the Confessio Augustana, XXVIII, 53-56, in support of his point. See Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, pp. 129-130.

[435] Fritschel, "Proper Understanding," p. 333.

[436] Ibid.

[437] Ibid., p. 336.

[438] Ibid.

[439] Ibid., p. 338.

[440] Ibid. Fritschel warns, however, that preachers are still bound to the Scriptures and to the church's confessions of faith.

[441] Ibid., p. 339.

[442] For details about Wilhelm Loehe's life, see James Schaff, ed., trans., Wilhelm Loehe: Three Books About the Church (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969), pp. 1-40.

[443] Wilhelm Loehe, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7/1: Agende für christliche Gemeinden des luterischen Bekenntnisses, ed. Klaus Ganzert (Neuendettelsau: Freimund-Verlag, 1953), p. 9; my translation. Hereafter, Loehe's liturgical work will be cited as follows: Loehe, Agende, followed by the page reference.

[444] Ibid., pp. 10-11. See Confessio Augustana XXIV, 1-9 in Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, pp. 91-92.

[445] Loehe, Agende, p. 11.

[446] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[447] Ibid., p. 12; my translation.

[448] Ibid., p. 11.

[449] Ibid.

[450] Ibid., p. 10.

[451] Ibid., p. 11.

[452] Ibid., pp. 15-16; my translation.

[453] Ibid., p. 10.

[454] Ibid.

[455] Reed, The Lutheran Liturgy, p. 183.

[456] Loehe, Agende, pp. 46-47.

[457] Ibid., pp. 23-27; 29-45; 77-83; 84-87; 88-104; 105-110.

[458] Ibid., pp. 111-163; 164-183; 184-194; 195-332.

[459] This "later" edition appeared in 1859 and is printed in the edition of Loehe's works edited by Klaus Ganzert. See Loehe, Agende, pp. 351 ff.

[460] Loehe, Agende, pp. 439-445; 447-452; 453-472.

[461] Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology, pp. 340-351.

[462] For the outline that follows see Loehe, Agende, pp. 47-76.

[463] See Bard Thompson, ed., Liturgies of the Western Church (New York: World Publishing Company, Meridian Books, 1961), pp. 106-137 for Luther's Formula Missae and his Deutsche Messe.

[464] Loehe, Agende, pp. 77-78.

[465] Ibid., pp. 64-68; my translation.

[466] Thompson, Liturgies of the Western Church, pp. 112-113.

[467] Loehe, Agende, pp. 78-80.

[468] Thompson, Liturgies of the Western Church, pp. 69-81.

[469] Loehe, Agende, p. 77.

[470] Ibid., p. 78.

[471] Ibid., pp. 81-83.

[472] Ibid., p. 52. Loehe argued that the Kyrie is not a confession of sin but an acclamation of praise for God's mercy in the face of human need.

[473] Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology, p. 350.

[474] Loehe, Agende, pp. 73-74; my translation.

[475] Tappert, Lutheran Confessional Theology, p. 350.

[476] Ibid., p. 350, note 10.

[477] Loehe, Agende, pp. 21-22.

[478] Ibid., pp. 411-418.

[479] See Confessio Augustana XI, 1-2: "De confessione docent, quod absolutio privata in ecclesiis retinenda sit, quamquam in confessione non sit necessaria omnium delictorum enumeratio. Est enim impossibilis iuxta psalmum: Delicta quis intelligit?" Text in Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, p. 66. See also Thompson, Liturgies of the Western Church, p. 117 (Luther's Formula Missae of 1523).

[480] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[481] "Idem effectus est verbi et ritus, sicut praeclare dictum est ab Augustino sacramentum esse verbum visible." Apologia Confessionis Augustanae, XIII, 5. Text in Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, p. 292.

[482] Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften, p. 292: "Nam si ritus habent mandatum Dei et promissionem gratiae, quae est propria novi testamenti." (Apologia Confessionis Augustanae, XIII, 4.)

[483] For details of John Mason's life, see John Henry Overton, "Neale, John Mason" in Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography, 22 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), Vol. 14, pp. 143-146.

[484] For examples see Percy Dearmer and Ralph Vaughan Williams, eds., The English Hymnal (Rev. ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1933), nos. 1, 14, 17, 19, 31.

[485] Overton, "Neale, John Mason," p. 144.

[486] Ibid.

[487] After 1846, the Cambridge Camden Society changed its name to the "Ecclesiological Society."

[488] Neale did have an interest in ancient liturgies, however. See John Mason Neale, ed., trans., The Ancient Liturgies of the Gallican Church (Burntisland: Pitsligo Press, 1855).

[489] John Mason Neale and Benjamin Webb, trans., The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments. A Translation of the First Book of the Rationale Divinorum Officiorum written by William Durandus (Leeds: T.W. Green, 1843), pp. xviii-cxxxii.

[490] Ibid., p. xxi.

[491] Ibid.

[492] Ibid., p. xx.

[493] Ibid., p. xxv, note.

[494] Ibid., p. xxvi.

[495] Ibid., p. xxvii.

[496] Ibid., p. xxx.

[497] Ibid., pp. xxxi-xxxiii.

[498] Ibid., p. xxxvii.

[499] Ibid.

[500] Ibid., pp. xxv; xxi-xxii.

[501] Ibid., p. lv.

[502] Ibid., p. lvii.

[503] Ibid., p. lviii.

[504] Ibid., p. li.

[505] Ibid., p. lii.

[506] Ibid., p. liii.

[507] Ibid., p. lii.

[508] Ibid., pp. lxlvii-cii.

[509] John 10.9. See Neale and Webb, Symbolism, p. lxlvii.

[510] Neale and Webb, Symbolism, p. lxlix.

[511] Ibid., pp. lxxxi-lxxxvii; Neale discusses the symbolic patterns connected with doctrines like baptismal regeneration and the atonement.

[512] Ibid., pp. cixx-cxxvii.

[513] Ibid., p. cxxi.

[514] Ibid., p. cxxiii.

[515] Ibid., pp. lxxxvi-lxxxvii.

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[516] Ibid., p. lxxviii.

[517] Ibid., p. lxxviii.

[518] Ibid., p. cxxviii.

[519] Ibid.

[520] Ibid., pp. cxxviii-cxxix.

[521] Ibid., p. cxxix.

[522] Ibid.

[523] Ibid., pp. cxxix-cxxxii.

[524] Ibid., pp. cxxx-cxxxi.

[525] Ibid., p. cxxxii.

[526] Ibid., p. cxiv.

[527] Ibid., p. cxv.

[528] Ibid.

[529] See Hierurgia Anglicana, Published by members of the Cambridge Camden Society, ed. and trans. Vernon Staley, 3 Vols. (London: De la More Press, 1902-1904; original edition, 1848), Vol. 1, p. ix. Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: HA, followed by the volume number and appropriate page reference.

[530] The Commission, established to resolve a number of questions about the Anglican liturgy, issued its first report in 1867. In that document, the Commission dealt a blow to those who favored the use of eucharistic vestments by stating: "We are of opinion that it is expedient to restrain in the public services of the United Church of England and Ireland all variations in respect of vesture from that which has long been the established usage in the said United Church..." Text cited in William J. Sparrow Simpson, "The Revival from 1845 to 1933," in N.P. Williams and C. Harris, eds., Northern Catholicism. Centenary Studies in the Oxford and Parallel Movements (London: SPCK, 1933), p. 53. See also S. Gaselee, "The Aesthetic Side of the Oxford Movement," in the same volume, pp. 424-429.

[531] HA, I, p. xiii.

[532] Ibid., p. xvi.

[533] Ibid.

[534] Ibid., p. xvii. See further, pp. 237-269, for material collected by the original editors of Hierurgia Anglicana on the topic of ritual customs in the English church during the Elizabethan period. For similar material during the period of the Caroline divines, see HA, II, pp. 219-295.

[535] HA, I, p. xvii.

[536] Frank E. Brightman, The English Rite, 2 Vols. (2nd. ed.; London: Rivingtons, 1921), Vol. 1, pp. 23 and 25. Hereafter this work will be cited: Brightman, ER, followed by reference to volume and page.

[537] HA, I, p. xviii.

[538] Brightman, ER, II, p. 638.

[539] Ibid., p. 639.

[540] HA, I, p. xxii, note 2.

[541] Ibid., p. xvii.

[542] Ibid., pp. 84-85 (an example of a Puritan's negative evaluation of Anglican ritual, written in 1637.) See also ibid., pp. 258-259, where one may read a negative reaction to "unreformed popery" in the English Church written by a Puritan in Elizabeth I's day.

[543] Cited in HA, I, p. xxiii.

[544] Ibid., p. xxiv.

[545] Neale and Webb, Symbolism, p. cxxix.

[546] Ibid.

[547] HA, I, p. xv.

[548] See William J. Sparrow Simpson, The History of the Anglo-Catholic Revival from 1845 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1932), pp. 67-104.

[549] Dearmer and Vaughan Williams, eds., The English Hymnal, p. 1016.

[550] Some of the essays are anonymous, others are signed. They may be listed as follows: "Ritualism and its True Meaning," Catholic World 6 (1867-1868), 357-391. John Hassard, "Ritualism," Catholic World 5 (1867), 52-65. "The Future of Ritualism," Catholic World 8 (1868-1869), 757-796. "Ritualism and the Anglican Church, Catholic World 31 (188), 757-769.

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"Through Ritualism to Rome," Catholic World 33 (1881), 721-735.

[551] "The Future of Ritualism," Catholic World 8 (1868-1869), 829.

[552] "Ritualism and its True Meaning," Catholic World 6 (1867-1868), 378-379.

[553] Ibid., pp. 390-391.

[554] Cited in "Ritualism and its True Meaning," pp. 378-379.

[555] Neale and Webb, Symbolism, pp. xlix, lv.

[556] HA, I, p. xvi.

[557] Brightman, ER, I, pp. cixiii-ccxxv.

[558] See the discussion on this point found earlier in this chapter.

[559] HA, I, p. xvii.

[560] Ibid., p. xvii.

[561] Neale and Webb, Symbolism, pp. l-liii.

[562] Ibid., p. lv.

[563] Ibid., p. xxv.

[564] See the discussion earlier in this chapter.

[565] For more detail, see the discussion earlier in this chapter.

[566] Schaff, PP, p. 224.

[567] The work appeared in 1880. See the reactions against Littledale's work in "Ritualism and the Anglican Church," Catholic World 31 (1880), 757-758, 765.

[568] See the discussion of this point in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[569] See Leopold's list of points to be debated by the bishops of Tuscany: Mansi, 38, col. 1001.

[570] Mansi, 38, col. 1036.

[571] Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), p. 188. Further remarks about Hirscher's anti-scholasticism and reactions to

it among his colleagues at Tübingen may be found in Pierre Chaillet, "Jean Adam Moehler, Historien et Théologien de l'Église," in Alan de Lilienfeld, trans., J.-A. Moehler: L'Unité dans l'Église (Paris: Cerf, 1938), pp. xi-xii.

[572] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 194.

[573] See the discussion earlier in this chapter concerning Hirscher's ecclesiological "populism".

[574] McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 190-196.

[575] Ibid., p. 13.

[576] See the list of books recommended by Leopold as a basic library for ecclesiastical studies: Mansi, 38, col. 1010.

[577] See the frequent appeals to the "ancient practice of the church" in Pistoia's decree on the eucharist: Mansi, 38, col. 1010.

[578] See the discussion of the work of Ferdinand Christian Baur in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[579] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 12. See the discussion of similar ideas in the thinking of Coleridge and Baur in Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation.

[580] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 13.

[581] Ibid., p. 56. As McCool observes on p. 33, the more traditional Catholic understanding of faith was "an intellectual assent to an historical word of revelation made under the illuminating influence of grace."

[582] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[583] Ibid., p. 45.

[584] See Denzinger-Schönmetzer, nos. 2730-2732. Gregory XVI described "indifferentism" as the view that one could be saved no matter what profession of faith he held. De Lammenais' tendency to equate the conviction of reason with the "strictly supernatural" assent of faith probably caused Gregory to fear that the distinction between nature and grace commonly accepted in traditional Roman Catholic theology at that time would be lost.

[585] Franklin, "Guéranger: A View," pp. 321-322.

[586] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 45.

[587] Ibid., p. 13. There McCool discusses the connections between French traditionalism of the sort proposed by de Lammenais and the post-Kantian idealism of the Tübingen School.

[588] On Guéranger's desire for simplicity in worship see Franklin, "Guéranger: A View," pp. 327-328.

[589] Tappert, *Lutheran Confessional Theology*, p. 13.

[590] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[591] Ibid., p. 14.

[592] Schaff, *Wilhelm Loehe: Three Books about the Church*, pp. 43, 50.

[593] Tappert, *Lutheran Confessional Theology*, p. 15.

[594] Schaff, *Wilhelm Loehe: Three Books about the Church*, p. 150.

[595] Ibid., pp. 111-115.

[596] Ibid., p. 92.

[597] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

[598] See the discussion of this point in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[599] See Schaff, *Wilhelm Loehe: Three Books about the Church*, p. 177: "That is why the traditional, ancient, beautiful forms were not abolished but only cleansed from sin and perversions."

[600] Ibid., p. 178.

[601] Ibid., p. 177.

[602] Sparrow Simpson, *The History of the Anglo-Catholic Revival*, pp. 67-104.

[603] John Henry Newman, *et. al.*, *Tracts for the Times*, (London: Rivington, 1834), I (1833-1834), p. 5.

[604] Ibid., pp. 1-3, 4-11.

[605] See Eugene Fairweather, ed., *The Oxford Movement* (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 11

[606] Newman *et al.*, *Tracts for the Times*, I, p. 2.

[607] Ibid., I, p. 7.

CHAPTER V

THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SACRAMENTAL THEORY AT MERCERSBURG

The nineteenth-century liturgical crisis in the German Reformed Church: 1849 was a momentous year in the history of the German Reformed Church in America. That year, the Synod of the church meeting at Norristown, Pennsylvania, resolved to establish a "Liturgical Committee" for the purpose of devising an order of worship that could be used by the whole German Reformed community in this country:

> Resolved, That a committee be appointed, to whom should be referred the whole subject of the proposed Liturgy, who shall report at the next meeting of Synod, a Plan or Schedule of a Liturgy, embracing an article of such a work as is proposed in the end to be produced. It is expected, therefore, that this Committee will thoroughly examine the various Liturgies of the Reformed Churches and other works published on this subject in later times, and specify as far as this may be done, the particular forms that are believed to be needed. . .[1]

The Norristown resolution seems to have been motivated by two factors: 1) the dangers discerned in the "free prayer" tradition associated with the "anxious bench" revivalism that had swept through America;[2] and 2) the general dissatisfaction felt throughout the German Reformed Church with the so-called "Mayer Liturgy" which had been approved by the Synod in 1837 and again in 1840.[3] The

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"Mayer Liturgy", so named after its principal author, the Reverend Lewis Mayer of York, Pennsylvania, was an order of service that contained material for baptism, Lord's Supper, marriage and ordination.[4] But these were "occasional" liturgies celebrated rather infrequently by members of the German Reformed Church. Even the Lord's Supper was not customarily celebrated more than two or four times a year.[5] Nearly everyone found something objectionable about the Mayer Liturgy: it was too dull and didactic, too much the work of a single author, too mechanical.[6] More seriously, the Mayer Liturgy contained no regular order of service for the Lord's Day. Each Sunday churches were at the mercy of the local minister's personal "inspiration".

By 1849, Lewis Mayer was dead and the Synod could act on the liturgical question without appearing to be ungrateful for his labor.[7] John Nevin and Philip Schaff, the most prominent members of the Synod's Liturgical Committee, set to work almost immediately. Before long, however, trouble began to brew. It must be remembered that Nevin and Schaff were regarded with considerable suspicion by many of their colleagues in the German Reformed Church. Their theological ideas, touching such things as the sacraments and the idea of "organic development" in Christian doctrine, had already been called into question at the Synods of 1845 and 1846.[8] Although the two men had been spared any official condemnation for heresy, there remained a considerable amount of uneasiness about their orthodoxy.

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Discouraged by such suspicion and burdened with financial worries, Nevin submitted his resignation from the seminary faculty at Mercersburg to the Synod in 1850.[9] Over the next couple of years, he also disassociated himself from the Liturgical Committee, from work on the Mercersburg Review, and from the presidency of Marshall College, which was then in process of moving from Mercersburg to Lancaster.[10] It is quite possible that this period of "dizziness" in Nevin's life was the result of a physical and psychological breakdown brought on by his indecision over whether he should remain in the German Reformed Church or convent to Roman Catholicism.[11] The Synod itself appears to have been a bit ambivalent about Nevin's case. It is significant, for example, that during the meeting of the Synod at Lancaster in 1851, resolutions expressing confidence in Nevin's orthodoxy were voted down; in their place the following were passed:

> Resolved, That the Rev. Dr. Nevin be respectfully requested to withdraw his resignation, and to resume his service in the Theological Seminary.
>
> Resolved, That in the case the Rev. Dr. Nevin should still insist upon his resignation, Synod yield to his request with great reluctance for the present, and leave his professorship vacant, in the hope that he, in the Providence of God, may see his way clear to return to the same at no distant day, and with the expectation and decided wish for him to remain in his present relation to the College in the meantime.[12]

To Nevin's admirers, these resolutions must have seemed like a damning with faint praise. To his opponents, they were received with apparent relief. In any case, Nevin maintained his resolve to resign and, at the meeting of Synod

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held in Baltimore the following year (1852), the delegates elected Rev. Bernard G. Wolff to fill the vacant position as professor of theology at the seminary in Mercersburg.[13] At the same time, the Synod resolved "that we continue to cherish for him (Nevin) sentiments of very high regard, and . . .never cease to respect and love him."[14]

Although Nevin later resumed presidency of the Liturgical Committee,[15] the troubles surrounding the preparation of a liturgy for the German Reformed Church in America were far from over.[16] After the presentation of the Provisional Liturgy to the Synod in 1857 and its publication early in 1858, bitter reactions poured in.[17] Pastors like John Henry Augustus Bomberger, himself a member of the Liturgical Committee, felt that the express wishes of the 1849 Norristown Synod for a Reformed liturgy based on sixteenth century models had been thwarted by an unrepresentative group of willful men. Even after the Provisional Liturgy was revised in 1866, Bomberger was still dissatisfied with it.[18] In his polemical book The Revised Liturgy, Bomberger angrily denounced the work of men like Nevin and Schaff:

> Who had directed the Committee to make the study of mediaeval or still earlier liturgies and litanies, an essential part of their work? Who had requested them to make selections of services from "works issued before the Reformation"? Not the Synod. On the contrary. . .the Synod. . . from the first used the precaution of naming definitely the sources from which it expected the matter of the new Liturgy to be substantially drawn. These were genuine Reformed Liturgies from that of the Palatinate (1663) [sic] onwards.[19]

Bomberger's complaint was not unfounded. He himself had been largely responsible for drafting the Norristown proposals for liturgical reform in 1849.[20] Among those proposals were the following:

> 1. That the use of liturgical forms of Church worship, as recognized by our forefathers has the clear sanction of the practice and peculiar genius of the original protestant churches. . .
>
> 2. That the Liturgy now authorized and partially used by the Church (the Mayer Liturgy) is inadequate to our wants, inasmuch as. . .it makes no provision for ordinary occasions of public worship.
>
> 3. That whilst the older Liturgies of the Church, and especially that of the Palatinate, are of such a character as to commend the greater portions of them for adoption, there is still need of various modifications in order to adapt them fully to our wants and circumstances. . .
>
> It is expected, therefore, that this Committee will thoroughly examine the various Liturgies of the Reformed Churches and other works published on this subject in later times. . .[21]

Bomberger was right, then, in his contention that the Norristown Synod had neither mandated nor envisioned an exploration of liturgical forms that existed prior to the Reformation.

Nevertheless, it was clear by at least 1852 that Schaff (Nevin had temporarily "seceded" from the Committee) had no intention of restricting his investigations to the liturgical literature of the sixteenth century. In a report of the Liturgical Committee filed with the Synod which met at Baltimore in 1852, Schaff observed:

> The liturgical worship of the Primitive Church, as far as it can be ascertained from the holy

> Scriptures, the oldest ecclesiastical writers, and the Liturgies of the Greek and Latin Churches of the third and fourth centuries, ought to be made, as much as possible, the general basis of the proposed Liturgy; the more so, as they are in fact also the source from which the best portions of the various Liturgies of the sixteenth century were derived, such as the forms of confession and absolution, the litanies, the creeds the Te Deum, the Gloria in excelsis, the collects, the doxologies, etc. . .[22]

Later, after the publication of the Provisional Liturgy, Nevin himself admitted a similar interest in the earlier Christian liturgies. In The Liturgical Question (1862), he wrote that the members of the Liturgical Committee had "considered it their duty to take a wider range of observation; to survey the whole field of liturgical literature; and especially to study the genius and spirit of the liturgies that have come down to us from the first Christian ages. . ."[23]

Because of the hostile objections aroused by the Provisional Liturgy of 1857, the Synod voted in 1861 to return the whole matter to the original Committee for revisions and corrections.[24] At the General Synod of 1866, held in Dayton, Ohio, Nevin unveiled the Order of Worship, a revised service-book that retained most of the features found in the 1857 Liturgy.[25] The revised Order of Worship (1866) met with almost as much displeasure as the Provisional Liturgy of 1857.[26] In a "minority report" filed during the General Synod meeting at Dayton in 1866, the following objections were raised:

> 1. It (the 1866 liturgy) involves an exceedingly great change in our Order of Worship, amounting, in fact, to a fundamental revolution of such order as has been observed in our Church during the whole period of its existence in America.

> 2. It is not in accordance with the original character and genius of the German Reformed Church, as this is manifested in the Palatinate and other Reformed Liturgies of the sixteenth century. . .[27]

Despite these reservations by the "minority", the 1866 Order of Worship won approval for a trial period of three years.[28]

In the meantime, however, liturgical controversy continued to rage in the German Reformed Church. At the 1869 General Synod meeting in Philadelphia, the Order of Worship was debated once again. The debate was complicated by the fact that the Synod of Ohio and the Northwest Synod had, by this time, jointly produced their own liturgy under the title: "A Liturgy, or Order of Worship, for the Reformed Church".[29] This "Western Liturgy" was quite different from the 1866 Order. It avoided making any definite connection between Sunday and the regular celebration of the eucharist, and was primarily a "pulpit manual" for the use of the local minister.[30] Supporters of the "Western Liturgy" hoped to undermine the 1866 Order of Worship (the "Eastern" liturgy) by submitting both orders to the individual Classes for adoption or rejection, and by forbidding the introduction of either one without formal approval by each local consistory and congregation.[31] This strategy would probably have resulted in the failure of both "Eastern" and "Western" liturgies to gain approval and adoption by the church as a whole. As Nevin wryly observed on the floor of the 1869 Synod, the "Westerners'" strategy reminded him "of the proposition of King Solomon, to thrust the sword through the living as well as the dead child."[32] Nevin wanted the General Synod to approve the use of either liturgy, without submitting the issue to a vote by each individual Classis.[33] When the vote was finally taken, it was Nevin's position that prevailed.[34]

By 1869, then, the church seemed to have tired of fighting over the liturgy. But during the next several years, the bickering over forms of worship continued. Finally, in 1878, the General Synod meeting at Lancaster resolved to establish a "Peace Commission" for the purpose of forging a compromise that would be acceptable to the warring factions within the Reformed community.[35] The result of the Commission's work was the publication, in 1884, of a Directory of Worship for the Reformed Church in the United States.[36] A second edition of the Directory appeared in 1887.[37] Both editions of the Directory received the approbation of the General Synod. In 1884, the Synod submitted the liturgy to the various Classes for their approval and, upon receiving it, the 1887 General Synod resolved that:

> Whereas, the Directory of Worship has received the affirmative vote of the number of Classes required by the Constitution for adoption of an ordinance in the Church; therefore, Resolved, That the said Directory of Worship is hereby declared to be constitutionally adopted as the Directory of Worship in the Reformed Church in the United States.[38]

Technically, then, the 1887 Directory became the authorized liturgy for the Reformed Church in America. Practically, however, some churches continued to use the 1866 Order of

Worship, while others adopted a *laissez faire* attitude toward the whole business of established liturgical forms.[39] In any event, the differences between the 1866 *Order* and the 1887 *Directory* were relatively insignificant.[40]

Nevin himself did not survive to see the final liturgical settlement brought about by the 1887 General Synod's approval of the *Directory*. On 6 June, 1886, he died at Lancaster.[41] Thirty years had elapsed since Nevin had presented the *Provisional Liturgy* to the delegates at the Synod meeting in Allentown (1857). On that occasion Nevin had said, in the "final report" of the Liturgical Committee:

> The new liturgy is not a mere compilation, or outward putting together of heterogeneous parts. It has a true life of its own, such as gives unity and harmony to it as a whole; and it is hoped, that this will be found to be in harmony, at the same time, with the theological life and historical genius of the Church for whose use more particularly it has been prepared. . .The Synod has ordered it to be prepared and published only for provisional use,. . .It must go forth among the church simply as an experiment.[42]

In its original (1857) form, Nevin's liturgical "experiment" had failed. That he suspected it might is clear from a gloomy letter which he wrote to Philip Schaff on 3 December, 1855:

> I will try to furnish the family prayers you request for the Liturgy. But I must decline the task of the other services you mention. I have no helps here at hand, no access to the ancient Liturgies. . .But what is more, I have no heart, no faith, no proper courage for any such work. A *leitourgia* (communion service) in the old sense demands a sort of faith in the "real presence", which I am afraid goes beyond all that is possible to engraft on Protestantism, even in our German

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> Reformed version of it. And without this, I feel that it is for me at least a species of mockery to pretend to the use of the like words and forms. . .[43]

It will be the task of this chapter to show why Nevin's unhappy prediction that his experiment would fail proved to be true.

Argument of the Chapter: Nevin's suspicion that his eucharistic doctrine had "gone beyond" even the "German Reformed version" of Protestantism was not an idle fear. For in my opinion, Nevin neither "recovered" the Reformed doctrine of the eucharist nor imitated the current Roman teaching as a "crypto-Catholic". He developed a new approach to the sacramental theology of the eucharist which, while greatly influenced by classical Reformed and Roman positions, differed significantly from them both.

In recent years, Nevin's doctrine of the eucharist, as recorded particularly in The Mystical Presence (1846), has been interpreted as a strategy to "recover" the sixteenth century Reformed teaching about the Lord's Supper. J.H. Nichols, for example, writes:

> The Mercersburg movement might be called essentially a sacramental, more particularly, a Eucharistic revival. . .The Mercersburg program. . .was the affirmation of the full classical Reformed or Calvinist understanding of the Lord's Supper in a church which had nearly forgotten it. . .[44]

In my opinion, Nichols' assessment of the Mercersburg "program" is both true and untrue. It is true that Nevin appealed to both Calvin and the classical Reformed confessions

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of faith in support of his eucharistic doctrine. All the major Reformed confessions of the sixteenth century are cited in The Mystical Presence: the French Confession of Faith, 1559; the Scottish Confession of Faith, 1560; the Belgic ("Dutch") Confession of Faith, 1561 (revised at the Synod of Dort in 1618 and 1619); the Palatinate Confession (represented by the Heidelberg Catechism), 1563; and the "Second Helvetic" ("Swiss") Confession, 1566.[45] It is also true that Nevin seems to have accepted Calvin's notion of "spiritual real presence" in the eucharist, even though, as Nichols notes, the Mercersburg men found "difficulties" in the Christology suggested by Calvin's view.[46]

It is untrue, however, to imply, as Nichols does, that Nevin's goal was simply to "recover" the Calvinist view, while "correcting" it in a few places.[47] I shall argue in this chapter that Nevin did much more than "recover and correct" the Reformed doctrine of the eucharist as found in Calvin. That Nevin opposed the common "puritan" views of church and eucharist current in American Protestantism is obvious.[48] That he wished to bring members of the German Reformed Church more closely in line with the eucharistic teaching of Calvin and the sixteenth-century Reformed confessions is equally obvious.[49] But Nevin did not merely "repeat" Calvin's position, not even in a slightly "corrected" or "amended" form; he re-interpreted it, much as Schaff had re-interpreted the Reformation in The Principle of Protestantism.[50] Nevin's re-interpretation confronted the

German Reformed community in mid-nineteenth-century America with a eucharistic theology a substantially new sacramental understanding.

It seems to me, then, that Nichols underestimates Nevin's achievement and that he also fails to discern the subtler connections between the eucharistic theory proposed in The Mystical Presence and the eucharistic praxis found in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857. For if Nevin had been so anxious simply to "recover" the "classical" eucharistic theology of Calvin and the sixteenth-century Reformed confessions, why did he not return as well to the sixteenth-century liturgies? We know that neither he nor Schaff felt comfortable with the idea of a return. Why? After all, editions and translations of these sixteenth-century liturgies were available. Calvin's "Form of Church Prayers" (Strassburg, 1545; Geneva, 1542) was known,[51] as were the old Palatinate Liturgy of 1563,[52] and Zwingli's "Action or Use of the Lord's Supper" (1525).[53] All these sixteenth-century liturgies contained forms for celebration of the Lord's Supper, but Nevin and Schaff avoided using any of them in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857.

It is my argument that the sixteenth-century Reformed liturgies were avoided precisely because Nevin and Schaff realized their eucharistic theology had gone beyond "all that is possible to engraft on Protestantism, even in our German Reformed version of it."[54] This does not mean that the Mercersburg theologians intended to "Roman Catholicize"

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Reformed worship. Rather, they were seeking to develop a sacramental theology compatible with their vision of "radical catholicity" and with their re-interpretation of the Reformation itself.[55] For Nevin, the principle of "catholicity" had nothing to do with "papal Catholicism". It dealt, rather, with the "inwardness", the "intensive wholeness" of Christianity, its "destination to raise humanity inwardly to a higher power."[56] The Mercersburg search for a "catholic" liturgy was not based on an archaeological nostalgia for quaint and curious forms from the past. It was based on the conviction that Christianity had something vital to do with the "inward history" of humanity as a whole.

As I hope to show, the Mercersburg theology of eucharist and worship was neither "romanticism", nor "recovery of the Reformed tradition", nor a "Catholicizing tendency" in nineteenth-century America. It is the result, rather, of a pervasive post-Kantian idealism that influenced many theologians both Protestant and Catholic in the early decades of the nineteenth-century.[57] Such a form of idealism was at work, for example, in men like Coleridge and Moehler, both of whom have been discussed in Chapter Two.[58] It was at work, too, in the thinking of Nevin and Schaff. According to this form of idealism, "spirit" must always "incarnate itself", i.e., it must always reveal itself in an outward, historical and visible form. These visible forms do not "contain" or "localize" spirit, but they are nevertheless spirit's real manifestations. For everything "spiritual" must achieve an external manifestation in order to arrive at the true perfection of itself.[59]

Such idealism is rather clearly at work in the Mercersburg understanding of incarnation and church, the two principles upon which Nevin's theory of the eucharist was grounded. As we have already seen in our analysis of Nevin's sermon on "Catholic Unity" (8 August, 1844),[60] the church must be visible and historical, catholic and life-bearing, if it is to be true to its "idea".[61] This indispensable quality of historical visibility is, in turn, based on the economy of the incarnation:

> If the fact of the incarnation be indeed the principle and source of a new supernatural order of life for humanity itself, the church, of course is not abstraction. It must be a true, living, divine-human constitution in the world. . . We are Christians singly, by partaking (having part) in the general life revelation, which is already at hand organically in the church, the living and life-giving body of Jesus Christ.[62]

For Nevin, then, "an outward church is the necessary form of the new creation in Christ Jesus."[63] And just as the church's historical visibility is demanded by the "idea" of the incarnation, so the church's worship must also be expressed in external forms: "To be real, the human, as such, and of course the divine also in human form, must ever externalize its inward life. . .This is the proper, deep sense of all liturgical services in religion."[64]

To Nevin's way of thinking, the need for external forms increases in direct proportion to the spiritual quality of an event or object: "The more intensely spiritual any state may be, the more irresistibly urgent will ever be found its tendency to. . .make itself complete, in a suitable external form."[65] Here, Nevin's thought rather openly reveals the influence of idealism. Just as the "ideas" of incarnation and church require visible, historical manifestation, so also the "idea" of worship demands external forms. Nevin's understanding of sacrament and worship is thus the direct result of his idealist vision of incarnation and church. Moreover, the specific sacrament of the eucharist can be analyzed under the same idealist perception. As will be seen, the eucharist is necessary not because of some juridical command imposed by Christ, but because it is the outward, historical and visible expression of that "invisible mystical union" which binds the whole Christ, human and divine, to believers. Thus, while Nevin derived the notion of "mystical union" from Calvin,[66] he developed it in a direction rather different from what was envisioned by the sixteenth-century Reformer.

An accurate analysis of Nevin's "idealist" understanding of the eucharist--and its implications for liturgy--will therefore demand a careful look at his innovative theory of "sacrament", "person" and "presence" as outlined, particularly, in his seminal work The Mystical Presence. Nevin was well aware that his sacramental doctrine might stretch the tolerance of his colleagues in the German Reformed Church. He was also aware that his views might not be altogether congruent with those of the sixteenth-century. Nevin freely admitted, for example, that the sacramental theology of the Reformers was "embarrassed by difficulties".[67] And he noted that the "theological and philosophical culture" of the sixteenth-century "has been in some measure superseded by later intellectual advances."[68] It was not, then, Nevin's intention simply to reproduce the eucharistic theology of Calvin. He sought not to "restate" sixteenth-century positions but to "re-interpret" the doctrine of the eucharist anew in the light of his idealist conceptions of incarnation and church.

NEVIN'S SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY IN THE MYSTICAL PRESENCE

Nevin's "theological anthropology" of the sacraments:

For Nevin, the visible church is an "intrinsic demand" of the incarnation and visible sacraments are an "intrinsic demand" of the church. There is a "law of inwardness" that operates throughout Nevin's idealist theology: the more "inward" ("spiritual") a thing is, the more it must become "enfleshed", must reveal itself visibly and historically in the world. This "law of inwardness" anticipates, in many respects, the anthropology developed by twentieth-century transcendental Thomist theologians like Karl Rahner.[69] Speaking of the relation between spirit("soul") and body, for example, Rahner has this to say:

> the soul cannot fulfill itself without making use of matter; the greater its self-fulfilment, that is to say, the more man becomes spirit, the more the soul (the man) becomes the body. This means that the body is the medium of all communication and that conversely the soul fulfils itself in proportion as man lives with bodily men in a bodily world.[70]

Spirit and matter, soul and body are not irreconcilable principles; they are distinct yet inseparable dimensions of that irreducible unity we call "a human person". "Inwardness" ("spirit") is not opposed to flesh; rather, the more "inward" a person becomes, the more he becomes "body" (visible, historical presence in the world). It is this line of thinking that determines Nevin's theory of the relations between creation, man, incarnation, church and sacrament.

Creation: Creation, according to Nevin's system, remains mute, opaque and unintelligible apart from man.[71] For this reason the created order struggles to converge and center itself in man, the "conscious poet" who brings creation light and voice:

> Without man the entire world would be shorn of its meaning. It is by the medium of his personality only, that it becomes transparent with thought and is made to utter any intelligible sound. The world finds itself, comes to the knowledge of itself, in man. All is dark until it has made its way up to the sphere of human consciousness. There all becomes light.[72]

Creation is not, therefore, simply the speechless system of physical laws and biochemical processes that awaits man's technological exploration; it is an organic, developing whole that seeks to become intelligible through the mouth of human agents. "Man," Nevin observes, "is the center of nature, the key to all its mysteries, the idea that binds its manifold parts into one and makes them complete as a single organic whole."[73] Through the visible historical existence of human beings, creation expresses its own inwardness--for,

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as Nevin points out, "nature" (the comprehensive order of created reality) has its "divine archetype" in the "sphere of the Spirit".[74]

It is man, then, and more especially the community of man called "church", that "completes" creation, awakens it fully and brings it to perfection. "The creation itself becomes complete only in the church, the life of nature in the life of the Spirit," Nevin argues. As "crown and complement of the whole world," the church (the "new creation") is the ultimate manifestation of what creation intends to become and to mean.[75] The inwardness of creation is definitively revealed only in the flesh of humanity gathered as one in the church.

Man: Man is thus the world's "center".[76] By the term "center", Nevin intends to signify that humanity is the radical source of all "true meaning and value" in the world.[77] All "lower" forms of life struggle to converge in the nature of man as the center of meaning and value:

> . . .all lower developments of life, however defective or seemingly monstrous, find their true meaning and value only as analogies and relative approximations to the nature of man--whose perfection and dignity in this way they serve, not to disparge, but to authenticate and magnify. . .[78]

Only in man does nature become "conscious of itself".[79] And it is toward this consciousness that even inanimate nature presses. For apart from this human consciousness there could be no source of meaning, value or intelligibility in the world; creation would remain altogether mute and dead. There is thus a kind of evolutionary spiral in nature that rises toward conscious humanity as its final end:

> Nature, through all lower forms of existence, looks upward continually to the idea of man. The inorganic struggles toward the organic; the plant toward the animal; and the animal nature, improving upon itself from one order of life to another, rests not until it is superseded finally by the human. Thus all converge toward the same end; each inferior nature foreshadowing that which is to follow, until the vast system becomes symmetrical and full. . .[80]

As the center of consciousness, meaning, value and intelligibility in the world, man must express himself as a body. The human body is not a sort of gnostic accident that imprisons the spirit (soul), nor is the proper identity of the human body to be confused with sheer materiality.[81] In terms very reminiscent of Aquinas' anthropology (the body is the "substantial form" of the soul), Nevin notes that the body is what permits the "inward and invisible" (spirit) "to gain for itself a true outward existence."[82] Man's body is not simply an organized portion of biochemical machinery; it is an organic system of life, the true outward expression of man's condition as "spirit" in the world.

This human condition of spirit/body is, for Nevin, an indissoluble unity. All forms of dualism (spirit vs. flesh, soul vs. body) must be rejected. As Nevin puts it:

> Soul and body, in their ground, are but one life; identical in their origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding forever in the presence and power of the self-same organic law.[83]

The inseparable connection between soul and body is not the result of some external, mechanical force. Nor are there two processes that govern human development, one for the soul and another for the body. Rather, there is a single "organic law" that governs the development of one life-process:

> The soul to be complete to develop itself at all as a soul, must externalize itself, throw itself out in space; and this externalization is the body. All is one process, the action of one and the same living organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become thus freer and more intensely complete.[84]

As we shall see, Nevin extends this unified vision of man as spirit/body to include the process by which Christ is formed in the believer. Just as there are not two processes that govern human life in its "bodily" and "spiritual" dimensions, so neither are there two processes by which Christ is formed in us. One process only, affecting both soul and body together, brings the believer into "mystical union" with Christ: "It (the divine/human life of Christ) lays hold of its subject in each case, not in the periphery of his person, but in its inmost center, where the whole man--soul and body is still one undivided life. . ."[85]

But Nevin's theological anthropology is not a naively optimistic one. Just as there is a single organic law that governs man's development in the world as an inseparable unity of spirit/body, so there is, as a result of the same law, an identification with the "organic ruin" of Adam.[86] Man is not only the conscious poet who gives voice to all

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creation, he is also a partaker in the history of sin in the world.[87] While carefully avoiding the terminology of "original sin", Nevin observes that the "terrible fact of sin" has become "incorporated with the inmost life of humanity itself."[88]

> The ruin under which we lie is an organic ruin; the ruin of our nature; universal and whole, not simply because all men are sinners, but as making all men to be sinners.[89]

Once again, the attribution of sin to humanity at its very root is not the result of mechanical forces utterly alien to human nature. Man's solidarity in the sin of Adam is not the consequence of some "mere outward transfer" or of some grim fiction imagined by theologians to explain the world's misery and unhappiness:

> . . .the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity involves no fiction. It is counted to them simply because it is theirs in fact. They are born into Adam's nature, and for this reason only, as forming with him the same general life, they are born also into his guilt.[90]

As a result of solidarity in Adam's sin, man is "fallen" in both soul and body. Adam's biography has become ours; the history of sin in the world is our own history.

But sin is not the last word about the human condition. The same process that gives rise to man's nature as an indivisible unity of spirit/body, the same process that results in man's solidarity in Adam's sin, will eventually "ripen" into the resurrection.[91] "There is nothing abrupt in Christianity," Nevin wrote, "The resurrection body will be simply the ultimate outburst of the life that had been

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ripening for immortality under cover of the old Adamic nature before."[92] Nevin's use of the "ripening" image to describe ultimate human destiny reflects his understanding of the "organic law" that governs all development. That law operates like a seed planted in warm, moist soil[93] or like an acorn that produces a forest of oaks.[94] As man's destiny, resurrection is not some alien miracle that bursts in quite unexpectedly from without; it is the maturation of a single process that has been going on from the beginning. And because man is an inseparable unity of spirit/body, the resurrection must comprehend his entire existence:

> The spiritual resurrection includes in the end the resurrection of the body. It is all, we may say, but a single process, reaching from the point of the new birth onward to the full restoration of the whole man. . .[95]

Incarnation:[96] If man is the conscious center of creation, then Christ must be considered the "universal Man", the "archetypal man, in whom the true ideal of humanity has been brought into view".[97] It is Christ who makes all authentic human personality possible.[98] Further, if humanity is somehow the "completion of creation",[99] Christ is the center and completion of humanity:[100]

> . . .what man is to nature. . .Christ may be said to be in some sense to man. Humanity itself is never complete until it reaches his person.[101]

As the "Second Adam", Christ's relationship to humanity (like that of the first Adam) is not extrinsic and "moral" only, but intrinsic and organic. Just as man's consciousness "awoke" creation and brought it to perfection, so in Christ human consciousness was awakened to the level of a new life:

> . . .human consciousness itself--the medium of order and light for the sphere of mere nature--is raised into a higher sphere, from which a new life is made to pour itself forth again over the whole world. Man finds himself in God, and wakes to the full sense of his own being. . .[102]

The incarnation is not, then, simply a past event which Christians occasionally remember with fondness. It is not a "transient wonder" but a continuing fact.[103] Nor is the incarnation merely the predictable product of an inexorable historical process. It is something strictly new in the history of humanity, while at the same time it "continues and completes" all previous historical development:

> The everlasting Word, in a way wholly unknown before, descends into the actual process of human history, and becomes within it the principle and law of a second creation immeasurably more glorious than the first. . .It is no revolution of the old, no historical advance upon the past merely. . .but the introduction, literally and strictly, of a new element--a new divine force--into the very organism of the world itself.[104]

The incarnation thus actuates the "new creation" at the heart of the world's history.[105] Indeed, just as all nature converges toward man as its completion and fulfillment, so all history converges toward the incarnation and the "new creation" as its ultimate destiny. "The mystery of the universe," Nevin exclaims, "is interpreted in the person of Jesus Christ."[106] History itself is thus "one vast prophecy of the incarnation."[107] Far from being an arbitrary collection of facts and events, history is an unfolding process, an immanent organic development toward the full disclosure of its deepest meaning and value in the person of Christ. As Nevin expresses it: "Christianity forms no violent rupture, either with nature of history. It fulfills, and in doing so interprets, the inmost sense of both."[108] In the light of the incarnation, nature and revelation, the world and Christianity, are seen as a single unified process:

> Nature and revelation, the world and Christianity . . .are not two different systems joined together in a merely outward way. They form a single whole, harmonious with itself in all its parts. The sense of the one. . .is necessarily included and comprehended in the sense of the other. The mystery of the new creation must involve in the end the mystery of the old, and the key that serves to unlock the meaning of the first must serve to unlock at the same time the inmost secret of the last.[109]

The incarnation, then does not "destroy" or "rupture" history any more than grace destroys nature. Instead, incarnation discloses the full depth of humanity's "inwardness": "Humanity itself has become the Shekinah of glory, in the person of Emmanuel."[110]

Nevin's idealist understanding of the incarnation also colors his approach to the role of non-Christian religions in history. The major world religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, "prophesy of Christ; for **all** proclaim the inmost want of humanity to be a true union with God."[111] Although he is critical of the "dualism" he believes is present in Hindu philosophy, for example, Nevin does present a positive (if somewhat chauvinistic) interpretation of world religions in the history of human development. In a similar vein

Nevin interprets Judaism as the history of God's growing ever closer to humanity. "The Old Testament," he remarks, "might be said in some sense to carry the gospel in its womb."[112]

For all that, however, Nevin regards both history and the world as unintelligible apart from the completion of humanity in the incarnate Christ. One of the most significant aspects of Nevin's theological anthropology is his understanding of the relation between the mystery of the incarnation and the mission of the Spirit. It is impossible to abstract the "presence and power of the Holy Spirit. . . from the presence of Christ himself."[113] Nevin writes:

> It is by the incarnation properly, that the way has been opened for a true descent of the Spirit into the sphere of the human existence as such.[114]

The Spirit was never closed to humanity, Nevin argues, than in the person of the incarnate Lord.[115]

Nevin's pneumatology is thus embedded in his doctrine of Christ and the incarnation. But the ultimate manifestation of the Spirit is disclosed "in the glorified humanity of Christ."[116] There is an intimate connection, in Nevin's thinking, between the resurrection of Jesus, his exaltation as Son of God in power, and the gift of the Spirit poured out over humanity.[117] In Jesus' Easter victory flesh itself has been transformed into spirit:

> Thus made perfect in the Spirit--his Christ's entire person raised above the power of death, and filled at every point with the immortality of heaven itself--the blessed Redeemer "became

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> the author of eternal salvation unto all of them that obey him." His glorification opened the way for the free outflowing of the Spirit --the same divine life with which he was himself filled--on the surrounding world.[118]

Even in his glorified and exalted state, Christ must never be separated from the Spirit.[119] For the Spirit is not a "substitute" or "surrogate" for Christ's presence to believers, but rather the very mode and medium of that presence.[120] The union of the Spirit with believers is, therefore, not merely "moral" or "legal" but real, just as the mystical union of Christ with the faithful is real.[121] Where Christ is, there is the Spirit:

> The whole glorified Christ subsists and acts in the Spirit. Under this form his nature communicates itself to his people. They, too, to the same extent, are made thus to live and walk in the Spirit, both in soul and body.[122]

The "new creation" is thus not only Christological, it is at the same time pneumatological. Just as the Spirit was operative in Jesus' death and resurrection to raise his person above the power of death, so the same Spirit "constitutes the form of Christ's presence and activity in the church."[123] Moreover the Spirit's work in the new creation is not simply immaterial or "psychic", it extends to the believer's body as well:

> The glorification of the believer's body is the result of the same process that sanctifies his soul. The order of existence in both cases is the same, pneumatic, and not simply natural or psychic.[124]

The Spirit's work will be complete only when human bodies have been fully transfigured into its own image.[125] Then,

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since humanity is the conscious completion of history and the world, nature itself will discover its "divine archetype", its "Urbild", in the Spirit.

Nevin's doctrine of the utter unity between the Spirit and the incarnate/glorified Christ might appear to leave him open to the charge of modalism.[126] If the Spirit is the triumphant Christ's "mode of subsistence" in humanity, can there be any real difference between Christ and the Spirit? In order to answer this question it is necessary to recall the theological framework of Nevin's thought: post-Kantian idealism. According to such idealism, the visible, historical manifestations of "spirit" or "idea", while necessary, are never to be confused with "absolute spirit" or "absolute idea". Spirit and Idea really do disclose themselves immanently within history, yet they always transcend that history and that disclosure. Thus, as G. McCool observes, Absolute Spirit is able to embrace, in its infinite identity, "the contradictory opposites which exclude each other in their finite manifestations within the world."[127] In the mystery of the Absolute, unity does not exclude difference, distinction or even contradiction. Given this context, it is rather easy for Nevin to argue that "in the pneumatic order of existence,. . .Jesus Christ is the principle and the Holy Spirit the medium."[128] This distinction between "principle" and "medium" permits Nevin to insist upon the absolute identification of Christ and the Spirit in the work of salvation, while at the same time recognizing a real

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distinction between them.[129] For Nevin to say that the Spirit is "Christ himself under a certain mode of subsistence"[130] does not make the Spirit a kind of celestial vapor emanating from the risen Lord. Rather, Nevin is trying to insist that Christ and the Spirit together constitute the real action of the absolute God at work in human history.[131]

Church: Nevin's theological anthropology completes itself in his vision of the church. Since the relation between incarnation and the church has already been discussed at some length in Chapter Three,[132] it will not be necessary to repeat that analysis here. In the context of the present discussion, however, it should be noted that Nevin does not limit his understanding of church to the "intensive life" disclosed in the world through the incarnation. The church is also the result of Christ's resurrection and exaltation:

> He (Christ) is the firstborn of the dead, . . . in a sense correspondent with that in which he is the firstborn of the creation; because the resurrection, which is the entire life of the church, flows forth from his person, and has its reality in him only to the end.[133]

The church is thus "a true native extract out of Christ's body."[134] Still, there is a difference between the risen Lord and his body the church:

> In the Savior himself, the victory over death and hell was consummated in his resurrection and ascension. In the church, however, as a whole, and in every individual believer, the new life reveals itself as a process.[135]

The church, then, is part of that same organic process of development that governs creation, humanity and human history.

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This is one reason why, as we have seen in Chapter Three, both Nevin and Schaff regarded all historical manifestations of Christianity as "partial" and "interimistic".[136] Neither creation nor history nor humanity nor the church will be complete until men have been transfigured, body and soul, into the very image of the Spirit.[137]

Nevin's theological anthropology was, then, dominated by two ideas: 1) the notion of organic development,[138] and 2) the notion that what is "spiritual" must ever seek to "incarnate" itself and so become visible, outward and historical. This second notion was, as has been observed, familiar in the philosophy of idealism common especially among German theologians during the first decades of the nineteenth century. While the incarnation remains central in Nevin's anthropology, we have also noticed the significant role he attaches to Christ's resurrection and the mission of the Spirit. The anthropological position outlined in The Mystical Presence must be kept in mind as we turn now to Nevin's theory of sacrament.

Nevin's understanding of sacrament

In developing his theology of the eucharist, Nevin was convinced that three things were necessary: a) he had to avoid the "localized" sense of Christ's sacramental presence and power--the view he identified with Roman Catholicism;[139] b) he had to oppose the "puritan" and "rationalistic" position which reduced the sacraments to mere "commemorative ordinances";[140] and c) he had to attempt to place the

Reformed sacramental doctrine of the sixteenth-century in its "proper scientific form".[141] Nevin was, in short, faced with the task of formulating a sacramental theory that would allow him to affirm, as Calvin did, that the Christian's participation in Christ's body and blood in the Supper is "not figurative merely and moral, but real, substantial, and essential."[142]

But there was a further problem that Nevin had to confront in The Mystical Presence: how could the sixteenth-century Reformed doctrine of the eucharist be reconciled with an idealist anthropology?[143] Nevin seems to have been well aware of the discrepancy between his idealist understanding of "organic development" and the need for spirit to "incarnate" itself, and what Kilian McDonnell has called the "eucharistic preoccupations" of Calvin.[144] Calvin's premier preoccupation was with the unconditional sovereignty of God, his absolute freedom, divinity and choice of election.[145] Any theory of grace, any theory of sacrament, any theory of causality that appeared to place conditions on God's utterly sovereign freedom was to be rejected as idolatrous.[146] This is one reason, perhaps, why Calvin's doctrine of church and sacrament began not with a focus on incarnation (as in Nevin), but with an emphasis on God's sovereign power of election and predestination.[147] Faith, for Calvin, is the work of the Holy Spirit, and it depends on God's strictly unconditioned election of a believer.[148] Grace is precisely grace; unowed, unexpected, an utterly free and gracious gift that has no reliance on personal merit, virtue or good works. There is, then, a strictly supernatural character to God's unconditional sovereignty, his choice and election of persons, and his free bestowal of grace. God's presence to believers in faith can thus never be institutionalized or bounded by any "laws" whether of nature or of theology.

Nevin's idealist anthropology, however, resulted in a rather different theological vision. The "law of organic development" and the "law of inwardness" relativize the distinction between natural and supernatural.[149] Like S.T. Coleridge, Nevin thought of history (embracing nature, man and the relations between God and man) as a transcendental unity, a unity of process.[150] There is nothing "abrupt" about Christianity, no violent intervention of God in the unfolding process of historical development.[151] All things--nature, man, the relations between God and man in Christ and the Spirit--are comprehended in a single "organic law", a single process. Thus Nevin can say:

> The supernatural has become itself natural; not in the way,. . .of putting off its own distinction . . .but by falling into the regular process of the world's history, so as to form to the end of time indeed its true central stream.[152]

In this passage Nevin does not deny the legitimacy of a distinction between natural and supernatural, but he regards the two as quite inseparable in the single organic process of historical development. Here again Nevin's thinking parallels that of Coleridge.[153]

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Nevin's theological anthropology, informed by the "law of organic development", is thus quite distinct from Calvin's preoccupation with the unconditional sovereignty of a God utterly unbounded by "laws" of any sort. It is not surprising, then, to find Nevin writing in _The Mystical Presence_: "It is easy to show that it (the sacramental doctrine of the sixteenth-century Reformers) labors under serious difficulties."[154] The "serious difficulties" Nevin perceived in the Reformed doctrine will necessitate our taking a careful look at his own understanding of sacrament. It will also require an attentive reading of Nevin's views of "personhood" and "presence" as they relate to the eucharist. We must be careful not to minimize the real _differences_ between Nevin's sacramental theory and that of Calvin. For, as I hope to show, Nevin's idealist anthropology led him to sacramental conclusions quite distinct from those of the sixteenth-century.[155]

1. _Sacramental objectivity_: Citing the _Westminster Shorter Catechism_ (1648), Nevin offered the following definition of a sacrament in _The Mystical Presence_:

> A sacrament is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers.[156]

This traditional definition, Nevin notes, insists that two things are necessary for a true sacrament: the signs and "the _invisible grace_ that is sacramentally or mystically joined with the signs."[157] Nevin went on to say:

> . . .the invisible grace enters as a necessary constituent element into the idea of the sacrament; and must be, of course, objectively present with it whenever it is administered under a true form.[158]

Nevin's stress on the objectivity of sacramental grace joined with the visible signs was, of course, an attack on the "puritan" and "rationalistic" idea that a sacrament is merely a commemorative ordinance--a "bold, violent metaphor, that comes in the end to mean almost nothing."[159] The old Reformed tradition, Nevin maintained, had always asserted the objective power and force of the sacraments:

> The sacramental union between the sign and the thing signified is real, and holds in virtue of the constitution of the ordinance itself, not in the faith simply or inward frame of the communicant.[160]

Sacramental objectivity required, in Nevin's view, an independence from the believer's faith. It is not the faith of believers that supplies sacraments with their power, even though faith is certainly a necessary condition for fruitful participation in them.

Nevin recognized that his objective view left him open to the charge that he was advancing the Roman doctrine of *ex opere operato* efficacy in the sacraments.[161] In a long footnote in *The Mystical Presence*, he defended himself against this charge by introducing a distinction between "condition" and "principle" in the sacraments.[162] Faith, Nevin admitted, is unquestionably a condition of the sacrament's fruitfulness in the life of a believer. If that condition is absent, the sacrament cannot communicate to the person what is signified by the sacramental signs (e.g., the real and true life of Christ in the eucharist). But condition must never be confused with principle. Faith alone does not render Christ present in the "sacramental transaction": "His presence is identified objectively with the sacrament itself; and we receive him in the sacrament as the bearer of his very life itself. . .the grace exhibited. . .belongs to the sacrament in its own nature."[163] Thus, while faith is an indispensable condition for fruitful reception of the sacrament, the principle (objective grace really exhibited in the sacramental transaction) remains quite independent of faith.[164]

Nevin attempted to clarify his distinction between condition and principle by appealing to a botanical image, the seed.[165] The principle of life and growth is objectively, immanently present within the seed itself. Appropriate conditions--rich soil, moisture, warmth and light--are necessary to call forth that growth, but the principle of life in the seed remains independent of the conditions for its healthy growth. In the Lord's Supper, the objective principle of grace is always exhibited in the sacramental transaction, even when unbelievers approach the holy table:

> To the unbeliever, the same life is exhibited under the same form, but he does not accept it in his soul. He eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord's body.[166]

It must be noted that Nevin's distinction between condition and principle in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper bears a strong resemblance to the position held by

Thomas Aquinas.[167] Thomas too stressed the objectivity of the grace exhibited in the sacrament, its independence from the subjective conditions of recipient or minister.[168] He also held, as did Nevin, that wicked men can partake of the eucharist sacramentally, even though they eat and drink judgment to themselves.[169] For Aquinas, then, the "principle" of the sacrament is an "objective embodiment in sign of God's will to bestow grace";[170] the "conditions" are faith and charity on the part of those who share in the eucharist.[171] But Aquinas would not have gone quite as far as Nevin did in the case of the unbeliever. The unbeliever, Aquinas argued, does not eat and drink sacramentally, since such a person lacks the faith necessary for the perception of a sacrament in the first place.[172]

Did Nevin's almost "Thomist" view of sacramental objectivity put him at odds with Calvin's staunch insistence on eating by faith? I think not. Calvin himself allowed for what might be called a "pneumatological objectivity" in the sacraments, i.e., the sacraments are objectively effective through the sovereign action of the Holy Spirit who gives faith.[173] For Calvin, the sacraments "have the same office as the Word of God: to offer and set forth Christ to us, and in him the treasures of heavenly grace."[174] But this offering is frustrated if faith is not present, since faith is the gift of the Spirit and it is "the Holy Spirit who makes us partakers in Christ"--in the sacraments as in all other events of Christian life.[175] Nevertheless, there are some real differences between Nevin and Calvin on the subject of sacramental objectivity. For one thing, Calvin did not countenance any sort of sacramental objectivity that was _extrinsic_ to faith.[176] Thus Nevin's statement, "To the _unbeliever_, the same life is exhibited under the same form," would have made little sense to Calvin.[177] Secondly, Calvin does not tie up the visible objectivity of sacraments with the visible objectivity of incarnation and church, in the way Nevin does through his idealist anthropology. For Nevin, the visible necessity of sacrament is based on the same "law of inwardness" that governs the visible and historical necessity of church: the need for spirit to "incarnate" itself to "project itself into space."[178]

2. _What does a sacrament do_? If a sacrament is neither a mere "commemorative ordinance" (the puritan view) nor a "mechanical" conferral of grace (the Roman view, in Nevin's analysis), then what does it really do? Does a sacrament, for example, "perform" or "effect" anything in the life of a believer that faith doesn't already do? Does it "add" anything to the life of a believer? Nevin seems to offer an affirmative reply to these questions. In his comments on article 21 of the "Second Helvetic Confession" (1566), he cites that document's threefold distinction between _corporal_, _spiritual_ and _sacramental_ eating. On this point the text of the Confession reads:

> There is more than one kind of eating. There is _corporal_ eating whereby food is taken into the mouth, is chewed with the teeth, and swallowed

> into the stomach. . .There is also a spiritual eating of Christ's body. . .whereby the body and blood of the Lord, while remaining in their own essence and property, are spiritually communicated to us, certainly not in a corporal but in a spiritual way, by the Holy Spirit. . .Besides the high spiritual eating there is also a sacramental eating of the body of the Lord by which not only spiritually and internally the believer truly participates in the true body and blood of the Lord, but also, by coming to the Table of the Lord, outwardly receives the visible sacrament of the body and blood of the Lord.[179]

In commenting on the distinctions made in this text Nevin remarked: "The sacrament adds something of its own to the ordinary life of faith."[180] Elsewhere in The Mystical Presence, his comments are even stronger. There is, Nevin noted, "a peculiar sacramental power" that is not available in the other practices of Christian life and faith.[181] Quoting the English Puritan theologian John Owen (1616-1683), Nevin offered the following statement as representative of the "old Reformed view":

> "There is a peculiar communion with Christ in this ordinance," says Dr. Owen, "which we have in no other ordinance"; and this, he adds, has been the faith of the whole church in all ages. "A way of receiving Christ by eating and drinking, something peculiar that is not in prayer, that is not in the hearing of the word, nor in any other part of divine worship whatsoever; a peculiar participation of Christ, a peculiar acting of faith toward Christ."[182]

It is significant that Nevin does not cite Calvin to support his claim that "the communion of the believer with Christ in the Supper is taken to be specific in nature, and different from all that has place in the common exercises of worship."[183] Calvin would have been very reluctant to acknowledge any specific gift communicated in the eucharist that was not already bestowed on the believer through faith. As Kilian McDonnell has observed concerning Calvin's understanding of eucharistic eating:

> Eating is an interpretation of faith insofar as it guards against an intellectualization of faith and, also, because it gives realism to the assertion that in faith we have a real communion with the glorified Lord, with his body and blood, and this through the power of the Holy Spirit. This makes it clear that eating is not specifically a eucharistic act, not an act which is limited to altar and cup. . . .For Calvin, as for Luther, there is no specific eucharistic gift, no object, person, effect, or grace given in the Eucharist which is not given in faith outside of the Eucharist.[184]

For Calvin, then, eucharistic eating was simply one aspect of a much larger "moment", the perpetual eating of Christ's true body and blood through faith under the power of the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that Calvin downplayed the necessity and importance of the sacramental eucharist in Christian life. Quite the contrary; he affirmed that eucharistic eating and drinking should be a regular frequent feature of the church's fellowship in faith:

> . . .baptism should be, as it were, an entry into the church, and an initiation into faith; but the Supper should be a sort of continual food on which Christ spiritually feeds the household of his believers.[185]

There is, moreover, clear evidence that Calvin desired a weekly celebration of the Lord's Supper among the Reformed communities.[186]

Still, Calvin would probably not have agreed with Nevin's (and Owen's) contention that something specific is

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communicated in the eucharistic sacrament that is "not (communicated) in the hearing of the word."[187] In Calvin's theology the sacrament itself has the character of Word.[188] That is one reason why Calvin rejected the Roman view of eucharist popular in the sixteenth-century. The Word of eucharist is not addressed to the elements (bread, wine) but to the people. Like the gospel itself, the eucharist is an act of proclamation; one preaches to people, not to bread.[189] In the *Institutes* Calvin thus remarked:

> . . .this principle was hidden from them, (Roman Catholic theologians) that the bread is a sacrament only to those persons to whom the word is directed.[190]

For Calvin, then, the proclamation of eucharist is an aspect of that "larger moment" by which the Word of faith is preached to persons, just as eucharistic eating is a dimension of that "larger moment" by which faith feeds perpetually on the Lord's true body and blood. It would therefore be difficult to appeal to Calvin in order to justify Nevin's claim that "there is a peculiar communion with Christ in this ordinance, (the sacrament of the Lord's Supper) which we have in no other ordinance."[191]

3. Seal: How, then, does Nevin legitimate his claim that the sacrament of the eucharist does something distinctive and "peculiar", something specifically different from what happens in faith or in the preaching of the Word? I will argue here that Nevin's view of "peculiar sacramental power" in the eucharist[192] arises from a) his understanding of the

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nature of sacramental "*seals*", and b) his view of the "*sacramental transaction*". The use of the term "seal" in a sacramental context was, of course, common in the Reformed confessions of the sixteenth century. The *Heidelberg Catechism*, for example, uses the term "seal" in its definition of sacraments:

> Q. 66. *What are the Sacraments?*
> A. They are visible, holy signs and *seals* instituted by God in order that by their use he may the more fully disclose and *seal* to us the promise of the gospel, namely, that because of the one sacrifice of Christ accomplished on the cross he graciously grants us the forgiveness of sins and eternal life.[193]

Calvin also employed this "sealing" terminology in the *Institutes*.[194] But Nevin seems to have wanted to push the meaning of sacramental "sealing" further than Calvin might have allowed. Calvin sometimes spoke of seals in *pictorial* terms, as *visible confirmations* of the invisible reality offered by the sacraments:

> And what is there, I beg, to offend any man greatly if we teach that the promise is *sealed* by the sacraments, when it is clear from the promises themselves that each confirms the other? For the clearer anything is, the fitter it is to support faith. But the sacraments bring the clearest promises; and they have this characteristic over and above the word because *they represent them for us as painted in a picture from life*.[195]

Nevin found this position unsatisfactory. In *The Mystical Presence* he insisted that the sacrament "is not a picture or reminder simply for the mind, but a true and real exhibition of that which it represents."[196] For Nevin the sacramental "seal" is not something outward and external that "certifies"

God's promises (like a picture or image); it is something *internal to the very structure of the "sacramental exhibition"* itself. Thus he writes:

> The grace (of the sacrament) goes inseparably along with the signs and is truly present for all who are prepared to make it their own. *The signs in this view are also seals; not simply as they attest the truth and reality of the grace in a general way, but as they authenticate also its presence under the sacramental exhibition itself.*[197]

The seal, then, is something internal to the structure of a sacrament. It is closely akin to what the earlier medieval scholastics spoke of as the "*res*" of the sacrament: the presence of real and effective sacramental grace.[198] To Nevin's way of thinking, "seal" is related to "sign" much as, for Aquinas, "*res*" is related to "*sacramentum*". The relation between the two is not extrinsic or "outward". The sacramental sign itself has an intrinsic and dynamic orientation to the "*res*" (Nevin: "seal").[199] This view of "seal" does not mean, for Nevin, that grace is contained in the sacrament as in a physical vessel. Just as the seal is neither a "picture" nor a "proxy",[200] so neither is the grace of the sacrament physically contained or located in the visible signs.[201] Nevin would have found confirmation for his view in Aquinas, who also argued that the grace of the sacrament is not "located" in the signs as in a vessel or physical container.[202]

4. *Sacramental Transaction*: An accurate understanding of Nevin's notion of seal thus requires some attention to his

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view of the structure of the sacramental sign itself. That structure is most clearly seen in Nevin's use of the phrase "sacramental transaction".[203] This phrase is used at least fifteen times in The Mystical Presence.[204] We find Nevin using the same vocabulary twenty years later in his essay on the "Theology of the New Liturgy".[205] What does Nevin intend by the term "transaction" and how does his use of it shed light on the structure of the sacramental sign?

First, it must be observed that Nevin uses the term "transaction" in order to avoid two "errors": 1) an exaggerated emphasis on the sacramental elements (the Roman error); and 2) an insufficient attention to the objective power of the sacramental signs (the Puritan error). Common to both these errors is the tendency to reduce the sacramental sign to something inert, motionless, static.[206] Against this view, Nevin suggests that the sacramental sign is not an object but an activity; not a thing but a deed; not a noun but a verb. In short, the sacramental sign is a transaction, an event-in-process that connotes continuing action or movement.

For this reason, secondly, Nevin introduces a distinction between elements and transaction.[207] The power of the sacrament resides not in the elements as such, considered locally and materially, but in the transaction. The grace objectively offered in the sacrament comes about through this transaction.

> The grace of the sacrament comes from God; but it comes as such under the sacrament as its true and

> proper form; not inhering in the elements indeed, outwardly considered; but still mysteriously lodged, by the power of the Holy Spirit, in the sacramental transaction as a whole.[208]

"Transaction" is thus a comprehensive term that embraces both the "outward" and the inward" dimensions of the sacrament.[209] It includes the signs (elements), the things signified (the inward power of grace), the condition of the believer (faith) and the action of signifying; but it is not to be identified with any of these alone. The "sacramental transaction" is thus neither a physical object nor an historical moment that can be isolated and captured as in a picture or photograph. Nevin calls it "the sacramental mystery as a whole".[210] It is this transaction that effectively mediates the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper:

> . . .this implies no local comprehension of the Savior's body in the elements, nor oral or corporal contact with it in any way. The mystery holds not in the sphere of the flesh, but in the sphere of the Spirit. We feed upon the broken body and shed blood of Christ, by faith. But that which is imparted to us through our faith, by the power of the Holy Spirit, is the true divine human life of the Son of man himself, objectively present in the sacramental transaction as such, and really carried over into our persons under this form.[211]

The term "sacramental transaction" is thus Nevin's comprehensive way of describing how sacramental symbols mediate their meaning, truth and reality to persons. Such mediation occurs on many different levels at once, and the "transaction" embraces all of them. Hence Nevin's "transaction" in a dense, "thick", multi-layered, many-levelled act of symbolic mediation. If we were to use a contemporary philosopher's thought to describe what Nevin means by "transaction", we might adopt Paul Ricoeur's notion of the "double (literal and opaque) intentionality" of symbols.[212] In genuinely symbolic mediation, Ricoeur observes, the "first, literal meaning" of the sign always points, analogically, to a second (opaque) meaning:

> . . .contrary to perfectly transparent technical signs, which say only what they want to any in positing that which they signify, symbolic signs are opaque, because the first, literal obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it. . .This opacity constitutes the depth of the symbol, which,. . .is inexhaustible.[213]

In Ricoeur's understanding of symbolic mediation it is important to notice two points. First, the "literal intention" of the symbol is not a negligible item; it is precisely this literal meaning that gives access to the "depth" (opacity) of the symbol. Secondly, the relation between "literal" and "opaque" meaning in the symbol is analogical in a very precise sense. Ricoeur clarifies both these points in the following passage:

> . . .in the symbol, I cannot objectify the analogical relation that connects the second meaning with the first. It is by living in the first meaning that I am led by it beyond itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and led by the literal meaning which effects the analogy in giving the analogue. . .In fact, unlike a comparison that we consider from outside, the symbol is the movement of the primary meaning which makes us participate in the latent meaning

> and thus assimilates us to that which is symbolized without our being able to master the similitude intellectually. It is in this sense that the symbol is donative; it is donative because it is a primary intentionality that gives the second meaning analogically.[214]

According to Ricoeur, the literal meaning of the symbol actually generates the movement by which we grasp the opaque ("analogical") meaning. The analogy that holds between "literal" and "opaque" meanings in the symbol is thus not an external analogy of proportion (e.g., A:B :: C:D), but an analogy that is grasped only from within the symbol's literal meaning: "It is by living in the first meaning that I am led by it beyond itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and by the literal meaning which effects the analogy in giving the analogue."

In my opinion Nevin's term "sacramental transaction" refers to the same sort of symbolic movement analyzed by Ricoeur. For Nevin, the "literal meaning" of the signs (i.e., the elements: bread and wine) generates and triggers a movement into symbolic depth (opacity: the real presence and communication of Christ's body and blood offered to believers). The analogy that holds between "signs" (elements) and "things signified" is not an external analogy of proportion; yet that analogical meaning can be grasped only by "living in" the literal meaning of the signs. In other words, the movement from literal intention to opaque intention can be made only if one directly engages ("lives in") the literal signs. In the case of the eucharist, this means that the movement toward symbolic depth is available only by direct engagement in eating and drinking. Thus Nevin insists:

> . . .the presence here affirmed, is not such as to identify the body of Christ in any way with the sacramental symbols, separately considered. It is not bound to the bread and wine, but to the act of eating and drinking.[215]

One arrives at the symbolic depth of eucharist only by direct engagement in the literal significance of the signs: bread is there to be eaten; wine is there to be drunk. The "sacramental transaction" thus embraces both the literal engagement of eating and drinking and the inward movement toward the symbol's depth (eating and drinking the Lord's body and blood). As we noted above, it includes signs (elements), things signified, the believer's condition (faith), and the action of signifying.

The structure of the sacramental transaction thus provides a way for Nevin to avoid the two unacceptable alternatives he rejected as explanations for the eucharist: Roman "localism" and Puritan "memorialism". The transaction is a movement into the symbol's depth (its "opaque intention"). It is not to be locally identified with the sacramental symbols of bread and wine, nor is it to be reduced to the level of mere pictorial representation. The transaction is real; it is a real movement into the symbol's depth and it is a real grasping of the symbol's opaque meaning. Moreover, while the transaction is not to be identified with the elements,[216] the elements are not "negligible items": they trigger the movement into the symbol's depth; one must "engage" them, "live in" them--i.e., one must eat and drink.

Here one can discern another difference between Nevin's approach to the doctrine of the eucharist and that of Calvin. Calvin tended to resolve the problem of local presence in the eucharist (i.e. the notion that the body of the Lord is somehow "contained" physically in the material elements) by an appeal to the work of the Spirit:

> "When I say that the flesh and blood of Christ are substantially offered and exhibited to us in the Supper, I at the same time explain the mode, namely, that the flesh of Christ becomes vivifying to us, inasmuch as Christ, by the incomprehensible virtue of his Spirit, transfuses his own proper life into us from the substance of his flesh, so that he himself lives in us and his life is common to us.[217]

For Calvin the substance of Christ's flesh is thus present, exhibited and offered to believers in the Supper through the "virtue" (power) of the Holy Spirit.[218] Calvin's understanding of the mode of eucharistic presence might be called "pneumatological realism", as opposed to those theories of "material or local realism" that sought somehow to contain the flesh of Christ in the sacramental signs of bread and wine. This "pneumatological realism" had the advantage of affirming the substantial reality of Christ's presence in the Supper while, at the same time, preserving the doctrines of Christ's utter lordship (his unconditional sovereignty over the church) and his true humanity. Hence this position was in harmony with Calvin's understanding of "Christological limits":

> . . .we must establish such a presence of Christ in the Supper as may neither fasten him to the element of bread, nor enclose him in bread, nor circumscribe him in any way (all which things . . .detract from his heavenly glory); finally, such as may not take from him his own stature, or parcel him out to many places at once, or invest him with boundless magnitude to be spread through heaven and earth. For these things are plainly in conflict with a nature truly human. Let us never (I say) allow these two limitations to be taken away from us: (1) Let nothing be withdrawn from Christ's heavenly glory --as happens when he is brought under the corruptible elements of this world, or bound to any earthly creatures. (2) Let nothing inappropriate to human nature be ascribed to his body, as happens when it is said either to be infinite or to be put in a number of places at once.[219]

But Calvin's pneumatological realism did raise some problems. Because he repudiated every attempt to compromise the unconditional sovereignty of the Spirit or to "divinize" the church, Calvin was reluctant to make the Spirit a genuinely interior principle of ecclesial life. The Spirit's connection with the church is not permanent and interior, but almost adventitious: the Spirit occasionally visits the church.[220] Nevin found this view unacceptable.[221] He wrote:

> Bound as he (Calvin) felt himself to be to resist everything like the idea of a local presence, he found it necessary to resolve the whole process into a special supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit, as a sort of foreign medium introduced to meet the wants of the case.[222]

As our discussion of his theological anthropology has revealed, Nevin regarded the presence of the Spirit as an immanent, interior principle of the church.[223] In virtue of the incarnation the Spirit has become immanent within the process of history itself.[224] According to Nevin the Spirit is not an occasional visitor but a permanent endowment of history and humanity, an abiding interior principle of the church's life. If the Spirit is at work in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper--a point Nevin did not wish to dispute--then that working must be simply the "natural and necessary result of the new life lodged in the soul itself."[225] Given Nevin's anthropology (the Spirit is immanently present within history and within human persons as a result of the incarnation), there is no need to invoke an "extraordinary divine power present for the purpose" in the case of the eucharist.[226] The Spirit's activity (in the eucharist as in the mystical union between Christ and believers) is not an "extraordinary" exercise of divine power, but an ordinary one. There is, after all, only one process that unites creation, man, history, incarnation, church and the mission of the Spirit; and that process is governed by the twin laws of "organic development" and "inwardness".[227] To Nevin's way of thinking, Calvin's pneumatological realism made the Spirit's operation in the eucharist external and extraordinary; it thus threatened to sunder the inseparable organic connection between the Holy Spirit and the person of Christ, incarnate and glorified.[228]

Once again one can see Nevin's idealist anthropology coloring his view of a sacrament and what it does. A sacrament performs (does) "transactionally" through the

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"literal meaning" of its elemental signs the sacrament moves participants into a real grasp of the "opaque intentionality" of the symbols.[229] The transaction is thus a single process of movement that embraces the "whole sacramental mystery" (signs, things signified, the condition of faith in the believer, and the act of signifying). In this transaction, Nevin acknowledged, the Spirit is certainly at work, but the work is not external and extraordinary. Rather, the Spirit is immanent within that single process of organic development that discloses God's presence and action in creation, in history, in the incarnation, in the church and in the eucharist. There is thus a single process of movement in the sacramental transaction and a single organic law of development that discloses the divine action in the world. The problem of real (but not local) presence in the eucharist does not, therefore, have to be solved by invoking an extraordinary operation of the Spirit. In contrast to Calvin, Nevin handles the problem by distinguishing transaction from elements[230] and by arguing that the Spirit's activity in the eucharist is not substantially different from its activity in creation, incarnation, grace ("mystical union") and church. In all these cases, the Spirit works immanently, inwardly, permanently: there is nothing "abrupt" in Christianity;[231] the "supernatural has become itself natural."[232] As a sacrament, the eucharist thus belongs to the "general law of the new creation".[233]

5. Sacraments as "symbols": In The Mystical Presence Nevin did not present a fully developed theory of symbolism, even though, as we have seen, his notion of the "sacramental transaction" implies a definite understanding of symbolic mediation. Unlike J.M. Neale, whose work on the "principle of sacramentality" was investigated in Chapter Four,[234] Nevin never offered a clear set of distinctions between symbol, allegory, type and figure. Nor did Nevin examine, as Coleridge did in the Biographia Literaria, the relation between reason, imagination and symbolism.[235] It would be illegitimate, therefore, to impose too much systematization on Nevin's thinking about symbols as it is revealed in The Mystical Presence. Nevertheless, it is possible to discover some hints about Nevin's view of symbolism, especially as it relates to the doctrine of the eucharist.

Like the earlier medieval scholastics and the Reformers of the sixteenth century, Nevin appealed to Augustine for the common understanding of sacraments as "visible signs of invisible realities" (grace).[236] Moreover, like an Aquinas or a Calvin, Nevin insisted that the connection between "visible sign" and "invisible grace" must be real, not merely notional or representational. Nevin thus rejected the idea that sacraments are merely "noetic", i.e., that they have an effect only on the mind of the believer. For this reason he vigorously opposed Charles Hodge's view that a sacrament merely presents something "to the intelligence so as to be apprehended and enjoyed." This, Nevin argued, is altogether contrary to the Reformed doctrine of the sacraments:

> The Calvinistic doctrine. . .never opposes a simply intellectual presence to a gross sensible presence, but holds either of these--and the first full as much as the last--to be a presence in the sphere of mere nature of flesh.[237]

Along similar lines Nevin repudiated all "representational" or "pictorial" notions about the relationship between visible sign and invisible grace. He particularly opposed Jonathan Edwards' notion of the sacrament as a proxy or picture. In his work On Full Communion, Edwards had written:

> The sacramental elements in the Lord's Supper do represent Christ as a party in covenant, as truly as a proxy represents a prince to a foreign lady in her marriage. . .Or the matter may be more fitly represented by this similitude: it is as if a prince should send an ambassador to a woman in a foreign land, proposing marriage, and by his ambassador should send her his picture, and should desire her to manifest her acceptance of his suit, not only by professing her acceptance in words to his ambassador, but in token of her sincerity openly to take or accept that picture, and to seal her profession by thus representing the matter over again by a symbolic action.[238]

To adopt this position, Nevin argued, is to reduce the sacrament to the level of a "figure, shadow, or sign".[239] This is the logical outcome of both puritanism and rationalism: "the sacraments. . .become signs and signs only."[240] Elsewhere Nevin complained that the puritan view resolves the sacrament into a mere "metaphor" or "figure".[241]

Thus, in those passages in The Mystical Presence where the context is a polemic against the puritan view, Nevin appears to regard "sign", "figure" and "metaphor" as inadequate for expressing the objective reality of the sacraments. In such passages he will sometimes use "symbols" or "sacramental symbols" in order to explain his own view.[242] Elsewhere, however, Nevin freely uses the familiar Augustinian distinction between "signs" and "things signified".[243] There seems to be no strict rule of vocabulary followed by Nevin. He is willing to use either "sign" or "symbol" for the sacrament, so long as one does not reduce their meaning to the level of "bare signs only".[244] Hence, Nevin's argument for the objectivity and reality of the sacrament rests not primarily upon a carefully articulated vocabulary but upon his theory of "seal" and "transaction".[245]

Nevin's critique of Calvin

Our exposition of Nevin's sacramental theory has yielded two significant results: First, it has shown that Nevin's understanding of sacrament is rooted in a theological anthropology dominated by the notions of "organic development" and the "law of inwardness". This anthropology may be characterized as "idealist", and it reveals how strongly Nevin had been influenced by the type of German idealism his colleague Philip Schaff was exposed to as a student of men like F.C. Baur. Secondly, this idealist anthropology sometimes led Nevin to conclusions rather different from those of John Calvin. We have already noted some of those differences. Here it may be useful to summarize them briefly.

1. Calvin's starting point for developing a doctrine of the eucharist as a sacrament is God's unconditional sovereignty disclosed in the utterly free actions of election and predestination.[246] On the other hand, Nevin's starting point is an idealist anthropology that sees the incarnation as the "crown and complement" of creation, as the point of convergence toward which all created nature, through man, is developing. Thus for Nevin incarnation and atonement are immanent within human nature and immanent within the organic process of historical development.[247]

2. Secondly, Calvin views sacraments as real and effective through the power of the Holy Spirit who unites believers to Christ in the "mystical union". But he was hesitant to regard the Spirit as a permanent endowment immanent within ecclesial life, since this might appear to compromise God's unconditional or to divinize the church freedom and sovereignty. Nevin was critical of Calvin's pneumatological realism. He argued that the Spirit acts in the sacramental transaction as a permanent principle immanent within the *ecclesia*.[248]

3. Thirdly, both Calvin and Nevin appealed to the Augustinian distinction between "sign" and "thing signified".[249] Both also acknowledged the relationship between these two aspects of the sacrament as "distinct but inseparable".[250] But whereas Calvin lets the dialectial tension between sign and thing signified stand, Nevin tends to resolve it through his theory of the "sacramental transaction".[251] According to

the interpretation I have offered in this chapter, Nevin understands this transaction as a movement from the "literal" to the "opaque" meaning of the sacramental symbols.[252]

4. Fourthly, Calvin did not recognize any "distinctive gift" offered in the eucharist that is not already bestowed in the "perpetual eating" of faith.[253] Thus in the Institutes he remarked:

> . . .the Sacrament does not cause Christ to begin to be the bread of life; but when it reminds us that he was made the bread of life, which we continually eat, and which gives us a relish and savor of that bread, it causes us to feel the power of that bread. . .I say that we eat Christ's flesh in believing, because it is made ours by faith, and. . .this eating is the result and effect of faith. Or if you want it said more clearly, for them (Lutherans, Roman Catholics) eating is faith; for me it seems rather to follow from faith.[254]

For Calvin the purpose of the eucharist is primarily functional; it serves to concretize and intensify the eating of Christ's body that already happens in faith.[255] Nevin, however, holds for a distinctive and specific gift bestowed in the eucharist that is not necessarily communicated in the act of faith. The mystery of the eucharist is for him "the epitome of the mystery of the Christian salvation itself."[256] It is not sufficient for the eucharist simply to constitute "the most significant and impressive exhibition of the grace of the New Testament."[257] In the sacramental transaction the eucharistic signs become true seals; as such they not only exhibit grace objectively, they also put us directly in touch with the power of Christ's sacrifice through the eating *of a symbolic meal*.[258] Thus the eucharist not only exhibits a real, substantial communion in the body and blood of Christ; it also effects "an actual union with the sacrifice itself".[259] *Transactionally*, the classic signs of a meal-sacrifice (food and drink to be consumed) trigger the movement into their symbolic depth, their "opaque" reality and meaning. In *The Mystical Presence* Nevin thus remarked:

> Under the elements here exhibited (in the eucharist), was offered truly and really the substance itself of which the Passover was only a sign; that is, the *new* covenant in Christ's death, as that in which was verified and fulfilled all that lay included as promise merely in the old. *This is*. . .the new covenant itself, the pledge and *seal* of blessings already come, and *now comprehended in this sacramental transaction*, as ordained for the use of the church, to the end of time. All of course, however, in the way of a living connection with the sacrifice itself. . .*Communion with the covenant involves of necessity communion with the sacrifice*.[260]

In the Lord's Supper, then, there is a distinctive communion with the atoning sacrifice of Christ available *only* in "the transaction", only in the sacramental *eating* and *drinking*. The eucharist not only "intensifies" or "concretizes" the objective exhibition of grace, it also bestows *real communion with Christ's sacrifice* precisely through the transactions of eating and drinking. Nevin was willing, therefore, to admit a notion of sacrifice into his doctrine of the Supper that might have made Calvin uncomfortable. Calvin was willing to use the term "sacrifice" in relation to the eucharist, so long as the term meant that in the eucharist believers are offered the body of Christ that was offered on the cross.

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In this sense Calvin remarked: ". . .we do not eat Christ duly and unto salvation unless he is crucified."[261] But for Nevin the eucharist effects a communion with Christ's sacrifice not in the sense of a reiterated propitiatory act (a common Roman view) nor in the sense, simply, of our participation in the body of Christ that was crucified (Calvin). Rather, communion with the sacrifice is effected in the sacramental transaction itself.

In order to understand Nevin's notion of "eucharistic sacrifice" it is important to recall his view of the incarnation governed, as it is, by the law of organic development and the law of inwardness. The incarnation is not an event that once happened and is now over with; it is a continuing process at the heart of the world's history, the same process that gives rise to church, to the "new creation", to the "mystical union" between Christ and believers: "The supernatural has become itself natural. . .by falling into the regular process of the world's history, so as to form to the end of time indeed its true central stream."[262] Moreover the incarnation, even as a specific mystery pertaining to the person of Christ, is a manifestation of the "law" by which "spirit" must necessarily "incarnate" itself historically (the "law of inwardness").[263] There is thus an organic continuum of process that unites incarnation, church, mystical union, sacrament and eucharist. The relation of Christ to his people is a "strict personal in-being on his own part";[264] the church is the "continuation of the Savior's theanthropic life itself."[265] There is thus an identification of process between those "theanthropic" actions that unfolded historically in Christ's life (including his act of sacrifice and death) and the actions of believers who enjoy fellowship with the "new creation" in the church. Hence it is possible for Nevin to argue that the church's eucharist effects a real communion with the sacrifice of Christ because that sacrifice, although unique in itself, was part of the same historical process that continues to unfold in the world. There are not two processes at work in human history, one that formerly governed the development of Christ's life and another that presently governs the lives of men. There is but one process, revealing itself "in the sphere of our common human existence."[266] The mystery of the eucharist thus belongs to the "general law of the new creation."[267]

These theological differences between Nevin and Calvin are not negligible. Indeed, as will be seen, Nevin felt his own theory of sacrament and eucharist "modif(ied) and improv(ed) very materially the Calvinistic doctrine of Christ's union with his people."[268] Nevin acknowledged quite explicitly that his intention was not a slavish reproduction of the "old Reformed view", although he felt he was substantially faithful to his historical religious tradition:

> . . .in all this the true and proper substance of the old doctrine is preserved. . .We are positive. We cling to the old; in its life, however, rather than by slavish adhesion to its letter. So it must be indeed in the case of all religious truth,

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> dogmatically considered. It cannot hold in the form of dead tradition. But neither can it be disjoined from the life of the past.[269]

For Nevin, then, fidelity to a religious tradition could be sustained only by re-interpreting that tradition according to the organic law of development. Such development was not merely "old dogmas in new words"; it was a substantial progress in the consciousness and understanding of doctrine. It is within the context of these basic theological differences between Nevin and Calvin that we must discuss the former's threefold critique of the latter.

1. Body and Presence: In Chapter Three of The Mystical Presence Nevin outlined three fundamental criticisms of Calvin's eucharistic doctrine. All three of these are related to a single point: the problem of Christ'a real presence, humanity and divinity, in the eucharist and Nevin's reluctance to accept Calvin's pneumatological solution to it.[270] Nevin's own solution to the problem has already been hinted at in our discussion of the "sacramental transaction".[271] Here, however, our concern will center upon the questions of "body" and "presence" as they affect the Christological basis of Nevin's sacramental theory.

John Nevin was hardly the first person to find John Calvin's Christology troublesome. The Reformer's Lutheran opponents in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made much of a text in the Institutes derisively labelled the

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"Extra Calvinisticum".[272] The text in question reads as follows:

> For even if the Word in his immeasurable essence united with the nature of man into one person, we do not imagine that he was confined therein. Here is something marvelous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed to be borne in the virgin's womb, to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross; yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning![273]

The passage is admittedly somewhat ambiguous and theologians unsympathetic to Calvin's views leaped to the conclusion "that it was characteristically Calvinist to teach that after the Incarnation the Eternal Son had an existence *etiam extra carnem*."[274] This, of course, sounded perilously close to the position commonly attributed to Nestorius: that the Incarnate Word had not only two natures but two *persons* as well. Calvin, however, had explicitly repudiated the Nestorian Christology in the *Institutes*:

> We therefore hold that Christ, as he is God and man, consisting of two natures united but not mingled, is our Lord and the true Son of God even according to, but not by reason of, his humanity. Away with the error of Nestorius, who is wanting to pull apart rather than distinguish the nature of Christ devised a double Christ![275]

But despite such protestations on Calvin's part, the charges of "Nestorianizing" did not easily vanish. It is possible that polemical preoccupations with the utter freedom and transcendence of God led Calvin to minimize the importance of the "bodily presence" of Christ during his public ministry.[276] It is possible, too, that this minimizing left Calvin open to the charge that he had "split" Christ into two persons: the one, utterly transcendent, divine and sovereign; the other, human and subject to the weaknesses of mortal flesh. Moreover, there are passages in the Institutes that do seem to disparage the salvific significance of Christ's flesh; for example:

> But the flesh of Christ does not of itself have a power so great as to quicken us, for in its first condition it was subject to mortality; and now, endowed with immortality, it does not live through itself. Nevertheless, since it is pervaded with fulness of life to be transmitted to us, it is rightly called 'life-giving'.[277]

It is the opinion of two contemporary students of Calvin's thought, however, that the Reformer was neither a Nestorian nor one who emphasized the divinity of the Incarnate Word at the expense of his humanity. Both E. David Willis and Kilian McDonnell conclude, from their extensive study of Calvin's writings, that the latter maintained both the oneness of Christ's personhood and the perpetual union between his divine and human natures.[278] Nevertheless, both Willis and McDonnell admit that Calvin was extraordinarily defensive when faced with any attempt to "mix" the two natures of Christ.[279] For Calvin, man must remain man and God must remain God--even when the two are joined in the person of Christ.[280] In Christ both humanity and divinity must be integral, unmixed. This is the case in all dimensions of Christology, whether one is dealing with the earthly life of the Incarnate Word or with the risen and ascended Lord of the church. As McDonnell has observed:

> Calvin is on the defensive against any attempt to mix the two natures. The Godhead of Christ fills

> all things, and although it is joined to the humanity and dwells in it, the Godhead is not bound to the humanity. One can predicate no dependence of the divinity of the humanity, not even in the smallest degree. . .The divinity, unmixed and undivided, does not limit itself to the humanity, but while dwelling there, remains also entirely outside of the humanity.[281]

Thus, Calvin's insistence on the integral and unmixed character of Christ's natures also holds firm in his view of the risen and ascended Lord. Through the resurrection and ascension Christ loses neither humanity nor divinity. Nor are the two natures mixed.[282] Rather, the exalted Lord, human and divine, becomes present to his people in a new way through the power of the Holy Spirit.

This last point--the presence of the glorified Christ to his people through the power of the Spirit--is crucial for understanding Calvin's Christology and also for grasping Nevin's objections to it as it relates to the doctrine of the eucharist. Calvin is clear; through the ascension Christ's bodily presence has really left us.[283] One cannot, therefore, accurately speak of any local presence of the ascended Christ on earth. But if this is true, how can one explain Christ's genuine presence to believers through faith, grace and the sacraments? Calvin answers this question by rejecting any notion of the ubiquity of Christ's glorified human nature and by appealing, as we have seen, to the action of the Spirit who effects both the mystical union between Christ and believers, and the real presence of the Lord in the sacrament of the Supper.

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Nevin did not dispute the power of the Spirit in effecting the mystical union and the real presence of Christ in the eucharist. But there were two things about Calvin's "pneumatological solution" that bothered him. The first--Calvin's tendency to regard the Spirit's action in the church as "occasional" and somewhat adventitious--has already been discussed.[284] The second concerned the way in which the Spirit mediates the presence of Christ's body to believers in the sacrament of the eucharist. To Nevin's way of thinking, Calvin's view of humanity failed to make an adequate distinction between "flesh" ("organized matter", "material volume"), and "the proper identity of a human body."[285]

Nevin thus sought to correct Calvin's understanding of bodiliness and of presence. He did this by appealing to the "law of inwardness", a prominent principle of his idealist anthropology. Like all ideas, the idea of the human body must find visible, historical manifestation: "what is inward and invisible," Nevin argued, must "gain for itself a true outward existence."[286] Nevin's view of the "Idea" was very similar to the thinking of people like F.C. Baur and S.T. Coleridge.[287] In an essay on "Human Freedom" originally published in 1848, Nevin gave clear expression to this idealist philosophy:

> All created life exists under two aspects and includes in itself what may be denominated a twofold form of being. In one view it is something individual and single, the particular revelation as such by which, in any given case, it

> makes itself known in the actual world. In another view, it is a general, universal force, which lies back of all such revelation, and communicates to this its true significance and power. In this form it is an *Idea*, not an abstraction or notion simply, fabricated by the understanding to represent its own sense of a certain common character. . .but the inmost substantial nature of these objects themselves, which goes before them, in the order of existence. . .and finds its perpetual manifestation through their endlessly diversified forms. All life is at once Ideal and actual, and in this respect at once single and universal . . .These two forms of existence are opposite but not. . .contradictory; their opposition involves, on the contrary, the most intimate and necessary union. The Ideal is not the actual, and the actual is not, as such, the Ideal; separately considered, each is the full negation of what is affirmed in the other, and still they cannot be held for one moment asunder. The Ideal can have no reality except in the form of the actual, and the actual can have no truth save as it is filled with the presence of the Ideal. Each subsists only by inseparable union with its opposite. . .[283]

This important text reveals a number of things about Nevin's view of *ideas*. They are: 1) *real*, not a fabricated construction of the mind; 2) *continually manifested in history*; 3) *distinct from the "actual", yet intimately and necessarily united with it*. It is also important to notice that for Nevin *all* life is simultaneously governed by these two "zones" of being: the ideal and the actual. Moreover, the *proper identity* of anything real and actual is to be found in its *idea*, for the idea is "the inmost substantial nature of these objects. . .in the order of existence."

In *The Mystical Presence*, Nevin applies this notion of "idea" to the phenomenon of human bodiliness. The *idea* of the body demands *actual* expression through visible form, organized matter. But the proper identity of the body must never be confused with its material form. Thus Nevin observed:

> The principle of the body as a system of life, the original salient point of its being as a whole, is in no respect material. It is not bound of course, for its identity, to any particular portion of matter as such. If the matter which enters into its constitution were changed every hour, it would still remain the same body. . .[289]

Precisely because ideas must disclose themselves through "endlessly diversified forms" the proper identity of the human body can never be "locally contained" by those forms.[290] This is not to deny, for example, that the forms of human bodily life are _real_ and _actual_. Rather, it is to affirm that, in the case of the "ideal" and the "actual", "_each subsists only by inseparable union with its opposite_."[291] Thus to the question "what gives the human body its proper _identity_?", Nevin would have replied: "its _idea_." And to the subsequent question "does this mean that the human body is somehow a mere shadow or ghost of the ideal?", Nevin would have replied: "No; because the ideal itself can have no reality except in terms of the actual."

According to Nevin the _same organic law_ which demands that ideas "incarnate" themselves holds both in the order of nature and in the order of grace.[292] What is said of the humanity of ordinary persons must also be said of Christ's humanity. In both cases the proper identity of the human body is "inseparable but distinct" from its visible historical manifestation. As _incarnate_ and as _glorified_, the proper identity of Christ's human body is constituted by its idea and is thus not "materially contained" by any place or locale.[293] This does not, however, mean that Christ's body, as incarnate and as glorified, is everywhere (the doctrine of ubiquity). To say this would be to confuse the proper characteristics of the ideal and the actual. For while the ideal is "general and universal", the actual is always "individual and single".[294] If Christ's human body were "everywhere", it would actually be nowhere at all.

Thus Nevin would have been quite willing to agree with Calvin that through the resurrection and ascension, the presence of Christ's human body has "really left us".[295] Nevin would also have conceded that, speaking in "local" terms, Christ's glorified human body is "at the right hand of God in heaven".[296] But Nevin objected quite vigorously to the notion that if Christ's human body is in "heaven" (locally speaking) it can enter into relationship with earthly human persons only through a "somewhat awkward and violent" operation of the Holy Spirit.[297] An appeal to some extraordinary action of the Spirit that puts earthly believers into a real relationship with the glorified body of Christ is, according to Nevin, quite unnecessary. Calvin's problem resulted from a confusion between the ideal and the actual, between the "proper identity of the human body" and "the material volume it is found to embrace as exhibited to the senses."[298] Whether one is speaking of the incarnate life of Christ or of his glorified humanity, the distinction between "ideal" and "actual" remains the same. The same organic law holds in both instances. So long as the proper relation (distinct but inseparable) between ideal and actual is carefully maintained, there is no danger of "localizing" the presence of Christ's body either in the mystery of the incarnation or in the mystery of his resurrection and ascension. This is why Nevin felt Calvin made far too much of the problem of "local presence" in the doctrine of the eucharist:

> . . .too much account is made perhaps of the flesh of Christ under a local form (here confined to the right hand of God in heaven), as the seat and fountain of the new life that is to be conveyed into his people; and the attempt which is then made to bring the two parties together, notwithstanding such vast separation in space, must be allowed to be somewhat awkward and violent.[299]

What Calvin lacked, Nevin insisted, was an adequate distinction between "flesh" (material volume) and the true identity of a "body" (its idea). Calvin tended to equate "flesh" with "body" and was thus faced with two almost insurmountable difficulties: 1) either the glorified human flesh of Christ is locally present in two places at once (in heaven, at the eucharist), or 2) Christ's glorified body can have no real relationship with earthly believers. In either case the full integral humanity of the risen and ascended Lord would have been compromised. Calvin's solution, Nevin observed, was pneumatological: the glorified humanity of Christ is "locally" present only in heaven; but it enters into a real relationship with believers through an extraordinary operation (Nevin calls it "miraculous energy") of the Holy Spirit.[300]

According to Nevin, it is not that Calvin's pneumatological solution is wrong, it is simply unnecessary because the problem was a false one in the first place. "Flesh" is not the same thing as "body", even if there is an inseparable connection between the two. It would be better to say that "flesh: body :: actual: ideal." Both flesh and body are real; neither of them is a ghost or a shadow or a chimera. But according to its proper "idea", the body can never be "localized", confined to a material place. Thus it is quite possible to affirm that in the eucharist Christ's real glorified human body is really present and is really communicated to believers. In no way does this imply that those who participate in the eucharist tactually mix themselves with the material particles of Christ's glorified human flesh. Nor does it imply that Christ's glorified human body is somehow contained and confined by the material elements of the eucharist (bread and wine). Since an "idea" is the "inmost substantial nature" of an object,[301] Christians can affirm that Christ's glorified human body is really, objectively and substantially exhibited and offered in the sacrament of the Supper.[302]

In all cases, then, the true principle of identity for the human body is its idea, not its material volume. One can quite readily acknowledge that Christ's real human body is exhibited in the sacramental transaction of the eucharist without falling into the fallacy of assuming that particles of Christ's flesh are somehow "inserted" into the bodies of believers. Nevin thus comments:

> A real communication. . .between the body of Christ and the bodies of his saints, does not imply necessarily the gross imagination of any transition of his flesh as such into their persons. This would be indeed of no meaning or value. For how could the flesh of Christ as something sundered from the law of life in the presence of which only it can have any force, and in this form supernaturally inserted into my flesh under the like abstract view, bring with it any advantage or profit?[303]

It must be remembered that "ideal", for Nevin, is not the opposite of "real". Indeed, just the opposite is true. It is the idea that gives the actual its "power and truth." At the same time, what is real depends upon the inseparable (but unconfused) union between the ideal and the actual. Thus Nevin wrote in his essay on "Human Freedom":

> The claims of the particular (actual). . .are just as valid and full as the claims of the general (ideal). We have no right to push either aside in order to make room for the other. The Ideal or general cannot subsist without the actual or particular, and it is equally impossible for this last to subsist without the first. They can subsist both, only in and by each other; and it is this mutual comprehension and inbeing of the two precisely, which gives life its proper realness and truth. The real is not the actual as such nor the Ideal as such, but the actual and Ideal perfectly blended together, as the presence of the same fact.[304]

This passage is extremely important because it reveals, germinally, how Nevin was able to handle the question of Christ's real presence in the eucharist without appealing to the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation, to the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity, or to the pneumatological realism of Calvin. While Nevin distinguishes "flesh" from "body", he

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does not separate them. To separate them would have been to fall into just the opposite of what Nevin considered to be Calvin's error (a confusion of "flesh" and "spirit"). Nevin was not saying, for example, that the glorified "flesh" of Christ is in heaven, while the "body" is exhibited in the eucharist. This would have destroyed the intrinsic unity of Christ's glorified human nature. Rather, Nevin seems to have been arguing for two things:

1. The "ideal" may express itself in "endlessly diversified forms".[305] These forms are not accidental or negligible; indeed, without them, the ideal "cannot subsist".[306] Thus, the idea of the human body must express itself in visible forms, (organic law of "inwardness": spirit must seek to "incarnate" itself) but these forms may be quite diversified and various.

2. This "law" also applies to the humanity of Christ as incarnate and glorified. Thus, the idea of Christ's glorified body must express itself--and, in fact, it does. Locally, the idea of Christ's glorified body is really manifested in the Lord who "sits at the right hand of God in heaven." Sacramentally, the idea of Christ's glorified body is exhibited in the transactions of eating and drinking. In both cases, the ideal expresses itself in the actual. In both cases, too, the principle of identity in Christ's glorified body remains the same idea. Both examples (local presence in heaven; sacramental presence in the eucharist) satisfy Nevin's criterion for what is real: "the real is not the actual as

such nor the Ideal as such, but the actual and Ideal perfectly blended together, as the presence of the same fact."[307] And while both these presences are real, neither of them needs to be confused with or opposed to the other. Both are true manifestations of Christ's glorified body; both are real; both maintain the integrity and unity of Christ's human nature.

Nevin thus rejected all three alternatives mentioned above as explanations for Christ's real presence in the eucharist: transubstantiation, ubiquity, and pneumatological realism. Transubstantiation, if interpreted as a kind of "local incorporation" of Christ's material flesh into the elements of bread and wine, ends up by confusing "local" presence with sacramental presence.[308] The doctrine of ubiquity compromises the integrity and unity of Christ's human nature in its glorified state.[309] And the pneumatological solution of Calvin, while not "wrong", is forced and unnecessary.[310]

The key to Nevin's understanding of real presence in the eucharist was thus the "organic law" of development and "inwardness" (spirit seeking to incarnate itself; the idea manifesting itself in visible forms). This single organic law is the same in the order of grace and in the order of nature. It governs the entire sweep of Christian anthropology: creation, man, incarnation, resurrection-destiny, church and sacrament. In all cases the law is the same: "to be real, the human, as such, and of course the divine also in human form, must ever externalize its inward life."[311] No further appeal was necessary in order to make sense of the Christian confession that the glorified Christ's true body and blood are exhibited, offered and received in the sacrament of the Supper. The form of the sacramental transaction is one of the ways in which the idea of Christ's glorified humanity manifests itself in the visible, historical life of the world. The fact that Christ's presence in the eucharist is "spiritual" does not make it less real. This is true for two reasons: first, because the manifestation of the ideal in the actual is what consistutes reality;[312] and secondly, because the principle of the body's identity is not its "material volume" but its idea.[313] As Nevin put the matter: ". . .the participation of Christ's life in the sacrament, is in no sense corporal, but altogether spiritual as the necessary condition of its being real."[314]

Nevin's first (and major) criticism of Calvin was thus developed by an argument in three stages. It will be useful to point out those stages here:

1. The argument begins with an axiom common to post-Kantain idealist philosophy: there is a single organic law that governs all human and historical development. That law demands that the ideal must disclose itself in the actual; spirit must incarnate itself in visible historical forms. This disclosure shows that the real is constituted by "the actual and Ideal perfectly blended together."[315] Thus, spirit and form, the ideal and the actual, are distinct--even

opposed--yet inseparable. For in this sort of idealism, as Gerald McCool has noted, "an idea defined itself over against its opposites. A developing idea became what it was by excluding what it was not."[316]

2. This same organic law operates in the sphere of nature and in the sphere of grace. That this is so is revealed most vigorously in the incarnation. For in the mystery of the Word made flesh, "the supernatural has become itself natural. . .by falling into the regular process of the world's history, so as to form to the end of time indeed its true central stream."[317] Thus the incarnation is a "moment" (albeit a most critical one) within Nevin's larger framework of theological anthropology. That larger framework portrays the whole created order as straining toward completion in the church and, ultimately, in the full resurrection-destiny when human bodies are "transfigured into the image of the Spirit."[318]

3. Finally, Nevin's view of the idea of Christ's glorified body permits him to affirm both the realness and the spiritualness of the eucharistic presence. For since the body's principle of identity is not material, it is possible to admit a real presence that is not "local and corporal" and to acknowledge a spiritual presence that is not unreal. Appeals to an extraordinary operation of the Spirit by which believers are united to Christ in the Supper are thus superfluous.

Unlike Calvin, therefore, Nevin held for a distinctive gift/presence of Christ in the eucharist that differed from the real relation to believers through faith and grace. The eucharist is more than simply a functional intensification or concretization of the "perpetual eating" done by faith. In the form of the sacramental transaction, the idea of Christ's glorified humanity really and substantially expresses itself, becomes actual in the human lives of believers.

2. The unity of Christ's person: Nevin's second criticism of Calvin's eucharistic theology flows logically from the first:

> . . .Calvin's theory. . .fails to insist, with proper freedom and emphasis, on the absolute unity of what we denominate "person", both in the case of Christ himself and in the case of his people.[319]

In this criticism, too, we will see Nevin's theological anthropology and his notion of "organic wholeness" and development at work.[320] Here Nevin's primary concern is to defend the idea that in the sacrament of the eucharist a real communication with the humanity of Christ takes place.

We have already seen, for example, that Calvin's preoccupation with the sovereignty of God led him to be defensive about any tendency to "mix" the divine and human natures of Christ.[321] Even within the unity of Christ's personhood, God must remain God and man must remain man.[322] Christ's divinity is in no sense bound to the humanity or dependent upon it.[323] As we have seen, further, Calvin's emphasis on the utter independence of the divine sometimes led him to minimize the soteriological significance of Christ's human flesh: "the flesh of Christ does not of itself have a power so great as to quicken us."[324]

Despite this minimizing tendency, however, Calvin did not totally reject a partaking of the humanity of Christ in the mystery of the Supper. In his Short Treatise on the Holy Supper of our Lord and only Saviour Jesus Christ (1540), Calvin wrote:

> . . .we shall confess without doubt that to deny the true communication of Jesus Christ to be offered us in the Supper is to render this holy sacrament frivolous and useless. . .Moreover, if the reason for communicating with Jesus Christ is in order that we have part and portion in all the gifts which he has procured for us by his death, it is not only a matter of being partakers of his Spirit; it is necessary also to partake of his humanity, in which he rendered complete obedience to God his Father, to satisfy our debts; though rightly speaking, the one cannot be without the other.[325]

On this point, however, Calvin's thought reveals the dialectical tension characteristic of his Christology and eucharistic doctrine.[326] For there are passages in the 1559 edition of the Institutes that seem to challenge the text just quoted from the Short Treatise. Calvin quotes Augustine's Commentary on the Gospel of John, for example:

> According to the presence of his majesty, we have Christ always; but according to the presence of the flesh, it is rightly said, "You will not always have me."[327]

This citation is, of course, a part of Calvin's argument that the communion of Christ's body and blood "takes place by the power of the Holy Spirit, not by that feigned inclusion of the body itself under the element."[328] As such, the text cannot be advanced as "proof" that Calvin intended to deny any real participation of believers in Christ's humanity in the eucharist. Furthermore, the larger context of Calvin's quotation from Augustine is a discussion of the *ascended* Christ, who is no longer bodily present on earth--a point with which Nevin would have agreed.

Nevin's second criticism does not imply, therefore, that Calvin denied any presence of Christ's humanity in the eucharist. Rather, Nevin argued that

> the view taken (by Calvin) of Christ's human nature becomes altogether *too abstract*, and it is made difficult to keep hold of the idea of a true organic connection between his life in this form, and that of his people.[329]

Calvin's fear of "mixing" Christ's divine and human natures, coupled with his dread of compromising either of those natures through some notion of "local" (material) presence, caused him, in Nevin's opinion, to lose sight of the difference between "a communication of the substance of Christ's life" and "an influence in the way of mere spiritual power."[330] This at least left Calvin open to the charge that his eucharistic doctrine was "virtualistic", i.e., that the sacrament conveys nothing more than the "spiritual power" (*virtus*) of Christ's glorified body.[331]

Once more, Nevin sought to improve on Calvin's vulnerable position by stressing the "organic connection" between the humanity of Christ and the humanity of believers. The humanity of the glorified Lord is not abstract, nor is it inaccessible to people (except through a quasi-miraculous operation of the Spirit), nor is it absent from the transaction of the Supper. In order to avoid the theological hazards of a localized presence it is not necessary to minimize the significance of Christ's flesh or to subordinate his humanity to the utterly transcendent power of his divinity. Nevin suspected that Calvin's admission of a presence of Christ's humanity in the eucharist was reluctant. Such reluctance, Nevin asserted, is unnecessary and indeed inappropriate:

> Christ's person is one, and the person of the believer is one; and to secure a real communication of the whole human life of the first over into the personality of the second, it is only necessary that the communication should spring from the center of Christ's life and pass over to the center of ours. This can be only by the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit in this case is not to be sundered from the person of Christ.[332]

The oneness of Christ's person in the incarnation is not lost in the resurrection and ascension. Nor does Christ's glorified human nature become "abstract", even though his bodily presence is withdrawn from earth and his flesh is now "at the right hand of God in heaven." Through the incarnation, the presence of Christ's human nature in history remains real and immanent, not tangential or outward. And since human nature does not depend for its identity on material volume (physical local presence), the same law that operated in the incarnation to bring the humanity of Christ into organic solidarity with history and with persons continues to operate, irreversibly, in the case of the glorified Lord.

All this, Nevin admits, could happen "only by the Holy Spirit." But the Spirit, after all, did not wait for Jesus' death and exaltation to begin its work. Through the incarnation the Spirit was brought "into the sphere of the human existence as such."[333] Moreover, Nevin maintained,

> The Spirit was never brought near to men before, as now through the incarnate Word. It dwelt in him without measure. Humanity itself was filled completely with its presence. . .[334]

Through the power of the Spirit at work in Jesus' incarnation, then, the Lord's real humanity has been brought into permanent and irreversible solidarity with "human existence as such." This union is not "local" but real, i.e., it is the "perfect blending" of the ideal and the actual "as the presence of the same fact."[335] Moreover, the union is irreversible; it is intensified by the resurrection, not enfeebled by it or rendered "abstract".

Once again, therefore, Nevin finds it quite unnecessary to invoke an extraordinary operation of the Spirit in order to effect the relationship between the glorified humanity of Christ and human persons. The key to the "mystical union" of grace and the "mystical presence" of eucharist lies with the organic law already disclosed in the incarnation. It is the same law that discloses the inseparable unity of Christ's person in his divine and human natures, the same law that establishes the irreversible communion between Christ's humanity and believers. According to Nevin, real participation in Christ's humanity does not become more remote as a result of the resurrection and ascension. The body of the risen and ascended Christ is *not* more inaccessible simply because his fleshly form has been withdrawn from earthly sight. The *idea* of that body continues irreversibly to express itself in the *form* of the "sacramental transaction", without any danger of localization or crass physical "transition" of Christ's glorified flesh into our own.[336]

Nevin's insistence on the organic *unity* of Christ's person reveals how significant the *starting point* of one's eucharistic theology is. As we have seen, Nevin and Calvin begin from two different positions.[337] Calvin begins with the proposition that God must be *God*, completely free, unconditioned and transcendent. It is this sovereign Lord who elects men in faith and unites them with Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit. But God remains unbound by church and sacrament. The eucharist puts no special claim on God; it is a moment within that "perpetual eating" in faith through which believers really and spiritually participate in Christ's body and blood. Hence the Lord's Supper does not offer believers any gift new and different from faith; it functions, rather, to *concretize* what is already being given in the mystical union of grace.

On the other hand, Nevin begins with the *incarnation*, the fullest disclosure of that organic law which unites creation to man and man to God. For Nevin, the incarnation manifests God's irreversible decision to "fall into the regular process of the world's history."[338] For this reason

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the visible church and its sacraments become the actual forms in which the idea of Christ's person really discloses itself. As one such form, the sacramental transaction of eucharist offers a real and distinctive participation in all the acts of Christ incarnate, crucified and glorified. For "the acts of the incarnate Word belong to his person as a whole . . .They are exercised by the theanthropic person of the Mediator, as one and indivisible."[339]

Thus Nevin's understanding of the unity of Christ's person is not limited simply to the Chalcedonian confession of two natures, inseparable yet unmixed, in a single divine personhood.[340] He translates Chalcedon's language about "natures" and "person" into idealist categories of "organic historical process", "form" and "idea". The unity of Christ's person is constituted by (transcendent) "idea" and (historical) "form". When "idea" becomes incarnate in historical form ("the actual"), an indivisible--yet unconfused --unity results. In the incarnate Word, however, the "idea" embraces both all that is man and all that is God. Christ is thus both "divine idea" (God's own complete self-expression or utterance: Word) and "human idea" (the ultimate expression of humanity), actually disclosed in visible form and immanently present within the process of history itself. Given this idealist version of Christology, Nevin's references to Christ as "the true ideal Man"[341] or as "the universal Man", the "archetypal man"[342] must not be dismissed too quickly. Christ is "ideal", "universal" and "archetypal" not because he is a kind of "moral exemplar" who set high behavioral standards for human living, but because in him the ideas of human consciousness and human personality--and thus of human nature itself--achieved full actualization.[343] This last point will become particularly important as we turn to Nevin's third criticism of Calvin's eucharistic doctrine.

3. The ideal (general) and the actual (individual): If Christ is both a specific historical man and "the true ideal Man", then in him the necessary union between the ideal (general, universal) and the actual (specific, individual) is fully demonstrated. Nevin wrote:

> In every sphere of life, the individual and the general are found closely united in the same subject. . . .the whole general existence thus produced is bound together, inwardly and organically, by as true and close a unity as that which holds in any of the single existences embraced in it, separately considered.[344]

Moreover, it is this unity between the ideal and the actual that discloses the proper meaning of human consciousness and human personality.

a) Consciousness: "Consciousness," Nevin remarked in his essay on "Human Freedom", "is itself emphatically the apprehension of the particular and single, in the presence of the universal."[345] As "self-conscious, self-active spirit",[346] man possesses himself as a subject freely open to reality as a whole. Human self-consciousness implicitly affirms the "universal" in its apprehension of the "particular and single".[347] Thus, according to Nevin there are two fundamental characteristics of human consciousness: 1) on the one hand, it is "reflexive": it is self-possession, self-consciousness--the immediate awareness and grasp of the self as opposed to what is "not-self" (all other objects); 2) on the other hand, it is spirit--a radical "transcendental" openness to the whole of reality (the whole of "being"). For Nevin, as for Coleridge, consciousness (man's self-possession as spirit) is the real constitutive and primordial act of knowing that satisfies two fundamental conditions for all knowledge: a) the simultaneous presence of "knower" (subject) and "thing known" (object); and b) the coincidence and union of these two.[348] Self-consciousness, thus defined, is the a priori condition of possibility for all human acts of knowing and willing. As Nevin put it, "All knowledge begins. . .in the consciousness of self."[349]

b) Personality: Moreover, this reflexive, "transcendental" consciousness allows man to possess himself in knowledge as a free subject, a person.[350] Human personality is consequently both "ideal" and "actual", universal and particular. Nevin defined it as follows:

> Personality is, by its very conception, the power of a strictly universal life, revealing itself through an individual existence as its necessary medium. The universal is not simply in the individual here blindly, as in the case of the lower world, but knows itself, also, has possession of itself, in this form, so far, at least, as the man has come to be actually what he is required to be by his own constitution. The perfection of his nature is found just in this, that as an individual, inseparably linked in this respect to the world of nature,. . .he shall yet recognize in himself the authority of reason, in its true universal character, and yield himself to it spontaneously as the proper form of his own being. . .The person is necessarily individual;

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> but in becoming personal, the individual life is itself made to transcend its own limits, and maintains its separate reality, only by merging itself completely in the universal life which it is called to represent.[351]

It is this vision of human personality, this power of a personal individual life to grasp itself as a conscious subject and at the same time "to transcend its own limits", that constitutes the real distinctiveness of man in the order of nature. For as we have seen in our discussion of Nevin's theological anthropology, man gives light and intelligibility to a creation that is otherwise dark, unintelligible and unfree.[352] Man is not simply one object among many others in the created order. He is also, in the strictest sense of the term, a subject "having possession of itself, and capable of self-action."[353] Man's personal, self-transcending subjectivity is what makes him radically "free" in a created world otherwise "held in slavish bondage to its own law":

> It is only in the sphere of self-conscious spirit, then, that individual independence becomes possible. Hence it involves two things, the light of intelligence and the power of choice. Both of these, in their very nature, refer to an individual center, or self, from which their activity is made to radiate, and towards which, again, it is found continually to return. All knowledge begins and stands perpetually in the consciousness of self; and every act of the will may be denominated, at the same time, an act of self-apprehension.[354]

We may therefore recapitulate Nevin's argument about what constitutes free, self-conscious, personal subjectivity as follows:

1. Human nature is fundamentally characterized by "reaching after" a "true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life."[355] This intrinsic "outreach" of the human spirit is quite similar to what the medieval scholastics meant by the term "potentia obedientialis", which may be defined as follows:

> The intrinsic being of man is called an "obediential potency" for supernatural grace, insofar as, in virtue of his spiritual transcendence to all being, man is open to God's self-communication, which can only be imparted to a creature whose nature does not confine it to a particular sphere of existence.[356]

2. Man's "outreach" for God discloses itself primordially in his nature as "self-conscious spirit".[357] As "spirit", man possesses himself as a free, self-transcending personal subject in the created world.

3. Human personality is thus simultaneously ideal and actual, universal and particular, capable of possessing itself individually and of transcending itself through a fundamental openness to the whole of reality, the whole of being.

4. Hence, the fact that every man is both particular (this man, living in this place at this time) and universal (sharing in a humanity common to all times and places) is rooted in the very structure of "self-conscious spirit" itself, which is both reflexive and transcendental.

5. As the "ideal" or "archetypal" man, Christ's "person is the root, in the presence and power of which only all other personalities can stand."[358] Put in a slightly

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different way, Christ is the "supreme example of personality", i.e., of free, self-conscious subjectivity.[359] The fact that, according to the Chalcedonian Christology, Jesus' human nature is said to subsist in the divine person of the Logos, does not make the humanity of Christ less "personal" in the sense of that term as used by Nevin.[360]

Nevin's analysis of human personality and of Christ as the supreme example of it gave him a way to deal with the significance of humanity (both ours and Christ's) in the eucharist. Because the structure of self-conscious spirit is both reflexive and transcendental, it is quite possible for one free human subjectivity to be really present to another such subjectivity without any danger of "local physical mixture"--and without any compromise of the distinct individuality of either personal subject. Nevin wrote:

> The distinction of an individual and a general life in the person of Christ, is just as necessary as the same distinction in the person of Adam; and the analogy is at all events sufficient to show that there may be a real communication of Christ's life to his people, without the idea of anything like a local mixture with his person.[361]

This text from The Mystical Presence must be read in the light of Nevin's comments about human consciousness, personality and subjectivity in the essay on "Human Freedom". The latter essay makes it clear that the relation between universal (ideal) and particular (actual) in man is not simply the relation between "biological species" (homo sapiens) and "example" (John Doe). While true, this last relation (biological species: example) would not be sufficient to disclose how the universal and the particular are united in the structure of human subjectivity itself. Thus the essay on "Human Freedom" clarifies Nevin's thinking by pointing out the relation between reflexivity and transcendence in the human personality (i.e., in the "self-conscious spirit").

In the eucharist a real presence and communion occurs between the personality Christ and the personalities of believers. Since such personality is structurally constituted by human nature as spirit, freedom and transcendence, there is no need to hold that the real inter-subjective communion between Christ and believers is in any way dependent upon a localized material presence of the Lord in the Supper. Nor is there any need to invoke an extraordinary operation of the Spirit to explain the union between Christ and the faithful. The single organic law that governs human nature, in Christ and in us, is sufficient to explain both the possibility and the fact of such presence.

It must not be thought, however, than in speaking of a real inter-subjective communion between Christ and believers in the eucharist Nevin has reduced the meaning of the sacrament to a mere psychological event. Christ's "personality" is not to be identified simply with moral influence or with the power of an important historical figure.[362] "The acts of the incarnate Word belong to his person as a whole," said Nevin.[363] And since the whole human person cannot be thought of without the body.[364] it should be clear that Nevin did not regard the personality as some kind of floating "spiritual abstraction", utterly disassociated from bodily life. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Nevin was quick to point out that the body does not depend, for its proper identity, on physical material volume.[365] Given this understanding of personality and bodiliness, it is easy to see why Nevin constantly insisted on a real communion with the *person* of Christ in the Supper: the eucharist "involves a real incorporation into Christ; and. . .this includes a special respect to his *human nature*--his flesh and blood--as given for the life of the world;"[366] in the sacrament believers find communion "in the true *person* of Christ. . . His *humanity* forms the medium of his union with the church,"[367] there must be "a real participation. . .in the life of his *person*."[368] In the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the *whole Christ* is really present in his full human nature (personality and bodiliness).

Nevin's idealist version of theological anthropology thus provided him with a solution to the problem of real presence in the eucharist that was different from both local (material, physical) and pneumatological theories. None of the factors required for a full human presence--bodiliness, personality, communicability--depend on material volume for their proper identity and realness. Nor do any of these factors require the invocation of some special action of the Spirit to "meet the wants of the case."[369] Nevin needed to appeal only to the single organic law that governs all human life and development in order to defend his thesis that the full humanity of Christ, incarnate and glorified, is truly present in the eucharist.

How is such presence possible? Through the sacramental transaction.[370] The literal signs of bread eaten and wine drunk trigger a movement into the "depth" ("opaque intentionality") of the eucharistic symbol. For Nevin the transaction is a form of real symbolic mediation. By direct engagement in the actions of eating and drinking, the full human nature of Christ is made really present to believers and they are made present to him. Thus the presence of Christ's body in the sacrament is "not bound to the bread and wine, but to the act of eating and drinking."[371] The presence of Christ is thus as real as the transactions of eating and drinking are.

Nevin's threefold critique of Calvin involves, therefore, a substantial reinterpretation of several key points in eucharistic doctrine: body and presence; the unity of Christ's person; and the notion of Christ's "personality". On all these points Nevin's theological anthropology, outlined earlier in this chapter, has an important bearing.[372] While he did not deny the role of the Spirit in the eucharist, Nevin regarded Calvin's "pneumatological realism" as unnecessary at best and awkward at worst. Thus, while Nevin honored the principle of fidelity to the "old Reformed tradition" formulated in the sixteenth century, he felt obligated to move beyond it. For as he was to say more than twenty years after the appearance of The Mystical Presence:

"the sixteenth century. . .cannot, by any means, be taken for the consummation of all Christian truth."[373]

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to expose John Nevin's sacramental theory and eucharistic doctrine as they are contained in his most important work on the subject, The Mystical Presence. We have seen that Nevin's thinking embraces three major areas: 1) theological anthropology; 2) an understanding of sacrament; and 3) a critique of Calvin's eucharistic theology. In all three areas Nevin's commitment to philosophical principles of idealism is evident. In this, he shared a point of view common to other prominent thinkers of the first half of the nineteenth century. For as we have seen in Chapters Two and Three, the philosophy of the "idea" had its impact on men like F.C. Baur, S.T. Coleridge and J.A. Moehler--all of whom exerted influence on the Mercersburg theology of church.

In The Mystical Presence it was not Nevin's intention simply to reproduce the eucharistic theology of the sixteenth century. He acknowledged that the doctrine of the Reformers was "embarrassed with some difficulties."[374] These difficulties Nevin sought to resolve by placing the entire sacramental question "in its proper scientific form".[375] I have attempted in this chapter to investigate how Nevin went about this task. The results of this investigation may be summarized as follows:

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1. Nevin reinterpreted both the anthropological and the Christological foundations of eucharistic doctrine by "translating" the traditional doctrines of creation, man, Christ, church and sacrament into idealist categories.

2. Central to Nevin's reinterpretation is what I have called his "law of inwardness". *Spirit* must ever seek to "incarnate" itself in the visible forms of historical life. *Ideas* must reveal themselves in a successive series of disclosures: creation discloses its *idea* in man; man in Christ; Christ in church and sacrament. These disclosures are *real* manifestations of meaning and intelligibility and they occur in the ordinary process of historical *development*. What is *real* must therefore be defined in terms of the dialectical relation between *idea* and *form*, *ideal* and *actual*, *universal* and *particular*. As Nevin remarked in his essay on "Human Freedom", "The *real* is not the actual as such, nor the Ideal as such, but the actual and Ideal perfectly blended together, as the presence of the same fact."[376]

3. Thus, to the question, "*What* is *really present* in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper?", Nevin would have replied: the *whole person* of Christ in his glorified humanity and in his divine power as Son of God, through the action of the Holy Spirit.

4. To the question, "*How* is such a real presence *possible?*", Nevin might have replied that he made three important distinctions:

a. *Distinction between identity and material* volume: Neither personality nor the human body depend on physical location in material volume for their proper identity. For:

(1) As spirit, man possesses himself in an act of consciousness that is simultaneously reflexive and transcendent. This act of self-consciousness is both:

(a) the radical beginning of all human knowing;[377] and

(b) at the same time the most fundamental disclosure of man's intrinsic "outreach" for God.[378]

Personality is constituted by precisely this transcending self-consciousness and self-possession.[379]

(2) The body's identity is to be sought in "the idea of the organic law" itself. As a "system of life", the body is "not bound. . .for its identity, to any particular portion of matter as such."[380] Thus, even if the actual material of the body were to change from hour to hour, the identity of the body would remain radically the same.

b. Distinction between transaction and elements: In the sacrament of the Supper the real presence of Christ does not depend upon physical location in the elements any more than human personality and bodiliness depend upon containment in matter and physical space for their proper identity. The presence of Christ is objectively disclosed and offered to believers in the physical transactions of eating

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and drinking precisely as these transactions "trigger" a movement into the symbolic "depth" (the "opaque intentionality") of the sacrament.

c. Distinction between condition and principle: In the sacramental transaction, the principle objective grace really exhibited and bestowed remains distinct from the condition (presence of faith on the part of Christians).[331] Hence the real presence of the Lord in the Supper can never be said to depend upon the faith of those who celebrate it.

Given these assumptions, Nevin found it unnecessary to adopt the pneumatological solution to the problem of eucharistic presence as Calvin had done. There was no need to invoke an extraordinary action of the Spirit in order to effect either the mystical union between Christ and believers in grace or the mystical presence of the Lord in the Supper. Presence can be affirmed simply by appealing to the organic law of inwardness whereby what is spiritual and ideal must ever seek to express itself in forms that are visible and historical. That God has "committed" himself to this law is evident, for Nevin, in the mystery of the incarnation wherein "the supernatural has become itself natural. . .by falling into the regular process of the world's history."[382]

The sacrament of the Lord's Supper is thus an objective example of the law of inwardness at work in historical space and time. It is "the sacrament of Christ's death",[383] an "actual union with the sacrifice" of Christ.[384] In this "perpetual sacrament of his body and blood",[385] Christ becomes one body and one spirit with believers.[386] All this can and does happen, Nevin concluded, because "the mystery of Adam. . .is the mystery of the Messiah."[387]

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1] Herbert M.J. Klein, History of the Eastern Synod of the Reformed Church in the United States (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Commercial Press, 1943), pp. 214-215. Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: Klein, HES, followed by the page reference. For more detail on the membership of the Liturgical Committee, see: Jack M. Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology (Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, no. 10; Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1976), pp. 139-158.

[2] See the discussion of this point in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[3] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 62, 88.

[4] Ibid., pp. 78-88. Maxwell gives a description of the old Mayer liturgy.

[5] See Theodore Appel, The Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin (Philadelphia: Reformed Church Publication House, 1889), pp. 31-32.

[6] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 86-87.

[7] Klein, HES, p. 214.

[8] Ibid., pp. 204-212.

[9] Ibid., p. 217 (the text of Nevin's letter of resignation).

[10] James Hastings Nichols, Romanticism in American Theology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 192. See also Klein, HES, pp. 215-216.

[11] Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 192-215.

[12] Klein, HES, p. 219.

[13] Ibid., p. 220.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., p. 235. Klein describes Nevin's resumption of the presidency of the Liturgical Committee. The resumption is noted in the minuets of the Synod for 1857.

[16] For a fully documented account of the liturgical crisis see: Benjamin Kuhns and Robert Kelker, The Liturgical Conflict and the Peace Movement of the Reformed Church in the United

States (Dayton, Ohio: Press of the United Brethren Publishing House, 1896).

[17] See A Liturgy: or, Order of Christian Worship. Prepared by the direction and for the use of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1858). On the work of Nevin, Schaff and other members of the Liturgical Committee during the period from 1852 until 1857, see Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 158-178. Hereafter, references to the Liturgy published in 1858 will be made as follows: PL (1857), followed by the page reference.

[18] The revisions made in the liturgy in 1866 will be discussed later in this chapter.

[19] John Henry Augustus Bomberger, The Revised Liturgy (Philadelphia: Jas. B. Rodgers, Printer, 1867), pp. 31-32. "1663" seems to be a printer's error for 1563, the actual date of the publication of the Palatinate Liturgy.

[20] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, p. 147.

[21] Klein, HES, pp. 214-215; emphasis added.

[22] Ibid., pp. 221-222; emphasis added.

[23] See The Liturgical Question. A Report by the "Liturgical Committee" (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1862), p. 39. Since the author of this tract was John Nevin, future references to the work will be cited as follows: Nevin, LQ, followed by the page number.

[24] Klein, HES, pp. 242-243.

[25] See An Order of Worship for the Reformed Church (Philadelphia: S.R. Fisher and Co., 1867). The most controversial section of this liturgy, the Order for Holy Communion, may be found in James Hastings Nichols, ed., The Mercersburg Theology (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 260-281. Concerning the "General Synod" the following may be noted: As the German Reformed Church in America expanded westward, there arose a need to creat more synods, with a "General Synod" to meet every three years to discuss problems and policies shared by the whole church. The Synod of 1858 had approved such a plan in principle (see Klein, HES, pp. 236-238). The first triennial meeting of the General Synod was held in Pittsburgh (1863); the second, in Dayton (1866); the third, in Philadelphia (1869). The fate of the liturgy in the Reformed Church was discussed at all three of these meetings.

[26] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 249-322.

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[27] Kuhns and Kelker, Liturgical Conflict, p. 17.

[28] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[29] Ibid., p. 23.

[30] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, p. 314.

[31] Ibid., p. 312.

[32] Appel, Life and Work of Nevin, p. 509.

[33] Ibid., pp. 508-509.

[34] Ibid., p. 509.

[35] Kuhns and Kelker, Liturgical Conflict, pp. 35-36. For the members of the "Peace Commission" see ibid., pp. 40-41.

[36] Harrisburg: Lane S. Hart, 1884.

[37] Philadelphia: Reformed Publication Board, 1887.

[38] Kuhns and Kelker, Liturgical Conflict, p. 72.

[39] Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 332-333.

[40] For examples see Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, pp. 326-330. See also Appel, Life and Work of Nevin, pp. 513-514.

[41] Appel, Life and Work of Nevin, p. 755.

[42] Klein, HES, pp. 236-237.

[43] Nichols, Romanticism, p. 300, prints the text of Nevin's letter.

[44] Ibid., p. 84.

[45] For examples of these confessions as cited in Nevin's The Mystical Presence, see: John W. Nevin, The Mystical Presence, ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 4; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1966), p. 106 (the French or "Gallic" Confession); pp. 62-63 (the Belgic Confession) pp. 66-74 (Heidelberg Catechism; pp. 64-65 (Second Helvetic Confession). Nevin also cited earlier Reformed Confessions, such as those of Basel, 1534 (pp. 45-46); the "First Helvetic" (pp. 45-46). For the texts of the five major reformed Confessions see: Wilhelm Niesel, ed., Bekenntnisschriften und Kirchenordnungen der nach Gottes Wort Reformierten Kirche (3rd. ed.; Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1938): French (pp. 65-75); Scottish

(pp. 79-117); Belgic (pp. 119-136); Heidelberg Catechism (pp. 148-181); Swiss (pp. 219-275). English translations may be found in Arthur Cochrane, ed., trans., Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1966).

[46] Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 100-101. See also Nevin, The Mystical Presence, pp. 151-160. Hereafter, Nevin's work will be cited in the following abbreviated form: Nevin, MP, followed by the page reference.

[47] Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 94-106.

[48] Nevin, MP, pp. 90-149.

[49] Ibid., pp. 104-116.

[50] See the discussion of this point in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[51] See Bard Thompson, ed., Liturgies of the Western Church, (New York: World Publishing Company, Meridian Books, 1961), pp. 197-210.

[52] For the text of the Palatinate Liturgy of 1563, see Niesel, ed., Bekenntnisschriften, pp. 140-148, 190-218. An English translation of this liturgy was prepared and published by J.H.A. Bomberger in Mercersburg Review 2 (1850), 81-96, 265-286; and Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), 97-128. It is to be noted that Bomberger's translation was made from an "incomplete edition initially published in 1684 and reprinted in 1763": see Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology, p. 89.

[53] See Henry Harbaugh's version of Zwingli's "Action" in Mercersburg Review 9 (1857), 594-600. See also Thompson, Liturgies of the Western Church, pp. 149-156.

[54] See Nevin's letter to Schaff (3 December, 1855), cited earlier in this chapter.

[55] See the discussion of these two points in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[56] See the discussion of the issue described here in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[57] See the discussion in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

[58] These points have already been discussed in detail in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[59] For an example of this point in the thinking of Ferdinand Christian Baur, see the discussion of his hermeneutic in Chapter

Two of this dissertation. Baur, of course, had been one of Schaff's professors. For the development of this form of idealism in the work of Schelling, see Gerald McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Seabury, 1977), pp. 69-70. For Schaff's admiration of Schelling's brand of idealism, see Philip Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, trans. E.D. Yeomans (New York: Scribner, 1853), pp. 86-87. See also: Philip Schaff, The Principle of Protestantism, ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker, (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 1; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1961), p. 222. Hereafter, references to these two works of Schaff will be made as follows: Schaff, HAC, with page reference; Schaff, PP, with page reference.

[60] This point has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[61] For fuller discussion of this point see Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[62] Nevin, MP, p. 24.

[63] Ibid., p. 25.

[64] Ibid., p. 26.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., p. 31.

[67] Ibid., pp. 41, 150.

[68] Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[69] For the philosophical connections between Rahner's transcendental Thomism and the post-Kantian idealism of the nineteenth century, especially in the Tübingen School, see McCool, Catholic Theology, pp. 5-6, 123-125.

[70] Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, trans. R. Strachan and ed. C. Ernst (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 60.

[71] Nevin, MP, p. 202.

[72] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[73] Ibid., p. 203.

[74] Ibid., p. 236.

[75] Ibid., p. 221.

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[76] Ibid., p. 212.

[77] Ibid., p. 205.

[78] Ibid.,

[79] Ibid., p. 202.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., p. 151.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., p. 168.

[84] Ibid., p. 169. See also Schaff, PP, p. 222 (thesis 17).

[85] Nevin, MP, p. 170.

[86] Ibid., p. 160.

[87] Ibid., p. 204.

[88] Ibid., p. 160.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid., p. 161.

[91] Ibid., p. 176.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid., p. 108, note.

[94] Ibid., p. 156.

[95] Ibid., p. 219; emphasis added.

[96] For a discussion of the incarnation in the Mercersburg theology, especially as it is related to the "catholic hermeneutic", see Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[97] Nevin, MP, p. 166.

[98] Ibid.: "His person is the root, in the presence and power of which only all other personalities can stand..."

[99] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[100] Nevin, MP, p. 202.

[101] Ibid., p. 203.

[102] Ibid., p. 203.

[103] Ibid., p. 210.

[104] Ibid. See also Karl Rahner, ed., Encyclopedia of Theology, trans. J. Cumming et al. (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 690-691.

[105] Nevin, MP, pp. 207-208.

[106] Ibid., p. 207.

[107] Ibid., p. 204.

[108] Ibid., p. 208.

[109] Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[110] Ibid., p. 218.

[111] Ibid., p. 205.

[112] Ibid., p. 207.

[113] Ibid., p. 174.

[114] Ibid., p. 226.

[115] Ibid., p. 174: "The Spirit was never brought near to men before, as now through the incarnate Word. It dwelt in him without measure. Humanity itself was filled completely with its presence."

[116] Ibid., p. 227.

[117] Ibid., p. 228.

[118] Ibid., p. 229.

[119] Ibid., p. 230: "We have no right to separate Christ from his Spirit, in such a way as to suppose the presence of the one where the other was not present at the same time....the indwelling of the Spirit and the indwelling of Christ in believers, are exhibited as one and the same thing."

[120] Ibid., p. 231 ("mode"); p. 233 ("medium").

[121] Ibid., p. 234.

[122] Ibid., p. 235.

[123] Ibid., p. 231.

[124] Ibid., p. 233.

[125] Ibid., p. 232.

[126] On "modalism" in Christian speculation about the relation of persons in the Trinity see Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, p. 290.

[127] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 69.

[128] Nevin, MP, p. 233.

[129] Ibid., p. 173.

[130] Ibid., p. 231.

[131] For the similarity between Nevin's and Rahner's view of the Spirit in the economy of salvation see Rahner and Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, pp. 471-473. For the difference between the Mercersburg understanding of Spirit and that of Ferdinand Christian Baur, see the discussion in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[132] See Chapter Three of this dissertation for a more detailed discussion of this point.

[133] Nevin, MP, p. 221; emphasis added.

[134] Ibid., p. 239. Nevin quotes Richard Hooker at this point in his argument.

[135] Ibid., p. 240; emphasis added.

[136] For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[137] Nevin, MP, p. 232.

[138] A more complete analysis of this point may be found in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[139] Nevin, MP, pp. 36-41.

[140] Ibid., pp. 90-149.

[141] Ibid., pp. 150-200.

[142] Ibid., p. 36. For Calvin's view see *De Vera Participatione Christi in Coena* in H.W. Baum et al., eds., *Corpus Reformatorum: Calvini Opera, IX* (Brunswick: 1863-1900), p. 519: "Convenit etiam Christum *re ipsa* et efficaciter implere quidquid analogia signi et *rei* signatae postulat; ideoque vere nobis in Coena offerri communicationem cum ejus corpore et sanguine, vel (quod idem valet) nobis a[illegible]rham sub pane et vino proponi, quae nos faciat corporis et sanguinis Christi participes."

[143] This issue of the anthropology followed by Nevin--and its differences from the sort of anthropology found in Calvin--is not treated by Nichols in his *Romanticism in American Theology*. As a result, Nichols misses a crucial aspect of the Mercersburg eucharistic doctrine.

[144] See Kilian McDonnell, *John Calvin, the Church, and the Eucharist* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 156-205.

[145] Ibid., pp. 160-169.

[146] See ibid., pp. 167-169 for Calvin's opposition to the notion of secondary causality, especially in the doctrine of the sacraments.

[147] Ibid., p. 35.

[148] Ibid., p. 177.

[149] For an analysis of similar points in the thinking of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[150] A fuller discussion of this issue may be found in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[151] Nevin, MP, p. 208.

[152] Ibid., p. 255.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid., p. 41.

[155] In my opinion, Nichols tends to minimize the real difference in the sacramental conclusions reached by Nevin from the views of the sixteenth century reformers. See Nichols, *Romanticism*, pp. 84-106.

[156] Text cited as in Theodore F. Torrance, ed. and trans., *The School of Faith*. The Catechisms of the Reformed Church

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(London: Clarke, 1959), pp. 54-61. See also Nevin, MP, p. 176.

[157] Nevin, MP, p. 177; emphasis added.

[158] Ibid., p. 177.

[159] Ibid., p. 115.

[160] Ibid., p. 108: "...faith does not properly clothe the sacrament with its power. It is the condition of its efficacy, but not the principle of the power itself."

[161] Ibid., p. 108, note: "Because faith is necessary to the right use of the Lord's Supper, they will have it forthwith that all the force of it must resolve itself into the exercise of this grace on the part of the worshiper; and when they hear of an objective virtue in the sacrament itself, the presence of a real spiritual energy belonging to it in its own nature whether apprehended by the communicant or not, and altogether independent of his faith, they are ready to exclaim against it at once as the very opus operatum of popery itself."

[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid., p. 181.

[164] It is important to notice Nevin's use of the phrase "sacramental transaction". As a transaction, the signs of a sacrament cannot be reduced simply to the elements (e.g., bread and wine). There is, then, an important distinction between "transaction" and "elements" in the sacramental sign. This point will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

[165] Nevin, MP, p. 108, note.

[166] Ibid.

[167] See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 80, A. 3.

[168] Ibid., IIIa Pars, Q. 85, A. 5; Q. 80, A. 3. See also Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, trans. P. Barrett et al. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 83-86.

[169] See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae Pars, Q. 89, A. 2; compare IIIa Pars, Q. 80, A. 3.

[170] Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, p. 83; emphasis added.

[171] See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 80, A. 4.

[172] There is no direct evidence that Nevin was acquainted with the works of Aquinas. Occasionally, however, his thinking bears remarkable similarities to that of the thirteenth-century theologian. Some further parallels between Nevin and Aquinas will be pointed out later in this chapter. It may also be noted that some of Nevin's reservations about the term opus operatum were apparently shared by Aquinas. While the term appears in Thomas' earlier work, such as the Scriptum super Sententiis, it was abandoned in his more mature writing. Thus, ex opere operato does not appear at all in the Summa Theologiae. On this point, see Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, pp. 82-89. For a contemporary Roman Catholic understanding of the term "ex opere operato" in a sacramental context see Karl Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, trans. William J. O'Hara (London: Burns and Oates, 1963), pp. 24-33.

[173] McDonnell, John Calvin, pp. 270-271.

[174] See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 Vols. (Library of Christian Classics, Vols. 20-21; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), Bk. IV.14.17: II, p. 1292. Hereafter citations of this work will take the following form: Calvin, Institutes, (Book, section, paragraph), followed by the reference to volume and page.

[175] Calvin, Institutes, IV.14.16: II, p. 1292.

[176] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 273. See also Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, pp. 188-189.

[177] Nevin, MP, p. 108, note.

[178] Ibid., p. 169.

[179] See Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, pp. 285-286; emphasis added. This sort of triple distinction was common in medieval theology, and is to be found, for example, in Thomas Aquinas. Like the reformers, Aquinas rejected a literal carnal eating of the Lord's body in the eucharist (see Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 77, A. 7, ad 3um: "ipsum corpus Christi non frangitur". To support his point Aquinas cites Augustine to the effect that eating Christ's body is not like eating butcher's meat.) Thomas also distinguished spiritual and sacramental eating (see Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 80, A. 1). For Aquinas, however, spiritual eating can and does communicate the sacramental effect (res) of the eucharist, vix., communion in faith and charity.

[180] Nevin, MP, p. 65; emphasis added.

[181] Ibid., p. 106.

[182] Ibid., pp. 105-106. Nevin sometimes made use of the language and thought of the English Puritan John Owen. For Owen's doctrine of the eucharist, see Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, 5 Vols. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 309-323.

[183] Nevin, MP, p. 105.

[184] McDonnell, *John Calvin*, pp. 178-179.

[185] Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.18.19: II, p. 1446.

[186] See Geddes MacGregor, *Corpus Christ. The Nature of the Church according to the Reformed Tradition* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958), p. 53, note 1, where the evidence from Calvin's writings is assembled.

[187] Nevin, MP, p. 106; emphasis added.

[188] McDonnell, *John Calvin*, p. 379.

[189] Ibid., p. 235.

[190] Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.17.15: II, p. 1377.

[191] Nevin, MP, p. 88.

[192] Ibid., p. 106.

[193] Cochrane, *Reformed Confessions*, p. 316.

[194] Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.14.5: II, p. 1280.

[195] Ibid., IV.14.5: II, p. 1280; emphasis added.

[196] See Nevin, MP, p. 177. In fairness to Calvin's position it must be noted that he did not utterly reduce the nature of the sacramental sign to a mere mnemonic or *aide-memoire*. See Davies, *Worship and Theology in England*, Vol. 2, pp. 309-311.

[197] Nevin, MP, p. 40; emphasis added.

[198] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. David Bourke (New Blackfriars' Edition, Vol. 56; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), p. 160 (s.v. "*res tantum*" in the Glossary).

[199] Ibid.: "*sacramentum et res*: the intrinsic state immediately produced by the *sacramentum tantum*, which itself in turn dynamically points on to and causes the ultimate effect, the *res tantum*."

[200] Nevin, MP, p. 110.

[201] Ibid., p. 177.

[202] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa Pars, Q. 62, A. 3, ad primum: "gratia non dicitur esse in sacramento sicut in subjecto; enque sicut in vase prout vas est locus quidam."

[203] Nevin, MP, p. 178.

[204] Ibid., pp. 54, 55, 108, 109, 115, 123, 127, 177, 178, 180, 184, 252, 255, 261, 263.

[205] *Mercersburg Review* 14 (1867), 23-66; see especially p. 64.

[206] Nevin, MP, pp. 182-183.

[207] Ibid., p. 108, note.

[208] Ibid., pp. 108-109; emphasis added.

[209] Ibid., p. 127; cf. p. 178: "The ordinance of the Lord's Supper holds in the sacramental transaction; which includes the presence of both, the one materially, for the senses, the other spiritually, for faith."

[210] Ibid., p. 108, note; emphasis added.

[211] Ibid., pp. 251-252; emphasis added.

[212] See Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. E. Bucanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 14-18.

[213] Ibid., p. 15; emphasis added.

[214] Ibid., pp. 15-16; emphasis added.

[215] Nevin, MP, p. 184; emphasis added.

[216] See the discussion of this point found earlier in this chapter.

[217] Calvin, *De vera Participatione* in: John Calvin, *Theological Treatises*, trans. J.K.S. Reid (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 22; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 267; emphasis added.

[218] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 231: "The Holy Spirit effects the presence of Christ when the sign representing the effect is communicated to the believer."

[219] Calvin, Institutes, IV.17.19: II, pp. 1381-1382. In this passage, Calvin seeks to eliminate both the Roman (local containment in the physical elements) and the Lutheran views (the ubiquity of Christ's glorified body).

[220] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 371.

[221] Nevin, MP, pp. 154-155; cf. pp. 49, 51, 53.

[222] Ibid., p. 155.

[223] See the discussion of Nevin's view of pneumatology earlier in this chapter.

[224] Nevin, MP, p. 174.

[225] Ibid., p. 155.

[226] Ibid.

[227] For further detail see the discussion of the notion of organic development as it affected Nevin's anthropology earlier in this chapter.

[228] See Nevin, MP, p. 155: "Christ's person is one and the person of the believer is one; and to secure a real communication of the whole human life of the first into the personality of the second, it is only necessary that the communication should spring from the center of Christ's life and pass over to the center of ours. This can only be by the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit in this case is not to be sundered from the person of Christ."

[229] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[230] This point has been analyzed in greater detail earlier in this chapter.

[231] Nevin, MP, pp. 176, 208.

[232] Ibid., p. 255.

[233] Ibid., p. 184.

[234] For more detailed analysis of this point see the discussion in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

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[235] See the analysis of these points in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[236] See Nevin, MP, p. 178. On Augustine's influence for later definitions of sacramental symbols, see David Bourke, trans., St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae (above, note 198), pp. xiv-xviii. For Aquinas' own appeal to Augustine, see especially Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 60, Aa. 1-8. For Calvin's use of Augustine, see, for example, Institutes, IV.14.1: II, p. 1277. There, after considering several possible definitions of a sacrament, Calvin states: "Whichever of these definitions you may choose, it does not differ in meaning from that of Augustine, who teaches that a sacrament is 'a visible sign of a sacred thing,' or 'a visible form of an invisible grace'."

[237] John Nevin, "Reply to Charles Hodge," in MP, p. 276. On Hodge's critique of Nevin's sacramental theology, see Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 88-92.

[238] Nevin, MP, p. 97.

[239] Ibid., p. 110; emphasis added.

[240] Ibid., p. 134.

[241] Ibid., p. 111; cf. p. 115.

[242] Ibid., pp. 125, 143.

[243] Ibid., pp. 40, 177-178.

[244] Ibid., p. 183.

[245] For fuller discussion and analysis see the section of this chapter devoted to this point.

[246] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 35.

[247] Nevin, MP, pp. 162-163.

[248] This point has already been discussed in detail earlier in this chapter.

[249] A more complete discussion may be found earlier in this chapter.

[250] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 228. See also Nevin, MP, p. 177.

[251] See McDonnell, John Calvin, pp. 258-270 for a discussion of Calvin's dialectic in his eucharistic doctrine.

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[252] A more complete analysis of this point may be found earlier in this chapter.

[253] McDonnell, John Calvin, pp. 178-180.

[254] Calvin, Institutes, IV.17.5: II, pp. 1364-1365.

[255] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 179 and note 10.

[256] Nevin, MP, p. 257.

[257] Ibid., p. 256.

[258] Ibid., pp. 258-259. Cf. p. 263: "The idea of a true participation in Christ's life, as the necessary condition of an interest in his sufferings and death, runs clearly through the whole transaction. The bread is given to be eaten; the wine must be drunk."

[259] Ibid., p. 259.

[260] Ibid., p. 263.

[261] Calvin, Institutes, IV.17.4: II, p. 1363. See the discussion in McDonnell, John Calvin, pp. 280-282.

[262] See Nevin, MP, p. 255. Cf. p. 254: "We are too prone to restrict the idea of supernatural interposition...to the single historical person of Jesus Christ; an error that tends directly to throw a certain magical docetic character, over the whole fact of the incarnation, and to sink Christianity at the same time to the form of a mere abstract spiritualism in the sphere of the flesh....We must not sunder the supernatural in Christ, from the life of his body, which is the church." Cf. also p. 210: "The everlasting Word, in a way wholly unknown before, descends into the actual process of human history."

[263] See Schaff, PP, p. 229 (thesis 76): "Church forms serve two general purposes: first, they are for the lower stages of religious development conductors over into the life of the spirit; second, they are for the church at large the necessary utterance or corporealization of the spirit, in the view in which Oetinger's remark holds good: 'Corporeity is the scope of God's ways.' " On Oetinger, quoted here by Schaff, see the article on him by James Herzog in Samuel M. Jackson, ed., The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 13 Vols. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1969), Vol. 8, pp. 227-228.

[264] Nevin, MP, p. 195.

[265] Ibid., p. 265.

[266] Ibid., p. 248.

[267] Ibid., p. 184.

[268] Ibid.

[269] Ibid., p. 158; emphasis added. See Philip Schaff's very similar position about the organic development of dogma in PP, pp. 219-220 (thesis 1): "Every period of the church and of theology has its particular problem to solve; and every doctrine, in a measure every book also of the Bible, has its classic age in which it first comes to be fully understood and appropriated by the consciousness of the Christian world."

[270] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[271] This issues has been analyzed more fully earlier in this chapter.

[272] For the origins of this term in the Christological disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see: E. David Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, Vol. 2; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), pp. 9-25.

[273] Calvin, *Institutes*, II.13.4: I, p. 481.

[274] Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, p. 23.

[275] Calvin, Institutes, II.14.4: I, p. 486.

[276] Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, p. 153.

[277] Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.17.9: II, p. 1369.

[278] Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, pp. 61-100. See also McDonnell, *John Calvin*, pp. 219-220.

[279] Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, pp. 99-100. See also McDonnell, *John Calvin*, pp. 219-220.

[280] Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, p. 99.

[281] McDonnell, *John Calvin*, p. 221.

[282] Willis, Calvin's Catholic Christology, p. 92: "Christ's resurrection and ascension do not mean his humanity was deified, somehow relinquishing that which made it human. Rather, by the resurrection Christ's victory was sealed. In the ascension, Christ withdrew his bodily presence that he might be present with the faithful in a far richer way, through the Holy Spirit."

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[283] Ibid., p. 94.

[284] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[285] Nevin, MP, pp. 151-153.

[286] Ibid., p. 151.

[287] For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[288] John Nevin, "Human Freedom," in Nichols, The Mercersburg Theology, p. 286.

[289] Nevin, MP, p. 151.

[290] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 286.

[291] Ibid.

[292] Nevin, MP, pp. 152-153.

[293] Ibid., p. 152.

[294] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 286.

[295] See the discussion earlier in this chapter.

[296] Nevin, MP, p. 152.

[297] Ibid.

[298] Ibid., p. 151.

[299] Ibid., p. 152.

[300] Ibid.

[301] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 286.

[302] Nevin, MP, pp. 34-41.

[303] Ibid., p. 151.

[304] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[305] Ibid., p. 286.

[306] Ibid., p. 287.

[307] Ibid., pp. 287-288.

[308] Aquinas did not share this confusion. He carefully distinguished Christ's "sacramental and substantial" presence

from "local" presence, and he concluded that the Lord is not present in the eucharist "sicut in loco." See Summa Theologiae, IIIa Pars, Q. 76, A. 5.

[309] Nevin, MP, p. 152.

[310] Ibid.

[311] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[312] Ibid., p. 26.

[313] Nevin, MP, p. 151.

[314] Ibid., p. 185.

[315] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[316] McCool, Catholic Theology, p. 12.

[317] Nevin, MP, p. 255.

[318] Ibid., p. 232.

[319] Ibid., p. 153.

[320] The notion of "organic wholeness" underlies both Nevin's understanding of church and his view of sacrament. See the discussion of this theme in the "catholic hermeneutic" of the Mercersburg theologians in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[321] See the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[322] In the first part of this chapter, Nevin's theological anthropology--and its impact on his eucharistic doctrine--has been assessed.

[323] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 221.

[324] For a more detailed analysis of this point, see the earlier sections of this chapter.

[325] Calvin, "Short Treatise on the Holy Supper of our Lord and only Saviour Jesus Christ," in John Calvin, Theological Treatises, trans. J.K.S. Reid, p. 146; emphasis added.

[326] McDonnell, John Calvin, p. 158. McDonnell speaks of Calvin's "ellipsoidal logic", as opposed to a strictly linear logic.

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[327] Calvin, Institutes, IV.17.26: II, p. 1394. The citation from Augustine reads as follows in Latin: "secundum praesentiam maiestatis semper habemus Christum; secundum praesentiam carnis, recte dictum est discipulis: Me autem non semper habebitis." Text in Sancti Aurelii Augustini, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus XXIV, ed. Eligius Dekkers (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latin, Vol. 36; Turnholt: Brepols, 1954), p. 439.

[328] Calvin, Institutes, IV.14.26: II, p. 1394.

[329] Nevin, MP, p. 154; emphasis added.

[330] Ibid.

[331] Calvin himself repudiated such virtualism in the De vera Participatione (Theological Writings, p. 263): "He gives the name of Energists to those who hold that only the virtue of Christ's body and not the body itself is in the Supper. However, he give me Philip Melanchthon for an associate and, to establish both assertions, refers to my writings against Westphal, where the reader will find that in the Supper our souls are nourished by the real body of Christ, which was crucified for us, and that indeed spiritual life is transferred into us from the substance of his body. When I teach that the body of Christ is given us for food by the secret energy of the Spirit, do I thereby deny that the Supper is a communion of the body?"

[332] Nevin, MP, p. 155; emphasis added.

[333] Ibid., p. 226.

[334] Ibid., p. 174; emphasis added.

[335] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[336] Nevin, MP, p. 151.

[337] For a more detailed analysis see the discussion of this point earlier in this chapter.

[338] Nevin, MP, p. 255.

[339] Ibid., p. 153.

[340] See Henricus Denzinger and Arnold Schonmetzer, eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Editio XXXIII; Rome: Herder, 1965), nos. 300-302.

[341] Nevin, MP, p. 203.

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[342] Ibid., p. 166.

[343] Ibid., p. 203: "Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The idea that it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form." Nevin's notion of man's inevitable "reaching after" God is similar to the transcendental Thomists' reading of Aquinas' "obediential potency," the *desiderium naturale ad visionem beatificam*. For this point, see Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, trans. William Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 280-290.

[344] Nevin, MP, p. 156; emphasis added.

[345] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 289.

[346] Ibid., p. 288.

[347] Ibid., p. 289.

[348] See the discussion of Coleridge's theory of cognition in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[349] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 291.

[350] Ibid., p. 291: "By means of intelligence, the individual self emerges out of the night of nature and into the clear vision of its own existence, and is thus prepared to embrace itself as a separate living center. It is no longer an object merely as before, acted upon from abroad, but is constituted a subject, in the strict sense of this term, having possession of itself, and capable of self-action."

[351] Ibid., pp. 289-290; emphasis added.

[352] It is significant that Nevin consistently uses images of darkness and night, bondage and slavery, to describe the condition of creation apart from humanity. See MP, pp. 202-203; cf. "Human Freedom," pp. 290-291.

[353] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 291.

[354] Ibid.

[355] Nevin, MP, p. 203.

[356] Rahner and Vorgrimler, *Theological Dictionary*, p. 367. Nevin's thinking is similar. As both "universal" (ideal) and "particular" (actual), human nature is not "confined" to a particular sphere of existence. As self-conscious spirit, man is reflexive and transcendent; i.e., he grasps himself

both as "an individual center or self" and as one who "transcends the limits" of his individual life. See Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 290-291. It is precisely man's nature as "freedom", "spirit" and "transcendence" that opens him to the self-disclosure of God in grace.

[357] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 291.

[358] Nevin, MP, p. 166.

[359] Rahner and Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, p. 352.

[360] Ibid., p. 352: "Insofar as personality...means that achieved self-consciousness (or the ontological principle of that self-consciousness) of a being which necessarily (really and existentially) refers it to a Thou and to God, the 'subsistence' of the humanity of Jesus in the Logos supremely exemplifies what is meant by personality." As we have seen, Nevin's understanding of personality means just what Rahner and Vorgrimler suggest here: "achieved self-consciousness...which necessarily refers it to a Thou and to God."

[361] Nevin, MP, p. 157.

[362] Ibid., p. 135, note.

[363] Ibid., p. 153.

[364] Ibid., p. 169: "The soul to be complete to develop itself at all as a soul, must externalize itself, throw itself out in space; and this externalization is the body."

[365] Ibid., p. 151.

[366] Ibid., p. 89.

[367] Ibid., p. 113.

[368] Ibid., p. 120.

[369] Ibid., p. 154.

[370] A more detailed discussion of this point may be found earlier in this chapter.

[371] Nevin, MP, p. 184.

[372] A more detailed analysis of this point may be found earlier in this chapter.

[373] John Nevin, "Answer to Professor Dorner," Mercersburg Review 15 (1868), 640.

[374] Nevin, MP, p. 150.

[375] Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[376] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[377] Ibid., p. 291.

[378] Nevin, MP, p. 203.

[379] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 289.

[380] Nevin, MP, p. 151.

[381] A more detailed discussion of this point may be found earlier in this chapter.

[382] Nevin, MP, p. 255.

[383] Ibid., p. 179.

[384] Ibid., p. 259. Cf. p. 260: "The sacrament of the Passover was at once abolished and fulfilled, in the sacrament of Christ's body and blood."

[385] Ibid., p. 262.

[386] Ibid., p. 266.

[387] Ibid., p. 216.

CHAPTER VI

THE EUCHARISTIC RITE OF THE PROVISIONAL LITURGY OF 1857

Our study of church, eucharist and liturgical reform at Mercersburg will conclude in this chapter with an investigation of the eucharistic rite found in the *Provisional Liturgy* of 1857. As we have seen in Chapter Five, the sacramental theory and eucharistic doctrine of the movement achieved its most systematic expression in John Williamson Nevin's *The Mystical Presence*. In that work an idealist theological anthropology governed the Mercersburg understanding of the relation between creation, man, incarnation, church and sacrament.[1] This idealism also led Nevin to criticize Calvin's eucharistic theology on three issues: body and presence; the unity of Christ's person; and the relation between "ideal" and "actual" in the constitution of Christ's "personality".[2]

This chapter will seek to show how the Mercersburg theology of eucharist was carried over into: 1) the theoretical foundations of Christian worship as expressed, for example, in *The Liturgical Question*, the 1862 report of the Liturgical Committee; 2) the hermeneutic of reform that gave rise to the *Provisional Liturgy* of 1857; and 3) the structure and content of the eucharistic rite of the 1857 liturgy.[3] It will also be necessary to discuss

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methods of interpretation for analyzing the Mercersburg liturgical texts.

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP

"Prayer-book liturgy" versus "sacramental liturgy": In The Mystical Presence, Nevin had already given what he felt was the "deep sense" of liturgical services in any religion:

> To be real, the human, as such, and of course the divine also in human form, must ever externalize its inward life....This is the proper, deep sense of all liturgical services in religion....The more intensely spiritual any state may be, the more irresistibly urgent will ever be found its tendency to clothe itself, and make itself complete, in a suitable external form.[4]

This idealist principle (the "law of inwardness": what is spiritual must ever seek to incarnate itself in visible historical form) supported not only Nevin's understanding of sacraments generally and eucharist specifically, but also his defense of public worship as presented in The Liturgical Question.[5]

Nevin distinguished his own, sacramental, view of worship from the "prayer-book" idea. This latter conceived of the liturgy as:

> ....simply a mechanical directory of the manner in which the services of the sanctury are to be conducted, with written forms of prayer and other public address, more or less full, thrown together in an outward and prevailingly independent way.[6]

According to this point of view, the liturgy is, above all, texts. It is a miniature library, a collection of materials to be used or discarded at the discretion of minister and congregation. The texts are valuable for their educational worth and for their usefulness in securing an order of worship that is fitting, decent and dignified.[7] Nevin did not repudiate the values associated with the "prayer-book" notion of worship. He acknowledged that the normative liturgical texts contained in a book were vastly superior to the system of "free (extemporaneous) worship":

> ...the misery of the extemporaneous system is, that its liberty is not joined with the strength that is needed for its whole work; so that it proves to be too generally the form only without the real substance of freedom--the liberty, in other words, of being weak, and of doing in a weak way what there is no power of doing in a way that is strong.[8]

But there are, Nevin noted, serious limitations to the concept of liturgy as mere "texts" or "prayer-book". For in the "deep sense" worship is not simply the ritual proclamation of texts, but the organic expression of an idea:

> ...a liturgy is not just a collection of prayers and other single forms of devotion, but a whole order or scheme rather of public worship, in which all the parts are inwardly bound together by their having a common relation to the idea of a Christian altar, and by their referring themselves through this always to what must be considered the last ground of all true Christian worship, the mystical presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist.[9]

Here Nevin's idealist presuppositions come to the fore. The same organic law of inwardness that governs the relation between incarnation, church and sacrament must also determine the proper nature of liturgy. Nevin's insistence on the liturgy as "a whole order or scheme... in which all the parts are inwardly bound together by... a common relation to the idea of a Christian altar" reflects a principle dear to the "catholic hermeneutic" of Mercersburg.[10] It was characteristic of this hermeneutic that it sought to discover the inward unity that generates and shapes the whole in its numberless historical configurations.[11] Thus, just as the incarnation may be considered the "inscape" of Christianity (the generating principle that unites the countless expressions of Christian life in the world),[12] so the liturgy is the "last ground of all true Christian worship"; it is the "inscape" that generates and unites all forms of sacrifice and praise offered by believers.

There is, therefore, an *inward law* of liturgy, the same law that requires all ideas to disclose themselves visibly and historically. That is why Christian worship can never be reduced simply to a collection of devotional texts (the "prayer-book" notion) or to the extemporaneous inspirations of a local minister (the "free worship" tradition). For by extension of the catholic hermeneutic, if the church is the "self-expression of the incarnation in history",[13] then liturgy is the self-expression of the church. As Nevin wrote in *The Mystical Presence*, "the very idea of a church implies the manifestation of the religious life, as something *social* and *common*....An outward church is the *necessary form* of the new creation in Christ Jesus, in its very nature...*Outward social worship, which implies, of course, forms for the purpose*, is to be regarded as something essential..."[14] Although he comes at the question from an idealist perspective, Nevin's demand for common social forms of worship is remarkably similar to Prosper Gueranger's position that external liturgical forms have an *intrinsic* connection with the virtue of religion and that liturgy guarantees the *integrity* of faith and doctrine.[15]

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Worship must therefore be sacramental for the same reasons that the church itself is sacramental.[16] Both liturgy and church act to disclose the "radical catholicity" or "intensive wholeness" of Christianity.[17] Church, for example, discloses the idea of the incarnation as the principle of wholeness which results from the very "in-being" of Christ at the heart of the world's unfolding history.[18] Similarly, sacraments actualize the idea of church within the developing historical coordinates of human space and time. For "a sacrament", Nevin affirmed, "is the presence of the super-natural in a mystery, under a natural and sensible form".[19] Hence without sacraments there could be no church at all. This is why Nevin argued, several years after the Provisional Liturgy was published, that the church is a "necessarily sacramental institution".[20]

Why did Nevin insist so vigorously on sacramentality as essential to the very structure and constitution of the church? As we have already observed in chapters three and five, Nevin's vision of church and sacrament was--like Johann Adam Moehler's in his mature work Symbolik-uncompromisingly incarnational. This fact had decisive effects on his understanding of the relation between the doctrine of Christ's presence in the sacraments and the doctrine of the atonement. The *chief* motive for the incarnation was not, in Nevin's opinion, Christ's suffering and death for the sins of the world. The incarnation has not only "chronological priority" over the work of atonement, it also has "soteriological priority":

> ...in the economy of redemption the life of Christ goes before His death, not only in the order of time, but in the order also of inward power and force. The mystery of the Incarnation includes in itself potentially, and in due course of time puts forth from itself actually, the mystery of the Atonement.[21]

Hence the incarnation was not merely an ingenious "outward device" used by God to achieve an ulterior purpose, viz., the reconciliation of men through the shedding of Jesus' blood. On the contrary, the incarnation represents God's irrevocable decision to disclose himself, really and actually, in the process of history. Nevin felt that this disclosure is the ultimate meaning of the term "gospel":

> It Christianity's whole significance is comprehended, first of all, in the Divine deed, whereby God manifested Himself in the flesh through the mystery of the Incarnation. *This objective act is itself the Gospel, in the profoundest sense of the term.*[22]

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The incarnation thus comprehends the entire meaning of "gospel". And in so doing, it discredits any view that makes "the death of Christ to be the ultimate and only end of His coming into the world".[23] For the gospel can never be reduced to the proclamation of Christ's atoning death. "Gospel" is a thick, many-layered term for Nevin; it includes the "incarnate gospel" revealed in the person of Jesus himself, the "post-resurrection gospel" of apostolic preaching, and the "gospel according to Paul".[24] In none of these cases, Nevin asserted, is the mission and ministry of Christ restricted in its significance to his sacrificial death. Speaking, for example, of the "incarnate gospel" that was Christ's own person, Nevin wrote:

> ...therefore was He, in the days of His flesh, directly and immediately, the one grand central object of Christian faith; which then had its "perfect work" as the sum of all truth and righteousness, without reference to any following doctrine or fact whatever. This was the form in which Christianity began in the world; the form in which it was originally preached by the Master Himself. Who will say that the preaching was not evangelical because it did not start with the atonement, but made the mystery of the incarnation exhibited in the living Christ to be the fundamental principle and beginning of the whole Christian salvation?[25]

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As has been seen in the discussion of Nevin's theological anthropology, the incarnation is something "demanded" by the very idea of humanity for its completion.[26] This view strongly implies the Scotist position that the incarnation would have occurred even had there been no "Fall" and consequently no "damage to repair" as a result of human sin.[27] The incarnation thus becomes for Nevin the supreme example of both God's self-disclosure in history and man's self-transcendence as "self-conscious spirit".[28] As such it includes *immanently within itself* the possibility and the fact of atonement. Hence Nevin argued:

> ...*the atonement itself*...is not an abstraction; it *is immanent, or as we may say, resident throughout, in the person of Christ*, and derives all its force thus continually from the power of His indestructible life....Such is the necessary order of the Christian faith. Christ first; and then His benefits. *The Atonement IN the Incarnation*; which is thus seen to be the root and principle of the whole Christian redemption.[29]

Nevin's understanding of the relation between incarnation and atonement anticipated a line of thinking that has become common among transcendental Thomist theologians of the twentieth century like Karl Rahner. Rahner too thinks of the incarnation as the meeting-place between

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God's radical act of self-communication and man's self-transcendence. Moreover, the mystery of the incarnation implies the doctrine of atonement. Rahner writes, for example:

> Where God's self-communication and man's self-transcendence reach their absolute and irreversible culmination, i.e., where God is simply and irrevocably "there" in time and space and consequently where man's self-transcendence also attains a similarly complete self-giving to God, we have what in Christian terms is called the Incarnation....this does not render the event of the cross and resurrection superfluous but actually implies them.[30]

Further, just as for Rahner God's self-disclosing act in incarnation provides the basis for a Christian understanding of symbol and sacrament,[31] so too for Nevin the mystery of the Incarnate Word establishes the condition of possibility for Christ's action and presence in the sacraments. If incarnation is an objective, real and historical fact, then church, sacrament and worship must follow this same organic law. In an essay on "The Theology of the New Liturgy", Nevin explained:

> Where the idea of the Church has come to make itself felt...as involving the conjunction of the supernatural and the natural continuously in one and the same abiding economy of grace, its sacraments cannot possibly be regarded as outward signs only of what they represent. They become, for faith, seals also of the

> actual realities themselves, which they exhibit; mysteries, in which the visible and the invisible are bound together by the power of the Holy Ghost...in such sort that the presence of the one is, in truth, the presence of the other.[32]

A proper perception of sacrament, Nevin added further, must necessarily manifest itself in common liturgical forms.[33]

Christ's presence and power in the sacraments is thus based upon his permanent presence in history as a result of the incarnation. This does not mean, however, that the atonement has an incidental or insignificant relation to the sacramental economy. Indeed, in The Mystical Presence, Nevin explicitly affirmed that "the sacrament of the Lord's Supper has reference directly and primarily to the atonement wrought out by Christ's death on the cross".[34] On the surface this statement seems to be a departure from Nevin's ordinarily staunch incarnationalism. But if one reads it in light of his conviction that "the atonement is IN the incarnation", it represents no inconsistency in his thinking. The incarnation remains the condition of possibility for Christ's presence and activity in the sacraments. If the sacramental transaction of eucharist effects a real relation with the atoning sacrifice of Christ--and Nevin insisted that it does[35]--then it does this precisely because it is sacramental. And it can be sacramental (in the real, objective sense championed by Nevin) precisely because of the incarnation.

For Nevin, then, the entire liturgical question was a sacramental--and therefore a doctrinal--one. Like Prosper Gueranger, Nevin maintained the inseparability of liturgy from doctrine. In his 1867 essay on the "Theology of the New Liturgy", he was to state:

> ...the liturgical question, as it now has place among us in the Reformed Church, is in truth a doctrinal question of the deepest significance; and it....has to do, not with one or two points of theological opinion simply, but with theology in its universal view.[36]

There is a similarity here between Nevin's understanding of liturgy and Schaff's view of church history. Just as Schaff regarded church history as a theological act "by which the writer defines and identifies himself as a believer",[37] so Nevin conceived of liturgy as a primary authentic utterance of the church's faith.[38] This is exactly the reason why the prayer-book conception of liturgy is ultimately unsatisfactory. It forgets that worship derives its essential significance from the same inward and organic law that determines the historical visibility of the church.[39]

Essential characteristics of Christian Worship:

1. Eucharistic: Because liturgy must be "ruled throughout by what we may call a sense of the sacramental in religion",[40] its center is the eucharist. In The Liturgical Question, Nevin implicitly criticized the old Mayer liturgy[41] when he complained against the practice of treating the eucharist as nothing more than an "occasional service". Noting that the "old idea of a liturgy" was "nothing more nor less than the celebration of this holy sacrament", he contended that the "solemnity of the Lord's Supper" must be the "glorious centre" of all liturgical activity in the church.[42]

2. Priestly: Nevin recognized that his use of the term "priestly" to identify an essential quality of Christian worship was bound to provoke misunderstanding from "unsacramental" opponents. Nevertheless he argued that "priestly" liturgy was the inevitable coefficient of sacramental worship:

> Where there is no sense of the mystical element in worship, growing forth from its universal centre in the sacrament of Christ's body and

> blood, there can be no power to sympathize with the priestly element, with its conceptions of altar and sacrifice drawn from the same source.[43]

J. H. Nichols suggests that Nevin's use of terms like "priestly" and "altar" was unnecessarily provocative.[44] In saying this, however, Nichols seems to have missed two items central in Nevin's sacramental theory. First, Nevin's understanding of the eucharist as a real "communion with the sacrifice" of Christ[45] is based on his notion of the "sacramental transaction".[46] Secondly, Nevin carefully distinguished his own "transactional" view of eucharistic sacrifice from Roman and Lutheran theories.[47] Use of the term "altar" was thus neither a careless concession to "Roman" and "high church" doctrine nor gross insensitivity toward churchmen in the Reformed communion. "Altar" was Nevin's way of saying two things: 1) that the eucharist is a sacrifice precisely because it is a meal transaction, i.e., the eating and drinking of elements (bread and wine) that signify communion with the God of the covenant promises;[48] and 2) that, in virtue of the incarnational principle, the eucharist effects communion with all the acts of Christ's "theanthropic" life, including his sacrificial death.[49] That is why

Nevin declared:

> ..."We have an altar," shall not be stultified to mean, We have a table only, and nothing more. Seeing the root and foundation of all Christian worship to be in the mystical presence of Christ in the sacrament of the Holy Supper; and seeing in this again the exhibition of his broken body and shed blood as the actually present virtue of his one offering of himself...it requires that some earnest be made with these sacrificial ideas, so that they shall be felt to carry with them the power of a real transaction at the time with God, based on something beyond the minds of the worshippers themselves.[50]

This text reveals that Nevin's intention in using the correlative terms "altar" and "priest" was neither insensitivity nor crypto-Romanism. He feared more damage to the church from the "puritan" view of eucharist because it reduced the sacrament to the level of commemorative ordinance and threatened to transform Christianity itself into little more than "humanitarian deism".[51] The altar must therefore "be regarded as the central object of the sanctuary--the place of the Christian Shekinah, forth from which must radiate continually the entire glory of God's house".[52]

3. Church Year: Since Christianity is above all a life,[53] it must move, grow, develop. The church year, in Nevin's estimation, operated as a kind of metaphoric disclosure of precisely that growth and movement. Through

the annual cycle of feasting and fasting, the church reveals its essentially historical visible character. Nevin perceived an intimate connection between faith, Creed and church year. In his view, faith that is not historical collapses quickly into gnostic rationalism, a vague cosmic benevolence without substance and without force. As the very symbol of faith, the Creed acts to keep the historical consciousness of the church's belief alive. It is thus "an abiding sacramental presence" that moves "in the very process of the Christological mystery itself".[54]

Creed and church year are thus extensions of the sacramental principle. A festival is not simply a "memorial" but rather "the bond...of the proper vital union that subsists between him Christ and his people".[55] The historical character of Christian days and seasons does not consist in their power to produce literal imitative behavior among believers, but rather in their power to reveal, in human space and time, that primordial act of disclosure whereby God's own life "fell into the regular process of human history".[56] It is not the purpose of the church year to inspire pious sentiments of remembrance,

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but to disclose the continuing historical action of God in Christ.

4. Popular participation: One of Nevin's central objections to the "free worship" system was its tendency to eliminate the "active assistance of the people" in the liturgy:

> The system...is unfavorable to any sort of demonstrative interruption on the part of the congregation; it will not suffer either man or woman to speak in the Church; and is hardly willing to tolerate, at last, so much as a simple audible *Amen* from "him that occupieth the room of the unlearned".[57]

"Passive concurrence" on the part of the people is quite insufficient, Nevin maintained, in the celebration of worship. For by its very nature liturgy is a transaction, "the *doing* of a work",[58] and without the participation of the people in word and gesture such a "doing" cannot happen at all. Thus, Nevin concluded:

> The people must so join in what is going forward, that this shall seem to be for them plainly a real objective work then and there taking place, in which they are themselves not spectators or hearers only, but participant actors. There must be gestures and postures significant of faith in what the service thus means, acts of bodily worship...responses of the tongue to seal and confirm the silent responses of the heart.[59]

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Nevin's insistence on the active role of the congregation in worship became the object of specific criticism by his opponents. In Reformed, not Ritualistic, his lengthy diatribe against Mercersburg "ritualism", J.H.A. Bomberger attacked Nevin's defense of popular responses and gestures in the liturgy.[60] Bomberger, himself an original member of the "Liturgical Committee" mandated by the 1849 Synod at Norristown,[61] argued that popular responses in the liturgy were quite out of keeping with the historical spirit of the Reformed tradition. "In these responses....", Bomberger charged, "we discover a purpose and a scheme, to sever completely all historical connection between our Church of the present and our Church of the past".[62] Not only did the responsive character of the Mercersburg liturgy render it inimical to the historical cultus of the Reformed Church, but so did its "ritualistic" extravagance. Nevin's call for "risings and bowings" in the liturgy[63] particularly rankled Bomberger. This, he protested, is "extremely ritualistic...and therefore strongly antagonistic to the genius and spirit of Reformed worship".[64]

Nevin was quite well aware that the sacramental qualities he felt were desirable and indeed essential in a Christian liturgy would arouse violent oppostion from proponents of the free worship system. But he argued, too, that the prayer-book conception of liturgy could never be successful against the champions of extemporaneous prayer. In The Liturgical Question, moreover, Nevin admitted that the real question facing the German Reformed Church was deeper than the debate between prayer-book and sacramental conceptions of worship.[65] The ultimate question, he wrote, is this: "Are we sure that we want a Liturgy at all?" If the answer is yes, then the liturgy must be sacramental in orientation; it must be eucharistic, priestly, rooted in the cycle of the church year, and committed to the principle of popular participation. If the answer is no, then a collection of prayer-book texts, however sophisticated, will accomplish nothing. It was Nevin's hope that the people themselves would decide the question in favor of sacramental worship.[66]

THE HERMENEUTIC OF REFORM AT MERCERSBURG

History: Science, Pietism, Idealism: The Mercersburg program of liturgical reform was based on the convergence of two methodologies: the one "historical-scientific" and the other "pietist-idealist". On the one hand, an authentic reform of worship must respect the historian's criticism of sources. From both F. C. Baur and A. Neander, Philip Schaff had learned to acknowledge the need for the *scientific* investigation of historical documents: their authenticity, dating, authorship, their interrelationships; and the socio-economic circumstances that produced them.[67] But there were two further corollaries about history, especially *church* history, that Schaff had learned from his teachers. First, Neander had taught him the pietist principle "*pectus est quod theologum facit*".[68] Church history demands not merely the scientific exegesis of texts and artifacts but the heart's submission to faith as well.[69] Schaff explicitly recognized his indebtedness to the pietism of Neander:

> He Neander pursued theology, not as an exercise of the understanding merely, but always as a sacred business of the heart also....The living center and heart's blood of the science was for him faith in Jesus Christ, as the highest revelation of a holy and merciful God, as the fountain of all salvation and sanctifying grace for the world.[70]

But at the same time, though far more reluctantly, Schaff conceded that he had been influenced by F. C. Baur.[71] It was Baur who introduced him to the notions of historical development and the organic progression of thought in the life of the church.[72]

Thus, the "historical" methodology adopted by the Mercersburg theologians was a curious blend of scientific rigor, German pietism (represented by Neander), and Hegelian idealism (represented by Baur). This convergent methodology had a definite impact on the Mercersburg proposals for liturgical reform. Commitment to the ideal of scientific history led Nevin and Schaff to go far beyond the sixteenth century in their search for patterns of worship that expressed "the genius and spirit of the liturgies that have come down to us from the first Christian ages".[73] As Nevin admitted in The Liturgical Question:

> The Committee knew, of course, that in carrying out their work...they were proposing to themselves something more than the reproduction simply of any older liturgy of the Reformed Church--something more than a mere compilation of offices and forms, modelled on the plan of these liturgies generally.[74]

In the same way, commitment to the *idealist* vision of history required something more than a prayer-book liturgy or a venerable thesaurus of ancient texts. As Schaff pointed out, fidelity to the church's history and tradition could be honored only by careful attention to the organic development of ideas:

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> That which constitutes the main thing in history, the ideas which rule it and reveal themselves in the process, imparting to it its only true significance and importance, are too generally disregarded...[75]

Despite this predilection for the idealist interpretation of history, however, Schaff was unwilling to stretch the notion of organic development quite as far as Baur and the "left-wing Hegelians" at Tubingen were willing to stretch it. As we have noted in chapter two, Schaff remained suspicious throughout his life of "rationalists" like Baur, and more especially, F. D. Strauss.[76] The Apostolic Age, the "supernatural century of miracles", remained off-limits as far as rigorous scientific criticism was concerned. Schaff remained faithful to the pietist principles learned from Neander. He insisted on the submission of reason to revelation, on the "humble bringing of reason into captivity to the obedience of faith."[77]

Philip Schaff's interpretation of organic historical development was thus qualified by an important pietist proviso.[78] In cases of apparent conflict, reason must submit itself to faith. In its own way, Nevin's program of theological anthropology supported the same point of view. If the world discloses its intelligibility only

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man, and if man is fully intelligible solely in the historically incarnate Christ, then any challenge to the absolute historicity of the incarnation can only be regarded as modern gnosticism. And indeed, it was precisely this charge of gnosticism that both Nevin and Schaff hurled against the rationalist Tubingen critics.[79]

Methodologically, then, the Mercersburg theologians adopted the idealist notion of organic development in history, while "correcting" it by means of the pietist proviso (submission of reason to faith in causes of conflict). Even though the _same_ organic law governs the evolution of both natural and supernatural events, and even though the "supernatural" has "fallen into the regular process of history", it remains true that the _incarnation_, the pivotal historical event, is a _mystery_, an object of _faith_. History itself becomes fully intelligible only for the believer. This is precisely the position adopted by Schaff in the long introduction to _History of the Apostolic Church_:

> The general relation...between secular or profane, and sacred history (including church history), is substantially the same as that between nature and grace, reason and revelation, time and eternity....All history before Christ prepared the way for

> the incarnation; all history since Christ must ultimately...serve to glorify his name and extend his everlasting kingdom....A representation of all history....making the fact of the incarnation the centre and turning point of the whole, would be Universal History in the widest sense.[80]

History must therefore be read "incarnationally", just as church and sacrament must be interpreted in the same way. The primitive history of man is a proleptic anticipation of Christ the "archetypal man"; the subsequent history of the world after the incarnation is the progressive disclosure of the "new creation". In short, as Schaff insisted, "history may be styled a self-evolution of God in time".[81]

The "catholic hermeneutic": wholeness versus all-ness: The modified "idealist" construction of history was one element in the Mercersburg hermeneutic of liturgical reform. Another was the "catholic hermeneutic" discussed in chapter three.[82] In that discussion we noticed that Nevin regarded the principle of catholicity as a matter of intention rather than extension, wholeness rather than all-ness. "Catholicity" means the organic transformation of man, nature and history from within, through the power of the "new creation" already introduced into the world through the incarnation. What is catholic is whole. For wholeness is not a statistical collection of persons, facts or events (this is "all-ness"), but rather the "necessary and perpetual ground of their own being and life".[83]

If the church itself must be characterized by this catholic wholeness, then its worship and sacraments must be as well. Here we have the reason why Nevin insisted that the proper conception of a liturgy has to be "sacramental" not "prayer-book"; organic and inward, not mechanical and outward.[84] The requirement of catholicity in worship does not mean that every church must follow the same liturgical formulas, not that the more widely a liturgy is used the more catholic it will become. Catholicity has nothing to do with statistics or geography. The same essential characteristics that apply to catholicity in the church also apply to sacraments and worship. It will be useful to recall those characteristics from our discussion in chapter three,[85] and to see how they are related to the Mercersburg theology of worship.

1. The "new creation" (Nevin's global term for the whole mystery of salvation) is always and everywhere present at the interior of human experience. According to the "law of inwardness", this new creation must express itself

in visible historical form. When it does, church and sacrament result--just as when God utters his Word into human history, Christ the "Universal Man", the completion of humanity, results. Like the church itself, then, liturgy must always be both catholic and sacramental: it must be the visible utterance of the new creation that abides permanently in the process of human history. And if history itself is nothing less than "God's self-evolution in time", then liturgy must be seen as the real disclosure of God's continuing action in Christ. Any form of worship that fails to communicate the realness and the objectivity of this disclosure must be rejected as "uncatholic" and "unsacramental". Here we meet the most radical objection Nevin and Schaff levelled against the puritan position. By reducing sacrament to commemorative ordinance the puritans denied its realness and objectivity. And by denying these things, they actually rejected the secure basis of Christianity itself: the real disclosure of God in space and time, the objective communication of God in the concrete forms of human life. In a word, unsacramental worship is a denial of both revelation and incarnation. That is why Nevin and Schaff so often complained that the puritans were no better than the rationalists: both ended in gnostic flight from the real historicity of God's self-disclosure.[86]

2. *The power and effectiveness of this event* (God's real historical disclosure in Christ) *does not depend on human reflection and choice; the event itself may be apprehended pre-reflectively in faith, but it is not dependent upon faith for its objective presence*. Once again, this characteristic of catholicity is essential for Christian worship. Nevin's indefatigable defense of objectivity in the sacramental transaction exemplifies this point.[87] Against the puritans he argued that sacraments do not derive their power and efficacy from the faith of believers. In saying this, Nevin did not mean to disparage faith. Faith is, for him, a real apprehension of the mystery of salvation--even when that apprehension is not fully developed or conscious, as in the case of infants who are baptized.[88]

In a curious way, then, Nevin and Schaff shared Calvin's concern for safeguarding the utter transcendence and freedom of God. Calvin feared binding God to the celebration of a sacrament; Nevin and Schaff feared putting him at the disposal of a rather abstract "faith". Unlike Calvin, however, the Mercersburg theologians were not afraid that

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objectivity in the sacraments might compromise God's sovereignty. For according to Nevin's theological anthropology, the sacramental principle was already disclosed in creation, man and incarnation. And the same organic law that determined those events is at work in the sacramental transaction itself, even when the unbelieving and the unworthy participate.[89]

3. The full transcendent meaning of God's self-disclosure is greater than the ordinary categories of historical space and time, but we can perceive it only within those categories. This characteristic of catholic wholeness also had its impact on the Mercersburg theology of worship. Indeed, it forms the core of Nevin's objection to the system of free worship. Nevin utterly rejected the idea that extemporaneous prayer is more "spirtual" because it is free and spontaneous.[90] According to the law of inwardness, what is spiritual must manifest itself in visible historical forms[91]--as the very condition of its being real. For the real, Nevin observed in his essay on "Human Freedom", is neither "the actual as such nor the Ideal as such, but the actual and Ideal perfectly blended together, as the presence of the same fact."[92]

By a kind of dialectical process of elimination, the application of this same characteristic of catholic wholeness led Nevin and Schaff to repudiate the program of the Oxford Movement. If God's self-disclosure is perceptible only within historical categories of space and time--and yet always exceeds those categories in its idea--then it is impossible to identify any single period of church life as the absolute ideal. Two theses in Schaff's *Principle of Protestantism* help to clarify this point. In one (thesis 17), Schaff explicitly affirmed the idealist principle of dialectical progress in history. In another (thesis 78), he accused the Oxford Movement of failing to recognize this principle.

> 17. The idea, unfolded in comprehensive and profound style particularly by the later German philosophy, that history involves a continual progress toward something better, by means of dialectic contrapositions (*Gegensaetze*), is substantially true and correct.
>
> 78. The grand defect of Puseyism...is its unprotestant character in *not recognizing* The importance of the Reformation and the *idea of progress in the life of the church* since.[93]

For Schaff, as for Nevin, the true idea of historical progress tends to relativize all historical manifestations of Christianity, while at the same time it affirms their necessity. Hence the idea of catholicity, for both church and liturgy, does not consist in a movement of repristination or in an attempt to re-create past forms of church life. It consists, rather, in a process of development identical to the one by which the kingdom of God itself unfolds in the world. Like the leaven of the kingdom catholicity develops "not simply as diffusing itself extensively through the world, but in a still more important sense as transfusing itself intensively into the life of humanity itself, as an organic whole".[94]

Application of the characteristics of catholic wholeness to the liturgical question enabled Nevin and Schaff to avoid alternatives they felt were undesirable: puritanism, rationalism, revivalism, Puseyism. None of these "isms" could generate a conception of worship that was authentically catholic and sacramental, because they either lacked a proper notion of organic historical development (puritanism, revivalism, Puseyism) or failed to observe the "pietist proviso" in applying it to Christianity (rationalism).

Pastoral Principles: 1. Active participation: The third element that contributed to the Mercersburg hermeneutic of liturgical reform was pastoral in orientation. A liturgy that is catholic and sacramental must also be "popular", i.e., it must permit and encourage the direct engagement of the people through word and gesture.[95] In Nevin's opinion this was not simply a strategy for keeping the people from becoming bored and restive, it was a genuine recognition of their baptismal priesthood.[96] A "pulpit liturgy", one that leaves the people entirely at the mercy of the presiding minister, results in the worst form of priestcraft. For it ends up denying that the people have anything significant to contribute to the liturgical action. As Nevin said, the pulpit system regards the "co-working activity of the congregation....superfluous".[97]

2. Repetition and Familiarity: While Nevin recognized the "forms of prayer are not enough of themselves to make the services of the sanctuary what they ought to be",[98] he also insisted that a liturgy could not survive without familiar, repetitive patterns of prayer. Schaff's report of the Liturgical Committee to the Synod of Baltimore in 1852 hinted at the same point:

> ...a Liturgy will never fully answer its purpose, and be sufficiently appreciated by the congregations, if it is confined to the hands of the

> minister. Like the Bible, the Catechism and the Hymn Book, it ought to be the Common property and manual of every member of the Church. The laymen will take a far deeper interest in the devotional exercises, if they can follow the minister by their book, and respond at least with an audible Amen at the end of each prayer.[99]

The desire for familiar and repetitive liturgical forms was thus rooted in the more general pastoral principle noted above: the need for popular participation.

3. Family Prayer: In addition to the forms of common worship, Nevin and Schaff hoped to include a section devoted to family prayer in the Provisional Liturgy. Schaff explicitly mentioned this hope to the Synod in 1852:

> The addition of a Family Liturgy, including a sufficient number of prayers, seems to be very desirable, not only on account of its independent value, but especially...because it would facilitate the introduction of the Liturgy amongst our laity.[100]

As we have seen, Nevin had been asked to provide texts for this purpose in 1855,[101] but his pessimism about the whole liturgical project at that time seems to have prevented his making a contribution.[102] As events turned out, however, such a section devoted to "Family Prayers" did appear in the 1857 book.[103] Since this portion of the Pro-

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visional Liturgy will not be discussed in detail, it may be useful to summarize its contents as an illustration of Schaff's and Nevin's concern for liturgically-inspired prayer in the family.

The section is divided into two weekly series.[104] In each of these a form of morning and evening prayer is provided for every day of the week. The prayers are scriptural in tone; indeed, they sometimes quote the language of the Bible directly.[105] Occasionally, too, the authors provided short litanies either of their own composition or from liturgical sources like the Byzantine Rite.[106] In effect, these family devotions amounted to a sort of short office for "Lauds" and "Vespers". For in addition to the biblically inspired prayers--some of which are directly dependent on the psalter[107]--the rubric at the beginning of the section "Family Prayers" recommends that a portion of Scripture be read in course each day:

> As an aid to Family Worship, which should be observed daily in every Christian household, the following prayers may be used, in connection with the reading of a portion of Scripture. It is recommended that the Scriptures be read in course, especially the New Testament and the Psalms.[108]

The rubric went on to recommend use of the Lord's Prayer "and, if it be thought proper, the following Benediction: The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God,

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and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with us all. Amen."[109]

4. Language and style: The same attention to scriptural language found in the section on "Family Prayers" was to be a general principle of the whole Provisional Liturgy. Schaff's 1852 report to the Synod included this statement:

> The language and style of the Liturgy ought to be throughout scriptural as much as possible, that is, simple, sublime, and devotional, such as we find in the Psalms especially, and in the Lord's Prayer. The doctrinal tone, which predominates too much in most of the Calvinistic Liturgies, ought to be used only within certain limits.[110]

The last sentence of this text is revealing. Nevin, too, felt that the Reformed liturgies of the sixteenth century were too didactic in tone. In *The Liturgical Question* he noted:

> The position occupied by the Churches of the Reformation was not in general favorable to the production of good liturgies. Attention was too much taken up with other interests; there was too little knowledge of liturgical antiquities; the subject was given up too much to mere particular fancy and taste, without any regard to necessary principles and laws.[111]

Nevin also charged that the early Reformers were too preoccupied with polemical reaction against the exaggerated cultus of the Roman Church to produce a well-integrated liturgical pattern of their own.[112]

5. Provision for extemporaneous prayers: Despite their dislike of the free worship system, the Mercersburg theologians did not demand the utter elimination of spontaneous prayer by the minister in the *Provisional Liturgy*. As Schaff said: "...a Liturgy ought not to interfere with the proper use of extemporaneous prayer, either in public or in private: but rather to regulate and promote it."[113] Nevertheless, Schaff seemed to favor limiting such spontaneity to "lesser" liturgical celebrations such as services on Sunday afternoon and evening, or to "weekly Bible lectures, social prayer meetings, catechetical exercises, and...special occasions".[114] In the actual text of the *Provisional Liturgy*, however, free prayer was permitted at one point even within the eucharistic rite. Following the distribution of communion the rubric directs: "the Minister shall offer a free *Prayer*, or the Post-Communion Prayer may be said..."[115]

These five principles--active participation, repetition and familiarity, provision for family worship, language and style, and provision for extemporaneous prayer--constitute the major pastoral preoccupations of Nevin and Schaff. It was their conviction that if given a chance, the people would react favorably to the forms of worship provided in the *Provisional Liturgy*. In *The Liturgical Question*, Nevin remarked:

> Our congregations generally have refused to go into the use of it; *yet they like it on the whole, we hear, and would be glad to accept it, if only it were relieved from its "objectionable peculiarities"*; and now to meet the exigency, the Synod, following the multifarious voice of the classes, has put it once more into the hands of the original Committee, for the express purpose of having it brought into such improved shape.[116]

Neither Nevin nor Schaff favored *imposing* the new liturgy on the churches as an absolutely inviolable rule. Their hope was to keep the liturgy alive long enough to let the people themselves decide for or against it. It was for this reason, as we have seen, that Nevin objected to the strategy of his opponents, who wanted to submit the liturgy to approval by the individual *Classes*.[117] It was also the reason why Nevin resisted any effort to revise the 1857 liturgy by tampering with "external particulars". He wrote: "It the Provisional Liturgy may be revised and improved *under its own character, and within its own sphere*; but any attempt to change its constitutional nature itself can only result in destroying it as it now is, and giving us in place of it a mongrel production".[118] Nevin reminded his foes that the liturgy had been conceived not according to a prayer-book conception of worship but according to a sacramental one. Its structure was thus "like a work of art...governed throughout by its own reigning idea".[119] In a highly emotional plea toward the end of The Liturgical Question, Nevin insisted:

> To take such a work to pieces, or to mar and change its parts, with the view of turning it mechanically into something else, is necessarily to ruin it in its own order of existence altogether. We have no right to kill the Liturgy in any such vandal style as that....The Synod has no right to make their the Liturgical Committee's labors absurd. As a work of literature at least, if nothing more, let the liturgy live.[120]

The work of the Liturgical Committee, Nevin argued, must stand or fall as a unified whole. If the people are not ready to accept it, then no amount of tampering or patchwork will help.[121]

THE MERCERSBURG LITURGY: METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

History, the "catholic hermeneutic" and pastoral principles: such were the component elements of the Mercersburg hermeneutic of liturgical reform. It is necessary now to seek a method of interpretation that will enable us to understand more precisely how the structure and content of the eucharistic rite of the Provisional

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Liturgy reflected what Nevin called a "sacramental" liturgy, one that was "priestly", "based on the church year", and "popular".

The interpretation of any text requires a carefully articulated method of interpretation. Texts, it must be remembered, have their origin in the human act of discourse--even when that discourse has been exteriorized and embodied in a subsequent act of writing. In a sense, then, every text suffers from what might be called a "problem of distance". This problem is twofold. On the one hand, there is the "distance" that separates the original author from his own work, for in being written the work achieves an existence of its own, independent of the person who produced it. On the other hand, there is the distance between the written work and its readers. If the work originally embodied an act of human discourse, is it possible for later readers, separated from the author by time, space and perhaps culture, to become parties to the discourse?

These problems and questions can only be resolved through a method of interpretation. It is not sufficient merely to accumulate data about the text: its sources, its historical background. Such data, while significant, does not suffice to disclose the meaning of a text; it simply

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tells us how the text was produced. This, it seems to me, is precisely the problem found in the interpretations of the Mercersburg liturgy offered by James Hastings Nichols and Jack Maxwell.[122] Both these men provide valuable information about how and why the Mercersburg theologians went about their work of creating liturgical forms. But neither of them delves into the deeper problem of what those forms _mean_ precisely as liturgical _texts_. With regard to the eucharistic rite, for example, their discussion tends to limit itself to the verbal resemblances between the liturgy formulated at Mercersburg and the liturgies found in sources like the _Book of Common Prayer_, the "Catholic Apostolic Liturgy", and the Palatinate Liturgy of 1563.[123] This discussion is accurate enough, as far as it goes. Schaff, who was principally responsible for the composition of the eucharistic rite that finally appeared in the _Provisional Liturgy_,[124] was quite obviously influenced by both the _Book of Common Prayer_ and the "Catholic Apostolic Liturgy". Indeed, as Maxwell has shown, he sometimes followed those sources _verbatim_ in the communion service of the 1857 liturgy.[125]

But a verbal inventory of the sort provided by Maxwell does not go far enough. The fact that Schaff borrowed words

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and phrases from the Anglicans and the Irvingites is interesting, but in the final analysis it does not tell us very much. To say that this phrase is borrowed from that text is helpful from a purely taxonomical point of view, but it does nothing to reveal the meaning of the text itself. Indeed, a method of comparison that limits itself to noticing the external resemblances of pattern and phraseology between one liturgy and another is exactly what Nevin rejected in The Liturgical Question. Such a method was, in his view, the "prayer-book conception" of liturgy--one that regarded worship as merely an "outward" collection of forms and prayers.[126]

My chief objection to the interpretation of Nichols and Maxwell is, therefore, methodological. To formulate the objection a bit more precisely: no text--and especially no liturgical text--can be adequately interpreted simply by giving a purely external history of its context, language, phrases, borrowings, dependencies, and similarities to other literature. Such a history is, of course, an important first step toward eventually discovering the meaning of a text, but it remains only a first step. Texts are stubborn; they will not yield up their meaning if we stop at the level of verbal or phraseological analysis.

Hence, the interpretation of a text involves more than one step. It also requires: 1) the question of the author's intention (does a text, as the "embodiment" or "exteriorization" of an author's "original intention" afford us any access to that intention?); and 2) an interpretation of the "world" disclosed by the text. In a word, there is need for a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the questions: what is a text? how does a text *mean*?; and how do we "readers" *interpret* and appropriate a text? In order to address these questions an appeal will be made in the pages that follow to the theory of interpretation outlined by Paul Ricoeur, especially in his recent work *Interpretation Theory*.[127]

1. *What is a text*? It has long been recognized that human language is a complex phenomenon. As human beings use them, words are capable of almost limitless variety and nuance. Although words can be analyzed for their phonological components alone, it is Paul Ricoeur's contention that words exist primarily for the sake of *discourse*, for the sake of the *sentence*.[128] Words seek to be embodied in a discourse whereby *someone* says *something* to *somebody else*. According to Ricoeur, the structure of discourse is constituted by a dialectical relation

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between "event" and "meaning": as "event", discourse is actual communicative speech that occurs in time; as "meaning", discourse manages to surpass or "survive" the limits of time. The fact that language "in the state of discourse (usage)" can survive the restrictions of time through meaning suggests that human language has intentionality.[129] This is so because the meaning of what is uttered in discourse can continue to be the same even after the temporal immediacy of the act of speaking has passed. Moreover, meaning has a thickness, a density of its own. It is both subjective and objective; it embraces both the intention of the speaker (the "utterer's meaning") and the intention of what is spoken (the intention of the sentence; the "utterance meaning"). Subjectively (utterer's meaning), the meaning of discourse is constituted by who the speaker is, by what he does in speaking, and by his intention to be recognized and understood by his hearers. Objectively (utterance meaning), the meaning of discourse is constituted by a dialectical relation between "sense" and "reference".[130] The objective "sense" of discourse is its "what"; the objective "reference" of discourse is its "about what".[131] Ricoeur summarizes the entire matter in the axiom: "If all discourse is actualized as an _event_, all discourse is _understood_ as _meaning_".[132]

A _text_, however, is a very particular kind of human discourse that has been exteriorized through the act of _writing_ ("inscription").[133] There are thus special advantages and disadvantages that result from the exteriorization of discourse in a text. The most obvious advantage of a text is that it "liberates" meanings by making them accessible to people who might not have "been there" when the original discourse happened. In this sense a text transcends, surpasses the original situation in which it was produced; potentially, it makes an author's world available to people of other times and places. For this reason a written text achieves what Ricoeur would call a "semantic autonomy": "the author's original intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide".[134] Ricoeur goes on to say: "Inscription becomes synonymous with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results from the disconnection of the author from the verbal meaning of the text, of what the _author_ meant and what the _text_ means."[135] In short, "the text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text means now matters more than what its author meant when he wrote it."[136]

But there is a serious disadvantage in a text, too. There is an obvious distance--cultural and temporal--between the original author and his situation, and later readers and their situations. These two qualities of a text--its "liberating" power and its "distanciation"--raise an important question. Can we really know what a text means? If we can, how would we go about discovering that meaning?

2. How does a text mean? Discovering how a text means requires that one avoid two fallacies. One such fallacy consists in assuming that a reader can directly "intuit", through a kind of literary magic, the original mental intention of an author. What Ricoeur has called the "romanticist hermeneutic" made precisely this error. It assumed that one could get at an author's original intention--or at his original audience--by a direct process of psychological identification. Another error, however, can be called the fallacy of the "absolute text". This error results from forgetting that the text was and remains a particular kind of discourse--something said by someone to somebody else. The struggle to avoid these two fallacies-the struggle to respect both the "semantic autonomy" of the

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text and the rights of the reader--reveals and generates the need for interpretation (the task of hermeneutics).[137]

As we have seen, it is precisely because a text is written and thus "disassociated" from its author that it can extend its field of reference. The meanings of a text can become accessible to persons of different times, places and cultures. How is this possible? Ricoeur would answer that it is possible only through a process of interpretation, a process that involves several steps or "moves". These may be called "guessing", "explaining" and "interpreting (understanding, appropriating)". A brief analysis of these moves will enable us to give more precision to our methodological objection to the interpretation of the Mercersburg liturgy offered by Nichols and Maxwell.

Guessing: Paradoxically, the very fact that the text "abolishes" the author's original intention results in the fulfillment of that intention. In this sense a text functions very much like a musical score. The score does not really permit us to get at the "original intention of the composer". Yet at the same time the conductor who obeys the notations of that score regarding such things as pitch, rhythm and phrasing actually fulfills and even surpasses the composer's

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intention. The successful performance of a musical score still does not reveal the composer's original intention to us; that remains unknown. Nevertheless, it is possible to "guess" at his intention by carefully observing what has been written ("inscribed") in the score itself.

This illustration borrowed from the field of music suggests that "guessing", as a first move of interpretation, should not be confused with simply "taking a stab in the dark". For a text is not an arbitrary concatenation of sentences. It forms a unit, a genre with its own immanent logic. Part of the work of "guessing" consists in identifying the genre (e.g., essay, poem, story) of the text. Is it mythical, parabolic, allegorical? The genre determines the internal architecture of the text, reveals it as a "work".[138]

The labor of "guessing" a text thus follows a logic of probability rather than a logic of absolute empirical verification. Despite the fact that a text liberates meaning, it does not present us with an unlimited field of possible constructions. Some interpretations are more plausible, more probable, than others. An example will help clarify this point. In modern biblical exegesis, scholars commonly note that the gospel parables--texts with a definite literary genre--have been redacted and reinterpreted in the very process of their transmission.[139] Thus, as they appear in the New Testament, the parables are "layered" texts that manifest a long history of oral transmission and literary editing. Originally, of course, the parable was a live act of discourse: something told by someone ("Jesus") to somebody else. But through the act of writing the parable has become a text--often a text whose genre has changed in the process (as, for example, when the parable becomes an *allegory*). The original mental intention of the speaker ("Jesus") and the original mental intention of the author (the evangelist) are not immediately available to us through the text of the parable (or allegorized parable). There is an obscurity that covers both "original" intentions: that of the speaker and that of the evangelist. Nevertheless it is still possible to "guess" the text of the parable and to arrive at a *probable* conclusion about its original form and even its original use in the life of the "speaker".[140] "Guessing" of this sort is not utterly arbitrary. It relies upon a careful analysis

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of things like literary genre, scientific dating, interrelationships between documents, internal and external evidence, the socio-economic mileu out of which the text arose, corroboration through other texts, etc. Still, guessing remains only the first move in the process of interpretation.

Explaining: On the basis of a probable guess it is possible to make a second move toward comprehending and appropriating a text. This second move may be called "explaining" or "reading" the text. One way to read a text is based on the assumption that its original "sense"[141] lies hidden behind the text. This way of reading presumes that with sufficient historical criticism, exegesis and guessing, it should be possible to "get behind" the text in order to discover the original intention of the author and the original historical situation of his readers. Ricoeur, however, would argue that this is not possible. The original historical circumstances that produced the text are precisely past; they cannot be repeated or re-enacted even by the most ingenious techniques of exegesis. One cannot, therefore, explain or "read" a text by attempting to get back to the "original situation".[142] Such an attempt would involve the reader in the romanticist fallacy described above.

But there is another possible way of reading a text and thus moving toward its meaning. This second way involves looking for the meaning of a text not behind but in front of it. The ostensive and historical references that "lay behind" the text (the things that conditioned the original intention and situation of the author) are no longer available to us. They have been cancelled by the passage of time. But the non-ostensive and existential sense of meaning in the text is not abolished by time.[143] This being the case, the meaning of a text is not to be found "behind" it (in some presumed original intention of the author) but in front of it. Meaning points ahead toward something, not backward to something behind the text. It is precisely this intentionality of meaning that allows discourse, even in its inscribed form as text, to survive the transitoriness of time and to continue its act of disclosure even when the author's original intention and situation have been superceded. A text may thus be said to have a surplus of meaning that surpasses the original intention and situation of its author.

Does this mean that a text has nothing to do with its original author? Ricoeur would answer no. But the disclosure of meaning offered by a text is not the author's intention; rather it is a world. By "world" here is meant what "we all understand when we say of a new born child that he has come into the world".[144] "World" is a progressively enlarging horizon of existence that includes the ensemble of references from the past as well as "projections", new ways of being in the world.[145] World is thus both past and possibility, the affirmation of what is and the reaching after what is not yet. As discourse, a text intends to disclose and project a world. As Ricoeur says, "The text speaks of a possible world and of a possible way of orienting oneself within it".[146]

Comprehending: It is when we grasp and are grasped by the text's disclosure of a world that we can say the process of interpretation is complete. It might be helpful to think of a text as a transaction: it is not only we who "perform operations" on the text; it also performs operations on us (i.e., discloses meaning by disclosing a world). Indeed, the disclosure offered by the test provides us with a new way of self-understanding,[147] a new direction of

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thinking and seeing. Like symbols, texts are "food for thought".[148] By comprehending the disclosure of a world through the text, we rescue it from the distanciation that prevents our knowing the author's original intention and situation.

METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF NICHOLS AND MAXWELL

Having outlined a possible theory of interpretation of texts, it is possible to become more precise in criticizing the assessment of the Mercersburg movement offered by James Hastings Nichols and Jack Maxwell. In my opinion these men have both made the _first move_ toward an interpretation of the Mercersburg liturgical texts. They have done the work of "guessing", and this is valuable as far as it goes. Maxwell, for example, provides a treatment of the texts that Schaff had at his disposal in putting together the eucharistic service of the _Provisional Liturgy_.[149] Nichols supplies useful information about the debate which the publication of the 1857 liturgy initiated. In both cases we are given a _history_ of the text: the names of the men who worked on it; their diverse backgrounds and interests. But such a history does not satisfactorily disclose the meaning of the text as _we_ readers--distanced from the original authors in space, time and culture--confront them. Furthermore, in the case of a liturgy like that of 1857, which has borrowed material from other sources, one must avoid what I would call the fallacy of "mere historical juxtaposition". This fallacy assumes that the meaning of a text has been securely demonstrated simply by putting it alongside its historical sources and pointing out the similarities and differences. Such juxtaposition, I contend, tells us very little about the "world" disclosed by a text.

An illustration will help clarify this last point. In the reforms of the Roman Liturgy inaugurated by the Second Vatican Council, the Consilium charged with the responsibility of composing new eucharistic prayers made use of the ancient text found in Hippolytus' Apostolic Tradition as a basis for "Eucharistic Prayer II".[150] The textual similarities between Hippolytus and Eucharistic Prayer II are rather obvious. The two texts may be conveniently placed in parallel columns for the sake of comparing structural and verbal resemblances.[151] But does this kind of juxtaposition prove that the two texts disclose the same world? Yes and no. Insofar as both Hippolytus and

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Eucharistic Prayer II disclose a world whose decisive event is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, we may say that the two texts are the "same". On the other hand, however, the Christology of the two prayers is vigorously dissimilar. Hippolytus' prayer discloses a Christology based on the assumption that Christ was not perfect son (_teleios_ _hiuos_) until he became the _Logos ensarkos_ in the incarnation.[152] Eucharistic Prayer II, however, is built around the Christology considered uniquely orthodox after the Council of Nicaea:[153] as the co-eternal Word, "one in being with the Father", the _Logos_ _asarkos_ was perfect Son from all eternity. There are, therefore, basic Christological differences between the two texts, even though they contain numerous phraseological parallels.

These Christological differences have, moreover, an important impact on the world projected and disclosed by the texts of the two prayers. The Hippolytan prayer projects an understanding of revelation and anthropology that is progressive, developmental. The incarnation was a _process_ that gradually achieved full human expression in the Word made _flesh_.[154] Christ is fully _Son_ when he becomes man. This, of course, suggests that manhood actually "adds" something to God the Word. From the viewpoint of theological anthropology it suggests, further, that when God utters himself in the world, man results.[155] Hippolytus' prayer thus projects a world wherein humanity itself may be regarded, really, as the place where God stands progressively revealed and communicated. Thus, Hippolytus' reference to the resurrection destiny of man in the phrase "et resurrectionem manifestet"[156] must be interpreted in light of the structures of revelation and anthropology already implied in his Christology. The "world" of Hippolytus' prayer projects a future in which resurrection is both the ultimate human possibility and the final disclosure of God's progressive self-expression in history. Because of its Nicene sensitivities, however, Eucharistic Prayer II has altered the Christological basis of the Hippolytan prayer and thus has changed the character of the world disclosed by the earlier text. In Hippolytus, incarnation and resurrection are aspects of a single logic according to which God progressively manifests himself in the world; the result of this logic is man's liberation from "alien powers" (revealed by the metaphoric

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phrase "vincula diaboli dirumpat").[157] In Eucharistic Prayer II, however, this logic has been altered. Resurrection is not part of the internal logic of incarnation itself; rather, it is something revealed by the One who was already eternal Son before the incarnation. The resurrection is not so much a human possibility disclosed by the very structure of incarnation but a doctrine revealed by a divine teacher, Christ the Incarnate Word. The world projected by Eucharistic Prayer II is a world where men await the disclosure of doctrine from the divine Word who teaches by his example. It is a world where men imitate Christ by embracing his example of suffering, death and resurrection.

The important point here is not that one of these prayers is "right" while the other is "wrong", but that they project and disclose different worlds, even though they are similar in structure and vocabulary. Eucharistic Prayer II is not adequately interpreted simply by acknowledging its phraseological dependence on the text of Hippolytus. An historical juxtaposition of the two texts may certainly reveal the sources used by the members of the Consilium who composed the modern Roman prayer, but it is not sufficient for interpreting the meaning of that prayer.

This, then, is my central objection to the analyses of the Mercersburg liturgy offered by Nichols and Maxwell. These analyses are not "wrong", but they do not carry the work of interpretation far enough. In his "theological and liturgical examination" of the eucharistic rite of 1857, for example, Maxwell has nothing to say about either 1) how this rite is related to the Mercersburg hermeneutic of reform, or 2) how this rite projects a "sacramental" world (a point Nevin himself considered critical for the valid interpretation of a liturgy).[158] Similarly, in his chapter on "The New Liturgy", Nichols writes that Nevin promoted the notion of worship as "sacramental sacrifice".[159] Factually, this is not incorrect; but it leaves a number of questions unaddressed. For in his earlier chapter on Nevin's eucharistic doctrine,[160] Nichols has failed to provide any detailed account of Nevin's idealist theological anthropology and sacramental theory--the very things that would supply an appropriate context for understanding a term like "sacramental sacrifice". More seriously, Nichols fails to test the validity of his interpretation of the Mercersburg doctrine of the

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eucharist by a hermeneutical investigation of the rite found in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857. In short, neither author advances our comprehension of the meaning disclosed and projected by the texts of the Mercersburg liturgy.

CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY IN THE MERCERSBURG LITERATURE

It is my contention that the Mercersburg theologians themselves offer criteria of adequacy for one who wishes to interpret the liturgy they produced. By "criteria of adequacy" I mean those conditions, expressed in the writings of Nevin and Schaff, which must be satisfied if one is to understand what a "liturgy" or a "liturgical text" is. These criteria are three: anthropological, sacramental and "transactional". Some comments about each of them are in order.

1. The anthropological criterion: As we have seen in chapter five, Nevin's anthropology was dominated by the idealist conviction that man is "self-conscious spirit".[161] A human person is not simply one object among many others in the world; he is a personal subject "having possession of itself, and capable of self-action".[162] Nevin thus projects a world in which authentic human freedom and self-transcendence are possible. In man the world becomes

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intelligible, intelligent and morally responsible.[163] Even law, taken in its most radical sense, does not abolish man's autonomy (his capacity as self-conscious spirit to be both self-possessed and self-acting).[164] For at its root law is not something hereronomous, an alien mandate mechanically imposed from without. Rather, it is "given" as "a power to be acknowledged and obeyed"[165] along with freedom, in the very act of self-consciousness. All concrete human existence reveals this basic polarity between liberty and authority (law).[166]

Nevin's anthropology is, then, an optimistic one. Even though sin causes man to rebel against the power of authority that reveals itself in his own consciousness, he is still capable of freedom and moral responsibility. Because of man, nature is no longer dark, blind and lawless. The world becomes "light" by discovering the knowledge of itself in the sphere of human consciousness.[167] Nature and world disclose their intelligibility and meaning in man, who is the "completion of creation". This anthropological criterion must find expression in any adequate interpretation of the Mercersburg theology and liturgy.

2. The sacramental criterion: A second criterion for interpretation is to be found in Nevin's notion of sacra-

mentality. As used here, "sacramental" is not to be identified as simply a liturgical or theological term. It is related, rather, to the Mercersburg concepts of "catholic wholeness" and the "law of inwardness". Sacramentality refers to the interior structure of reality itself, its "spiritual" nature and thus its impulse to express itself in historical visible form. In Nevin's thinking at least, sacramentality is not restricted to the specific phenomenon of Christian life and faith. Thus Nevin could remark, in his "Answer to Professor Dorner":

> Such is the connection in fact between nature and the supernatural, that where the power of seeing and feeling has come to be properly awakened through the exercise of religious faith, the whole visible creation will be felt to be, not the outward symbol only, but in a profound sense the very sacramental presence of things unseen and eternal.[168]

In its original sense as used by Nevin, the term "sacramental"--even when applied to the liturgy--does not have the technical meaning of "objective offer of invisible grace through visible forms". Actually, it is related to one of the pastoral convictions held by the Mercersburg men: the need for the "embodiment" of faith through gesture and word on the part of the people. "Sacramental" is a

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performative "code" word for Nevin. It is his way of insisting that the language and actual performance of faith must be public. To the degree that the discourse of faith (whether verbal or non-verbal) becomes private and hidden ("gnostic"), to that degree faith becomes unreal. For if faith is spiritual, it must, according to the law of inwardness, embody itself performatively in word and gesture. The same organic law that governs the structure of all reality ("visible creation" as "sacramental presence of things unseen") also governs the structure of faith.

3. The transactional criterion: The third criterion for interpretation suggested within the Mercersburg literature is the notion of "transaction". This term as used by Nevin has a specific meaning in sacramental theory.[169] But there are broader resonances to the term as well, resonances that can be discerned if we examine the two expressions Nevin characteristically used in opposition to "transaction". These two expressions are "picture" ("proxy") and "local".[170] In the specific case of the eucharist, the "picture" theory does to the sacrament what Ricoeur's "romanticist hermeneutic" does to texts: both suppose that some kind of psychological identification

with an "author's original intention" can occur. This sort of move would turn the sacrament into a commemorative ordinance wherein by "imitating" the behavior of Jesus at the Last Supper, we "identify" with him and "remember" his benefits. The result would be a destruction of the objectivity of the sacramental event (in Ricoeur's terms, an abolition of the "semantic autonomy" of the text).

Similarly, transaction is opposed to "local". As applied to the eucharist, "local" implies that presence cannot be real unless it is confined to quantitative, spacial dimensions. As transaction, however, the sacrament liberates presence and meaning from physical confinement to the elements, much as text frees meaning and makes its disclosure possible to a potential universe of readers. In the "transactional discourse" of a sacrament, presence becomes really available through the "operations" of eating and drinking; in the "inscribed discourse" of a text, meaning becomes really available through the hermeneutical operations ("moves") of guessing, reading/explaining, and comprehending.

Seen as transactional, the power and meaning of a sacrament are disclosed not "behind" (or under) the elements, but in front of them. Transactionally, the sacrament opens up a world, permits us to inhabit that world and become a part of it. That is why Nevin could say that real presence in the sacrament is "not bound to the bread and wine, but to the act of eating and drinking".[171] The notion of transaction thus provided Nevin with a way to interpret the meaning of sacramental discourse without destroying either its autonomy or its liberating power. The puritan error (picture theory) would have destroyed the autonomy of sacramental discourse, its radical objectivity; the localization theory would have abolished the sacrament's ability to "free" meaning by projecting a world.

These three criteria of adequacy found in the Mercersburg literature will influence our own method of interpreting the liturgical texts to be analyzed in the next section of this chapter. It must be remembered, however, that these criteria are operational. All three of them deal with the way a liturgy works; they tell us that a liturgy works anthropologically, sacramentally and transactionally. But they do not immediately tell us what a liturgy means; they do not automatically disclose its world to us. What these three criteria of adequacy do tell us is this: that as an act of discourse "in the condition of inscription", as a formal text, the liturgy will speak to us on three basic levels. These may be identified as follows:

1. The liturgy is an act of human discourse; it speaks a human language, not a divine one. As such it will disclose a human world, one in which man can be free, intelligent and responsible. The liturgy is not a speculative treatise about God, but a disclosure about man's possibilities in an historical world that is developing. This may be termed the "anthropological disclosure" of the liturgical text.

2. The liturgy is sacramental discourse; it speaks of the radical intelligibility of creation in the light of human consciousness. As such it will disclose creation's need to come to a knowledge of itself, to embody itself in another, viz., in man. It will also speak of man's need to embody himself in word and gesture--and of faith's need to embody itself in the public discourse of worship and praise. This may be termed the "sacramental" disclosure of the liturgical text.

3. Finally, the liturgy is transactional discourse; it not only takes man seriously, it also takes itself seriously. It preserves its own autonomy, objectivity. As such it projects a world toward which man must move.

For the liturgy does more than merely describe the world as it is; it also projects a world that might become.[172] Transactionally, the liturgy forbids worshippers from "short-circuiting" its meaning through techniques of psychological identification or localization. What the liturgy discloses is always a world "beyond", "in front of" man's own immediate psychological or physical environment. This may be termed the "transactional" disclosure of the liturgical text.

THE EUCHARISTIC RITE IN THE MERCERSBURG LITURGY OF 1857

The structure and mechanics of the eucharistic rite in the *Provisional Liturgy* of 1857 have been analyzed in detail by Jack Maxwell. It does not, consequently, seem necessary to repeat that information here, except for providing the reader with a general outline of the rite.

Outline of the Eucharistic Rite: In the *Provisional Liturgy* the eucharistic rite is divided into two major sections: the "Preparation for the Holy Communion" and "The Holy Communion". The preparation service seems to have been conceived as an independent self-contained unit that could be celebrated on a day different from the actual celebration of the eucharist.[173] Both sections, preparation and the actual eucharistic celebration, were almost certainly the work of Philip Schaff.[174] The structure of these services may be outlined as follows:

I. Preparation for the Holy Communion[175]
  A. Scripture sentence: "The Lord is in His holy temple"[176]
  B. The Ten Commandments, with response and collect[177]
  C. The Litany[178]
  D. A Psalm or Hymn[179]
  E. Sermon (optional)[180]
  F. Hymn
  G. Exhortation addressed to the communicants[181]
  H. Prayer of confession of sins[182]
  I. Declaration of assurance of pardon ("absolution")[183]
  J. Doxology or short hymn[184]
  K. Concluding benediction by the minister[185]

II. The Holy Communion[186]
  A. Opening Sentence: "In the name of the Father.."[187]
  B. Prayer[188]
  C. Scripture passages read by the minister[189]
  D. Gloria in excelsis or Te Deum or Canticle proper for the season or Hymn[190]
  E. Gospel and Epistle appointed for the day, with proper collect and festival prayer according to the season[191]
  F. Brief sermon or homily (optional)[192]

G. Nicene Creed[193]

H. Collection of offerings from the people[194]

I. Exhortation addressed to the people concerning the communion[195]

J. Confession of sin[196]

K. Prayer of assurance said by the minister[197]

L. Eucharistic Prayer[198]

   1. Opening dialogue

   2. Preface

   3. _Sanctus_

   4. Words of institution

   5. Epiclesis[199]

   6. Anamnesis and prayer for acceptance of the sacrifice[200]

   7. Intercessions[201]

   8. Prayer for union with the blessed company of all the saints

M. Lord's Prayer

N. Benedictions over the people and _Pax_[202]

O. Distribution of communion[203]

P. Post-communion prayer, or free prayer by the minister

Q. _Te Deum_, if not used earlier; alternatives: _Gloria_ or a portion of Psalm 103

R. Closing benediction by the minister

As Jack Maxwell has noted, this rite contains few surprises if one compares it closely, as he has done, with the structure of the eucharistic liturgy in the Book of Common Prayer and in the "Catholic Apostolic Liturgy".[204] Schaff's reworking of these and other sources was, however, distinctive and in some cases highly original. Maxwell thus seems quite justified in his conclusion about Schaff's work on the eucharistic rite in the Provisional Liturgy:

> Armed with Scripture, a sizable array of historic liturgies and a sensitive, poetic spirit, Philip Schaff composed his own work, borrowing, adapting, and freely creating fresh forms which would articulate Reformed theology as Mercersburg understood it, yet which would also forge a devotional bond between a small band of nineteenth century German immigrants in an American Commonwealth and the saints of the ages.[205]

Interpretation of the eucharistic rite in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857: Our discussion of a method of interpretation appropriate for analyzing liturgical texts[206] suggests that we attempt to discover the "world" projected by the prayers of the Mercersburg eucharistic rite of 1857. Such a procedure seems even more justified when we consider that the Mercersburg men did not think of themselves as simply compiling a collection of liturgical forms. That, in Nevin's view, would have amounted to the "prayer-book" conception of liturgy. In the minds of the men who were responsible for it, the 1857 liturgy did not consist in "mere external particulars here and there, but in the _whole inward life and spirit of the_ schemes".[207] What we must try to grasp from the prayers of the _Provisional Liturgy_ is not, therefore, Schaff's affection for the Irvingites or Nevin's supposed "catholicizing" tendencies but the disclosure of a world. Our concern is for what these texts _mean_.

We can best get at the meaning projected by the texts of the _Provisional Liturgy_ by paying close attention to the patterns of language found therein. Two such patterns seem to dominate the eucharistic rite of 1857. The first of these is what might be called a "language of sin, repentance and creaturliness"; the second is a "language of communion". Taken together, these language patterns will help us identify the sort of world disclosed by the 1857 liturgical texts.

Pattern 1: A language of sin, repentance and creaturliness; a language of assurance: Time and again the _Provisional Liturgy_ defines man in terms of weakness, sin and distance from God. In the preparation rite, the prayer of confession of sins[208] directs the people, kneeling, to say: "we cast ourselves down at Thy feet, with deep humiliation and heartfelt penitent grief, in view of our manifold sins and great unrighteousness...[209] The text continues with a veritable litany of sins, offenses and shortcomings:

> We have sinned against Thee in thought, word and deed. We have broken Thy holy laws. We have come short of Thy righteousness and glory, in all our ways. Our lives bear testimony against us, and our own hearts condemn us, as being prone to all evil, and backward to all good. We have abused Thy mercies, and made light of Thy judgments. We have turned aside from Thy covenant;...We acknowledge and bewail before Thee, the corruption of our nature, the vanity of our minds, the waywardness of our hearts, the wanderings and apostasies of our whole fallen life....[210]

The confession of sin in the holy communion service proper[211] employs this same kind of language:

> We have sinned, we have sinned, we have grievously sinned against Thee, in thought, in word, and in deed, provoking most justly Thy wrath and indignation against us. Our righteousnesses are as filthy rags; our iniquities, like the wind, have carried us away...[212]

Even the eucharistic prayer speaks of "we sinners of the dust".[213]

On the surface of things, this sort of language raises some questions. How can the rather grim view of man portrayed in the texts just cited be reconciled with the optimistic anthropology found, for example, in Nevin's The Mystical Presence? How can "sinners of the dust" be reconciled with expressions like man as "the completion of creation" or the "light" which gives intelligibility and meaning to the darkness of nature? Are we to conclude that the Provisional Liturgy projects a world in which man is inevitably defeated by his own weakness and rebellion?

Some assistance in answering these questions may be found if we remember the nature of liturgical language. As Philip Wheelwright has pointed out, human language commonly employs two basic strategies for disclosing meaning: one is "efficient", the other is "expressive" or "mythopoeic".[214] An efficient strategy in language produces what Wheelwright calls "steno-language", a type of discourse that depends on precision, common social agreement as to the exact meaning of terms, and rigorous logical control.[215] But an expressive strategy produces "mythopoeic" discourse.[216] The distinction between these two strategies of language is not a judgment of value; one strategy is not "more valuable" than another. Nor is one strategy "subjective" while the other is "objective".[217] Rather, the distinction is based on a difference of function and intentionality. The two strategies of language intend different types of real disclosure. Wheelwright describes the intention and function of mythopoeic discourse as follows:

> ...it is the task of mythopoeic language to find ways of symbolically indicating the chronic ambivalence of the proto-religious affirmation, and of keeping the possibility of it alive despite opposition from literal believers on the one side and sceptical iconoclasts on the other.[218]

Mythopoeic language is tensive; it arises from the characteristic tension ("metaphoric clash") common to all metaphoric discourse. For, writes Wheelwright, the "essence of a metaphor consists in a semantic tension which subsists among the heterogeneous elements brought together in some striking new image or expression".[219] In the strategy associated with steno-language, discourse intends exactness and this intention results in a diminishment of its tensive quality.[220] By way of contrast, the strategy of mythopoeic discourse is

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revealed by "language that strives toward adequacy-- as opposed to signs and words of practical intent or of mere habit-- and is characteristically tensive to some degree".[221]

It is precisely this semantic tension that characterizes liturgical discourse.[222] But it must be remembered that the tensive quality of metaphor is not always obvious; it may often be latent.[223] In the case of a theological or liturgical text, a statement may often look literal but in fact be latently metaphorical. Wheelwright provides an example of such a case in the following passage:

> The statement "God exists" is...inescapably metaphoric and paradoxical in an age like ours where the notion of existence is straitjacketed by experimental and statistical techniques. But it is an inexpungeable expression of...our "world", in contradistinction to our "environment"; of the flowing wholeness of things, which we know through the total response of our personhood, and which generates the central divine myth around which our being revolves. The metaphor and the myth are necessary expressions of the human psyche's most central energy-tension.[224]

Thus, to say that the sentence "God exists" is metaphorical is not to claim that it is unreal or "merely subjective". It is precisely through the semantic tension inherent

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in metaphor that mythopoeic discourse discloses a real world.

These qualities of tensive mythopoeic discourse can help us make better sense of the Provisional Liturgy's language pattern of sin, repentance and creaturliness. Structurally, the liturgy's language of sin is always countered by a language of assurance. This fundamental pattern occurs in both the rite of preparation for the holy communion and the communion service proper. Notice, for example, the strategy of tensive opposition in the following two sets of texts:

> Set 1: Confession of sin: We have sinned against Thee....We acknowledge and bewail before Thee, the corruption of our nature, the waywardness of our hearts, the wanderings and apostasies of our whole fallen life.[225]
>
> Absolution: Hearken now unto the comforting assurance of God's grace... unto all who turn to Him with true repentance and faith...Unto as many of you, therefore, beloved in the Lord, as have now made confession of your sins unto God with hearty repentance and sincere faith....I declare by the authority of the Gospel, that all your sins are remitted and forgiven, through the perfect satisfaction of the most holy passion and death of our Lord Jesus Christ.[226]

Set 2: Confession of sin: We have sinned, we have sinned, we have grievously sinned against Thee....Our righteousnesses are as filthy rags; our iniquities, like the wind, have carried us away. The remembrance of our transgressions and shortcomings fills us with sorrow and shame.[227]

Absolution: The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, grant unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him: the eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of His calling, and what the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints...[228]

In each set of texts the strategy is identical. The language of sin is opposed to the language of assurance; and it is precisely the tension of opposition between the two that generates insight into the world projected by the texts. For this same pattern of opposition keeps re-emerging throughout the liturgy. Man has "turned aside" but God gives assurance that he can "walk back" (equals "return") through the blood of Jesus that "cleanseth from all sin".[229] Man has "rebelled" but God assures "pardon and peace to our souls".[230] Men are "sinners of the dust" but God assures them they are also his own "image" and "likeness".[231] Similarly, man's deeds are "filthy rags" but God assures that he will "purify" them.[232] The language strategy of the prayers thus discloses a set of oppositions that are characteristic of mythopoeic discourse: falling away--returning; rebelling--finding peace; dust--image and likeness; filth--cleanliness.

The texts of the *Provisional Liturgy* thus project a world where values and meanings are conflicting. It is a hazardous ambivalent world, where human mistakes of judgement and choice are possible and indeed probable. And yet this actual world, a place of conflict and disfigurement, is the real historical manifestation of that "heavenly world" where "a cloud of witnesses" even now "compasses us about in our Christian course".[233] The actual historical world is thus neither negligible nor unintelligible. It is a world of possibilities that must be actualized; and even though human rebelliousness can distort its meaning (falling away, rebelling, dust, filth), that distortion has been radically overcome (returning, finding peace, image and likeness, cleanliness).

The liturgy's tensive language of sin and assurance confirms the sort of world projected by Nevin in *The Mystical Presence*. Nevin's idealist anthropology led him to view man not only as the ultimate sphere of consciousness in creation[234] but also as the definitive center of freedom and responsibility in the world.[235] Grace itself becomes a metaphor for man's radical capacity as "self-conscious spirit" to possess and transcend himself in freedom. Sin is the metaphor for man's refusal to actualize himself in this way. This does not mean that Nevin denied the God-given character of grace or that he identified sin simply with an accidental human failure to "develop organically" in history. Man's ruin through sin is organic and real, and the Pelagian position about it is "shallow in the extreme".[236] Similarly, grace is a real life bestowed by God at "the very center of humanity itself".[237] Nevertheless the fact remains that the world's intelligibility, meaning and value will be disclosed through man--or it will not be disclosed at all. In this sense, Christ is truly the "archetypal man" who reveals once and for all what human consciousness, freedom and self-transcendence mean. For the same organic law that makes man the "voice" and "completion" of creation also makes Christ the completion of humanity. Thus Nevin could write: "The mystery of the new creation must involve in the end the mystery of the old, and the key that serves to unlock the meaning of the first must serve to unlock at the same time the inmost secret of the last".[238] The eucharistic prayer of the Provisional Liturgy makes the same point in somewhat different language:

> Thou also at the first didst make man in Thine own image, and after Thine own likeness, and didst set him over the works of Thy hands, endowing him with the excellent gift of righteousness, and forming him for immortality. And when afterwards, through the fraud and malice of Satan, he fell by transgression from that first estate, Thou didst not leave him still to perish utterly in his fall, but wast pleased to raise him up again and to restore him to the joyful hope of everlasting life, by the promise of redemption through Jesus Christ; who, being God of God, very God of very God, dwelling in the bosom of the Father with unspeakable blessedness from all eternity, at last when the fulness of time was come, came down from heaven, and became man...[239]

The world projected by the Provisional Liturgy through its tensive linguistic strategy of sin and assurance is, therefore, one in which human freedom, choice and responsibility are central. It is a world wherein ethical questions are critically important and moral decisions are vastly consequential. It would be a mistake to underestimate the ethical dimension of the Mercersburg liturgy. It was impossible for its authors to think of a ritual etiquette of the Lord's Table without thinking, at the same time, of the ethics of the Table. Like Calvin, Nevin and Schaff thought of man as a "free but reluctant" agent of God's purposes in creation.[240] For Nevin especially, a lawless or "ethically neutral" world can never be a human world.[241] Through its language of sin, repentance and creaturliness--and its correlative language of blessing and assurance--the 1857 liturgy projected a world where men are responsible for what they do and ultimately accountable for their decisions.

This interpretation seems to satisfy the three "criteria of adequacy" which we have discerned in the Mercersburg literature.[242] The liturgy sees man as alive in a developing world of possibilities that must be actualized through a responsible use of freedom and choice (the "anthropological disclosure" of the text). It sees the world itself as a real historical disclosure of that "heavenly world" where the fulness of blessing dwells[243] (the "sacramental disclosure" of the text). Finally, it challenges man to move toward a world that is larger and deeper than his immediate physical and/or psychological environment (a world of "peace and rest": the "transactional disclosure" of the text).[244]

Pattern 2: A language of communion: the dialectic of absence and presence: The language of sin and repentance in the *Provisional Liturgy* reveals that human sinfulness produces "absence" from God and from one's fellows. At a number of points the liturgy uses strong physical images to convey this absence. Impenitent sinfulness, for example, makes the Lord's Supper a "savor of death unto death".[245] We must "cast ourselves down" since we have departed God's ways through wickedness.[246] We have been "backward"; we have "abused" God's goodness; we have been "carried away"; we are "unworthy to approach".[247] All these strong physical images suggest that sinful man finds himself in the world absent from God, absent from himself and absent from his neighbors.

The features common to all these images is that they act as latent metaphors for removal, absence, withdrawal. Existentially, these texts suggest, man finds himself estranged from God, from self, from neighbors. This estrangement reveals itself both "vertically" and "horizontally". Man is afraid to "approach" God unless he "repents in dust and ashes",[248] and he finds himself subject to alien powers ("the power of worldly affections and lusts")[249] and lacking in charity toward those with whom he lives.[250] Thus, even though he is the conscious "light" of creation,[251] man has become "dark", unconscious of his role as the "crown and complement" of nature.

As is characteristic of tensive mythopoeic discourse, however, the "language of absence" just discussed is opposed by a "language of presence and communion". As a counterpoint to the vocabulary of estrangement the Provisional Liturgy weaves a vocabulary of fellowship, communion and presence. For example, the minister's exhortation in the rite of preparation for the holy communion identifies fellowship of the church and possession of the Spirit as the "way back" from the absence and withdrawal caused by sin.

> ...we cordially invite to this table all who are truly grieved and penitent for their sins, who look to the Lord Jesus Christ for righteousness and salvation, who abide in the fellowship of His Church, and who earnestly desire to possess His Spirit.[252]

In the eucharistic rite proper, the vocabulary of fellowship and communion is even more frequently encountered. There, the minister's exhortation reminds those who intend to communicate in the sacrament of Christ's "perpetual presence in the Church by the Holy Ghost"[253] that they must live in charity. For the bond between Christ and believers is a "living *union* and *fellowship*" that is rooted in the "baptismal *engagements* and *vows*".[254] Significantly, too, the people's prayer of confession that follows the minister's exhortation begins with an affirmation of the *communion* that exists even between Christ and *sinful* humanity:

> Almighty God, our heavenly Father, who dost admit Thy people unto such wonderful *communion*, that partaking by a divine mystery of the Body and Blood of Thy dear Son, they should dwell in Him and He in them; we unworthy sinners...do...repent...[255]

In the eucharistic prayer, as one might expect, the language of communion and presence intensifies. The preface traces a vision of cosmic praise that joins the earthly and the heavenly liturgies:

> Thee, mighty God, heavenly King, we magnify and praise. With patriarchs and prophets, apostles and martyrs; with the holy Church throughout all the world; with the heavenly Jerusalem, the joyful assembly and congregation of the first-born on high; with the innumerable company of angels round Thy throne...we worship and adore Thy glorious name, joining in the song of the Cherubim and Seraphim...saying: Holy, Holy, Holy....[256]

Toward the end of this same prayer, the identical theme of communion and fellowship with a larger "cloud of witnesses" is repeated:

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> O God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named; we rejoice before Thee in the blessed communion of all Thy saints, wherein Thou givest us also to have part. We praise Thee for the holy fellowship of patriarchs and prophets, apostles and martyrs, and the whole glorious company of the redeemed of all ages, who have died in the Lord, and now live with Him for evermore.[257]

Somewhat surprisingly the epiclesis of the eucharistic prayer lacks this strong language of communion. Entirely of Schaff's own composition without any borrowings from the Book of Common Prayer or the "Catholic Apostolic Liturgy",[258] the epiclesis is probably the most self-consciously doctrinal portion of the eucharistic prayer. It contains, in effect, a short summary of the Mercersburg eucharistic doctrine:

> Almighty God, our heavenly Father, send down we beseech Thee, the powerful benediction of Thy Holy Spirit upon these elements of bread and wine, that being set apart now from a common to a sacred and mystical use, they may exhibit and represent to us with true effect the Body and Blood of Thy Son, Jesus Christ; so that in the use of them we may be made, through the power of the Holy Ghost, to partake really and truly of His blessed life, whereby only we can be saved from death, and raised to immortality at the last day.[259]

The text of the epiclesis has to be interpreted in the light, particularly, of Nevin's pneumatology and his theory of the sacramental transaction, both of which have been discussed in chapter five.[260] As it appears in the Provisional Liturgy the epiclesis does not mean that the Spirit is invoked to perform some adventitious and extraordinary visitation of the elements. The power of the Spirit, Nevin was convinced, is perpetually resident in the church, where it continuously effects the mystical union between Christ and believers. The Spirit is not an absent friend who must be coaxed into appearing from time to time. Rather, it is because of its constant working in the mystical union that the mystical presence exhibited in the sacramental transaction is possible. Schaff's phrase "so that in the use of them we may be made...to partake really and truly of His blessed life"[261] is important. It reflects Nevin's position that the real presence of the Lord is "not bound to the bread and wine, but to the act of eating and drinking",[262] i.e., to the sacramental transaction as a whole.

In its own way, then, the epiclesis of the eucharistic prayer also speaks a language of communion and presence, though it does so in rather self-conscious doctrinal terms. At another point in the eucharistic liturgy, however, the Spirit's connection with the eucharistic fellowship of the church is explicitly affirmed. In a blessing given by the minister immediately before the "pax" and the distribution of communion, we find the following formula:

> The Holy Ghost, the Comforter, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, come down upon you in His glory, and take up habitation in your hearts henceforth and forever.[263]

In this second language pattern that dominates the Mercersburg eucharistic rite, therefore, we find the same sort of semantic tension noticed in the first. Man is estranged from self, God and others; yet at the same time he is drawn into communion with the "blessed company" of angels, prophets, patriarchs and martyrs. The dialectic between estrangement and fellowship permits one to identify the "world" projected by these liturgical texts. It is a world larger and deeper than man's present physical or psychological environment. This world is rendered present in the transaction of worship. Men eat and drink not merely to satisfy physical thirst or hunger, but in order to satisfy a far deeper craving for communion that will not be silenced. As Nevin put it, this craving stems from the fact that "our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life".[264] Despite the depth of man's estrangement--and the depth is real because his ruin is "organic, universal and whole"[265]--his "outreach" for God continues to assert itself. In the world projected by these liturgical texts, human life is an indestructible tension between absence and presence, estrangement and fellowship, withdrawing and reaching out.

Our analysis of these two language patterns in the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 re-enforces a point made by Paul Ricoeur about the power of texts to disclose a "world". My purpose has been to read the texts, not reconstruct the original intention of the authors.[266] Although the interpretation presented here is, I maintain, faithful to the thinking of Nevin and Schaff, it clearly exceeds their own immediate interests and preoccupations. Schaff, quite obviously, would not have said that he used a "tensive mythopoeic language strategy" to "project a world" of "sin and assurance" or of "estrangement and fellowship". He may not even have been willing to admit that his liturgical language was metaphorical. For him it was "simple, sublime and devotional".[267] But the process of interpretation demands, as Ricoeur has said, that we try to "understand an author better than he could understand himself":

> To understand an author better than he could understand himself is to display the power of disclosure implied in his discourse beyond the limited horizon of his own existential situation....In this sense, appropriation has nothing to do with any kind of person to person appeal. It is instead close to what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons (Horizonverschmelzung): the world horizon of the reader is fused with the world horizon of the writer. And the ideality of the text is the mediating link in this process of horizon fusing.[268]

THE PLACE OF THE MERCERSBURG LITURGICAL REFORMS IN THEIR NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT

The investigation of the Mercersburg theology of sacrament and eucharist in chapter five, together with the interpretation of the Provisional Liturgy in the present chapter, permit us to situate the liturgical proposals offered by Nevin and Schaff within the larger framework of nineteenth century reform movements. The patterns of reform analyzed in chapter four will assist us in this task. Three of these patterns have special importance for interpreting the Mercersburg liturgy of 1857: those of Johann Baptist Hirscher, Prosper Guéranger, and John Mason Neale.

1. Johann Baptist Hirscher's populist ecclesiology and the Mercersburg pastoral principles: As we have seen, J. B. Hirscher's hermeneutic of reform was based on a populist model of ecclesiology--one that viewed reform as proceeding "from the bottom up" not "from the top down".[269] It is probably significant that the Mercersburg men knew and admired Hirscher's work. In _The Principle of Protestantism_, Schaff referred to him as one among "theologians of more evangelical views in the Romish Church".[270] It is not my purpose here, however, to argue for any direct and conscious influence of Hirscher on the _Provisional Liturgy_. Nevertheless it may be said that Hirscher's preoccupation with direct engagement by the people in worship was shared by Nevin and Schaff. This point is especially evident in two areas: the synodical politics that accompanied the appearance of the 1857 liturgy and, eventually, its revision; and the pastoral principles Nevin and Schaff felt were crucial in a reform of worship.[271]

The political strife occasioned by the publication of the 1857 liturgy has already been mentioned in chapter five.[272] There, it was seen that Nevin's own political strategy for securing the life of the new liturgy was based on the principle: "let the people decide".[273] For this reason he opposed the strategy of his opponents, which would have required submission of the liturgy to approval by the individual Classes and consistories of the German Reformed Church. This last, Nevin knew, would result in the death of the liturgy before ever it had a chance to be tested and evaluated by the people themselves.

It is possible, of course, to argue that Nevin's motives in this matter were selfish. He, and more especially Schaff, had devoted considerable energy to the production of the 1857 liturgy. And in a shrill sentence in The Liturgical Question, Nevin argued, somewhat testily, that "the Synod has no right to make their the Liturgical Committee's labors absurd".[274] Still, it is difficult to deny that Nevin's overriding concern was the question: what does the church itself want and need? He wrote:

> Let it be decided, then, first of all, what order of liturgy the German Reformed Church in this country is supposed to need, as best suited to her present theological and historical position. This is a question which goes necessarily before all other questions, and which we have no right to pass in our circumstances, without a full and clear answer.[275]

Here we find an echo of Hirscher's insistence that the people themselves must be directly engaged in the task of deciding the church's policy and discipline.[276] It would be a mistake, then, to underestimate the emphasis Nevin and Schaff placed on the pastoral needs of people in the German Reformed Church and on their responsibility for deciding what form of worship might best meet those needs.

There is another aspect of Hirscher's thought about liturgical reform that was shared by the Mercersburg men--and detested by their opponents: viz., the notion of liturgy as a dialogue between presiding minister and people.[277] The debate about popular responses in the 1857 liturgy generated an extraordinary amount of acrimonious opposition from people like J.H.A. Bomberger. Bomberger protested that the use of popular responses in worship was unhistorical, contrary to the distinctive spirit and genius of the German Reformed Church's cultus, whereas Nevin insisted that responses were essential for a properly sacramental conception of the liturgy.[278] As Nevin saw it, the debate was deeper than a disagreement over forms. Like Hirscher he regarded popular participation in worship as a non-negotiable theological principle.

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Without the active engagement of the people in worship there can be no liturgy in the proper sense of the term; and without the liturgy there can be no church.

2. Guéranger's search for "common ritual symbols" and the Mercersburg concern for a "catholic" liturgy: Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, the pastoral concerns of Nevin and Schaff put them in the company of another nineteenth century liturgical reformer: Abbot Prosper Guéranger of Solesmes. As we have seen in chapter four, Guéranger's work was dominated by a search for "common ritual symbols".[279] These symbols, which Guéranger saw expressed most fully and truthfully in the Roman rite, would provide the best way to combat the chief cultural errors of his day: rampant subjectivism and individualism. Nevin and Schaff shared Guéranger's protest against subjectivism. To their way of thinking, the chief enemies of orthodox Christianity were precisely puritan sectarianism and "gnostic" rationalism (of the sort associated, for example, with the left-wing Hegelians of the Tubingen school). Schaff said as much in _The Principle of Protestantism_, particularly in theses 53, 54, and 55:

> 53. Its Protestantism's grand maladies at this time are rationalism and sectarism.
>
> 54. Rationalism is one-sided theoretic religious subjectivism and its fullest and most perfect exhibition has taken place in Germany....
>
> 55. Sectarism is one-sided practical religious subjectivism and has found its classic ground within the territory of the Reformed Church, in the predominantly practical countries, England and America.[280]

The antidote to these evils was, for the Mercersburg men as for Guéranger, a theology of church and worship based on the radically social, communal, visible and historical nature of God's revelation in Christ. Although neither Nevin nor Schaff could have accepted Guéranger's thesis that the church's historical visibility and its union in faith and charity were preserved above all in the Petrine office of the bishop of Rome, they nevertheless affirmed his view that Christian faith cannot survive if the church lacks common ritual symbols. Such symbols act as a principle of identity and cohesion in the ecclesial body. Without them there is nothing left but the destroying angels of revivalism and rationalism.[281] These forms of "quackery" (to use Nevin's term) are most effectively opposed by an "objective church system" based on the catechism and on a catholic liturgy.

3. John Mason Neale's "sacramental principle" and Mercersburg's principle of sacramentality: Finally, it is to be noted that Nevin's plea for a "sacramental" conception of liturgy[282] has much in common with John Mason Neale's "catholick principle of sacramentality" in church architecture.[283] Both Neale and the Mercersburg men despised the literalism that exalted a purely outward and mechanical approach to Christian symbolism and art. The contrast Nevin drew between prayer-book and sacramental conceptions of worship was similar to the contrast Neale drew between architecture as "catholick"[284] and architecture "as a means of livelihood". In both men, too, we can discern the influence of Platonist categories. Compare, for example, these two passages:

> Neale: ...we would allege that everything material is symbolical of some mental process, of which it is indeed only the development; that we may see in everything outward and visible some inward and spiritual meaning.[285]
>
> Nevin: Such is the connection in fact between nature and the supernatural, that where the power of seeing and feeling it has come to be properly awakened through the exercise of religious faith, the whole visible creation will be felt to be, not the outward symbol only, but in a profound sense the very sacramental presence of things unseen and eternal.[286]

In their view of symbolism and sacramentalism, Nevin and Schaff bear strong resemblances to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose symbolic theory also reveals traces of Platonism as interpreted, particularly, by the sixteenth century Cambridge divines.[287]

There is, however, one point of difference between Neale and the Mercersburg effort at reform that ought to be noted. Neale and other members of the Cambridge Camden Society claimed at least in the early days of the society's existence, that they were primarily concerned with bringing Anglicans back to their own proper and distinctive liturgical tradition.[288] They did not think of themselves as appealing to any tradition other than the written requirements of the Anglican rite itself, especially "as it existed in the second year of the reign of Edward the Sixth".[289] Nevin and Schaff, on the other hand, recognized the deficiencies of the German Reformed Church's historical liturgies. They even dared to criticize the revered Palatinate Liturgy of 1563. And they acknowledged quite openly that their intention, in proposing a reform of worship, was not to limit themselves to texts of the Reformation period, but to explore "the liturgical worship of the Primitive Church...

and the Liturgies of the Greek and Latin Churches".[290]

The Mercersburg movement was not, then, an effort to recover a distinctive German Reformed tradition from the past. Indeed, it was Nevin's and Schaff's refusal to rely on classical liturgies from the Reformation period that rankled men like J.H.A. Bomberger so deeply. Unlike Neale--and unlike the American Lutheran confessionalists Matthias Loy and Sigmund Fritschl[291]--the Mercersburg men were reluctant to identify "historical" (as applied to liturgy) with "sixteenth century". While they shared Neale's, Loy's and Fritschl's concern for Christian faith as visible, historical and symbolic (sacramental),[292] they did not think the German Reformed Church would be served by reconstructing a sixteenth century rite.

SUMMARY

It has been the purpose of this chapter to provide an interpretation of the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 that covers its theoretical foundations, its meaning precisely as a liturgical text, and its place within the framework of early and mid-nineteenth century liturgical reform movements. This investigation has required the exposition of a method appropriate for the analysis

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of texts generally and liturgical texts specifically. Following the lines suggested by Paul Ricoeur in his Interpretation Theory, I have tried to show that an adequate interpretation of the Mercersburg liturgical texts cannot limit itself simply to an historical or phraseological analysis. Rather, through a set of carefully delineated hermeneutical "moves", one must seek to comprehend the text as projecting and disclosing a "world"--a world in which the horizon of the original writer and the horizon of the reader meet and "fuse". This world--and not the original intention of the author--is what the text discloses. It was necessary, further, to extend Ricoeur's theory by noting that, in the case of liturgical texts, the language is tensive, metaphorical and thus "mythopoeic". Philip Wheelwright's theory of metaphoric tension was thus employed in order to help "read" the texts of the 1857 liturgy.

Finally, the chapter related the liturgical proposals of Mercersburg to other reform movements that were developing, particularly in Europe, during the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century. It was noticed that the hermeneutic of reform which Nevin and Schaff followed had several points in common with the work of

Johann Baptist Hirscher, Prosper Guéranger and John Mason Neale. All these movements of reform were characterized by a search for set forms of worship, for the principle of sacramentality (common ritual symbols) and for a way to combat the perils of subjectivism, whether that took the form of Gallican eccentricity (Guéranger), revivalism (Nevin), or rationalism (Schaff).

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the Mercersburg movement of liturgical reform was, as has been seen in chapter five, its rather carefully worked out anthropology and sacramental theory. Nevin and Schaff brought their brand of German idealist philosophy to bear not only upon the theological issues of man, incarnation, grace, church, and sacrament, but also upon their vision of worship. Like incarnation and church, the liturgy must obey the "law of inwardness": it must ever seek to incarnate itself in forms that are historical and visible. For as Nevin wrote in The Mystical Presence:

> To be real, the human, as such, and of course the divine also in human form, must ever externalize its inward life....This is the proper, deep sense of all liturgical services in religion.[293]

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1] This point has been discussed more fully in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[2] For a fuller analysis of this point, consult Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[3] John Nevin, *The Liturgical Question* (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1862). Hereafter this work will be cited as follows: Nevin, LQ, followed by the page reference. See also: *A Liturgy, or Order of Christian Worship*. Prepared and published by the direction and for the use of the German Reformed Church in the United States of America (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1858). Hereafter this work will be referred to as follows: PL (1857), followed by the page reference.

[4] See John Nevin, *The Mystical Presence and Other Writings on the Eucharist*, ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology, Vol. 4; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1966), p. 26. Hereafter this work will be cited as follows: Nevin, MP, followed by the page reference.

[5] The same principle is at work in John Nevin, *Vindication of the Revised Liturgy* (Philadelphia: Jas. B. Rodgers, 1867), but this work deals with the revised *Order of Worship* (1866). Hereafter references to this work of Nevin will be abbreviated as follows: Nevin, *Vindication*, followed by the page reference.

[6] Nevin, LQ, p. 1.

[7] Ibid., pp. 7, 11.

[8] Ibid., p. 21.

[9] Ibid., p. 23.

[10] For a more detailed discussion see Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[11] A detailed analysis of this point in Nevin's thinking appears in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[12] Nevin, LQ, p. 21.

[13] Ibid., p. 23.

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[14] Nevin, MP, p. 25; emphasis added.

[15] A further analysis and discussion of this point may be found in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

[16] For Nevin's use of "sacrament" as a term applied to the church, see his "Answer to Professor Dorner," Mercersburg Review 15 (1868), p. 626.

[17] A more detailed discussion of this point appears in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[18] Nevin, MP, p. 195.

[19] Nevin, LQ, p. 24.

[20] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," p. 582. For more detailed background on the debate between Dorner and Nevin, see: James I. Good, History of the Reformed Church in the U.S. in the Nineteenth Century (New York: The Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America, 1911), pp. 471-475. It should be noted, too, that there are explicit Platonic overtones in Nevin's conception of sacramentality. See his "Answer to Dorner," p. 625. We have also noticed the influence of Platonic thinking (via the sixteenth century Cambridge divines) in the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

[21] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," p. 600.

[22] Ibid., pp. 591-592.

[23] Ibid., p. 602.

[24] Ibid., pp. 602-613.

[25] Ibid., p. 605.

[26] A more detailed discussion of this point appears in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[27] See P. Parthenius Minges, Iohannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica, 2 Vols. (Ad Claras Aquas: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1930), Vol. 2, pp. 368-388.

[28] See John Nevin, "Human Freedom," in James Hastings Nichols, ed., The Mercersburg Theology (Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 291.

[29] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," pp. 612-613; emphasis added.

[30] See Karl Rahner, ed., Encyclopedia of Theology, trans. J. Cumming et al. (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 698-699. Elsewhere, Rahner speaks of the incarnation as the "fundamental dogma of Christianity." See Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," in Theological Investigations Vol. IV, trans. Kevyn Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), p. 113.

[31] See Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," in Theological Investigations Vol. IV, p. 239: "The humanity of Christ is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when God, expressing himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears which we call the humanity of the Logos....It follows from what has been said that the Logos, as Son of the Father, is truly, in his humanity as such, the revelatory symbol in which the Father enunciates himself, in this Son, to the world--revelatory, because the symbol renders present what is revealed."

[32] John Nevin, "The Theology of the New Liturgy," Mercersburg Review 14 (1867), pp. 43-44.

[33] Ibid., p. 44: "A theology which is truly Christocentric must follow the Creed, must be objective, must be historical; with this, must be churchly; and with this again, must be sacramental and liturgical."

[34] Nevin, MP, p. 178.

[35] A fuller discussion of this point appears in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[36] Nevin, "Theology of the New Liturgy," p. 23.

[37] For further discussion of this point, consult Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[38] Nevin, LQ, p. 11.

[39] Nevin, MP, p. 25.

[40] Nevin, LQ, p. 24.

[41] A more detailed analysis of this point occurs in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[42] Nevin, LQ, p. 24.

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[43] Ibid., p. 26.

[44] See James Hastings Nichols, Romanticism in American Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 106: "...he assumed a continuity between the sacrificing Roman mass priest and the Reformation minister of the Word and Sacraments. An indication of Nevin's insensitivity to issues on this side was his habitual use of the term altar, showing his unawareness of Reformation views about the difference between the Sacrament of the Holy Table and a propitiatory sacrifice at an altar."

[45] Nevin, MP, p. 263.

[46] As has been seen through our discussion in Chapter Five of this dissertation, this term is essential for grasping Nevin's thought about how a sacrament does what it does. Nichols fails to provide any analysis of the term.

[47] Nevin, MP, pp. 263-264, 178-179.

[48] Ibid., pp. 262-263.

[49] Ibid., p. 179: "It (the eucharist) is the sacrament of Christ's death."

[50] Nevin, LQ, pp. 27-28.

[51] Ibid., p. 28.

[52] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[53] A fuller discussion of this point appears in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[54] Nevin, LQ, pp. 29-30.

[55] Nevin, MF, p. 241, note.

[56] Ibid., p. 255, where Nevin speaks of the incarnation.

[57] Nevin, LQ, p. 32.

[58] Ibid., p. 33.

[59] Ibid. Nevin defended the place of gesture and posture in worship by appealing to the intrinsic unity of personal human life: "Such is the relation everywhere of inward and outward, in our human constitution. Soul and body, thought and word, are the natural and necessary complements of each other, in every sphere of our existence (LQ, p. 34). Note that here, once more, Nevin uses the anthropological argument.

[60] See John Henry Augustus Bomberger, Reformed, not Ritualistic (Philadelphia: Jas. B. Rodgers, 1867), pp. 95-109.

[61] See Herbert M.J. Klein, History of the Eastern Synod of the Reformed Church in the United States (Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1943), pp. 214-215. Hereafter this work will be cited as follows: Klein, HES, followed by the page reference.

[62] Bomberger, Reformed, not Ritualistic, p. 96. A bit later, Bomberger claimed that these responses manifested "an essential hostility to the historical cultus of the Reformed Church." "It is not only our privilege but our duty," Bomberger wrote, "to preserve and perpetuate our identity."

[63] Nevin, LQ, p. 35.

[64] Bomberger, Reformed, not Ritualistic, p. 107.

[65] Nevin, LQ, p. 68.

[66] Ibid., pp. 22-23, 71.

[67] A more detailed discussion of this point appears in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[68] In Chapter Two of this dissertation this issue is discussed at length.

[69] Consult Chapter Two of this dissertation for a more extended treatment of the subject.

[70] Philip Schaff, "Recollections of Neander," Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), p. 78.

[71] A more extended analysis of this topic is found in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[72] Consult Chapter Two of this dissertation for more detail.

[73] Nevin, LQ, p. 39.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Philip Schaff, What is Church History?, trans. John Nevin (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1846), p. 5. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as follows: Schaff, WCH, followed by the page reference.

[76] Consult Chapter Two of this dissertation for more detail.

[77] A more extended treatment of this subject appears in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

[78] See Philip Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, trans. Edward D. Yeomans (New York: Scribner, 1853), p. 91: "The right apprehending of the theory of development depends altogether on having beforehand a right view of positive Christianity, and being rooted and grounded in it, not only in thought but also in heart and experience."

[79] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[80] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[81] Ibid., p. 3.

[82] For a more extensive discussion of this point consult Chapter Three of this dissertation.

[83] John Nevin, "Catholicism," Mercersburg Review 3 (1851), p. 3.

[84] Nevin, LQ, pp. 34-35.

[85] Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, p. 73, pp. 114-115. See also Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," pp. 549-556; "The Theology of the New Liturgy," pp. 52-53.

[86] Consult Chapter Three of this dissertation for further detail.

[87] More details about this issue may be found in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[88] Nevin, "The Theology of the New Liturgy," pp. 57-63.

[89] Nevin, MP, p. 108, note.

[90] Nevin, LQ, pp. 17-21.

[91] Nevin, MP, p. 26.

[92] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 287-288.

[93] Philip Schaff, The Principle of Protestantism, ed. Bard Thompson and George Bricker (Lancaster Series on the Mercersburg Theology; Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1961), pp. 222 (thesis 17) and 229 (thesis 78). See also thesis 82 (p. 230): "Puseyism is to be viewed then as nothing more than a simple reaction, which has served to bring to light the evils of ultra-pseudo-Protestant individualism,

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but offers no remedy for it save the perilous alternative of falling back to a standpoint already surmounted in the way of religious progress." Hereafter, this work will be cited as follows: Schaff, PP, followed by the page reference.

[94] John Nevin, "Introduction," to Schaff, PP, pp. 50-51.

[95] Further discussion of this point may be found earlier in this chapter.

[96] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," p. 634.

[97] Nevin, LQ, p. 32.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Klein, HES, p. 222.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Further analysis may be found by consulting Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[102] See Jack M. Maxwell, Worship and Reformed Theology (Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, Number 10; Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1976), pp. 217-219. The "Family Prayers" seem to have involved the work of both Philip Schaff and Henry Harbaugh. Hereafter, Maxwell's work will be abbreviated as follows: WRT, followed by the page reference.

[103] See PL (1857), pp. 289-334.

[104] Ibid., pp. 289-312, 313-334.

[105] Ibid., p. 313: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to His abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away...." (Second Series, "Sunday Morning").

[106] Ibid., p. 325, pp. 318-319.

[107] Ibid., p. 299: the opening prayer for Wednesday Morning, First Series, makes use of Psalm 79 (80).

[108] Ibid., p. 289.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Klein, HES, p. 222; emphasis added.

[111] Nevin, LQ, p. 40.

[112] Ibid., pp. 41-42: "Liturgies, of course, were everywhere introduced; for no one thought then of a perfectly free worship. But the right auspices for their production were not at hand. The disposition to get away, as much as possible, from the outward usages of the Roman Church, was the cause of extreme views in the opposite direction."

[113] Klein, HES, p. 223 (report to the 1852 Synod at Baltimore.)

[114] Ibid.

[115] PL (1857), p. 202.

[116] Nevin, LQ, p. 57; emphasis added.

[117] For more detailed discussion of this point consult Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[118] Nevin, LQ, p. 64; emphasis added.

[119] Ibid., p. 65.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid.: "If the mind of the Church be not in fact prepared for the order of worship to which the Provisional Liturgy belongs, it is not to be imagined that it can be satisfied with its forms, merely by having them shorn of some of their peculiarities, and forced to take their place in a difference scheme of worship."

[122] Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 33-57. See also Maxwell, WRT, pp. 113-176.

[123] See the comments of Nichols, The Mercersburg Theology, pp. 260-263. See also the more detailed discussion of Maxwell, WRT, pp. 199-243.

[124] Maxwell, WRT, p. 213; pp. 227-236.

[125] See ibid., Appendix V, pp. 439-455, where Schaff's sources for the Communion Service are indicated by means of a color-coded system.

[126] Nevin, LQ, p. 1.

[127] Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976).

[128] See Paul Ricoeur, "Structure--Word--Event," Philosophy Today 12 (1968), pp. 114-129.

[129] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 12.

[130] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[131] The "sense" of meaning is "non-ostensive" and existential; the "reference" of meaning is "ostensive" and historical.

[132] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 12; emphasis added.

[133] Ibid., p. 23: a text is "discourse in a condition of inscription."

[134] Ibid., p. 29.

[135] Ibid., p. 30.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid., p. 32.

[138] The term "work" here is used in the sense of "works of art" or the "work" that is a musical composition.

[139] For an example of this approach to the interpretation of New Testament parables, see Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[140] Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching, pp. 87-90. There Perrin discusses the Matthean parables of the hidden treasure and the pearl. See also ibid., pp. 15-40, for a discussion of the criteria Perrin has used to establish the probable reconstruction of Jesus' (the original speaker's) teaching.

[141] This term ("sense") has been discussed earlier in this chapter.

[142] This point shows the significance of Ricoeur's concept of distantiation as it applies to the theory of interpretation. See Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distantiation," Philosophy Today 17 (1973), pp. 129-141.

[143] For further discussion of the dialectical relation between sense and reference in a text, consult the earlier portions of this chapter.

[144] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 37.

[145] Ibid.

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[146] Ibid., p. 88.

[147] Ibid., p. 94.

[148] See Paul Ricoeur, "The Symbol: Food for Thought," Philosophy Today 4 (1960), pp. 196-207.

[149] Maxwell, WRT, pp. 227-236. Nichols supplies useful information about the debate which the publication of the 1857 Liturgy initiated: see Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 281-307.

[150] For the text of the eucharistic prayer in Hippolytus, see Anton Hänggi and Irmgard Pahl, Prex Eucharistica (Spicilegium Friburgense, Vol. 12; Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1968), pp. 80-81. For the Latin text of Eucharistic Prayer II, see: The Sacramentary. Approved for Use in the Dioceses of the United States of America by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and Confirmed by the Apostolic See. English translation prepared by the International Commission on English in the Liturgy (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 1064-1065.

[151] See Carlo Braga, "De Novis Precibus Eucharisticis Linguae Latinae," Ephemerides Liturgicae 82 (1968), pp. 216-238.

[152] See George L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics (The Bampton Lectures for 1940; London: SPCK, 1963), pp. 23-43. See also Alois Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, trans. J.S. Bowden (London: Mowbrays, 1965), pp. 133-139.

[153] See Henricus Denzinger and Arnold Schönmetzer, eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Editio XXXIII; Rome: Herder, 1965), nos. 125-126. Hereafter, this work will be cited: DS, followed by the appropriate reference to the number(s).

[154] Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, p. 136.

[155] Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," p. 116: "If God wills to become non-God, man comes to be, that and nothing else."

[156] Hänggi and Pahl, Prex Eucharistica, p. 81.

[157] Ibid.

[158] Maxwell, WRT, pp. 227-236.

[159] Nichols, Romanticism, p. 303.

[160] Ibid., pp. 84-106.

[161] For further discussion, consult Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[162] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 291.

[163] Ibid., p. 295.

[164] For Nevin, law, taken in its most original sense, is an "idea" and thus manifests the characteristics of an idea: "The law...is of course an Idea, not an abstraction. It has in itself, accordingly, the two grand attributes of an Idea, universality and necessity." (Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 294).

[165] Nevin, "Human Freedom," p. 296.

[166] Ibid., p. 299.

[167] Nevin, MP, pp. 202-203.

[168] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," p. 625.

[169] For more detailed discussion consult Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[170] Nevin, MP, pp. 109-110; p. 184.

[171] Ibid., p. 184.

[172] See Roger Grainger, The Language of the Rite (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), pp. 5-23.

[173] See PL (1857), p. 189, where the final rubric of the service reads: "Then shall the congregation rise, and join in singing a Doxology or a short Hymn; after which the service shall be concluded with this Benediction: 'The God of peace, that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus...' "

[174] Maxwell, WRT, pp. 213, 219.

[175] PL (1857), pp. 183-189.

[176] Ibid., p. 183.

[177] PL (1857), pp. 27-28.

[178] Ibid., pp. 24-27.

[179] Ibid., p. 183.

[180] Ibid., p. 183: "Then a short Sermon may be preached, bearing on the general object of the service."

[181] Ibid., pp. 183-187.

[182] Ibid., pp. 187-188.

[183] Ibid., pp. 188-189.

[184] Ibid., p. 189.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ibid., pp. 190-202.

[187] Ibid., p. 190.

[188] Ibid., p. 190. The prayer is similar to the "collect for purity" in the *Book of Common Prayer*. See the discussion in Maxwell, WRT, pp. 227-228.

[189] PL (1857), pp. 190-192. The rubric directs: Then shall the minister pronounce slowly and solemnly, either the whole, or some part of the following selection of passages from the Holy Scriptures." The texts given are: Isaiah 53.4-7; John 1.29-34; John 3.14-17; I John 1.5-9; I John 4.9-10; John 15.4-5; John 6.51-58. This selection of Johannine texts is interesting in light of Nevin's comments on that gospel in MP, pp. 243-252.

[190] Ibid., p. 192. For the text of the *Gloria*, see p. 22; for the text of the *Te Deum*, see pp. 23-24; for the proper seasonal canticle, see the section entitled "Prayers for Festival Seasons" on pp. 148-182.

[191] Ibid., p. 192. For the lectionary of biblical readings and the proper collects see pp. 30-128. Notice that the gospel precedes the epistle in the order of service. For the "Festival Prayers" see pp. 148-182.

[192] Ibid., p. 192. The rubric directs that, in place of the sermon or homily, the "minister may...read a fit lesson of moderate length, taken from the Holy Gospels, on the history of Christ's passion and death."

[193] Ibid., p. 16, for the text of the Creed.

[194] Ibid., p. 192.

[195] PL (1857), pp. 192-194.

[196] Ibid., p. 194.

[197] Ibid., pp. 194-195.

[198] Ibid., pp. 195-200.

[199] Ibid., pp. 197-198. On the place of the eucharistic epiclesis in the Reformed tradition, see: William D. Maxwell, An Outline of Christian Worship (Rev. ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 124-125.

[200] PL (1857), p. 198. See the discussion of the anamnesis in Jack Maxwell, WRT, pp. 232-233.

[201] PL (1857), pp. 199-200.

[202] Ibid., p. 201. The blessings of the people by the minister and the rite of peace that follow are based on the Catholic Apostolic Liturgy. See Jack Maxwell, WRT, p. 234.

[203] PL (1857), p. 201.

[204] Jack Maxwell, WRT, pp. 199-205; 227-236; 435-437; 439-455.

[205] Ibid., p. 236.

[206] This point has been discussed in greater detail earlier in this chapter.

[207] Nevin, LQ, p. 64; emphasis added.

[208] PL (1857), pp. 187-188.

[209] Ibid., p. 187.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid., p. 194.

[212] Ibid.

[213] Ibid., p. 198.

[214] Philip Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain (Rev. ed.; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 21.

[215] Ibid.

[216] Ibid., p. 28; cf. pp. 73-100 for the characteristics of mythopoeic language.

[217] Ibid., p. 17.

[218] Ibid., p. 28.

[219] Ibid., p. 102.

[220] See Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 17: steno-language is "the limit toward which language tends as its connotative fulness and tensive aliveness diminish."

[221] Ibid., p. 46; emphasis added.

[222] Ibid., p. 47. In this passage, Wheelwright uses liturgical word and gesture to exemplify his point about the tensive quality of mythopoeic language.

[223] Wheelwright, The Burning Fountain, pp. 122-123.

[224] Ibid.

[225] PL (1857), p. 187.

[226] Ibid., pp. 188-189.

[227] Ibid., p. 194.

[228] Ibid., pp. 194-195.

[229] Ibid., pp. 187-188.

[230] Ibid., p. 188.

[231] Ibid., p. 196.

[232] Ibid., p. 194.

[233] Ibid., p. 200; the quotation is from the eucharistic prayer.

[234] Nevin, MP, pp. 202-203.

[235] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 294-301.

[236] Nevin, MP, p. 160.

[237] Ibid., p. 163.

[238] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[239] PL (1857), p. 196.

[240] On the ethical implications of Calvin's Christological doctrine see E. David Willis, Calvin's Catholic Christology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), pp. 132-152.

[241] Nevin, "Human Freedom," pp. 299-300.

[242] A fuller discussion is found earlier in this chapter.

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[243] PL (1857), p. 200.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Ibid., p. 185. See the exhortation in the rite of preparation for the Holy Communion.

[246] Ibid., p. 187. See the confession of sin in the rite of preparation for the Holy Communion.

[247] Ibid. Cf. p. 194, the confession of sins in the Communion Service proper.

[248] Ibid., p. 194.

[249] Ibid., p. 185.

[250] Ibid., pp. 186, 193, where the minister exhorts those who intend to communicate to "be in perfect charity with all men."

[251] Nevin, MP, pp. 202-203.

[252] PL (1857), p. 185.

[253] For a discussion of Nevin's view about the relation between the incarnation and the abiding presence of the Spirit in humanity, see Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[254] PL (1857), p. 193.

[255] Ibid., p. 194.

[256] Ibid., p. 197.

[257] Ibid., p. 200.

[258] Maxwell, WRT, p. 232.

[259] PL (1857), pp. 197-198.

[260] A fuller discussion of this point may be found in Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[261] PL (1857), p. 198.

[262] Nevin, MP, p. 184.

[263] PL (1857), p. 201.

[264] Nevin, MP, p. 203.

[265] Ibid., p. 160.

[266] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 93.

[267] Klein, HES, p. 222.

[268] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 93.

[269] A fuller discussion of this point may be found in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

[270] Schaff, PP, p. 84.

[271] For more detailed analysis see the discussion earlier in this chapter.

[272] Further details may be found in Maxwell, WRT, pp. 323-370. See also Nichols, Romanticism, pp. 281-307.

[273] For a more detailed examination of this issue see Chapter Five of this dissertation.

[274] Nevin, LQ, p. 65.

[275] Ibid., p. 66.

[276] Ibid.

[277] Ibid.

[278] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Schaff, PP, pp. 226-227.

[281] Ibid.

[282] Nevin, LQ, p. 21.

[283] Ibid.

[284] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[285] John Mason Neale, The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments (Leeds: T.W. Green, 1843), p. li.

[286] Nevin, "Answer to Dorner," p. 625.

[287] Ibid.

[288] Ibid., p. 626.

[289] Ibid.

[290] Klein, HES, p. 221.

[291] Ibid., pp. 222-223.

[292] Ibid.

[293] Nevin, MP, p. 26.

CONCLUSION

Our investigation of church, eucharist and liturgical reform at Mercersburg during the period from 1843 until 1857 permits us to draw a number of conclusions. As part of a larger "theological awakening" that occurred in the nineteenth century, the Mercersburg movement reveals both an indebtedness to theological trends in Europe and an independent creativity of its own. The concluding remarks that follow underscore the distinctive contributions made by Nevin and Schaff to the development of Reformed theology in nineteenth century America.

Nevin and Schaff worked in a situation of theological pluralism. This pluralism was both European and American. On the European side, Schaff's own educational background at Halle, Tübingen and Berlin confronted him with a variety of theological programs and methods: evangelical pietism; "rationalist" higher criticism; and the more moderate "right-wing Hegelianism" that stressed the principle of organic development in doctrine and church life, while it honored the traditional theological formulations of orthodoxy. Schaff's reaction to this theological pluralism seems to have remained ambivalent, at least during his years at Mercersburg. On the one hand, Schaff maintained his affection for August Neander's pietist motto: "Pectus est quod theologum facit." On the other hand, Schaff was critical of Neander's failure to recognize the objective character of Christianity and the church, as well as his failure to admit the progressive, evolutionary nature of doctrinal development. For all his attacks against F. C. Baur and the Tübingen "rationalists", Schaff admitted the surpassing value of their notion of historical development. And indeed, this notion of organic development colored Schaff's own assessment of church history in such early works as What is Church History? (1846) and the introductory essay in The History of the Apostolic Church (1851).

On the American side, Nevin and Schaff found themselves faced with a situation of religious pluralism that they could only regard as unwholesomely sectarian. The bete noire identified in Nevin's The Anxious Bench (1843) was "revivalism". But this revivalism, according to Nevin's account of it, was a many-headed beast. It had even infiltrated the "German Zion" (the German Reformed Church in America) and was the sad legacy bequeathed by departure from the "objective church system" of the Heidelberg Catechism. Such sectarianism was, in Nevin's view, even more dangerous to "objective", "churchly" Christianity than Romanism or heathenism.

The Mercersburg movement reacted to this two-fold pluralism (European and American) in two ways. First, Nevin and Schaff appealed for a revitalization of the fundamental doctrines of church and sacraments. Although they defended this appeal by constant references to the traditions of the Heidelberg Cathechism and the theology of Calvin's Institutes, it is clear that Nevin and Schaff were asking for something more than a return to the theological resources of the sixteenth century. Nevin identified this "something more" as "catholic wholeness" or "radical catholicity": the gradual interior transformation of humanity, nature and history in the new creation already introduced into the world in the person of Christ. As I have argued, especially in Chapter Five, Nevin supported his vision of catholic wholeness by developing an anthropology in The Mystical Presence that was indebted to post-Kantian idealist thought. In this sense, Nevin's major work on the eucharist is more important for the anthropology which it implies than it is for its criticisms of Calvin's "pneumatological solution" to the question of Christ's presence in the Holy Supper. For his part, Schaff contributed to the "catholic hermeneutic" at Mercersburg by adopting a version of Baur's notion of organic development that was modified by the pietist historiography of August Neander. Taken together, these two notions--Nevin's "idealist" anthropology and Schaff's developmental theory of doctrine and church life--constitute the first stage of the Mercersburg reaction to the theological and sectarian pluralism they encountered in Europe and America.

The second stage of the Mercersburg reaction to pluralism emerges in the work that led to the publication of the Provisional Liturgy in 1857. Here too, the ambivalence noticed in Schaff's reaction to the conflict between historical criticism and traditional orthodoxy is evident. On the one hand, the Mercersburg men seem to have shared the concern of a Roman Catholic liturgical reformer like Prosper Guéranger, who sought "common ritual symbols" that would insure the integrity of faith in a culture plagued by subjectivism on national and personal levels. On the other hand, both Nevin and Schaff were concerned to preserve the Reformation heritage of freedom in worship--a theme noticed in Chapter Four, where the liturgical work of nineteenth-century Lutherans like Matthias Loy and Sigmund Fritschel has been discussed.

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Thus, despite their affection for set patterns and "classical" forms of Christian worship, Nevin and Schaff were not insensitive to the pastoral needs of German Reformed Christians in America. After writing pages of passionate defense in The Liturgical Question (1862), Nevin's conclusion was: "Let the people decide!" It was Nevin's hope, one shared by Schaff, that the objective and "churchly" expressions of the Provisional Liturgy would, if used consistently by the people, triumph over the subjective eccentricities of sectarian pluralism and the "free prayer" tradition.

But the Mercersburg theologians did more than react to their immediate situation of theological and sectarian pluralism. This dissertation has attempted to show that seminary scholars like John Nevin were also thinkers of considerable originality. Nevin's originality as a theologian is particularly evident in The Mystical Presence. This work is perhaps more important for its implied anthropology than for its eucharistic theology. By reinterpreting the traditional Christian doctrines of creation, Christ, church and sacrament according to a "law of inwardness" (Chapter Five), Nevin found a way to provide firm anthropological footing for his convictions about the real, historical objectivity of Christ's grace and presence in the Lord's Supper. Moreover, through his theory of the "sacramental transaction", Nevin offered an innovative solution to an obstacle that commonly afflicts eucharistic theology: the apparently irreconcilable conflict between what is "symbolic" and what is "real". As argued in Chapter Five, Nevin's notion of the sacramental transaction permitted him to affirm that the presence of Christ is objectively disclosed and really offered to believers in the physical transactions of eating and drinking--precisely as these transactions "trigger" a movement into the symbolic "depth" (the "opaque intentionality") of the sacrament. These two positions--an idealist anthropology and a transactional view of sacramental symbolism--allowed Nevin to overcome the problems inherent in certain Roman understandings of physical presence in the eucharist and, at the same time, to "correct" the anthropology and the pneumatological realism of John Calvin's eucharistic doctrine.

Finally, this study has shown that in the *Provisional Liturgy* of 1857, Schaff's organic conception of ecclesiology and church history, as well as Nevin's transactional view of sacramental symbolism, are clearly at work. Despite the fact that the liturgy of 1857 borrows freely from sources like the Book of Common Prayer and the Catholic Apostolic liturgy, there is a great deal of originality in the Mercersburg proposals for liturgical reform. Indeed, as indicated in Chapter Six, an historical investigation of the sources used by Schaff and others in the texts of the 1857 liturgy is ultimately insufficient for interpreting the full meaning of those texts. This has been my chief criticism of the earlier analyses of the Mercersburg liturgical material offered by James Hastings Nichols and Jack Martin Maxwell. A hermeneutic for interpreting liturgical texts must accompany the efforts of those who study the historical and literary sources of worship. Such a hermeneutic I have attempted to outline in the final chapter of this dissertation by appealing to the work of a contemporary French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur.

This study of church, eucharist and liturgical reform at Mercersburg has, therefore, raised issues of contemporary relevance for the student of Christian worship. Our discussion of the "hermeneutics of reform" in the nineteenth century (Chapter Four) has implications for our assessment of similar reform movements in the twentieth. Similarly, our analysis of the structure and content of the Provisional Liturgy of 1857 (Chapter Six) has raised broader

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questions about the appropriate hermeneutical method to be employed in the analysis of _any_ liturgical text.

Although the conclusions of this study are modest, they reveal both the profit and the continuing need for examining the work of theologians and liturgists of the last century. Many of the questions debated by Christian theologians today--the "pluralist context" of theology; theological anthropology; method and hermeneutics; the nature of symbolic discourse; the possibility of authentic religious knowledge--were raised, if not satisfactorily answered, by nineteenth-century thinkers. It is my hope that the present study will whet the appetite of those who want to learn more about the movements and the people who laid the groundwork for the theological and liturgical questions we find so intriguing today.

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